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If any would not work, neither should he eat. 
New Testament 
Work is that human activity which expresses creative achievement and 
corresponds, therefore, to part of desire, our will to objectivate 
ourselves individually and collectively by creating objects or 
social relations. 
If work was liberated from its instrumental character, we might 
discover how to resolve the leisure problem. When time becomes 
unbounded, moral decay does not necessarily follow. But, having been 
formed in a society in which work as a defining activity is completely 
recorded as labor, most people are left defenseless by free time, 
thrown to the twins of buying and eating. 
We must "work" to create, quite intentionally, new forms of social 
life in order to reinvent a politics in which individuals are truely 
empowered. 
Stanley Aronowitz 
What has divided...different ideologies has not been the goal (an 
Enlightenment vision of the free; prosperous citizen) but the means 
of reaching the goal. In basic income it seems possible they could 
agree on at least one of the means. 
Tony Walter 
It is always possible to distinguish between the just and the unjust, 
the legitimate and the illegitimate, but this can only be done from 
within a given tradition, with the help of standards that this 
tradition provides; in fact, there is no point of view external to all 
tradition from which one can offer a universal judgement. 
In politics the public interest is always a matter of debate and a 
final agreement can never be reached; to imagine such a situation is 
to dream of a society without politics. 
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Though it is not at the centre of political attention, Citizen's 
Income (CI) receives the kind of widespread ideological support 
which most other proposals in the areas of labour market and social 
security reform do not. Given the breadth of such support, the 
objective of this research is to improve our understanding of why 
various ideologies get involved in the CI debate, and of how their 
differing contributions to that debate produce ideological variants 
of CI. 
Chapter 1 introduces us both to the debate and to this thesis, while 
chapter 2 outlines the principal ideologies with which the thesis 
deals. Chapters 3 to 5 then address those subjects - citizenship, 
work, full employment - which are at the heart of disagreements over 
benefit reform, since it is here that ideological distinctions 
relevant to the welfare state begin to be made. This approach allows 
us to formulate those principles which our varying ideologies would 
have a CI serve. Chapter 6 then examines Negative Income Tax as that 
form of CI most likely to be supported by economic liberals. Chapter 
7 analyses why social democrats are attracted to the principle of 
social insurance, and why this might lead them to support a 
combination of CI and insurance benefits, i.e. a Participation 
Income. Chapter 8 looks at the importance of a social dividend to any 
market socialist strategy, and chapters 9 and 10 examine, 
respectively, ecological and feminist justifications for CI. 
In the concluding chapter, I argue that the widespread ideological 
support for CI is largely of a negative kind, i.e. a series of 
distinct but complementary reactions to the failures of non- 
integrated tax and benefit systems. Should CI enter the mainstream 
of policy -making debates then this consensus might well break down, 
since disagreements over the generosity and the (un)conditionality 




1. The Subject of the Research 
Theorists are still struggling to digest the political changes of 
the last two decades. The 1970s saw the Centre -Left on the defensive 
and in retreat against an ever more confident New Right. The 1980s 
saw the New Right's economic and social philosophy influence 
governments, including those of the Left, across the world, and it 
was in Britain, more than any other European nation, that this 
influence was at its height. As such, it was in Britain that the 
Centre -Left came under greatest attack. Whether or not there was 
anything that could be termed a Thatcherite Revolution, the 
Conservative Party's intention was to sweep away up to a century's 
legislation on various industrial and social issues. Through all of 
the various debates and altercations it is upon the welfare state, 
more than upon any other comparable subject, that the most essential 
and bitter controversies between political ideologies have been 
focused. 
Those controversies centre upon a single question: what is the 
nature and function of welfare in a modern economy? The New Right 
critique was unrelenting. The welfare state, they insisted, soaks up 
national wealth and saps private initiative and responsibility. At 
best, it has been a necessary evil whose time is passed and which 
should, therefore, be reduced to an absolute minimum. In response, 
the Centre -Left argued that the welfare state serves those ethical 
values which any society proclaiming itself to be a civilized one 
must embody. Furthermore, it promotes, rather than disables, 
economic efficiency by reducing the social costs produced by a market 
economy. Claim and counter -claim have shot to and fro for twenty 
years now. The passion and the frustration which have been generated 
is considerable and it is often difficult to agree on even the most 
basic data, e.g. the level of unemployment. 
1 
Perhaps the greatest amount of agreement has surrounded the 
social security system, even if such agreement has largely been of a 
negative kind. Very few people do not see the need for reform of some 
sort. For the Left, the system is still not equitable to a sufficient 
extent; for the Right, it is an obstacle to economic efficiency and 
enterprise. Yet both sides face considerable dilemmas when it comes 
to consideration of reform. The Left wishes benefits to be broadly 
universal but is frightened by how expensive such a system might turn 
out to be. The Right wishes benefits to be selective but is wary of 
harming those transfers, i.e. tax reliefs and allowances, which go to 
a lot of relatively prosperous voters. Out of the many assumptions 
with which Beveridge worked two seem to be of direct relevance to the 
contemporary dilemmas with which both Left and Right are struggling. 
Firstly, he assumed that full -time full employment could be 
maintained; benefits, therefore, only needed to be thought of as 
temporary replacements for wages in the achievement of a national 
minimum, as suggested by Rowntree. Secondly, he assumed that most 
women did not work most of the time and so could be treated as 
dependants of their husbands. Obviously, these assumptions no 
longer describe present realities. Furthermore, when the social 
security system was given its Beveridgean, post -war form most of the 
people receiving benefit did not pay tax and most who paid tax did not 
receive benefit also. This, too, is no longer the case. There are, 
then, two central questions which all of those interested in social 
security must ask. Firstly, how do we make the benefit and tax 
systems work with, rather than against, each other? Secondly, how do 
we make benefits more responsive to the viscissitudes of today's 
labour market, a market within which woman play a greater role than 
ever? 
Generally speaking, there are three strategies that can be 
adopted, though these strategies overlap to a considerable extent 
and numerous combinations of them can be imagined - indeed, this 
thesis will concern itself with several such combinations. The first 
strategy corresponds to the policies of Tory governments since 1979, 
namely, cut back on benefit levels across the board, tighten up on the 
rules governing entitlements and phase in more means- tested 
benefits. Also, perhaps, introduce some kind of de facto workfare 
system quietly and gradually. The New Right, then, favour a 
'selectivist option. The second strategy, meanwhile, is what might 
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be termed 'strategic co- ordination'. This would basically involve 
making benefits more flexible, and therefore more compatible with 
fluctuating earnings, and making contributions easier to 
accumulate. In this thesis strategic co- ordination will be referred 
to as 'New Beveridge', a universalist and broadly social democratic 
approach, which was the preferred strategy of the Social Justice 
Commission and which is likely to influence the policies of any 
future Labour government. The third strategy is one of 'structural 
integration'. In its purest form this implies fusing the tax and 
social security systems completely and paying an unconditional 
weekly income to every man, woman and child on an individual basis 
regardless of work record, work status or marital status. This 
option is universalist, but is one which takes the principle of 
uncondit Tonal ity to be just as important. The history of structural 
integration is long and sometimes dramatic. In Europe, at the 
moment, structural integration goes under the name of Basic Income. 
In Britain, it is now more often referred to as Citizen's Income (CI) . 
CI is the main subject of this thesis. 
So, this research project is focused upon the third of these 
strategies though, as I have indicated and as we will be seeing, 
several combinations of the three may exist. Firstly, structural 
integration may overlap with the New Right approach. This produces a 
form of CI known as Negative Income Tax (NIT). Secondly, structural 
integration may overlap with the New Beveridge strategy and so 
produce a form of CI known as Participation Income. NIT will be 
dealt with in chapter 6 and Participation Income in chapter 7. 
Alternatively, we may prefer that structural integration does not 
overlap with the other two strategies at all. This produces the 
'purest' form of CI, one which is entirely unconditional. There is 
one version of this pure form which is revenue -neutral, what will be 
referred to as a partial CI, and one which is not, i.e. a full CI which 
would provide quite a substantial income. One way in which such a 
full CI might be funded is through a 'social dividend' and we will 
examine this in chapter 8. 
Now there are three alleged benefits which the introduction of a 
purely unconditional income would provide: 
1) it would enhance the autonomy of individuals by freeing them from 
the welfare state's bureaucratic machinery and by supplying many 
with an independent income for the first time ever; 
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2) it would reduce, though not on its own eliminate, poverty traps by 
an amount greater than any other reform proposal, thus generating 
employment and economic activity; 
3) it would enhance social equality and solidarity both in terms of 
its redistributive efficacy and in its subversion of the distinction 
between taxpayer and recipient. 
Yet there are, critics allege, three serious defects with CI: 
1) paying an income to each and every citizen would either be 
prohibitively expensive or, if it were to be affordable, CI levels 
would be so low as to be useless; 
2) reform of this magnitude lacks feasibility because it would either 
require an unrealistically large consensus between political 
parties or the determination of a single government beyond anything 
previously witnessed; 
3) either CI would have a negative effect on work incentives or, at 
best, the effect is not now predictable, in which case CI is a high - 
risk strategy which it would be reckless to take. 
This thesis is not going to deal systematically with the various pros 
and cons since there are introductions to CI which already do so 
(Jordan, 1987; Walter, 1989; Parker, 1989; Hill, 1990; Van Parijs, 
1992a & 1995). What, then, is the point of this research? 
There are two broad ways of approaching any major, untried, reform 
proposal: through questions of feasibility or through questions of 
desirability. By 'feasibility' reference is being made to costings, 
incentives -effects and so forth. It is such questions which inspire 
some CI proponents to observe the ability of a non -earnings -related 
income guarantee to allow wages to fall to market -clearing levels, 
thus creating employment, and critics to charge that with CI there 
would be a mass exodus from the labour market, thus undermining its 
sustainability. Feasibility is the principal concern of economists. 
By 'desirability' reference is made to such issues as whether any 
transfer system should be conditional or not, the relation between 
liberty and equality and the ethical basis of welfare provision. 
Desirability is the principal concern of moral, political and social 
philosophers. 
Admittedly, even at this general level, such a distinction is 
rather forced. The desirability of a reform proposal which simply 
lacked feasibility would not be worth considering, while something 
completely undesirable would not be worth the attention of 
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economists. Nevertheless, the distinction remains and is reflected 
in the CI literature. Now, this thesis is going to be concerned 
primarily with questions of desirability. It will attempt to offer a 
distinctive approach to such questions by engaging with the debate's 
ideological dimensions, rather than with the standard philosophical 
angles, both moral and political, which are dealt with in the texts 
referred to above. To explain why this approach is justified we must 
now delve into the history of CI proposals and appreciate the state of 
the current debate. 
2. The History of the Debate 
What I want to suggest is that, over the last fifty years, the 
appeal of CI has waxed and waned depending upon the nature and 
efficacy of the prevailing orthodoxies of economic and social 
policy. Early versions of CI made an appearance in debates which 
challenged the hegemony of market capitalism, as we shall see in 
chapter 8. Yet the popularity of CI, or the lack of it, must be seen 
in terms of the post -war synthesis of Keynesian and Beveridgean 
policies. Let us look first at economic policy. 
Immediately after the First World War the social credit proposals 
of C.H. Douglas (1974) attracted a great deal of attention and 
support. It was Douglas's contention, given his experiences as an 
engineer in the war, that technological innovation in the twentieth 
century would both depress the demand for labour and drive wages 
down. The cumulative effect of this would be to undermine aggregate 
demand and so threaten the circulation of income and goods upon which 
a capitalist economy depended. As a solution Douglas proposed a 
social credit scheme. This would have involved government paying a 
dividend of £5 per month - a third of average earnings at that time - 
to every household. Such a dividend, he believed, could be financed 
by increasing the money supply which would be acceptable given that, 
in the absence of bouyant consumer spending, the very economic fabric 
of capitalism was at risk. 
Exactly why Douglas's ideas, which were quite popular at one time, 
never influenced government policy is difficult to say. Perhaps it 
is the case that paying an unconditional income would have threatened 
too many vested economic interests, especially those of the banks 
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with their monopoly on the lending of capital. But if Douglas's 
proposals offended classical economics, they were equally 
unacceptable to Keynesians. Keynes goes so far as to mention Douglas 
in The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1954). 
Douglas receives some small applause for touching on demand 
management, unlike Marshall or Pigou (1954, 32), but Keynes accuses 
him of relying upon "...hypotheses inappropriate to the facts" 
(1954, 371) , though why this is so is not spelt out. If Keynes chose 
to regard Douglas as a halfway house between classical economics and 
his own, then history would seem to be in agreement. Douglas sank 
into obscurity though social credit parties achieved some 
prominence, and electoral success, in Canada (Macpherson, 1962a). 
This early version of CI, therefore, was eclipsed by what had become 
the new economic orthodoxy by the Second World War. A similar defeat 
in the area of social policy was to follow. 
The principle of social insurance will be dealt with more closely 
in chapter 7. For now it is enough to note that the guaranteed income 
scheme which most closely resembles the proposals of the present 
day's Citizen's Income Study Centre dates back to 1943. In that year 
Juliet Rhys Williams ( 1943, 141 -8) advocated a New Social Contract as 
an alternative to the Beveridge Report. The Beveridge proposals, she 
claimed, would reward the idle and penalize the industrious, thus 
undermining the single greatest motive for labouring, i.e. the 
desire for gain. As the will to work drained away the state direction 
of labour would be required. If this concern of Rhys Williams with 
voluntary unemployment makes her seem somewhat draconian, she is 
more generous when castigating the report for not adequately 
safeguarding women and children against poverty. Her proposal was 
for a social contract rather than a dole. Through such a contract, 
complete with signatories, the state would acknowledge a duty of 
maintaining all individuals at all times, "...ensuring for them the 
necessities of a healthy life..." and, equally, adults would 
acknowledge a duty to contribute to the " ...production of the wealth 
whereby alone the welfare of the community can be maintained..." 
(1943, 141 -8). On signing the social contract, therefore, 
individuals would be subject to a work test; and yet, at the same 
time, each signatory would be entitled to a weekly payment which, 
according to Hermione Parker (1989, 122), would have left a married 
couple considerably better off than under Beveridge. Woman would no 
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longer be treated as dependents and a child allowance would be paid as 
of right, not out of charity. 
But, like Douglas's before them, these ideas did not filter 
through to the policy- making process. Probably because it 
emphasized social insurance, and so represented a greater continuity 
with the past, the Beveridge Report overwhelmingly won the day. So, 
CI had now been defeated on two fronts (not that the contest had ever 
really been an equal one anyway): by the new economic orthodoxy of 
Keynesianism and by the new social policy orthodoxy of Beveridgean 
social insurance. As post -war reconstruction married the two 
together on what was to be a thirty year reign, CI slipped onto the 
margins of mainstream debate. 
This is not to imply that it sank simply into obscurity. Brandon 
Rhys Williams (1967; 1989) - a Conservative M.P., unlike his mother 
who had been a Liberal peer - picked up on and modified the idea of a 
guaranteed minimum income and James Meade (1948; 1972) has made 
considerable room for CI in his New Keynesianism. Furthermore, 
Milton Friedman (1962) became familiar with Rhys Williams's 
proposals during the war and, back in America, formulated NIT on the 
basis of them. Under the influence of Friedman's ideas NIT gained 
popularity in America and Richard Nixon almost succeeded in 
introducing a variant of it in his Family Assistance Plan of 1969 
(Moynihan, 1973, 113 -228). Similarly, Edward Heath's tax credit 
scheme of 1972 could easily have became a reality - see chapter 6. 
More recently, Basic Income was looked on favourably by a 
subcommittee of the Treasury and Civil Service Committee's 1983 
inquiry into income tax and income support; also, Green parties have 
seized on CI as an environmentally -benign proposal - see chapter 9 - 
and the Liberal Democrats had CI in their 1992 general election 
manifesto. What is more, interest in CI has grown in many other 
countries (Parker, 1989, 100 -1) . So CI, far from lying dormant in the 
post -war era, has, in certain respects, flourished. Yet I would 
still like to suggest that despite this interest we should regard 
this period as one which was not favourable to CI since it was still 
expected to fit into the framework established by the Keynes - 
Beveridge policy agenda rather than being able to dominate economic 
and social policy all on its own - as it might have done had Douglas 
and Rhys Williams been able to wield more influence. While the 
Keynes- Beveridge agenda reigned, therefore, CI remained of 
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little importance. We should not be surprised to find that as the 
former has waned, debate surrounding the latter has re- ignited. 
For in the 1980s this is precisely what happened. The New Right 
assault on both post -war economics and social policy opened up a 
space within which CI ideas could re- emerge. Since the 1970s, the 
British New Right has felt able to contemplate a reform to the social 
security system which would have means- tested benefits providing a 
guaranteed minmimum: NIT. Meanwhile, those alarmed by the New Right 
success have had to re -group and re- think. Did this mean continuing 
to value old principles and proposals or trying something new? One 
way or another, the more intelligent responses to this question have 
admitted that insurance and assistance benefits cannot continue in 
their current form, and it is this realization which has allowed CI to 
come back onto the agenda. Half a century ago the Keynes- Beveridge 
approach prevailed over CI, but now that that approach is in doubt 
CI's relevance to contemporary problems has grown. For this reason 
the basic CI idea attracts support from across the political 
spectrum. This means that not only do CI advocates bring a diversity 
of moral and social perspectives to the debate but, in so doing, they 
also bring disagreements over the purpose of CI and the kind of 
society within which it might operate. 
So the evolving debate since the early 1980s has partly been 
internal - between CI advocates - and partly external - between 
advocates and those who reject CI, for whatever reason. This 
research, as a consequence, will touch on both the internal and 
external aspects of the debate. Yet I have still not said why I am 
primarily addressing questions of desirability. To answer this we 
need to understand something of the state of the current debate. 
There are three areas on which I will now focus: the Fowler reforms; 
partial and full CIs; the Liberal Democrats abandonment of CI. 
As already noted, the CI debate revived in the 1980s because of the 
assault on the Keynes- Beveridge agenda and because many believed 
that a simple return to that agenda would not be possible and perhaps 
not even desirable. But what inspired the debate from that point on? 
In certain respects it was the Fowler reforms which did so. In 1984 
Norman Fowler, then Secretary of State for Social Services, 
announced a review of a social security system which, by then, 
satisfied virtually nobody. The Green Paper of June 1985 announced 
itself as the "...most fundamental examination of our 
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social security system since the Second World War" (DHSS, 1985a, 1) . 
From the start, however, it was clear that this was hyperbole. The 
Green Paper proceeds by dividing up the various areas of social 
security and deals with each one separately: pensions; supplementary 
benefit; housing benefit; family .support; maternity, death and 
widows' benefits. What this 'divide and rule' strategy demonstrates 
is that a fundamental examination was the one thing that was not going 
to occur since, by working according to the existing, fragmented and 
incoherent system, the Green Paper rendered itself incapable of 
questioning the very principles and assumptions with which Beveridge 
had worked. For instance, in reviewing the history of supplementary 
benefit it concludes by stating: 
It is clear that no reform has found a satisfactory answer to the 
continuing problem of running a major scheme of social 
assistance. (DHSS, 1985b, 12) 
But any suggestion that social assistance itself was a long - 
discredited form of provision is not considered. The White Paper of 
December 1985 confirmed that the government' s rhetoric - "The need is 
not for trimming but for proper reform" (DHSS, 1985c, 1) - would not 
be matched by its recommendations. Indeed, even as a pragmatist's 
text it fails, e.g. it calls for sensible co- operation between the 
social security and tax systems, but nowhere deals with the latter. 
By calling for schemes like Family Credit and a Social Fund, the White 
Paper revealed that its reluctance to engage with deep -seated reform 
was due to the New Right agenda implicit with it. The reforms were 
passed by Parliament in 1986 and implemented fully by 1988. 
Now how did CI advocates respond? The initial response was to 
denounce the lack of economic flesh on the report's bare bones. It 
disagreed with Fowler that it was the underlying principles, rather 
than detailed costings, which were of primary importance: 
...the arithmetic is all- important, not just because of the 
distributional effects but also because all systems and all 
proposed new systems tend to throw up unintended consequences. 
(BIRG, 1985, 1) 
This was followed up by a quantitative analysis of the Fowler reforms 
which claimed that they would make the poorest poorer and cut 
disposable incomes from lower paid work (BIRG, 1986, 12 -17). So the 
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emphasis was very much on proving the viability of CI against those 
who would dismiss it as unworkable and perhaps thereby give support 
to the kind of piecemeal approach which characterized the Fowler 
reforms. Indeed, Parker (1989, 3) viewed her own research on tax and 
social security as taking up where Fowler left off, as being 
concerned with causes, not symptoms. Now, in the context of the 
debate in the mid -1980s this seems reasonable and sensible, 
especially given the social and economic circumstances to which the 
debate itself was attempting to respond. What I am going to suggest, 
though, is that the - debate, and the debate's context, has changed 
largely due to the initial emphasis on feasibility. Questions of 
feasibility must continue to be asked, re- examined and publicized of 
course but, once firmly established as they now are, should be 
regarded as a shell which is very much dependent upon a more 
fundamental, internal core which concerns itself with questions of 
desirability. 
So it was the inadequacies of the Fowler reforms which inspired 
much of the systematic work on CI which was subsequently done. 
Parker's Instead of the Dole (1989) seems to be the first work which 
makes a distinction between a partial CI (PCI) and a full CI (FCI). 
This is the single most important distinction which the economic 
analyses have made since it attempts to head off any objection which 
says that CI is unrealistic because it would 'cost too much' . By a 
PCI Parker refers to a guaranteed, unconditional income which would, 
broadly speaking, be revenue -neutral. It would not in itself provide 
enough to live on without being supplemented by wages or conditional 
benefits - at 1994 levels it would have represented about £36 per week 
- but would undoubtedly reduce poverty traps considerably. By a FCI 
is meant a guaranteed income which would be enough to live on, e.g. 
about a third of average earnings, which at 1994 levels would have 
provided about £115 per week. Now the distinction has to be made 
because Parker (1989, 110 -1) costed a such a FCI as requiring a tax 
rate on all other income of at least 70 %. This would, if anything, 
institutionalize poverty and the poverty trap. A PCI, meanwhile, by 
aiming to be neutral with respect to existing expenditure on social 
security and tax allowances avoids the kind of incredulous response 
which a 70% tax rate elicits. 
This does not mean that Parker's proposal for a PCI is 
uncontroversial, of course. For instance, why not aim for a FCI which 
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provides less than a third of average earnings and so might lie within 
the realms of feasibility when it comes to the consequent taxation 
rate? Also, David Purdy (1994, 42) makes the point that a PCI could 
be taken to imply the equivalent of a FCI paid to a section of the 
population, i.e. the poorest. This, though, might be to retain 
stringent conditions on eligibility. Furthermore, Meghnad Desai 
(1995, 7 -8) has written of the feasibility of a revenue -neutral CI of 
£50 -£60 per week. This, however, would eliminate all kinds of 
conditional, supplementary benefits and ignores the possibility 
that income- testing is sometimes the best way of getting resources to 
those who need them the most. At the same time, of course, Parker's 
PCI raises questions as to whether it is too low to be efficacious 
since £36 per week would not have covered most people's housing costs 
in 1994. And, more recently, even introducing a PCI is seen as a long 
process requiring prior, transitional CI's which are very modest - 
about £15 per week (Parker & Sutherland, 1994). However, these 
latter arguments regarding the supposed inadequacy of a PCI do tend 
to ignore the research which has been conducted. Parker and 
Sutherland (1994, 3 -8) have used a simulation model on the 
redistributive effects of a transitional CI and have found it to be 
surprisingly redistributive. For instance, with a CI in 1994 of £15 
per week for an adult, and £12 per week for a child, 37% of the poorest 
decile would have gained by over £15 a week, 24% would have gained by 
between £5 and £15 a week and 1% by less than £5 (cf. Atkinson, 1995, 
109 -29). These figures are still relatively modest - and the 
consequences for the second poorest decile are not as good - but they 
are more substantial than the critics of PCI tend to allege. 
These various criticisms aside Parker, in introducing her 
research, felt confident enough to proclaim that the obstacles to the 
implementation of CI were now political rather than economic and 
technical: 
...the critical issues are ethical (and political), not 
technical at all. The technicalities must be confronted if the 
case for integration is to be fully understood, but the real 
argument concerns human relationships and human values. Do we 
want to live in a society where making money is all that matters, 
or are there other objectives that we hold more dear? (1989, 6- 
7) 
Yet attempts, by her and others, to convince the political and 
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economic establishments of this have achieved less than many might 
have hoped. In the mid -1990s the technicalities continue to engulf 
debate over social security reform. Why is this the case? It is, I 
think, because we live in a political culture which has never been 
very good at addressing moral and social issues and, in truth, CI 
advocates have not been very effective at challenging that 
culture. 
This can be illustrated by looking at the Liberal Democrats. The 
Liberal Party, as it used to be, has looked favourably on tax /benefit 
integration since 1978. Indeed, it was this Party's debate on social 
security reform that influenced so much of what was to follow (Vince, 
1983) - including proposing transitional CIs and coining the name 
Citizen's Income. The support which many in the political centre 
have given to CI is not difficult to explain. On the one hand, their 
commitment to systematic welfare provision is stronger than that 
given by the Right. The Conservative government is condemned for 
preferring targeting, which only serves to discourage potential 
claimants while stigmatizing existing claimants. Socialists, on the 
other hand, are viewed as favouring the introduction of rigidities 
into the labour market, e.g. a minimum wage would either be too low to 
be useful or would price many jobs out of the market (Meacher & 
Ashdown, 1992). The Liberal Democrats went into the 1992 election 
with a firm commitment to CI but, subsequently, this commitment began 
to unravel and was firmly ditched in September 1994. This has been 
partly because of suspicions that Labour had lost the election 
because of its tax proposals, as modest as they were; also, because 
the new party has incorporated many ex -SDP members into its ranks who 
are also ex- Labour Party and who, therefore, feel more comfortable 
with a familiar social insurance approach. So, at the 1994 
conference a good 60% of delegates voted to scrap the CI commitment. 
Now, one of the most outspoken critics of CI in the Liberal Democrats 
has been Sir William Goodhart. At the conference, Goodhart was able 
to argue against CI by invoking the spectre of a 70% tax rate and, as 
such, CI was condemned as impractical and utopian. This was the case 
despite the Party having ruled out the possibility of a FCI in a 
policy document (Liberal Democrats, 1989) which it endorsed in 1990. 
Hermione Parker (Goodhart & Parker, 1994) also pointed out that it 
eras necessary to quantify exactly what is meant by a full CI, without 
which simply throwing around the 70% figure was intellectually 
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dishonest. Yet Goodhart's objections prevailed. His confusion of 
PCI with FCI was reflected in the conference vote, where many 
delegates even seemed to have little knowledge of their own policy. 
In one respect this confusion reflects an ignorance of the 
feasibility issues. But this ignorance itself may be due to the 
reluctance of the Party to publicize CI by first debating its 
revolutionary implications, e.g. those of unconditional provision, 
and then by taking the debate to the wider electorate. Within the 
party the debate remained at the level of economics - costings, 
incentives - and there may have been a feeling that arguing for an 
unconditional income on the doorstep would not be a vote -winner. As a 
matter of pragmatic politics this is probably the case. But can 
social justice be achieved by limiting ourselves to pragmatics? Is 
it not the case that we should be redefining the scope of pragmatism, 
arguing against Joe Voter's misconceptions and biases if we consider 
these to be obstacles to desirable objectives? 
In engaging with issues of desirability this research is not 
claiming that this is the approach that must always be taken, that 
feasibility does little more than supplement deeper, more 
theoretical considerations. However, I am arguing that at this point 
the debate the emphasis should shift to reflect the fact that, if 
it is to ever merit serious consideration by political parties and 
the wider public, as much attention must be given to CI's moral 
implications as to its economic implications. In certain respects, 
CI has still not made it off first base. All of the costings and 
economic modelings in the world will be irrelevant if gut instincts 
still rebel against such features as unconditionality. A desirable 
consequence of this research would be to intervene in the debate in 
these terms and contribute a voice to those who proclaim that CI is 
not only economically feasible but socially desirable. 
As such, it has to be admitted that whereas the main purpose of 
this thesis is to provide a broad outline of the CI debate, and how it 
interacts with other debates over social security reform, my own 
personal advocacy of CI cannot be eliminated. When push comes to 
shove I feel that, for all its faults, CI represents the most 
desirable option for reform. Hopefully, however, this preference, 
or bias, on my part will not have the consequence of unfairly 
magnifying CI's advantages while conveniently concealing its 
defects. 
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3. The Focus of the Research 
Now, if are we are to deal with the broad area of desirability upon 
what, specifically, should we focus? What are the varying ways in 
which the normative questions might be dealt with? 
We might, for example, examine the moral foundations of CI. To 
what extent can CI be justified according to libertarian, 
egalitarian and communitarian principles? Does it assume rights, 
need or desert as the basis of welfare provision? What are its 
implications for issues such as taxation, free -riding, pluralism 
etc. (Van Parijs, 1992a & 1995; White, 1995)? Or, we might look less 
at moral concepts and more at how a CI could contribute to the 
democratization of economic and political institutions. Would it 
entail a more open and accountable state by promoting individual 
autonomy? Could it unite welfare provision with a de- bureaucratized 
welfare state (Jordan, 1985 & 1989; Hirst, 1994)? Alternatively, we 
could look at the the ideological foundations of CI. How do the 
varying perspectives approach CI, especially in the light of wider 
attitudes to social security and the welfare state? What are the 
points of agreement and disagreement in their approaches and how 
might these affect the design of CI if and when implemented? 
Each of these approaches has its merits. For instance, high -level 
philosophizing demonstrates the extent to which the debate 
surrounding CI often goes to the heart of contemporary moral and 
political philosophy (Van Parijs, 1995). However, this thesis is 
going to take an 'ideological' approach. The conceptual angle is 
limited when it comes to social policy debates. White (1995) argues 
that a more - than- minimal CI would exploit those who earn and 
contribute to society, whereas Van Parijs (1995) argues that this is 
not the case. For my part, I feel that we may well accept that a CI 
theoretically implies the exploitation of the earner /contributor by 
those who take the CI but contribute little in return, yet that we may 
still find in favour of CI because a comparative analysis with other 
proposals reveals its disadvantages to be outweighed by its 
advantages. Yet it is this comparative analysis which the high -level 
philosophizing of those such as White and Van Parijs manages to 
avoid. Also, arguments over the potential renewal of economic and 
political institutions which CI may represent are obviously 
derivative on ideological debates concerning the nature of those 
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institutions. Furthermore, unless we assume that economic analysis 
is a neutral, objective and scientific procedure then we ought to 
investigate the ideological contexts within which such analyses 
proceed. 
So, although concerned largely with the ' desirability' side of the 
debate, an ideological approach, to a certain extent, allows us to 
make the jump from 'desirability' to 'feasibility', i.e. from the 
theoretical abstractions of the debate to the more practical, social 
policy aspects. This makes it a crucial, yet still under- researched, 
aspect of the CI literature. In examining the theoretical 
foundations of CI, then, this research is going to take the 
structures of those foundations as being profoundly ideological. 
This will not only, hopefully, provide an original insight into the 
CI debate but will make us familiar with wider social security 
debates - as suggested earlier when I mentioned that several 
combinations of various reform strategies (New Right, strategic co- 
ordination, structural integration) could be imagined. 
4. The Objective and Structure of the Research 
This now allows me to outline this research's single over- riding 
objective. Basically, this consists in giving some response to the 
following three questions. Why do ideological proponents make a 
contribution to the CI debate in the first place? What form do those 
contributions take? Why do the ideological variants of CI emerge as a 
result? Let me explain why these questions are so crucial. 
One of the most distinctive features of CI is the fact that it 
receives a certain degree of support from across the political 
spectrum. Whatever its significance for mainstream political 
debate, CI manages to gather support from Right libertarians to 
Marxists, from ecologists to feminists to theologians. Since there 
are relatively few reform proposals of which this can be said, it is a 
phenomenon deserving of attention. Curiously enough, however, this 
distinctive feature of CI has failed to receive an analysis which is 
both systematic and comprehensive. The literature which does 
address issues of desirability tends to examine CI exclusively in 
terms of one principle or another. For instance, Van Parijs (1992, 
81 -240) initiates investigations of CI in terms of liberty, 
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equality, community and efficiency, but says relatively little as to 
why and how CI manages to appeal simultaneously to all of these 
principles. His approach, therefore, captures why varying 
justifications of CI conflict with each other, but not why they also 
manage to establish some kind of consensus. As such, we need to 
appreciate the fact that CI touches on subjects which are much 
broader than those which are normally dealt with in the literature, 
and raises issues which give rise to consensus as much as to conflict. 
There are three subjects which must be investigated if the above 
questions are to be addressed. Firstly, we must understand that 
attitudes towards the state -provision of benefits -in -cash derive, 
in large part, from prior conceptions of citizenship, i.e. the 
recognized status of social members. It is therefore through an 
examination of those conceptions that we begin to appreciate why 
ideologies which conflict on so many matters may, nevertheless, all 
be attracted to a proposal for a Citizen's Income. The subject of 
citizenship, as such, relates to the first of the above 
questions. 
Clearly, those conceptions alter as interpretations of the 
justice and efficiency of our market -based society alter. So 
although many ideologists may agree on citizenship as a basis for 
income provision, the precise nature of the provision which they will 
support depends upon their competing ideas regarding the labour 
market status of individuals. Should benefits simply reflect wage - 
earning capacity, or the lack of it, or are there non -earning forms of 
work which deserve reward? Our second subject, then, concerns work 
and employment, and an analysis of these enables us to begin to 
understand why ideologies make differing contributions to the CI 
debate. 
Finally, these diverse conceptions of citizenship and labour 
market activity go hand in hand with divergent economic philosophies 
concerning employment generation: a CI would have disparate designs 
and implications depending upon whether it was found in a monetarist 
economy which eschews full employment, in a Keynesian economy which 
supports it, or in a post -employment economy which focuses upon 
employment redistribution. Once, therefore, we have examined work 
and employment generation we have begun to address the question of 
why ideologies make differing contributions to the CI debate. 
This leaves us in a position to address the third of the above 
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questions. If ideologies are attracted to the basic idea of CI, and 
so have reason to involve themselves in the debate, but draw 
dissimilar conclusions as to its social and economic role, then what 
variants of CI emerge as a result? What are the principal models of a 
social security system which is tax /benefit integrated? Exactly how 
do those models correspond to the ideologies which inspired them? In 
a way, then, this final question is a synthesis of the preceding two: 
once we understand why CI 's attraction extends across the political 
spectrum, and why that attraction breaks down under the weight of 
ideological polemics concerning work and employment generation, 
then we are able to comprehend the CI variants on offer. Addressing 
ourselves to the above three questions, therefore, should allow us to 
map the contours of consensus and conflict which are to be found 
within the CI debate. 
Looking ahead somewhat, we will see that because economic 
liberals conceive of wage- earning activity in the formal labour 
market as the basis of self and society they tend to be attracted to 
labour market flexibility and to means- tested benefits. By taking 
the emphasis away from minimum wage proposals CI would seem, for 
economic liberals, to offer income security without the rigidities 
of the current system. Social democrats, meanwhile, are also 
committed to the functional qualities of wage- earning activity but 
do not believe that the market alone can insure people against the 
risks and traumas which the market itself creates. Social insurance 
is required; however, since it is clear that both insurance benefits 
and supplementary, 'assistance' benefits have been far from perfect, 
and that the labour market is more fragmented and fragile than 50 
years ago, then the emphasis must be shifted away from a lifetime of 
paid contributions. With its citizenship ethic CI could offer social 
democrats a way forward. Finally, the democratic Left are those who 
are most suspicious of what they see as the disciplinary strategies 
of both state and market, and who therefore seek forms of social 
formation and identity formation which lie outside these realms. The 
unconditionality of CI would appear to provide one way in which non- 
market and non -state spheres of activity could be promoted. 
But though this explains the attraction of differing ideologies 
to CI in the abstract, this is obviously not the whole story. For 
example, though all ideologies might stress the desirability of 
social and income security what this means and implies will obviously 
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alter as we move across the political spectrum. So once the debate 
ceases to be abstract and theoretical and becomes a prelude to policy 
formation then we will begin to see, in Part 2, how and why differing 
contributions to the debate produce alternate forms of CI. With 
their stress on market -led flexibility and low public spending 
economic liberals usually favour the ex post form of CI provision 
known as NIT. Social democrats still wish to retain some notion of 
conditionality, since unconditional benefits are thought to fail to 
discriminate between duty- observing citizens and free -riders, 
leading them to either abandon CI in the short -term or perhaps to 
favour the conditional variant known as Participation Income. 
Furthermore, a PCI appears to lack the kind of benefit generosity 
which social democrats prefer. The democratic Left are satisfied 
with unconditional benefits but not, similarly, with the modest 
levels of PCI; they, though, are less willing than social democrats 
to sacrifice low rates of benefit withdrawal in order to achieve 
generous benefit levels. As such, they will wish to fund a FCI, in 
the form of a social dividend, through ecological taxes and /or 
returns on co- operatively -owned resources. So, by examining NIT, 
Participation Income and social dividend we will begin to appreciate 
the particular contributions which ideologies make to the debate and 
why their various contributions give rise to differing CI models. In 
short, I submit that the questions identified above, to which our 
objective is to provide some response, are essential to 
understanding the CI debate as it moves from its more theoretical 
aspects to its more practical ones. 
Before outlining the chapters which are to follow, it is necessary 
to insert two points. The first concerns a possible objection to the 
structure of this thesis and to the relatively limited number of 
ideologies with which it is dealing. Why could this thesis not have 
dealt with six or seven ideologies on an equal basis by outlining the 
ideology per se, its interpretation of the welfare state and its 
likely approach to CI, thus allowing the reader more of a wide - 
ranging comparative analysis? I have not adopted such a structure 
because it does not, to my mind, allow ideologies to engage with each 
other to a sufficient extent: it does not highlight the central 
issues around which ideological disagreements over social security 
reform revolve. I have therefore tried not only to draw ideological 
distinctions but to do so in terms of those issues which make it plain 
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what is at stake when ideologies engage in debate over social 
security. This is the aim of chapters 3 to 5, especially. 
Furthermore, if this is the approach to be taken then, consequently, 
the number of ideologies with which we can deal comprehensively 
becomes limited. This may be a particular problem when we consider 
the degree of attention which has been given in recent years to both 
ecological and feminist thought. As a solution, I have given a 
certain amount of attention to each, but not on an equal par with 
economic liberalism et al. Though far from ideal this can be 
justified: many ecological thinkers have lent their support to CI, 
yet critiques of the welfare state itself are few and far between (cf . 
George & Wilding, 1994, 161 -88) ; and although feminism has developed 
such critiques (Pascal', 1986) there has been very little work done 
on CI itself, and it is far from clear that feminism offers a 
different model of CI. As such, ecologism and feminism are examined 
in chapters 9 and 10, respectively, partly in their own right, with 
the objective of extending their commentaries on social security and 
CI, and partly as ideological critiques upon which the democratic 
Left must draw if it is to have a political future. This final point 
needs underlining. I am not claiming, because I do not believe, that 
the democratic Left is the natural, or the only, home of feminists and 
ecologists. On the contrary, my approach is entirely the opposite of 
this: it is the democratic Left which must draw on feminist and 
ecological critiques if it is to effect the transition from a series 
of high -level philosophical debates to a coherent political 
programme. Elements of this philosophy and this programme make an 
appearance in the chapters to follow. 
The second point concerns a note on terminology. As I have 
indicated, CI has gone under a number of names at different times and 
places. Also, the proposition of this research is that differing 
ideologies have alternate versions of CI that deserve investigation. 
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NIT, Participation Income and social dividend refer to the preferred 
forms of CI of economic liberalism, social democracy and the 
democratic Left respectively. So when I refer to 'CI' itself I will 
refer to what David Purdy calls a "field of debate ": 
An analogy might be the distinction between the concept of 
proportional representation as an abstract ideal and the 
various alternative voting systems which attempt to put it into 
effect. (1994, 31) 
So let us now briefly review the chapters which are to follow. The 
purpose of Part i is to identify those areas upon which varying 
ideologies differ in their essentials. After outlining the 
ideologies with which we are dealing (chapter 2) I go on to discuss 
citizenship ( chapter 3) , since a CI would make citizenship the basis 
of income provision though, as we shall see, ideologies have 
profoundly different conceptions of social membership. Then I go on 
to address ' work ' ( chapter 4) , i . e . what the concept means now and how 
its meanings have evolved over recent centuries. The point here is to 
understand how committed our ideologies are to what I will define as 
an 'employment ethic'. Finally in Part 1 we will examine full 
employment (chapter 5) , i.e. at what our ideologies take it to mean, 
and at how conceptions of the proper role of a social security-system 
alter as economic philosophies alter. So, Keynesianism and 
Monetarism are discussed, as are various other factors which 
challenge familiar notions surrounding full employment. In each of 
chapters 3 to 5 the significance of the discussions for CI are spelt 
out 
Having explained in Part i why each ideology ascribes to CI a 
different rationale, Part 2 attempts to explain why these 
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rationales give rise to alternative variants of CI and to give an 
outline of those variants themselves. So, what is NIT, how has 
interest in, and analysis of, it developed and why is it primarily 
economic liberals who are drawn to it (chapter 6)? Why are social 
democrats so closely attached to the principle of social insurance? 
Why should this attachment cause them either to reject CI or to be 
attracted to an insurance -based variant of it, i.e. Participation 
Income (chapter 7)? Has CI a role to play either in a market 
socialist economy, as preferred by the democratic Left, or in the 
transition to such an economy (chapter 8)? Having outlined the 
dominant CI models, we are then left with the separate justifications 
for CI which are provided by both ecological and feminist thought. 
Why might ecologists and feminists find elements in CI to attract 
them and in what ways does CI contribute to the practicalities of an 
ecological programme (chapter 9) and of a feminist programme 
(chapter 10)? At the same time, in each of these chapters one section 
is devoted to ecological and feminist critiques of market socialism - 
in order to round off our account of the democratic Left and to 
speculate as to whether a CI could form the basis of a radical 
politics. Finally, in the concluding remarks (chapter 11), we will 
not only summarize the research but will also look towards European 
integration and the likely implications both for the welfare state 
and for the future direction of the CI debate. In this way, I hope to 
contribute both to the CI literature and to the wider debate over 




ECONOMIC LIBERALISM, SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE DEMOCRATIC LEFT 
1. Introduction 
This chapter provides an initial characterization of each of the 
three principal ideologies with which we will be dealing. With both 
economic liberalism and social democracy (sections 2 and 3) I will 
first outline their defining features before looking at each in terms 
of several major theorists in order that those features may be 
illuminated. Since the democratic Left, however, is far from being 
an established ideology, and is only now in the process of emergence, 
our treatment of it in section 4 will need to be both more speculative 
and more tentative. 
2. Economic Liberalism 
In this thesis I am going to treat economic liberalism as being 
synonymous with the 'Right' . Yet since the Right is often taken to 
signify both a libertarianism and a conservatism, or welfare 
paternalism, does not my emphasis risk over -balancing any analysis 
in favour of the former as against the latter? Would this emphasis 
not miss the considerable social and moral critiques which such 
conservatives, in their hostility to the unrestrained market, have 
raised? And would this not damage any study of a system - social 
security - which is far from being a purely economic institution? 
There are two possible responses to such objections. 
The 'historical' response runs something like this. The object of 
my research may be the social security system but, obviously, this is 
inseparable from the wider welfare state. Now, over the last fifty 
years, what we may refer to (in a British context) as one -nation, 
paternalist conservatism has taken its lead from social democratic 
approaches to the welfare state. This should not be over- stated. The 
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welfare state of Churchill, Butler et al would undoubtedly have been 
different from that of Attlee, Bevan et al. Also, post -war social 
democracy in many ways took its inspiration from earlier, reformist 
liberals who were as devoted to free trade as they were to minimum 
welfare standards. Nevertheless, given the context of the Second 
World War and the reconstruction necessary after its close a broad 
consensus over welfare was established which was social democratic 
in character, in that it implied not only a welfare state but also a 
managerial, interventionist state. Until the late 1970s Labour and 
Conservative administrations established a high degree of 
continuity in their management of welfare provision. In many repects 
the post -war consensus was a welfare consensus. With the advent of 
Thatcherism, British conservatism underwent something of a 
bifurcation. Some one -nation Tories, like Ian Gilmour, held out 
against the rightward drift and suffered because of it. Some, like 
Keith Joseph, embraced and helped to define economic liberalism. 
Others, like Chris Patten, sought to adapt their conservatism to the 
new language of economic liberalism, with debatable effect. In any 
event, this need not alter my approach. To the extent that 
conservatism has retained a non -Thatcherite edge it still seeks a 
broad consensus with social democracy over the welfare state. Often 
with different motivations and objectives, to be sure, but not enough 
to warrant treating conservatism as a distinct ideology in this 
context. Similarly, to the extent that British conservatism has 
sought a broad agreement with economic liberalism there, too, it has 
not established a distinct position, i.e. the assumptions, 
principles and values of economic liberalism have dominated. In 
terms of social policy, therefore, I feel justified in deleting 
specific ideological reference to conservatism, treating it as a 
supplement to social democracy and economic liberalism, 
alternately, and referring to it in these terms. The same would 
obviously not apply if we were dealing with other subjects, 
especially something like constitutional reform. 
So, thought of historically, British conservatism has not 
constituted a distinct ideology - unlike continental christian 
democracy. However, a more philosophical response to the earlier 
objections reminds us that economic liberalism implies considerable 
non- ideological conservative elements in any event. We will not go 
into detail on this point here, since the later treatment of Hayek 
23 
will explain what is meant, except to note that economic liberalism 
does suggest social and moral critiques which have profound 
implications not only for society but also for the self. Having dealt 
with this objection, therefore, this section will first provide a 
systematic outline of what I will mean by economic liberalism before 
drawing a distinction between its conservative and libertarian 
variants. 
In order to understand economic liberalism there are four basic 
aspects to it which I think we should stress. Firstly, there is an 
epistemological aspect. This insists that the survival and 
development of society depends upon our recognizing, and remaining 
within, the limits of rationality. If we do not recognise that such 
limits exist and attempt to step over them, even with the best of 
intentions, then society is transformed from an open and plural space 
into a closed, bureaucratic machine. Once this occurs we are well on 
our way to totalitarianism via the naiveties of social democracy. 
Our examination of Hayek, below, will elaborate on this point. 
Secondly, economic liberals stress individualism. In other 
words, individuals possess natural capacities and abilities which 
are repressed or violated unless they are free to interact as they 
choose. Such interaction requires a state to maintain law and order, 
the condition of free interaction, but not the kind of state action 
which would intrude into private relations and so itself become the 
origin of coercive force. Such coercion is, therefore, immoral; 
further, it is 'strategically' naive since it ignores the fact that 
market relations produce an outcome economically and socially 
superior to any collectivized design. This aspect, then, is 
ultimately political: a minimum state only is required. However, as 
we shall see, there is a critique which suggests that this 
individualism is incredibly shallow since unrestrained market 
relations only allow the individual to identify with a narrow range 
of goals and goods. This critique goes along with the one which says 
that though the economic liberal state is minimal, it is also 
authoritarian. 
Thirdly, justice is about free choice and the conditions of free 
choice, which do not imply reference to end -states of resources and 
powers. As we shall see, this aspect of economic liberalism is most 
clearly articulated in the response which Nozick gives to Rawls and, 
as the next chapter will argue, seems to depend upon too rigid a 
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separation between rights and powers. 
Fourthly, in Hayek's version of economic liberalism - the most 
subtle and defensible version there is - room is made for a public 
sphere which is far more holistic than that allowed by more 
libertarian thinkers. However, it is precisely this holism - in its 
depth and complexity - which does not permit it to be identified with 
the collectivized state. Any attempt to 'take hold of that public 
sphere and mould it according to rational design will malfunction and 
so invite yet more interference and yet more malfunctioning. 
Rationality, if not held in check, snowballs into something so 
irrational that it is beyond the control of conscious design. 
Finally, it is these above characteristics which explain why 
economic liberals tend to value market relations above all. The 
limits of rationality demand that we step back from the social order 
and, rather than regard it as material to be programmed and managed 
according to conscious design, respect it as the unintended outcome 
of a multiplicity of market exchanges, for only through the invisible 
hand is private self- interest transformed into the public good. 
Though the occasional act through which market failures may be 
corrected is defensible, for the most part the (market) means justify 
the (social) ends such that considerations of justice do not apply to 
collective states -of- affairs. To ignore this, which is the vice of 
socialists especially, is to invite a collectivist, managerial state 
which dissolves the private space of individual freedoms as surely as 
it does the free market of contractual exchanges. 
These five, inter -related points do not allow us to comprehend 
the entire range of economic liberalism, but they do summarize its 
essential philosophical, economic, political and moral assumptions. 
The rest of this section will elaborate on these points as we now draw 
a distinction between the conservative and libertarian aspects of 
economic liberalism via the ideas of Hayek and Noz'_ck 
respectively. 
When the New Right began to wield political influence in the mid - 
1970s, the target was as much paternalist conservatism as 
democractic socialism - indeed, the former attracted outrage 
precisely because it was seen to have complacently incorporated 
elements associated with the latter. All the more strenuously, then, 
did New Right theorists strive to dissociate economic liberalism 
from any conservative tendencies, which they often viewed as pseudo- 
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socialist. The best and, so far as I can tell, the earliest example 
of this is provided by F.A. Hayek (1960, 398 -406). 
Why does Hayek go to the trouble of doing so? Because, he says, 
conservatism "...cannot offer an alternative to the direction in 
which we are moving" (1960, 398). That direction is a socialistic 
one, which Hayek saw as leading inexorably to totalitarianism. 
Conservatism may act as a brake on this process but it cannot offer us 
a different direction in which to proceed. This is because 
conservatism is so highly contextual, i.e. it treats every context 
within which it finds itself as 'given' , as something beyond which we 
cannot go in order to subject that context to rational critique. For 
conservatives, rationality is severely limited, the slave to other, 
non -rational forces. This means that political thought should not 
concern itself with constructing the best kind of society - there are 
no conservative utopias, other than those located in the past. 
Instead, conservatism sees it as the purpose of political action to 
preserve and to conserve existing relations and institutions. 
But, insists Hayek, what this orientation to tradition actually 
translates into is a pragmatism which, like a weather -vane, points in 
whatever direction the ideological wind is blowing. So whereas in 
the nineteenth century conservatism first resisted and then 
succumbed to laissez -faire liberalism, in the twentieth it has 
surrendered even this position to socialism. For socialists, by 
contrast, have had no compunction about re- organizing society 
according to abstract principles. As a consequence, conservatism 
has been either unable or unwilling to resist public ownership, state 
intervention, the welfare state etc. Indeed, to a large extent 
conservatism has, in practice, been indistinguishable from 
socialism. Hayek would therefore have us embrace liberalism: 
What I have described as the liberal position shares with 
conservatism a distrust of reason....The liberal differs from 
the conservative in his willingness to face this ignorance and 
to admit how little we know, without claiming the authority of 
supernatural sources of knowledge where his reason fails him. 
(1960, 406) 
But some commentators sympathetic to Hayek have complained that 
the distinction is still overdrawn. Norman Barry (1987), for 
example, says that conservatism is more varied and complex than its 
critics allege. It does work with rational principles, it does 
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criticize the policies and institutions of the Western democracies. 
Certainly, it has little empathy with individualistic liberalism - 
whether Kantian or Utilitarian - but contemporary liberalism is 
often organic and sceptical: 
The current emphasis in liberalism is on spontaneity, that 
there are natural tendencies to growth and progress in complex 
societies which operate more effectively the less the state 
intervenes. (Barry, 1987, 86 -7) 
Now, I am far from certain why Barry should imagine that 
contemporary liberalism can be characterized in this way, but his 
argument does seem applicable to Hayek. Hayek's version of economic 
liberalism is not solely libertarian - as is the case with Nozick 
(1974) and Rothbard (1973) - so that we err if we overlook the 
conservative aspects of his thought. Conservatism could be 
distinguished as an ideology in its own right, implying as it does a 
distinctive outlook on human nature and society - though not one we 
are considering for reasons already explained; and in this sense 
Hayek is most certainly not a conservative. But conservatism also 
implies something of an anti - ideology, as Hayek recognized. As such 
it constitutes a mood, an attitude, a disposition; conservatism is 
that which reminds us that theorizing and organizing have inherent 
limits. It is this latter, non - ideological kind of conservatism 
which makes an appearance in Hayek's work. In what way? 
Civilization 'begins', he says, when individuals can use and 
profit from the knowledge which they themselves do not possess. 
Understanding such a society therefore implies recognizing and 
appreciating our ignorance: "Though we cannot see in the dark, we 
must be able to trace the limits of the dark areas" (1960, 23) . 
Civilization is that which is created by us but not designed by us. 
As we become conscious of our surroundings we attempt to adapt 
ourselves to them. This means striving for objectives, though what 
we actually achieve may not be what we intended - since reason is 
internal to nature and experience. A change in social conditions 
requires changes in our activities and practices, though the form 
which our new practices will take is beyond our control. The 
instruments of adaption - institutions and traditions - are beyond 
our comprehension. Individual freedom is both justified and 
required precisely because of our ignorance of the factors shaping 
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our ends and goals. The collective is that which we cling to as a 
means of forgetting how ignorant we are. So guaranteeing individual 
freedom is the one way we may intervene in civilization to ensure that 
the limitations of our reason are protected and nurtured (1960, 22- 
38). 
Hayek's disclaimer, therefore, that he is not a conservative 
should not be taken on trust. What Hayek is doing is interpreting 
conservatism purely as an ideology and thus rejecting it both as a 
critique and as an influence on himself . But conservatism as a mood 
or attitude, as something which is not systematically ideological, 
is palpable in his work. The fallibility of humanity, the 
imperfectability of society, the embeddedness of the individual in 
his surroundings, the innate value of inherited traditions, the 
organic character of civil society, the virtue of authority and 
hierarchy, the symbolic or expressive complexion of power, the 
pragmatism of political action: all of these conservative elements 
make some kind of appearance, to some degree, in Hayek's texts. 
So Hayek's antipathy to the 'collective' is explained by what 
might be called his moral epistemology. The collective would make us 
drift into a state of amnesia, of unconsciousness, where we imagine 
that we possess unlimited strength and powers. So egalitarianism is 
one of the dreams which comes to the collective. But, argues Hayek, 
to treat unequals equally results in inequality in their actual 
position. Egalitarianism is not only undesirable, it is self - 
contradictory: 
Equality before the law and material equality are therefore not 
only different but are in conflict with other; and we can 
achieve either the one or the other but not both at the same 
time. (1960, 87) 
Since without law civilization is threatened, and since equality 
before the law entails abandoning material equality as an objective, 
it follows that any attempt to design a particular pattern of 
material distribution and impose this on society will threaten the 
very survival of civilization. This is what the welfare state, 
public ownership and state interference in the economy represent. 
These artificial institutions are what promote the coercion inimical 
to a free society, and deprive people of the sense of responsibility 
they require in order to be reasonable beings. 
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So, we begin to understand why economic liberalism has the 
character is does: valuing the private over the public, the 
individual over the collective; defining freedom negatively as an 
absence of coercion; encouraging spontaneity in social /economic 
relations under the rule of law. At this point, though, the virulent 
'pro- market, anti -state' Hayek of Law, Legislation and Liberty 
(1973; 1976; 1979) had not quite emerged. In The Constitution of 
Liberty (1960) he is willing to view the state as having some positive 
functions to play, so that it is the character rather than the volume 
of government activity which is seen as important. In other words, it 
is better to have an active state enabling a market -led economy than a 
completely inactive state standing to one side while the economy 
fails (1960, 220 -2) . This manages to both prefigure and to contrast 
with the anti- democratic rhetoric of Hayek's later years. Perhaps in 
reacting so strenuously against conservatism, Hayek was reacting 
against the conservative and pseudo -socialist elements in his own 
work! 
Yet, for all their confusion of the meaning of liberalism, those 
economic liberals who combine conservatism with libertarianism are 
being consistent. If society is going to erect a 'wall between the 
polity and the economy, a wall which is to be breached by the state 
very infrequently, then what is this 'wall' to consist of? It must 
include such personal characteristics as respect for the 
constitution and rule of law, and acceptance of material inequality. 
Immediately, it seems, we must begin to think of the 'wall' not as a 
series of external institutions, offices and practices which are 
there to keep the state and economy apart, important as such 
insitutions are; instead, the separation is to be effected and 
maintained through insitutions internal to the characters who make 
up the economic liberal society. Economic liberalism basically says 
that the market is best. But for the market to operate, the 
individuals of whom it is composed must identify closely, if not 
absolutely, with the workings and outcomes of the market . This means 
imbuing individuals with the virtues of self -reliance and self - 
responsibility. It means, in short, the construction of human 
identity to ensure that it internalizes the imperatives and needs of 
capitalist market economics. This not only requires an economic man, 
who will act rationally in the market order according to his self - 
interest, but a conservative man whose sense of self is dependent 
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upon where he is located in the social structure of material 
inequality. 
The polity and economy are ultimately kept apart by 'characters' 
who accept the authority of the market as infallible, inviolable and 
unquestionable (Heelas, 1991, 72 -90). It is precisely the necessity 
of nurturing individuals who will identify with the unrestrained 
market which libertarians ignore. Lesser theorists such as Friedman 
(1962) , Rothbard (1973) and Buchanan (1975) reveal little more than a 
brute materialism and positivism. A more substantial theorist like 
Nozick, however, rewards closer attention. In Nozick's society the 
means or procedures through which a particular distribution is 
produced are subject to considerations of justice, the social ends 
which are thereby created are not. The means always justify the ends. 
For to regard patterns of distribution as either just or injust is to 
ignore the status of justice as an attribute of individuals' actions. 
Justice prevails when the rules of acquisition and transfer have been 
satisfied (1974, 155 -9). Distributive conceptions of justice, 
meanwhile, casually identify a social entity where no such entity 
exists (1974, 32 -3). Though these ideas are similar to Hayek's, 
Nozick is perhaps more willing to attribute utopian implications to 
liberalism: not as a totalized, unflawed state -of- affairs, but as 
one within which we each create our own utopias by pursuing our freely 
chosen ends without interference (1974, 297; Gray, 1986, 41). 
There seem to be five basic priciples underlying Nozick's 
position. Firstly, property rights are absolute, so that taxation is 
equivalent to forced labour. Secondly, entitlements to goods 
'trumps' considerations of desert and need. Thirdly, we should only 
be concerned with material benefits since only these can be 
quantified: an individual's ' inner- state' is not publically visible 
and therefore is irrelevant to political thought. Fourthly, 
ownership is synonymous with private ownership. Fifthly, self - 
ownership is formal rather than substantive, since you are the owner 
of yourself regardless of the resources and powers you possess, or 
could possess. 
Though Nozick's defence of procedural justice throws up several 
problems, putting in question his justification of a minimal state, 
Perhaps the main one is that even if we assume that justice is solely 
about acquisition and transfer, how do we know that the distribution 
which has actually come to exist is the same as that distribution 
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which should exist? How do we allow for all of the transfers down all 
of the centuries - since when? - that have not been legitimate? 
Nozick, famously, allows for this himself: 
...past injustices might be so great as to make necessary in the 
short run a more extensive state in order to rectify them. 
(1974, 231) 
So Nozick is caught on the horns of a dilemma. The shorter the 
duration of this extensive state, the greater the redistribution of 
resources to rectify past injustices would have to be - perhaps to a 
point surpassing that which even Marxists have imagined. But the 
longer the existence of the extensive state, the more Nozick's 
position collapses into a social democratic one. Nozick could, of 
course, shorten the duration and modify the redistribution but this 
would be to preserve the effects of the past injustices themselves. 
By limiting himself to a procedural conception of justice, 
therefore, Nozick finds it impossible to reconcile the fact of past 
injustices with the desirability of the minimal state he is 
recommending. 
The same dilemma does not arise for an economic liberal like Hayek 
because conception of justice encompasses and goes beyond 
proceduralism. His is a conception which centres upon individual 
character rather than individual action. Certainly the individual 
must act justly in order to be virtuous, but Hayek et al seem to take 
on board Durkheim's dictum that every contract implies a non- 
contract, i.e. a society within which contracts were based solely 
upon legal enforcement would not work, for unless we recognize the 
claims of the other person to whom we bear a non -codifiable 
obligation, then we are not even in a position to judge whether and 
when a contract has been broken. So procedural, inter -active justice 
depends for its coherence upon a pre -procedural character -based 
justice. This is why Hayek et al elaborate, whether they appreciate 
it or not, a moral conservatism which implies a holistic vision of 
society with authoritative relations with which the individual is to 
identify. Indeed, at times their self- proclaimed individualism 
seems ludicrously misplaced - consider, for instance, the kind of 
Thatcherite moral absolutism which heralds free choice so long as 
what is freely chosen is consistent with the needs of a laissez -faire 
market, i.e. you can opt -out of the public sector into the private 
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sector, but you cannot ultimately opt -out of the market. So, in 
Hayek's modified libertarianism, the possibility of past injustices 
does not arise as a problem since we are rooted in our historical 
environments and cannot raise ourselves above history to judge other 
historical periods armed with the instruments of procedural justice. 
Nozick's Kantian emphasis on rationality is as alien to Hayek et al as 
the rationality of socialism. 
So, economic liberalism is a face with two countenances: a 
libertarian one and a conservative one. The former works with a 
conception of rationality more universal than the latter; the latter 
develops a conception of justice more holistic than the former. It 
has to be acknowledged that the distinction I have worked with here is 
one of degree rather than kind and, if anything, it is the 
conservative version which dominates since there seem to have been 
very few pure libertarians. Now, it is not my job to assess economic 
liberalism since it would take too long to do so thoroughly and the 
objective of this research lies elsewhere. Personally, I believe 
that a purely libertarian version of an economic liberal society 
would not survive twelve months and that though a conservative 
version is durable - the evidence is all around us - it is too 
stifling of authentic individuality. In any event, the distinction 
between these two aspects of economic liberalism is one we will 
rarely need to draw again so that we may now pass on to examine the 
second of our three ideologies: social democracy. 
3. Social Democracy 
Here, I propose to adopt the pattern that was followed in the 
previous section, i.e. give a brief, but hopefully useful, 
introduction to the essential principles of the ideology before 







theorist - in this case Rawls, though with some reference 
n. 
democracy was originally a title adopted by the German 
1875 and one which managed to elicit the contempt of Marx 
, 1977, 564 -70). In this thesis I will refer to social 
in two senses. Firstly, it seems reasonable to use the term 
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social democracy as signifying both political centrism and 
democratic socialism whenever we consider the history of ideological 
ideas, especially since European Leftist parties have been torn 
between the reformism of the former and the radicalism of the latter. 
However, it is undoubtedly the case that social democracy has, 
especially recently, come to refer largely to political centrism, 
with democratic socialism having been marginalized. So, secondly, 
when we consider the specifics of possible social security reform 
proposals, social democracy will be referred to in this more modest 
sense. This is to both imply that a space has opened up on the 
political spectrum, due to the increasing conservatism of social 
democracy, into which the democratic Left is stepping and to avoid 
the objection that I am over -populating this thesis with versions of 
Left -wing thought. Consequently, democratic socialists are 
currently having to decide whether they favour the mainstream agenda 
of social democracy or the emerging radicalism of the democratic Left 
with its greater sensitivity to ecological and feminism thought. 
Initially, though, we have to ask what the essentials of social 
democracy are in its broader historical sense. Firstly, there is a 
commitment to some form of economic democracy. Obviously, there has 
only ever been a partial consensus over what this means. Centrists 
have looked more to state intervention within a mixed economy while 
socialists have conceived of more widespread nationalization - co- 
operatives and workplace democracy have usually taken a backseat to 
state -oriented conceptions. In any event, the purpose of economic 
democracy as an objective has been to socialize the process of 
distribution by making profit less of a consideration. And, indeed, 
what may have motivated socialization in the past was less ideology 
and more the pragmatics of post -war re- construction, though even 
this distinction may be too overdrawn, i.e. democratic socialists 
have tended to draw on wartime experiences as evidence of the 
efficacy of a planned economy, while centrists have believed it 
necessary to draw back from a planned economy precisely in order to 
consolidate the gains made in wartime against the powers of private 
monopolies. 
Secondly, social democrats have promoted the interests of the 
working -class as the agents of a fairer and more democratic society. 
In this respect they have not differed substantially from Marxists, 
both having viewed the working -class as the inevitable constituency 
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of social change. Though the former have not attempted an out -and- 
out distinction between a class -in- itself and a class -for- itself 
they, too, seem to have basked in the confidence of an industrial 
class whose interests only social democrats can fully articulate. As 
archaic as this now sounds it is undeniable that the highpoint of 
social democratic influence coincided with the highpoint of 
organized labour's influence and, therefore, of corporatism and 
statism. Recently, though, centrists have insisted that support for 
social democratic parties has shrunk among the working -class which 
means that social democracy can only survive if it accommodates 
itself to middle -class interests. Democratic socialists, 
meanwhile, have warned that this is to overestimate the decline of 
traditional working -class interests, though many also stress the 
need to re- articulate such interests in terms of the interests of 
women and ethnic minorities especially. On this point, the prospects 
for social democracy are difficult to predict. 
Thirdly, comes the objective of widening the scope of democratic 
rights beyond their basis in civil and political liberties. This 
means working for social, economic and perhaps industrial rights by 
systematically redistributing resources which the free market would 
not, on its own, provide and attempting to accomodate the meanings of 
a liberal constitution and a democratic polity to this end. We will 
examine this point in detail in the next chapter. 
Fourthly, as a means to these ends social democrats have adopted a 
growth- oriented strategy which looks more to the formal than to the 
informal economy as the site of economic and social reform, where 
'work' tends to be equated with 'paid employment' . We will analyse 
this 'employment ethic' in chapter 4 and attempt to give some kind of 
assessment of it in chapters 9 and 10 which will, therefore, provide 
ecological and feminist critiques of the social democratic frame of 
mind. 
Finally, and as another means, social democrats have supported 
welfare provision via some kind of central, state apparatus. This is 
not to pretend that the welfare state is the archetypal social 
democratic institution - since this would be to re -write history, 
among other things. However, given that the purpose of social 
democracy is to humanize market relations and compensate for market 
failures the welfare state seems to be perhaps the principal 
instrument through which this is to be achieved. All the more so, 
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indeed, because social democracy is itself so ideologically 
heterogeneous: the welfare state has satisfied, not always 
perfectly, the conservative desire for social solidarity and 
legitimation, the reformist liberal desire for a healthy, educated 
workforce and the socialist desire for a stepping -stone to something 
yet more progressive. 
Social democracy, then, is an ideology committed to some notion of 
distributive justice, of not leaving everything to market forces. At 
the same time, though, distributive justice is nothing of the sort 
unless individual tastes and liberties are preserved and, of course, 
thereby enhanced. So, we might adapt what Kymlicka (1990, 85 -90) 
says of 'liberal equality' and claim that social democracy is that 
which simultaneously attempts to be endowment -insensitive, i.e. it 
wishes to compensate for social and natural disadvantages which it 
sees as being arbitrary from a moral point of view, while attempting 
to be preference -sensitive, i.e. not to interfere with people's 
desires, tastes and freely -arrived at decisions. Philosophically, 
the goal of social democracy is to draw this distinction coherently, 
while politically the goal is to 'operationalize' the distinction. 
In the rest of this section we will pass over the political or 
pragmatic dimension - which, so far as social security is concerned, 
is dealt with in chapter 7 - and concentrate on the philosophical 
dimension. To illustrate this dimension we will look at one of the 
most important of all political theorists, John Rawls - this is not to 
claim that Rawls is a social democrat, a more controversial claim 
than many imagine, but that he engages with the kinds of problems and 
debates with which social democrats should be, and indeed have been, 
concerned. 
Rawls's distinction between two principles of justice, and why 
the first is to be regarded as more important than the second, has 
influenced many: 
First principle 
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive 
total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a 
similar system of liberty for all. 
Second principle 
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that 
they are both: 
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, 
consistent with the just savings principle, and 
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under 
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conditions of fair equality of opportunity. (Rawls, 1972, 
302) 
The first principle is ' lexically prior' to the second simply because 
unless we protect liberty and justice above all, we are likely to 
invite the kind of political regime which will not establish the 
distribution of economic resources which we consider to be fair. So 
the second principle is dependent upon the first in a way that is not 
reciprocated; basic civil and political liberties can still exist 
even in the face of massive economic inequalities. Now I have my 
doubts as to whether this is the case. It could be argued that 
Rawis's 'lexical ordering' is a neat, theoretical sleight -of -hand 
but one which does not apply to the real world. Without attention 
given to issues of social welfare and so forth, civil and political 
institutions do not attract the free consent of the people, 
especially the poorest, which they require for their legitimacy and 
their very survival. And this is long before we come to a possible 
class -analysis of society and of the welfare state. However, 
pursuing these critiques takes us into questions of how to define 
liberalism and away from considerations of welfare and distribution. 
So, for the purposes of this section we will take Rawls 's distinction 
as read and direct our attention to the second principle above: the 
difference principle. 
The difference principle provides some means of being both 
endowment -insensitive and preference -sensitive and, therefore, some 
answer to the questions which lie at the heart of social democracy. 
To what extent should equality be our objective? Why is inequality 
justifiable? How do we reconcile social justice with economic 
inequalities? This gives some indication of the plethora of 
questions and problems which surround this single term 'equality'. 
Are we to talk only of equality of opportunity, or something more 
substantial? If so, what? Why might equality be considered 
desirable? How might equality be achieved? To whom is it to apply? 
Is it similarly applicable to both the public and private spheres? No 
single theorist could be said to address all of these questions more 
than superficially. However, Rawls provides more illuminating 
insights than most. 
A standard 'escape clause' for many social democratic politicians 
has been to insist that by equality we must mean equality of 
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opportunity, for this seems reasonable and harmless enough and is 
less likely than other definitions to scare away taxpaying voters. 
But Rawis (1972, 72 -5) seems to provide two basic objections to this 
line of thought. Firstly, although equality of opportunity captures 
our desire to compensate for undeserved, social inequalities, e.g. 
inherited wealth, and our desire to eliminate racial and sexual 
discrimination etc., it is still not enough. An equality of 
opportunity will still entail an inequality of outcome, or end - 
states, and unless we address the extent to which such inequality is 
desirable then our 'escape clause' has solved nothing. Indeed, 
unless equality of opportunity is to mean nothing more than ' equality 
before the law' then it has to involve some transfer of resources 
which, again, requires us to address some difficult questions. 
Secondly, if there are social inequalities which are undeserved, 
cannot there be natural inequalities which are also undeserved? If I 
do not deserve to benefit fully from the fact that my parents are 
rich, why should I benefit fully from being intelligent or gifted or 
even healthy? To refer to undeserved social and natural 
disadvantages is to refer to those factors over which the individual 
has no control, factors which are therefore arbitrary from a moral 
point of view. This does not mean that equality of opportunity is 
irrelevant, but it does mean that such equality is only meaningful if 
incorporated within some wider notion of distributive justice. Some 
idea of what this implies is given by asking to what extent I should 
be allowed to benefit from endowments which are legally mine or 
talents which are naturally mine. 
Now, I am not going to enter into a discussion of Rawis' s version 
of the social contract. What is the status of the original position? 
Is it a metaphysical account of the self or a political construct? 
Personally, i have always inclined to the latter view so that the 
original position be considered as a device for rendering our 
intuitions more vivid and precise through a process of reflective 
equilibrium. There is textual evidence for this (1972, 21) though 
the 'metaphysical' interpretation prevailed to such an extent that 
Rawls felt the need to subsequently clarify his position (1993, 3- 
46) . To interpret the social contract as a constructivist device is 
to allow Rawls to contribute more profitably to the whole 
liberal /communitarian debate, without allowing him to escape from 
feminist critiques of his assumptions (Frazer & Lacey, 1993, 113 -7) . 
37 
So on this interpretation we can appreciate what the difference 
principle says without worrying too much as to why it says it. 
The difference principle says that social and economic 
inequalties should be arranged so that they are to the benefit of the 
least advantaged and attached to positions or offices open to all. In 
other words imagine three societies in which the distribution of 
resources between three actors or classes is as the following: 
(A) (B) (C) 
Rich 20 16 18 
Middle 15 13 13 
Poor 6 10 8 
According to the difference principle (B) is the most just since it is 
here that the poorest are most well -off. According to strict 
utilitarian criteria we would be forced to prefer (A) since the total 
number of 'units' here is greater than in (B) or (C) . And according 
to the criteria of Pareto- optimality we might, if we compare (B) and 
(C) , prefer (C) since it appears as if in (B) the poor have gained at 
the expense of the rich. But in simply comparing minimum standards 
with minimum standards Rawls's conception of justice, as long as the 
principle of liberty is intact, demands that (B) be preferred. In a 
way, this captures a populist intuition that the richest should only 
be allowed to gain if a consequence of their doing is that the poorest 
gain also. 
Now, as with economic liberalism it is not my purpose to go into 
the various criticisms which may be made, and have been made, of 
Rawls. Briefly, Nozick (1974, 183 -231) complains that a logical 
consequence of the difference principle is that we would also be 
required to redistribute natural attributes and talents. But this 
would be to violate the liberal principle of self -ownership, for I 
may not deserve my high I.Q., devastating beauty and immense charm 
but these are nevertheless mine and I am therefore entitled to them 
and to the resources which they help generate. Would Rawls advocate 
making the intelligent stupid and the beautiful ugly? Presumably 
not, but this would be the consequence of compensating for natural 
disadvantages. For whenever we give attention to end -states, rather 
than the procedures through which end- states are attained, then we 
treat individuals instrumentally, contradicting the very anti- 
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utilitarianism articulated by Rawls. And all of this is to assume 
that we can even identify the least advantaged in the first place. 
Others, on the Left, have complained that Rawls only concerns himself 
with redistribution and has nothing to say regarding the possibility 
that redistribution is itself a capitalistic concept which, if 
anything, justifies the private ownership of productive resources by 
diverting attention away from that notion of justice which requires 
co- operative ownership. So, his difference principle of justice is 
parasitic on standard civil and political rights and does not 
establish distinct economic rights because he is not concerned with 
defining a principle of just ownership (Macpherson, 1973, 87 -94). 
Such objections might be confirmed by the fact that Rawls (1993, 229) 
came to slightly down -grade the importance of the difference 
principle. However, many on the Left regard Rawls as potentially 
contributing to a more radical economic critique (Clark & Gintis, 
1978, 324; DiQuattro, 1983, 53 -9). 
Whatever the truth of such objections, Rawls would seem to provide 
some answers to earlier questions. To what extent should equality be 
our objective? To the greatest extent possible as long as liberty is 
guaranteed, since equality captures those "...features of human 
beings in virtue of which they are to be treated in accordance with 
the principles of justice" (1972, 504). Because we are all moral 
persons capable of developing conceptions of the good and a sense of 
justice then we are all entitled to equal justice (1972, 504 -12). 
This is what defines Rawls's position as one of liberal equality. But 
what the difference principle then calls for is the deliberate 
distribution of certain goods to ensure fair social interaction. 
The second question raised earlier was: why is inequality 
justifiable? The Rawlsian answer is that it is justifiable when it 
maximizes the position of the least well -off. This captures the 
intuition that it is better for Poor Tom to have 3 cows if Rich Bob has 
10 than, it is for Poor Tom to have 2 cows while Rich Bob has 5. In 
real -world politics this translates into the argument that examples 
of extreme wealth are desirable in so far as we gain as individuals - 
by being provided with incentives - and as a society, because through 
innovation, investment and taxation collective living standards 
rise. Nevertheless, there is still a popular feeling that extremes 
of wealth and poverty must be avoided. 
What of the third question: how do we reconcile social justice 
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with economic inequalities? Rawls seems to articulate the balancing 
act which social democrats have attempted between (largely) 
privatized production on the one hand and socialized distribution on 
the other. Some form of market economics and private ownership are 
needed to maximize the total stock of resources, and some notion of 
distributive justice is needed to ensure that these resources are 
shared out to the greatest practicable extent. So there is no 
'reconciliation' as such: social justice, as the difference 
principle succeeds in demonstrating, just is the assumption that 
equality and efficiency are mutually inclusive and not simply 
reducible to quantifiable statistics. 
So if Rawis provides some answers to the questions asked earlier, 
why is Ronald Dworkin of relevance? Partly because he is more 
specifically identifiable as a social democrat than Rawls and partly 
because he offers a critique of Rawlsian justice which highlights the 
complexities of distinguishing between endowment- insensitivity and 
preference- sensitivity. Basically, he accuses Rawis of 
inadequately compensating the disadvantaged and of not being 
sufficiently responsive to our ambitions and preferences. Now, in 
one respect, Dworkin (1985) too has a minimalist definition of 
liberalism. Liberalism, he says, is concerned with constitutive 
principles, i.e. those principles that are valued for their own sake 
and not as a means for the realization of deeper principles. So, the 
principle that we should treat people as equals is the constitutive 
principle of equality, while the principle that we should treat 
people equally is the derivative principle (1985, 181 -204). So, at 
the most basic level liberal equality implies an "abstract right to 
equal concern and respect" (1977, 181), so that, strictly speaking, 
liberalism does not permit a society to legitimately help its members 
achieve some form or other of the good. However, this really only 
applies to a hypothetical world, whereas in the real world 
differences in holdings produce forbidden inequalities making some 
form of redistribution necessary. What might this involve? 
Dworkin orientates himself to an economic market, which, 
...as a device for setting prices for a vast variety of goods and 
services, must be at the centre of any attractive theoretical 
development of equality of resources. (1981, 284) 
For only by imagining a market procedure like an auction can we 
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eliminate envy from our theory of equality. This echoes Rawls's 
approach (1972, 530 -41), though it might be argued that by giving 
such an emphasis to envy, Rawls and Dworkin surrender to the Right's 
insistence that envy and egalitarianism go together. In any event, 
Dworkin imagines an auction on a desert island where everyone has 100 
clamshells and are to use these shells to bid for the island's 
resources. If the auction is free and fair everyone should end up 
with those resources that they desired and will not, consistently, be 
able to envy those resources collected by someone else (1981, 285) 
However, no such auction exists in real life; or, rather, we all start 
bidding with widely unequal amounts of initial assets - clamshells - 
allowing the richest to purchase more and better resources than the 
poorest. By an inequality in initial assets is meant both undeserved 
social disadvantages and undeserved natural disadvantages. What we 
should imagine, therefore, is that on our hypothetical island 
periodic redistributions and fresh auctions take place, this being 
perfectly consistent with an equality of resources: 
It argues only that resources available to him at any one moment 
must be a function of resources available or consumed by him at 
others... (1981, 310) 
Dworkin, though, is perhaps more pessimistic than Rawls regarding 
the possibility of reconciling individuals' ambitions with 
inequalities in initial assets. The "brute fact" is that choice and 
redistribution do not of themselves ensure distributive justice 
(1981, 329 -30; Kymlicka, 1990, 80 -4). At the same time, though, 
Dworkin is at least more clearly identifiable as a social democrat. 
Those on the Right, like Nozick, are found guilty of dogma for 
assuming that equality is only concerned with the quantity of 
disposable goods. So the market is valuable to the extent that it 
serves an equality of resources, but must be abandoned or constrained 
whenever it fails in that task. 
So, in this section we have outlined the essentials of social 
democracy, shown why these essentials are concerned to draw a 
distinction between endowments and preferences and examined Rawls, 
and to a lesser extent Dworkin, as demonstrating how such a 
distinction might be drawn. We now pass on to examine an ideology 
which is both more recent and more nebulous than either economic 
liberalism or social democracy: the democratic Left. 
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4. The Democratic Left 
As I noted earlier, with both economic liberalism and social 
democracy we are able to draw upon a fairly coherent body of theory 
and analysis so that it is not too difficult to explicate the 
principal features of those ideologies. With what I am calling the 
'democratic Left', however, there is a considerable problem. We 
should always be suspicious of those who talk the language of crisis 
and collapse: such analyses are often facile and over -estimate the 
extent to which there has ever been unity of principle and purpose on 
the part of the Left. Nevertheless, and with certain exceptions, 
there has been a diminution in the Left's energy and direction over 
the last couple of decades. Indeed, disputes extend down to the level 
of meanings: there is disagreement over what 'the Left' actually 
signifies and some would go so far as to deny any conceptual relevance 
to the term whatsoever. 
How, then, should we proceed? Should we simply draw upon recent 
theorists who identify themselves as Left without worrying too much 
about the wider debates? Should we merely attempt a review of Left 
parties and movements without too much analysis? Yet both of these 
approaches might ignore what is specific, and exciting, about the 
Left dilemma: namely, that dispute over the Left project's future go 
to the heart of conflicts essential to contemporary philosophy. More 
than this, those conflicts are only now in the process of emerging 
into a fully fledged series of political strategies. It is this 
transformation from philosophy to politics which characterizes 
democratic Left thought at present and which will inform the accounts 
of it given in this thesis. 
Instead, this section will attempt to do four things. Firstly, it 
will outline the basic principles which I consider to be at the heart 
of the emerging democratic Left project. Secondly, it will explain 
the philosophical conflicts which are essential to democratic Left 
theorists. Thirdly, my own perspective on those conflicts will be 
spelt out. Finally, this section will reflect the growing desire to 
'go beyond' such high -level debates and flesh out a practical 
political strategy by anticipating the arguments of chapters 8 to 
10. 
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a) Four Principles 
Firstly, the democratic Left seems to offer a critique regarding 
not so much the nature of power, along the lines of debate pursued by 
elitists and pluralists, as its direction of flow. The modernist era 
conceived of power very much in pre -modern terms, as a vertical, 
hierarchical and unidirectional structure. To be in control, 
therefore, was to occupy those centres of economic and political 
decision- making, i.e. the state and the firm, which dominated the 
more social and civil spheres of human interaction. Those theorists 
who identify with postmodernist theory invert this representation 
and conceive of power as 'horizontal', as multiple and 
contradictory. There are no longer any centres of power since there 
are only an infinite series of peripheries to be occupied. Control 
comes through the decoding and subverting of the established codes 
and not from 'seizing hold of modernist structures, as Marxists 
always imagined. The democratic Left, as I would like to present it, 
somehow combines these conceptions. On the one hand, power is more 
centralized than ever before. Capital, in all of its institutional 
forms, commands more and more deliberative influence and capricious 
force as the hegemony of profit, enterprise, competition, take -overs 
and asset -stripping insinuates itself into every corner of the 
globe. Equally, the military and political power of the West is 
stronger than ever, as demonstrated whenever its interests are under 
threat - compare Kuwait and Bosnia. On the other hand, power seems to 
imply a decentralization. Capital reveals far less of a 
nationalistic face than it used to. The very fact that the 
capitalistic game is played everywhere means that it is less easy to 
direct from any particular place on the globe. Growth in the West 
stagnates as growth in the Third World, China especially, 
accelerates. Also, individuals feel more able than ever to challenge 
the claim of companies and governments to do whatever they will. As 
the nation -state and its political parties are no longer viewed as 
the only, or even the principal, means through which people may make 
their voices heard, grass -roots protests are raised against all 
military, political, economic, patriarchal and industrialized 
interests. The new politics is an anti- elitism, dedicated to 
dissolving power rather than to reproducing it. 
Secondly, liberty for the democratic Left has something to do with 
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that new chestnut, empowerment. To empower is not only to establish 
'external' forums and opportunities for the realization of 
individual freedoms; it is also to oppose the passivity and 'culture 
of victimization' which the old corporatist social order encouraged. 
Whereas social movements in the past all too easily ossified into the 
kind of practices and offices which quickly lost touch with the new 
realities they themselves had helped to bring about, the new social 
movements appear to be dynamic and restless, reproducing themselves 
in ever new forms rather than settling into the kind of parliamentary 
compromises which has stalled the ambitions of organized labour. To 
empower, then, implies groups and individuals providing themselves 
with the means to organize. In this respect the democratic Left 
represents an individualization of means combined with a 
collectivized vision of social, and usually ecological, ends. To act 
locally and think globally. To decentralize not in order to abandon 
the legitimacy of Law, constitution and parliament but, rather, to 
reclaim them for those who have for too long had to consume the 
decisions made elsewhere. 
Thirdly, and as such, the democratic Left makes room for the 
enabling state, for the welfare state, but does not see these as the 
sufficient condition of social justice. Its purpose is to subvert 
all of the logics which have gone before. The either /or logic of 
economic liberalism and old -style social democracy with their 
prevailing emphases upon the market and the state, respectively; 
but, also, the both /and logic of the new social democracy 
(NewLabour ?) which tends to regard state /market partnerships as the 
sole objective of a modern socio- economy and which wraps its 'both 
public and private' logic up in the rhetoric of community. For the 
democratic Left there is nothing wrong with 'community' as such, 
focusing as it does upon that sphere of civil society formally 
neglected by Anglo- American thought, but there is everything wrong 
with regarding such communities as given, as already formed in some 
conceptual space to which real people in real civil society must 
conform. That is to risk transforming the rhetoric of community into 
another conservatism, often with anti- feminist credentials - the 
nuclear family with its stay -at -home wife being stressed as the 
bedrock of a stable society. For the democratic Left - see the next 
chapter - community and civil society imply endogenous forms of 
relations which are defined in the process of emergence but which, 
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because of the protection of guaranteed rights and the provision of 
material resources for all, are less liable to fragment into the 
nationalisms of Eastern Europe or the separatist militias of the 
United States. By looking 'beyond' the state and the market the 
democratic Left tries to effect a balancing act between the sclerotic 
universalisms of modernity and the destructive particularisms of 
(conservative) postmodernity. 
So, finally, the politics of the democratic Left is neither social 
democratic nor Marxist. It emphasizes equality in a material sense 
since extremes of wealth and poverty are regarded as both immoral and 
socially unstable. To this extent a class -based politics, with its 
notion that our identities are principally dependent upon where we 
stand in the structures of occupation, wealth and income, remains 
relevant. This is a politics of identity and unity where we conceive 
of some universal human nature, or essence, as that which is being 
violated by concentrations of capital ownership. Yet there is also 
an emphasis upon equality in a non -material sense, such that 
reductions in wealth extremes do nothing in themselves to combat race 
and gender discrimination, environmental destruction and so on. The 
accent here is upon dialogue, the main bearers of which are social 
movements which do not derive their identities and projects directly 
from the socio- economic order and who negotiate coalitions and 
constituencies with other movements and classes rather than finding 
them lying around ready -to -hand. This is a politics of difference 
and dislocation where there are no definable social ends, even in an 
ecological sense. 
These, then, are the main principles which define the democratic 
Left as I see it at this time. They are, I am afraid, inevitably 
subject to change themselves and we will see why both in this chapter 
and in those which are to follow. Having outlined them, therefore, it 
is necessary now to backtrack somewhat and begin to understand the 
philopsophical background out of which the democratic Left politics 
is beginning to emerge. 
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b) Philosophy and Conflict 
There is doubt on the democratic Left as to whether we live in an 
epistemological or post- epistemological age. Those who hold to the 
former insist that without an epistemological critique we are left 
without any 'purchase' on the world from which society can be 
rationally criticized. Those who hold to the latter insist that it is 
the search for such an 'Archimedean point' which has led the Left 
astray in the past, inviting all sorts of totalitarian monsters into 
our midst. These are disputes which we will now address. Before we do 
so, it should be pointed out that the distinction which I have just 
drawn could also be thought of as a distinction between humanists who 
retain some notion of ideology and 'ideology- critique' and post - 
structuralists who prefer to emphasize discourse and 'discourse - 
analysis'. This further distinction - which also goes some way to 
explaining why, in this thesis, I discuss ideologies rather than some 
alternative - is, however, long and rather tangential to our main 
concern. I have therefore included it as an appendix which may be 
read in conjunction with what is to follow but which may also be 
safely read independently and at a later date. So, let us now examine 
those epistemological debates within the democratic Left which I am 
suggesting are crucial to its political future. 
To be an epistemologist is also to be a representationalist, i.e. 
someone who believes that the world as it is in- itself is somehow 
reflected in the concepts and signifiers through which we conceive of 
and describe it. Post -epistemologists, meanwhile, are also 
pragmatists like Rorty (1980) who insist that our concepts and 
descriptions are always made from within our particular contexts. 
This dispute between epistemologists or representationalists on 
the one hand and post -epistemologists or pragmatists on the other can 
be thought of metaphorically. Imagine a group of people existing on a 
landscape. They only have vague and conflicting ideas of how they got 
there. What is more, they are enveloped in a deep mist so that they 
are barely able to see the landscape upon which they must live. There 
is a dispute as to the landscape's true shape. Some insist that the 
terrain is uneven and consists of mountains and hills so that it might 
be possible for them to grope their way up beyond the mist and so get a 
clearer idea of where they are. In the past, for sure, there have 
been false starts and disappointments. Often they have climbed 
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upwards to find that the mist does not clear to the extent they had 
expected. But that is no reason not to continue to make the attempt, 
in the belief that there must somewhere exist a mountain so high that 
it escapes the mist and so offers a view of the surrounding 
environment. However, there are others who insist that this is 
naive. They insist that the terrain is largely flat and sensations of 
climbing upwards in the past have been delusions bred by a desperate 
desire for clarity and certainty. On the contrary, where they are is 
where they must be. No overall view of the lanscape is possible and 
no overall view is necessary so long as they learn to live without the 
need for absolute clarity and certainty. So, rather than yearning 
after a God's -eye view, the landscape's inhabitants should learn to 
communicate with each other and work for new ways of describing each 
other rather than a single, irrefutable True description. 
It should be obvious why this metaphor is relevant. 
Representationalists are those who believe in climbing upwards in 
order to strive for a greater knowledge of their environment. To 
them, being content to remain on the plain is a defeatism and a denial 
of the human project which is to seek better places to be. Indeed, 
that would be to invite a passivity which would allow society to 
stagnate in the status quo. Anti -representationalists, or 
pragmatists, are those who say that there is no climbing to be done 
and that the history of ideas is littered with the ruins of self - 
delusion. What is more, the strivers after some ultimate and 
absolute Truth have inspired those who belive that there is only one 
God, one true religion, one ideal society etc. and have been willing 
to kill and torture to ensure that everyone else believes it as well. 
If, instead, we recognize how radically situated in our given 
contexts we are then we will learn to respect and cultivate both our 
contexts and those of others with whom will start communicating 
instead of competing. Rorty is a prime example of someone for whom 
representationalism is the deluded attempt of humans to become God- 
like. 
Yet why on earth should any of this be relevant to the future of 
the democratic Left? Because, simply put, the Left now seems to be 
split between representationalists and pragmatists. On the one 
hand, there are those who believe and have always believed that the 
Left only has a future if it can offer some overall view of how the 
land lies and, subsequently, some proposals for reforming the land so 
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that it is controlled by, and for the good of, all its inhabitants. 
If this conception is abandoned then the Left has nothing distinctive 
to say and becomes just another localized discourse among other 
localized discourses. This, implicitly, would be to surrender the 
landscape to the imperatives and objectives of the Right (Geras, 1990 
& 1995) . On the other hand, pragmatists insist that it is precisely 
this striving for a God's -eye view which has always crippled the Left 
project. Marxism, for instance, always embodied this impulse to leap 
beyond our situated contexts and know the Truth and, in so doing, has 
helped create some of the most dangerous tyrannies of all time. But 
if the Left were to lower its sights and become more modest in its 
appraisal of our environment then its democratic potential would be 
finally liberated. So that instead of designing some once- and -for- 
all reform for our socio- economic systems it should take hold of the 
democratic project, to which it itself has often contributed, and 
seek to extend democracy into every quarter of the land. Only in this 
way does the Left have a future (Laclau fi Mouffe, 1985) . 
So, we are left with two seemingly contrasting visions of what the 
Left is and should try to do, corresponding to two seemingly 
contrasting visions of what intellectual endeavour consists of in a 
period of high modernity, or even postmodernity. How are we to 
proceed? In what follows, I will first take a look at Habermas as an 
example of a Left representationalist and then at Laclau as an 
example of a Left pragmatist. 
Critics of Habermas generally single out his avowed universalism 
as the most appropriate target of criticism. But such criticisms 
tend to be based on a misreading of Habermas's endeavours - a 
misreading which sometimes seems deliberate. His intersubjective 
rationality is little more than caricatured if it is regarded as an 
attempt to resurrect the Enlightenment project of searching for 
secure foundations for knowledge and inquiry. Indeed, I will argue 
later on that Habermas's post -metaphysical thought represents the 
best way forward since it seems to be an attempt to establish a 
consensus with the more reasonable versions of pragmatism. The real 
problem is that Habermas is both too much of a Marxist and too much of 
a liberal. Too Marxist in the sense that he still works with the kind 
of binary, hierarchical models which characterize the bulk of 
Marxist theory and too liberal in that he conceives of the self in 
unitary, fixed, static terms. This leaves his notion of language and 
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discourse as too inter -subjective in its implications. Both of these 
aspects hark back to the worst elements of the modernist perspective. 
On the one hand, an attempt to provide 'total explanations of human 
existence by reducing its complex ambiguity to essentialist 
principles and distinctions. On the other, to treat subjectivity and 
identity as coherent and transparent elements. Why is this? How has 
his thought evolved? 
It was in the early 1970s that Habermas (1976, 22 -40) contrasted 
the Capital -Labour relations of liberal, nineteenth century 
capitalism with the corporatism and interventionism of organized, 
twentieth century capitalism. He concluded that the economic crises 
which characterized the former have been displaced into other crises 
within the latter. In short, capitalism could only have survived by 
allowing a greater amount of state intervention and administrative 
control. Contradictions persist but are now more likely to be 
political and social rather than economic and are less likely to have 
the kind of transformatory potential diagnosed by Marx. As his 
thought evolved Habermas came to look at the specific forms through 
which crisis tendencies are manifested. In advanced capitalism 
legitimacy is based less on localized traditions and more on the 
steering mechanisms - money, power - of the economic and political 
sub -systems respectively. This process is what he refers to as the 
colonization of the lifeworld. This means that our background of 
norms and understandings are reproduced according to the imperatives 
of economic and political rationality. The task of a critical 
theory, then, is to understand the "lines of conflict" along which 
new "potentials for protest" are emerging (1987, 392) . This implies 
appreciating the significance of social movements, an appreciation 
threatened by the neo- conservative implications of postmodernism. 
But why should postmodernism imply the kind of neo- conservatism 
which threatens the progressive potential of critical theory? 
Basically, because Habermas (1990) thinks of modernity as an 
unfinished project. Certainly, if modernity is taken to imply 
foundationalism, universalism and rationalism then it has not been 
an unqualified success. Excessive bureaucracy, commodifi cat ion , 
destructive individualism, all examples of the constraining, 
alienating implications of modernity. But, insists Habermas, 
modernity has also implied freedom and emancipation and so we should 
not reject it too quickly lest we risk destroying these progressive 
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factors also. Yet this is precisely what postmodernism threatens to 
do. So, Habermas sets out to retrieve what is most stimulating and 
positive in the modernist tradition - a reflexive, inter -subjective 
rationalism - and deploy this against the principal postmodernists: 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, Bataille, Foucault. At each stage he 
trys to show how these theorists depend upon, and even appeal to, the 
kind of foundationalism which they denounce modernity for embodying, 
e.g. Heidegger's ontology collapses back into the philosophy of the 
subject from which he was trying to escape (1990, 151) . So Habermas 
concludes that, 
The democratic critique of reason exacts a high price for taking 
leave of modernity. In the first place, these discourses can 
and want to give no account of their own position. (1990, 
336) 
It is this silence, this wilful amnesia, which means that 
postmodernists may be neo- conservatives in disguise: 
It could be that they are merely cloaking their complicity with 
the venerable tradition of counter -Enlightenment in the garb 
of post -Enlightenment. (1990, 5) 
Habermas's thought, however, is still organized around a 
dualistic and hierarchical logic. By this I mean the tendency to 
construct binary oppositions and structure them 'vertically' . The 
most obvious example in social theory is historical materialism's 
base /superstructure distinction. Habermas's re- working of critical 
theory abandons the specific reductionisms of Marx (and Weber) but 
retains their dualistic, hierarchical logic. The primary 
distinction he makes between system and lifeworid implies a 
condition where processes 'out- there' engender pathologies 'in- 
here' . This has to be the case since otherwise Habermas would have to 
attribute substantive social integrative functions to money and 
Power, thus threatening the very validity of a system /lifeworid 
distinction in the first place. This explains why he interprets most 
social movements as "defensive strategies ", where only feminism has 
"..the impetus of an offensive movement, whereas the other 
movements have a more defensive character" (1987, 392). This might 
be true if emancipation is seen in purely external terms - as directed 
against mediatizing sub -systems - though even this is to 
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underestimate the socio- economic critique given by ecological 
thought. But if emancipation is also 'internal' - cultural, 
aesthetic, symbolic - then Habermas's characterization of social 
movements is myopic. Social movements, it can be said, decodify the 
meanings /roles assigned to us by the dominant material culture and 
re- codify them accordingly. In these terms, the ecological movement 
is as potentially subversive, and therefore political, as feminism. 
Habermas gives insufficient attention to 'internal' emancipation 
because ultimately he sees the subject as that which constitutes 
discourse, which must therefore be seen as an inter -subjective 
process, and does not consider that subjects are reciprocally 
constituted by discourse, which therefore must have intra- 
subjective implications. Giving attention to both the internal and 
external aspects of emancipation, without privileging one over the 
other, would mean looking beyond the kind of simple legal and 
political reform which now occupies Habermas so much. Indeed, 
because of this emphasis, and despite his support for feminism, some 
feminists insist that Habermas's system /lifeworld distinction is 
gendered through and through (Fraser, 1989, 113 -144). 
So, referring back to my earlier metaphor, Habermas is an example 
of someone who believes that attaining an 'overview' of the landscape 
upon which we stand is both possible and necessary. But, in so doing, 
Habermas is open to the accusation that he is reproducing the kind of 
hierarchical logic with which postmodernists charge modernity. 
However, two things remain to be said. Firstly, Habermas's theory of 
subjectivity has more recently been given a sophisticated form 
(1992, 163 -204) - this I have not taken account of here. Secondly, he 
has somwehat modified his approach to the postmodernist critique - 
this I will return to after taking a look at Laclau. 
Ernesto Laclau is an eclectic theorist and not someone who is easy 
to label. But, in drawing upon the post -structuralist and 
postmodernist critiques, Laclau is one of those who recommends a 
politics of conflict, flux, dispersion and dislocation. The 
significance of his work is in reminding us that if we wish to realize 
democratic objectives we should abandon any notion that a society can 
be immutable, stable and transparent to itself. However, Laclau is 
far less capable of defining those objectives themselves and in 
motivating us to work towards one set of objectives rather than 
another. 
I will deal with each of these points in turn. 
For Laclau - and Chantal Mouffe his sometimes collaborator - the 
social can never be finally and permanently fixed. Fixity is only 
ever provisional because there is no structure and no identity which 
is not vulnerable to dislocation. This is because discourse, or the 
infinite play of differences, is what constitutes identity and since 
the discursive is multiple, shifting and overdetermined the 
boundaries of identities overflow themselves constantly. So the 
politics of identity is the politics of antagonisms where no a priori 
lines of conflict are conceivable. Like Habermas, they see the 
significance of social movements but they insist that the identity 
and role of a social movement are not 'given' but are to be 
hegemonically articulated in the endless reformulation of 
contingent relations (1985, 132 -7) . The value of this approach is in 
its reminding us that practices which are essentialist and 
homogenizing either lurch into totalitarianism or lapse into a 
political pessimism. They are right to insist that a democratic 
politics has to jettison such practices. 
The problem comes when we ask why should anyone commit themselves 
to radicalism in the first place. Laclau himself raises the 
question. For if "...emancipation and constitution are part of the 
same process....Why choose between different types of society ?" The 
answer? 
...if the agent who must choose is someone who already has 
certain beliefs and values then criteria for choice - with all 
the intrinsic ambiguities that a choice involves - can be 
formulated. (1990, 83) 
But any such formulation will depend upon the beliefs and values 
which we hold, in which case our belief -system will be substantially 
reflected in any subsequent criteria. So, the range of options we 
will face derive from who we already are. Laclau and Mouffe work 
within and against the Marxist tradition simply because it 
"...constitutes our own past" (1985, 4). Curiously, then, Laclau 
combines an abstract analysis of the social as substantially 
indeterminate with a particularist conception of the self as 
substantially embedded and situated. We believe and act as we do 
because we are saturated with the contexts within which we move. Is 
it possible that for Laclau the 'discursive articulation of the self' 
is something of a passive process? We need not worry, he seems to 
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say, that social indeterminacy will be destructively anarchic 
because we are already constituted out of relatively stable subject - 
positions. Personally, I have no problem with this in itself - 
leaving aside whether there is a performative contradiction at work 
here - but Laclau fails to make a further move and characterize these 
subject- positions in terms of a political economy because he is 
scared that this will collapse him back into an economics of 
essentialism. So he, like Rorty, risks committing the mistake of 
embracing non -universalism and contextualism so strongly that two 
things come to the fore: the more conservative aspects of the 
communitarian critique and a neo- pragmatism which trashes utopian 
thought as surely as it does essentialism. 
So, as these observations make plain, Laclau and Moufle are not 
constructing an 'anything goes' philosophy where articulation 
implies a social stream of mutability and flux with no permanence and 
stability whatsoever. On the contrary, they define 'nodal points' as 
partial fixations of the social, or as "privileged discursive 
points" (1985, 105 -13) . These points therefore provide a focus for 
identity and identity- formation. The trouble is that they are so 
concerned to argue that such points have no metaphysical grounding 
that they neglect to deal with the way in which nodal points may be 
historically identified with capitalist institutions (Best & 
Kellner, 1991, 201 -4) . So they regard nodal points, too, as multiple 
and decentred rather than as coalescing around the enduring social 
structures which are functional to the accumulation of capital. 
Laclau and Mouffe cannot identify nodal points with the material 
practices of capitalist institutions for this would be to argue that 
it is concentrations of economic power which act as constraints on 
discursive formation and this, in turn, would be to suggest that 
socialist /working -class politics have a significance over and above 
their status as an articulatory practice. Not as a world -historical 
agency along the lines pursued by so much Marxist theory, but simply 
as a critique which 'got there first'. Not as the centre of all 
democratic politics but as something which, in its pursuit of social 
justice and equality, provides a model for more recent political 
radicalism. This is why, in Part 2, we look at feminism and political 
ecology partly in terms of market socialism. This will not be to 
suggest that the Left provides the only home for feminism and 
political ecology but it might suggest that it provides the best home 
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given the extent to which global capital is environmentally 
destructive and overwhelmingly concentrated in male hands. However, 
this stronger claim is one which I will not be pursuing. 
For Laclau and Mouffe, however, any suggestion that there is such 
a strong, Leftist bond between such critiques and practices is to 
fall back into essentialist error of mistaking contingency for 
necessity. But my reply is that this is to over -estimate, and react 
too strongly against, the prevalence of essentialist politics. 
Their alternative 'articulatory politics' seems therefore to offer 
no reason why we should prefer, say, socialist feminism to 
conservative feminism. I would agree that there are no a priori 
criteria for deciding which is superior, but Laclau and Mouffe offer 
no grounds at all for preferring one to the other: they simply seem to 
hand the process over to the articulatory practices deriving from the 
particular traditions we find ourselves in. So, where I have 
characterized ideology as a story which we tell ourselves about the 
world, which implies that the narration can be changed and new 
stories invented, Laclau has a negative interpretation of ideology, 
seeing it as a totalizing force: an attempt to 'close' the social, to 
fix meaning and to freeze discursive play. Ideology, he says, is 
certainly constitutive of the social and is in any case unavoidable, 
but it is also something to be resisted (1990, 89 -92). On the 
contrary, I would have us regard ideology as a liberating force, as a 
means of understanding the world and of projecting new worlds which 
will be, hopefully, more just than the present one. Laclau's 
theories capture how we debate but not why we debate in the first 
place. 
So Laclau tells us how to organize in terms of our objectives, but 
not why this set of objectives is preferable to that. He lacks, in 
short, a meta -critique of the social. Accepting a weaker version of 
his thesis would require us to view socialism as more than simple 
democratization - by which Laclau seems to mean the questioning of 
all stability, the dislocating of all fixity. A weaker version would 
require us to identify those marginalized spaces which, being 
'peripheral' to the social order, are therefore currently superior 
to those capitalist nodal points which lie at the 'centre' (Best & 
Kellner, 1991, 192 -204). The disclosure of society which Laclau 
champions has yet to occur since it is still a field structured around 
immobility and fixity. it is not yet an open space of discursive 
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formations because such openness is not in the best interests of 
global capital. In short, Laclau describes a future worth working 
towards, not a present worth preserving. 
So, if Habermas is an example of a representationalist who is 
desirous of a God's -eye view, Laclau is an example of a pragmatist for 
whom such endeavours are dangerous and futile. If we have reason for 
being sceptical of both of these positions then where does that leave 
us and what are the implications for a democratic Left politics? 
c) Beyond Pragmatism and Representationalism? 
I propose that we be dissatisfied with both of these extremes. At 
its worst, representationalism does indeed stand accused of 
imagining that our mental apparatus, our language and so forth, 
mirror the way things really are such that a God's -eye view of the 
world is immediately accessible to us. Yet, equally, pragmatism is in 
danger of collapsing the distinction between the progressive and 
regressive implications of representationalism. For example, by 
rejecting the liberal notion of legitimacy Foucault usually failed 
to distinguish between those forms of power /knowledge which repress 
and those which offer the potential to liberate since he rejected the 
capacity of reason to gain some distance from the world in order that 
such a critical distinction could be made. At the same time, Foucault 
(1982) is a good example of someone who came to believe that 
subjectivity and power could be theorized and deployed as a site of 
resistance rather than experienced as a discursive force. 
So most of us, I submit, would attach ourselves to neither of the 
above extremes to any great extent. In fact, it seems reasonable to 
regard representationalism and pragmatism as existing along a 
continuum rather than as implying the kind of either /or mentality 
often demonstrated by their proponents. This means that we accept 
that a God's -eye view is chimerical and that, to mix a metaphor with 
an analogy, the mouth of Plato's cave is something which always 
recedes from us as we try to approach it. At the same time, we 
recognize that remaining where we already are - playing around with 
vocabularies, as Rorty would have it - is also unsatisfactory. 
Remaining chained to Plato's rock is not an option either. So what we 
strive to do is attain some kind of bird's -eye view of the surrounding 
landscape while admitting that any view we attain will be partial and 
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temporary, we always fall back to the earth and must always strive to 
ascend above it once again. How is this to be effected? In fact, it 
is effected every day politically. An ideology, as a story we tell 
ourselves about the world, is the way in which we achieve a partial 
perspective on the landscape. Neither essentialist politics nor 
articulatory politics is what I am proposing, but an ideological 
politics. 
Now I am well aware of how unsatisfactory this would appear to many 
people. Both representationalists and pragmatists might accuse this 
position of either being incoherent or of rapidly collapsing into 
one position or another. However, some support for it can be found in 
the literature. In his 'postmetaphysics' Habermas seems to be 
attempting to mark out a position which both die -hard modernists and 
postmodernists would disclaim: 
The metaphysical priority of unity above plurality and the 
contextualistic priority of plurality above unity are secret 
accomplices.... the unity of reason only remains perceptible in 
the plurality of its voices. (1992, 116 -7) 
So established discources and practices can only communicate with 
each other, along the lines desired by Rorty, if we also assume a 
wider interpretative horizon without which such communication would 
quickly malfunction: 
...all parties appeal to the common reference point of a 
possible consensus, even if this reference point is projected 
in each case from within their own contexts. (1992, 138) 
The ideal speech situation is not a concrete reality where 
communicants debate with each other free of power relations. Rather, 
it is a reference point which receeds from us even as we make a common 
appeal to it: 
From the possibility of reaching understanding linguistically, 
we can read off a concept of situated reason that is given voice 
in validity claims that are both context-dependent and 
transcendent. (1992, 139) 
Far from being opposed to individualism, universalism is the 
condition of individualism. The unity of reason is the source of the 
diversity of reason's voices (1992, 140). 
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Now no doubt some will continue to see this as modernist 
metaphysics laying claim to the rhetoric, but not the force, of 
contextualism and pragmatism and, for the most part, Habermas 
continues to direct his fire against what he calls 'negative 
metaphysics' , which he tries to explain sociologically. Yet, it does 
represent some attempt to give substance to what we have referred to 
as an alternative to the either /or of modernism and 
postmodernism. 
Politically, then, the Left should be satisfied neither with 
those who harken back to the absolutes of representationalism nor 
those who dissolve the Left project into a discourse which signifies 
nothing beyond what those who identify with the Left believe. On the 
former side, we have an essentialist Marxism which believed it had 
attained a scientific status and spent a century either waiting for 
the future to drop into its lap or explaining why this had not been 
so. On the latter side, we have a kind of post -Marxism which has its 
finger on so many theoretical pulses that it is in danger of leavng 
the world as it is. The former was too ambitious; the latter is not 
ambitious enough. The former misunderstood where it was; the latter 
refuses to understand where it could be if it tried. So as with 
economic liberalism and social democracy, the democratic Left as I 
conceive it denotes a complex philosophy, one which eschews the 
dichotomies of metaphysics vs. anti -metaphysics, 
representationalism vs. pragmatism, modernism vs. postmodernism. 
However, economic liberalism and social democracy also imply a 
political practice whereas, as I indicated at the beginning of this 
section, the democratic Left is only currently groping its way 
towards such practice. What might this involve? 
d) From Philosophy to Politics? 
The political practice of the democratic Left, I submit, must 
concern itself with conceptualizing and evolving the agencies and 
the institutions which would correspond to the bird's -eye view of 
which I have spoken. So we will now conclude this section by drawing 
out some practical implications of the philosophical debates which 
have been outlined. Let us begin with 'agency'. 
As just made plain in the discussion of Laclau, if social justice 
is our goal then it would be a serious error to imagine that there is a 
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the future to drop into its lap or explaining why this had not been 
so. On the latter side, we have a kind of post -Marxism which has its 
finger on so many theoretical pulses that it is in danger of leavng 
the world as it is. The former was too ambitious; the latter is not 
ambitious enough. The former misunderstood where it was; the latter 
refuses to understand where it could be if it tried. So as with 
economic liberalism and social democracy, the democratic Left as I 
conceive it denotes a complex philosophy, one which eschews the 
dichotomies of metaphysics vs. anti- metaphysics, 
representationalism vs. pragmatism, modernism vs. postmodernism. 
However, economic liberalism and social democracy also imply a 
political practice whereas, as I indicated at the beginning of this 
section, the democratic Left is only currently groping its way 
towards such practice. What might this involve? 
The political practice of the democratic Left, I submit, must 
concern itself with conceptualizing and evolving the agencies and 
the institutions which would correspond to the bird's -eye view of 
which I have spoken. Now, in some small way - and even this is a 
presumptuous claim - chapters 8 to 10 of this research thesis are 
concerned with exactly that. So, to round this section off, we seem 
justified in anticipating later arguments in order to appreciate the 
practical implications of these epistemological debates. Let us 
begin with 'agency' . 
As just made plain in the discussion of Laclau, if social justice 
is our goal then it would be a serious error to imagine that there is a 
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single agency through which it will be realized. The fault of the 
Left was always to conceive of the future as being a specific location 
downstream to which we would be carried through the medium of the 
working -class. This, as mentioned in the previous section, is a 
vision that motivated social democrats as much as Marxists. It is a 
vision that has faded. However, neither should we lurch into the 
opposite mistake of imagining that there exist no privileged agents 
of social transformation, for this would lock us into the eternal 
present of the pragmatist. Women, for instance, are discriminated 
not only as women but as members of a socio- economic class which has 
to sell its labour power to survive and which barely survives because 
the 'purse- strings' are held not only by men but by capital- holders. 
(To this comes the objection that a wealthy woman faces no clear 
distinctions as to where her 'real' interests lie and, certainly, in 
the West female interests are far from being as uncontroversial as 
the previous sentence might suggest. However, if poverty is indeed 
being feminized then Laclau et al might be open to the accusation of 
biasing their articulatory politics not only on an ethnocentric but 
also on a middle -class perspective. ) To ignore the importance of 
gender constructions would be socialist reductionism and to ignore 
political economics would be feminist reductionism. As should be 
plain the democratic Left can be satisfied with neither of these. 
So the democratic Left needs to avoid both a politics of pure 
identity - where practice coalesces around a unitary, world - 
historical agency - and a politics of pure difference - where there 
are no privileged agencies whatsoever. Chapters 8 to 10 try to 
suggest this. Wage -earners remain as agents of transformation given 
their inferior position in the labour market which breeds both 
poverty and exploitation for many. Woman enter onto the scene, as 
they have been doing for thirty years, as those most likely to suffer 
through a labour market still largely dominated by the covert 
discrimination of men. And, more recently, ecological agents have 
appeared as those people unhappy with the dominance of the artificial 
and the cultural in human affairs so that, here too, an economics 
seems called for. In each case - and in the case of ethnic minorities 
and gays with which I am not dealing here - a more egalitarian 
redistribution of resources seems appropriate. Not as the essence of 
feminism etc., but as its foundation. In other words, this is not to 
pretend that material redistribution would, of itself, bring about a 
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non -patriarchal, environmentally benign world. But it would be a 
step on the right direction. Firstly, because women suffer 
disproportionately from concentrations of economic power and no 
ecological society could be established and justified if it were to 
be economically unjust. A politics of redistribution reflects this. 
As such, secondly, a recognition of this on the part of both 
ideologies could form the basis of co- operation and mutuality. And 
because the Left has material redistribution as a long -standing goal 
then this gives us some reason to speculate about a three -pronged 
critique of existing capitalism, i.e. a democratic Left neither 
social democratic nor Marxist. 
So, it is at this point that we pass from consideration of agents 
to institutions. What are the institutions which would effect such 
redistribution while avoiding both essentialism and anti - 
essentialism? There are no satisfactory answers to this at present. 
In chapters 8 to 10 I attempt to evolve some kind of democratic Left 
economics by giving feminist and ecological critiques of market 
socialism in order that the latter - currently the most comprehensive 
and coherent radical economics available to us - can be modified. 
However, movements in this direction are tentative and far from 
secure. Nevertheless, there does seem to be one policy proposal 
which is, or could be, of common concern to all three: CI. A CI, in 
the guise of a social dividend, would make some kind of appearance in 
a market socialist society since it offers a means of effecting 
common ownership without the kind of heavy- handed state control 
which has been discredited. It could make an appearance in a non- 
patriarchal society since it would take the emphasis away from the 
male -dominated formal sector, there being real doubts as to whether 
social insurance could ever have the same effect. And CI might be 
important to the anti- growth strategies of ecologists since it would 
provide the income which a post -employment, post- industrial society 
could not generate via jobs and economic growth. Moreover, since CI 
seems to be of common interest to each of these three ' forks' of the 
democratic Left it could emerge as a dual instrument: firstly, as a 
means of allowing these three agencies of social transformation to 
recognise a common condition, a common goal and, therefore, a common 
project; secondly, as a means of building up the institutional forums 
without which the democratic Left will remain as an abstract 
collection of epistemological debates. Hopefully, such speculation 
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on my part is not too unreasonable. Some, though, might object that 
interpreting CI as a lynchpin both of the democratic Left's agencies 
and institutions is too wishful and ambitious. In any event, this 
seems as good a time as any to bring this chapter to a close and 
embark on a discussion of those theoretical debates which provide the 
foundation for the CI debate. 
5. Conclusion 
Finally, then, our three ideologies have been dealt with in both 
their philosophical and political presuppositions. Economic 
liberalism embodies a moral epistemology which would 
institutionalize the limitations of reason in terms of spontaneous 
market relations. Social democracy searches for redistributive 
mechanisms appropriate to the principles of liberal equality. The 
democratic Left attempts wider social and economic reform in a way 
consistent with contemporary philosophical debates. The time has 
come to look at how these ideologies differ in their approaches to 
citizenship, work and full employment in order that we may, later on, 
see how and why they approach the kind of social security reform 
implied by CI. Firstly, though, what do each of these ideologies 





Why is citizenship of such importance to this research? Simply 
because there are several bases upon which entitlement to social 
security benefits can be grounded. We might, for instance, prefer to 
establish market- driven criteria, whereby people are entitled to 
benefits if they can demonstrate that they are in need and are unable 
to provide for themselves through no fault of their own. This might 
imply a system of income -testing - a test of income - and /or means - 
testing - a test of income and other assets. Or, our criteria might 
be categorical where provision is dependent upon membership of a 
particular category. One category might be for those who are 
recognized as disabled and therefore more disadvantaged than able - 
bodied people in terms of job opportunities and so forth. A further 
set of criteria might cover those who are unemployed but who are fit 
and available for work - with further sub -categories distinguishing 
between those who are eligible for insurance benefits and those who 
are not. Now, of course, each of these three bases are present at any 
one time and it is difficult to imagine that a social security system 
could be grounded upon one exclusively - though some might disagree, 
e.g. those wishing to privatize the system in its entirety. In 
Britain in the mid -1990s we have means -testing in, say, the form of 
housing benefit, categorical entitlement in the form of disability 
benefits and contributory benefits like unemployment benefit - with 
those who have not paid sufficient contributions having to fall back 
on means -tested Income Support. But even if all social security 
systems combine all three forms of provision to some degree we may 
still identify differing welfare regimes where one form is 
emphasized at the expense of the others (Esping -Anderson, 1990) . So, 
what should our welfare philosophy be? Should we favour greater 
selectivity or universal categorical and contributory benefits, or 
something like CI which is not only universal but also unconditional 
in that it ditches all reference to contributions? Obviously, the 
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form of provision we favour will depend upon the ideologicál 
presumptions we bring to the subject which means, consequently, that 
our notion of entitlement will in large part derive from our 
conception of what it is to be a citizen. The citizen who is 
primarily a bearer of rights will have different entitlements to the 
citizen who is primarily a bearer of duties and the decision as to 
which conception we should prefer is an ideological decision through 
and through. It should be clear, then, why attention to citizenship 
is of importance to our ideological approach. 
As we might expect, these differences tend to reproduce 
themselves within the CI debate. Economic liberals tend to prefer a 
NIT which is very much a conditional form of provision which might 
suggest an interpretation of citizenship which is closely allied to a 
person's position and status in the labour market. Social democrats 
are universalists but still concerned to make provision conditional 
upon the performance of socially -useful activity, as I will show in 
the chapter on social insurance. This represents a greater degree of 
scepticism toward the market, so that citizenship embodies some 
degree of autonomy from the market. The democratic Left tend to 
favour complete universality and unconditionality, which suggests a 
notion of citizenship which is considerably alienated from both 
market and statist criteria and imperatives. So, again, a discussion 
of this subject seems of immediate relevance. 
To begin with I will state a simple definition of citizenship 
which, while not uncontestable, is one which could be accepted by 
each of the ideologies with which we are dealing. Citizenship, then, 
refers to the equal status of all members of civil society. Now, what 
happens if we highlight the essential components of this basic 
definition? Equal status would seem to refer to some notion of 
justice and equality. Members refers to those who possess and 
perform citizenship rights and duties. Civil society refers to the 
'space' within which such performance occurs. So, in this chapter, I 
will tease out the ideological differences regarding these 
components by proceeding through discussions of the following: 
social justice, rights and duties, civil society. I will then 
summarize the theories of citizenship implicit within our three 
ideologies before, finally, spelling out the implications for social 
security reform and CI. 
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2. Social Justice 
But if citizenship implies the equal worth or status of each 
citizen, what exactly does this mean? I submit that, first and 
foremost, it must refer to an equal capacity for, and an equal need 
of, self- respect. The reference to self is somewhat problematic. 
Obviously, how I stand in my own eyes is somehow interlocked with how 
I stand in the eyes of others; nor is it easy to disentangle the 
material from the non -material aspects of self- worth, i.e. my sense 
of integrity, my very identity, is bound up with my material 
possessions and concrete achievements - rank and qualifications. 
Even so, these other components of status are unlikely to be 
meaningful unless held together by a 'core' of self- respect and 
esteem. Citizenship requires that self- respect be thought of as 
antecedent to my actions and interactions Citizenship gives the self 
not only its coherence but its sense of coherence. 
But self- respect is undermined and eventually destroyed by 
poverty. I state this bluntly as an assertion that all ideologies 
accede to. Poor citizens are not full citizens because poverty 
reflects back to them an image which is vague, distorted, one - 
dimensional and narrow. The difference comes during considerations 
of poverty, its nature and occurence. Economic liberals usually view 
poverty as an absolute - as not having enough to maintain the most 
basic subsistence - of which there are very few examples in the 
industrialized West. Those further to the Left regard poverty as 
relative to the standards of living of the society in question. To be 
poor is to suffer a lack of resources such that a normal social 
existence cannot be led. At that point disagreements begin between 
those who would regard poverty purely in relative terms (Townsend, 
1979, 32) and those who would re- introduce some reference to an 
'absolute' (Sen, 1984, 672 -3). Furthermore, there are specific 
ideological differences as to how poverty may be relieved and whether 
it can ever be fully prevented. Nevertheless, the distinction 
between absolute and relative poverty is crucial. This is what makes 
social justice of relevance. The Right, simplistically speaking, 
regard it as a conceptual error which mistakes the prevalence of 
Poverty and therefore the nature of self- respect and citizenship. 
The Left, broadly conceived, says that without social justice and an 
anti- poverty regime then self- respect, and therefore the status of 
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full citizenship, cannot be extended to all. 
As before it is Hayek who offers the most rewarding economic 
liberal critique. Since, he says, the general welfare refers to the 
economic, social and legal conditions within which individuals and 
groups can provide for their own needs, 
The idea that government can determine the opportunities for 
all, and especially that it can ensure that they are the same for 
all, is therefore in conflict with the whole rationale of a free 
society. (1976, 9) 
A moral system is inseperable from a given social order and our moral 
obligations in some sense refer to the benefits we derive from that 
order. This means that our freedom is opaque, an act of trust and 
moral investment in forces which we cannot control. So only human 
conduct can be judged as just or unjust. Collective states -of- 
affairs can be thought of as good or bad, but it is a categorical 
mistake to regard them as either just or unjust. We can discern rules 
of just conduct but justice is not assignable to the social, 
spontaneous order which is the unintended consequence of 
individuals' actions (1976, 27 -38). The mistake the socialist makes 
is to imagine that justice preceeds the law and that the legislator's 
will preceeds justice: 
It is an ideology born out of the desire to achieve complete 
control over the social order...(l976, 53) 
Social justice is the product of the mistaken desire to subject 
everything to design and regularity and is therefore destructive of 
the very market order which is essential to freedom. True, the 
benefits and burdens entailed by a market economy would be unjust if 
such a distribution had been deliberate. But no such deliberative 
allocation exists in a market order. On the contrary, it is social 
justice which creates such deliberation and so sends us down the road 
toward serfdom and totalitarianism (1976, 62 -9) . Absolute poverty 
has been abolished, but not by social justice - Hayek recognizes the 
concept of relative poverty but believes that it is largely benign 
and unavoidable. Social justice has only ever hindered the abolition 
of Poverty by hindering market mechanisms. Indeed, social justice is 
often really only a pretext for special interest claims, for as the 
general wealth has increased the position of some groups has not done 
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so and might even have worsened. It is they who demand that the 
market be 'corrected' and market outcomes weighted in their favour. 
As this occurs, for reasons of political expediency, other social 
groups demand equivalent treatment until social justice weaves its 
spell over everything and everyone and the market order is severely 
threatened (1976, 139 -43). 
The curiosity is that Hayek seems unable to account for the 
widespread belief in the meaningfulness and virtuousness of social 
justice. The moral epistemology I sketched in the previous chapter 
would seem to suggest that Hayek views the advocates of social 
justice as misunderstanding the nature of rationality leading them 
to blame the market order for that for which it cannot be held 
responsible, a consequence of which is to hand responsibility over to 
the irresponsible state. This goes along with Hayek's moral 
anthropology, namely that primitive close -knit societies have 
recourse to some notion of social justice but advanced, mass 
societies do not, since their sheer size and complexity means that 
they can only function according to impersonal rules. On both 
counts, social justice derives from a category mistake. Yet this 
sits uneasily with Hayek's acknowledgement that, 
There is no reason why in a free society government should not 
assure to all protection against severe deprivation in the form 
of an assured minimum income, or a floor below which nobody need 
descend. To enter into such an insurance...may well be in the 
interest of all; or it may be felt to be a clear moral duty of all 
to assist... those who cannot help themselves. So long as such a 
uniform minimum income is provided outside the market to all 
those who, for any reason, are unable to earn in the market an 
adequate maintenance...(1976, 87) 
There is little here with which many on the Left would disagree with 
substantially. So long as provision is agreed upon democratically, 
whether out of enlightened self - interest or moral duty, and so long 
as it does not inhibit the market then why not refer to it as social 
justice? Hayek would not permit this, but then Hayek is restricting 
the term social justice to a kind of collectivist ethic and does not 
allow for such provision to have derived from the altruistic desires 
of individuals. Hayek, in other words, sees second -order desires - 
my desire to help others - as derivative, as somehow less maningful 
than those desires which are geared towards self- interest. But even 
if we accept that justice does not have a collectivist character, 
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this does not mean that we have to accept a strict individualism. 
Indeed, we could combine an anti -collectivism with a kind of 
socialistic co-operativism, where individuals pool their talents in 
non -market forms of association and then democratically provide for 
themselves, as a society, welfare provision based upon the 
principles of social justice (Wainwright, 1994). By attributing 
justice solely to self- interested individuals, by regarding history 
deterministically,- as a movement from primitive to modern societies 
-and by making democracy an instrument of market imperatives Hayek 
severely misrepresents arguments for social justice. 
The problem for advocates of social justice, therefore, is to 
argue for it as essential to a free society without succumbing to the 
statism which Hayek criticizes effectively. And yet the Centre -Left 
often has succumbed to a statism of one form or another and the 
biggest problem facing social democrats is to detach social justice 
from statism. In the past it has failed to do so due to a confusion 
between ends and means. If social justice is taken to refer to that 
socio- economic condition which enables all individuals to gain some 
minimal degree of self -respect, then there are diverse ways of 
attempting to bring these conditions about. For instance, in terms 
of ownership we could favour a version of Jeffersonian small 
property -holdings, or an economy of localized co- operatives, or 
centralized public ownership. But social democrats, broadly 
conceived, have in practice tended to favour the latter. Co- 
operatives have rarely been supported by governments and property - 
holdings have been identified with capitalistic share and home 
ownership, thus surrendering the debate to the Right. This in itself 
would not be too bad except that public ownership often came to be 
regarded as an end -in- itself. Rather than be thought of as an 
instrument of social justice, social democrats have often considered 
it to be an inherent principle of social justice. So much is 
recognized by Blairite modernizers who seek to detach, rightly, 
social justice from statism. But this statism may, in turn, have had 
something to do with the excessive faith displayed by many social 
democrats in economic growth. By seeking to work largely within the 
parameters set by capital, social democrats have shied away from 
addressing the form and extent of redistribution which would be 
required to deliver social justice and, out of electoral expediency 
or whatever, have insisted that growth would 'deliver the goods'. 
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The benefits of economic re- structuring could thereby be delivered 
without having to face too many of the burdens. After the war, growth 
was seen to have been harmed by pre -war laissez -faire capitalism such 
that planning and interventionism were now required. So if social 
justice was desirable and growth was necessary then widespread 
public ownership would reconcile the two. The confusion between 
means and ends begins here and though the Blairites may successfully 
detach social justice from statism it is far from clear that they 
appreciate the necessity of re- conceptualizing exactly what it is we 
mean by 'growth' . 
This confusion of means and ends has had unfortunate 
consequences, not least for the welfare state. Universal rights were 
embodied in state provision of education, health and housing but were 
imperfectly extended to the social security system. Beveridge was 
far from unusual in imaging that families would receive an adequate 
income through the full employment to be provided by planning and an 
ever -growing economy. A social insurance system would therefore 
provide for temporary hardship whenever the labour market faltered. 
So rather than embodying a right for individuals to have their basic 
needs met, the system would provide for needs once normal, labour - 
market provision had broken down. This entailed both a top -heavy 
welfare bureaucracy to assess when needs were not being met and an 
over -emphasis upon contribution records which would be accumulated 
through life -long labour market activity. Now it should be clear, 
though I will argue the points more fully in Part 2, that even when 
this system worked as it was supposed to it still discriminated 
against women, who have traditionally been less active in the labour 
market and at a disadvantage when they have been earning. 
Furthermore, growth has not 'delivered the goods', full employment 
was not maintained and the needs -based justification of the system 
has suffered accordingly. At the end of this century, we are 
therefore left with a top -heavy bureaucracy requiring people to 
operate in social and economic circumstances for which the system was 
never designed in the first place. So whatever the problems in the 
other areas of the welfare state, the social security system requires 
us not only to re -think how it is to be funded, but also to re -think 
the efficacy of its essential structure. If less faith had been put 
in growth originally, and the means and the ends of social justice 
more clearly distinguished, then the current crisis might have been 
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more manageable. Basically, we face three options if social justice 
is to be realized in the future. Either we attempt to re- generate 
economic growth along the lines of post -war strategies, or we address 
the difficult issues of redistribution, or we do a bit of both by re- 
conceptualizing what it is we mean by growth. 
It is this third option which seems to be favoured by the 
democratic Left. But whereas economic liberals like Hayek theorize 
social justice inadequately, and social democrats have under- 
estimated the measures required to realize it, the democratic Left is 
in danger of asking the concept to do too much. Can 'social justice 
be expected to capture all of the various responsibilities which we 
owe? What responsibilities do I mean? 
Firstly, we have responsibilities to the under developed parts of 
the world: to what extent should the West redistribute material 
resources to those nations which suffer from widespread absolute 
poverty? Charity at times of natural disaster is uncontroversial but 
the affluent nations show a greater reluctance to surrender their 
high living standards in order to help the poorest. What might be 
called 'global distributive justice' is therefore in some tension 
with social justice, e.g. how do we prioritize the needs of the 
homeless in our cities against the needs of starving Africans, when 
even the homeless are well -off by comparison (Danielson, 1973; 
Amdur, 1976-7)? As so often a cop -out is to imagine that growth will 
solve all since this does not seem consistent with what might be 
called 'environmental justice'. 
So, secondly, environmental justice demands that attention must 
be paid to animals and non -sentient life -forms, not least because the 
disappearance of oxygen- generating rain -forests can only exacerbate 
the build up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere with horrifying 
results. Furthermore, it might be that our own humanity is in some 
sense dependent upon the respect we show for nature, such that unless 
we recognize our place in a wider community then our own future is 
threatened. But, again, what has social justice to do with any of 
this? Can we easily abstract from the concept to learn what we ought 
to do about pollution, resource -depletion etc? Worse, if social 
justice is an inherently human- centred, anthropocentric principle 
then it could be a hindrance more than anything. 
Thirdly, we also owe something to future generations, though what 
exactly? To illustrate the tensions between the various notions of 
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justice outlined here we will now examine this 'intergenerational 
justice' in more detail (Goulding, 1972; Goodin, 1985, 170 -85). 
Derek Parfit refers to a version of the Prisoners' Dilemma. Since 
each generation suffers from the burdens imposed upon it from the 
previous, it is in the interest of each to relieve those burdens in 
such a way that impose burdens on the next, and so forth (1984, 383) . 
A useful, though not entirely accurate analogy, is to imagine an 
auditorium. The front row cannot see the stage properly and so stands 
up to get a better view, blocking the view of the second row who are 
then obliged to stand thus blocking the view of the third row...etc. 
Finally, we end up with everyone standing but no -one having a better 
view than before and everyone being uncomfortable. If our generation 
is the first row to become aware of this, what do we do about it? Do we 
remain seated and accept the burdens of not doing so? If so, what 
balance of material wealth, resource conservation and environmental 
preservation should we hand on? Or, should we stand up and accept 
that this makes us free -riders on the misfortunes of future 
generations? 
Rawis attempts to answer this question with his 'Just Savings 
Principle' where, in the Original Position, no -one would know to 
which generation they belonged so that the difference principle 
would apply across time also (1972, 287 -92). The trouble is that 
Rawis sees these as familial generations so that he is referring to 
purely intra -state relations. But what do we in the West owe to the 
next generation of, say, Chinese (Danielson, 1973, 334; Amdur, 1976- 
7, 452 -55)? Rawis does not seem to be able to specify. His theory, 
though, does serve to remind us of a potential contradiction between 
global distributive justice and intergenerational justice, i.e. by 
preserving resources for future generations might we harm those 
currently starving around the world? Yet if Rawls the Kantian fails, 
so does Parfit the Utilitarian. He ponders whether a large 
population with a low standard of living would be better than a 
smaller population on a higher standard. On the principle of total 
utility, it would. But then so would an astronomically high 
Population with a living standard barely rising above starvation 
level. Parfit believes that we need to find a theory which avoids 
this implication and yet solves what he calls the non -identity 
problem - which suggests that there is no moral reason for preferring 
either resource depletion to conservation or vice -versa. Parfit 
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himself fails to find such a theory, but "...I believe if they tried 
others could succeed" (1984, 388 -90). Could they, or would they 
regard the attempt as somewhat muddle- headed? 
Though Rawls and Parfit throw some light on the difficulties of 
formulating intergenerational justice, it might be that both 
'rights' and 'utility' are too strongly anthropocentric to do the job 
expected of them. Perhaps we need to work with an ethic which is 
neither strongly anthropocentric nor strongly biocentric, i.e. 
nature -centred. This might be some way of reconciling the various 
notions of justice. The point is, we should be clear how far we have 
gone past a relatively simple notion of social justice. 
What are we left with? A discussion of social justice is important 
to an examination of citizenship because they both imply 
perspectives on 'equal status'. Economic liberals treat social 
justice as a seductive mirage which, by doubting the efficacy of the 
spontaneous market order, inhibits the equal status of individuals. 
Social democrats work with some notion of social justice as a 
desirable objective capable of conferring equal status by attacking 
poverty. But a combination of political expediency and pragmatism in 
the past has meant that this objective has not always been pursued 
effectively. The democratic Left is clearer about the necessity of 
reconciling social justice, global distributive justice, 
environmental justice and intergenerational justice but it is 
precisely the difficulty of doing so which renders their conception 
of equal status somewhat vague and doubtful. Let us leave this 
subject as we now take a look at the rights (and duties) of social 
membership. 
3. Rights 
To be a citizen is to be a social member. Membership implies the 
possession of rights - leaving it open as to whether these are 
natural, institutional, or whatever - and the performance of duties. 
Now, given economic liberals' rejection of social justice as a 
meaningful concept, they define as legitimate those claims which 
facilitate, or do not impede, the operation of the market. Those 
claims which do impede such operation, over and above the prevention 
of coercion, are not legitimate therefore. Legitimate claims are 
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then thought of as civil and political rights which imply not only the 
basic rights of free speech, voting, election etc. but rights of 
property and of contract. They are, in short, the rights of the 
individual against the state. Claims to social, economic and 
industrial rights are illegitimate since they threaten the 
sovereignty of contractual relations by aggrandizing the state 
beyond its proper function. Social and economic inequalities are 
neither good nor bad in themselves, however, they can only be removed 
by infringing the rights of the individual. Since individual freedom 
requires an absence of coercion then social rights, which are to be 
enforced by the state, would inhibit the space of freedom. The 
responsibility of the state is to implement the rule of law and of 
just conduct, not to invent and enforce some ideal distributional 
pattern (Hayek, 1976, 101 -6). 
All of this should be clear from previous discussions. However, 
it would be simplistic to read economic liberals merely as 
inegalitarians. They reject social justice and defend a 'minimal' 
conception of rights precisely because they see a market order as 
guaranteeing, not always perfectly, equality of status. For 
instance, approximately fifteen years before J.S. Mill's Subjection 
of Woman (1989) , Herbert Spencer gives a startling defence of women' s 
rights. He argues that to deny such rights would imply grading all 
rights according to abilities and capacities, i.e. women not having 
rights because they are thought to be inferior in abilities and 
capacities to men. But this activity Spencer sees as being 
unrealizable. If, alternatively, by a right we should mean a right to 
exercise one's faculties then even if women's faculties are inferior 
to those of men this would in no way prove that women do not possess 
rights equal to those of men (Spencer, 1902, 71) . In the context of 
the time Spencer's arguments were bold and unorthodox. 
Economic liberals, therefore, do make strong appeals to equality 
of status. But is this appeal consistent with the social order they 
simultaneously defend (Pinker, 1971, 27; Miller, 1976, 189 -207)? 
Spencer, for instance, makes a distinction between the liberty to 
exercise a faculty - a right - and the powers which I possess in the 
social order. Extreme wealth confers greater powers than does 
extreme poverty but does not thereby confer more rights. But this 
Quickly leads to a shallow conception of rights - the poor man and the 
rich man have an equal right to sleep under a bridge and to dine at the 
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Ritz - and of personal responsibility, i.e. that the poor man has 
either chosen to sleep under the bridge or has chosen not to exercise 
the faculties which would enable him to emulate the rich man. So the 
defence of equal status made by economic liberals depends upon 
ignoring economic and material conditions, especially those 
afflicting the worst -off. At their worst, economic liberals come to 
regard massive inequalities as perfectly just since they are thought 
of as the outcomes of free choice and, anyway, rights remain 
possessed in equal measure by all. So whereas in 1850 Spencer 
attributed the vices of labourers to their poverty - to which the rich 
and comfortable would be no less susceptible (1902, 96 -7) - thirty 
years later he was writing of poverty as both necessary and curative 
(1902, 296 -7). But are my counter -arguments really fair? Why not 
make a distinction between rights and powers after all? Why confuse 
inequality with inequity? Some further light can be thrown on these 
questions by addressing the relation between rights and duties. 
If rights and powers do not overlap then neither, according to the 
logic of economic liberalism, can duties and powers. Those on low 
incomes may have to cope with pressures which are alien to the 
wealthiest in society but that in no way explains why people commit 
crimes nor excuses their actions when they do so. The duties which we 
owe to society are equally binding on all, income and wealth 
differentials being immaterial. Civic, parental and environmental 
responsibilities are blind to differences in material 
circumstances. To imagine otherwise would be to invite a widespread 
abrogation of personal responsibility and an outbreak of civil 
disorder. Indeed, some on the Right would point to rising crime rates 
as largely attributable to over -generous welfare regimes. The 
answer is to slash welfare and hold people more accountable for their 
actions; or, in other words, to foster the kind of personality which 
the conservative elements of economic liberalism require, such as 
respect for authority and acceptance of market outcomes. 
But what if this is misguided? The temptation to commit a crime 
obviously weighs heavier on the person brought up in a slum than on 
the person brought up in a comfortable suburban home. That is not to 
excuse crime which is motivated by poverty but it is to explain it - a 
distinction economic liberals are usually reluctant to make - and 
social policy may be influenced accordingly. Another distinction 
which economic liberals rarely make is that between negative and 
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positive duties. The former are non -voluntary and are, indeed, 
binding on all as a condition of citizenship. They refer to the 
obligations we owe to others' rights of non -intereference, i.e. a 
right not to be threatened, harmed, slandered and insulted. Positive 
duties, meanwhile, are voluntary and refer to those obligations we 
feel we owe to others as human beings who may need our assistance or 
help. If I refuse to give directions to a stranger, or money to a 
charity, then I am not violating my negative duties as a citizen but I 
may, depending upon the circumstances, be violating my positive 
duties. Indeed, at several points throughout this research I will 
argue that it is incoherent to base the performance of positive 
duties on any form of coercion or sanction. Here, I simply want to 
suggest that without some approximation of social justice, without 
social and economic conditions which reflect the equal status of all, 
then it is highly unlikely that many will admit the desirability of 
positive duties and the necessity of negative duties. In 
contemporary society it may be that the poor should be seen to possess 
greater rights and fewer responsibilities than the rich. To 
correlate rights and duties exactly and to ignore degrees of 
responsibility, on the basis that this is to foster social 
dependency, is to make citizenship both formal and abstract in the 
legal sphere as well as repressive and draconian in the social policy 
sphere. Some on the Right would evade such counter- arguments by 
accepting that, in any event, social rights are here to stay, i.e. 
they may be eroded but not eliminated (King, 1987, 164) . But this is 
hardly comforting and social democrats are concerned to theorize 
social rights as essential to full citizenship. As an example of such 
thinking, let us look at T.H. Marshall. 
Marshall's objective is to understand when economic inequality is 
and is not legitimate. He views the drive to greater equality as the 
final phase in the evolution of citizenship, though there are limits 
beyond which that drive should not be allowed to pass, i.e. when free 
choice and differences in talents are threatened. Only with the 
welfare state have civil, political and social rights - to economic 
welfare and security - come abreast of one another (1963, 73 -5). 
Civil rights largely developed in the eigthteenth century, political 
rights in the nineteenth and social rights in the twentieth. Some 
overlap did occur: for instance, social rights made an early 
appearance under the Speenhamland system but were severely curtailed 
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with the 1834 Poor Law since welfare provision would now only be made 
through the surrender of full citizenship by entry into a workhouse. 
Though representing decisive steps forward, education reform and the 
Factory acts also decoupled social rights from citizenship (1963, 
76 -85). The welfare state, however, has synthesized citizenship 
with social rights at last. The equality of citizenship which has 
resulted has undermined class inequality but not social inequality 
which, when suitably flexible, acts as an incentive to effort. So 
social rights give a substantial content to the formalism of civil 
and political rights by providing a universal right to real income 
which is not proportionate to the market -value of the claimant ( 1963, 
88 -100). They detach status from contract. Marshall does, however, 
see a basic conflict between social rights and market value which 
remains unresolved; even so, he objects to activity, such as that 
sometimes carried out by trade unions, which accept the benefits of 
having market contracts pushed to one side but do not recognize the 
accompanying obligations of citizenship (1963, 115 -21). 
Numerous responses to Marshall's ideas have been made. B.S. 
Turner (1986) argues that Marshall's account of the development of 
citizenship is too focused on the Western democracies and ignores 
causal factors such as war and migration. J.M. Barbalet (1988, 11- 
23) sees Marshall as working with a conception of class which takes 
into account the cultural identity of class- members but not that 
class's objective situation in the productive process. This is to 
miss the extent to which social rights actually preserve class 
inequality and domination by not addressing concentrations of 
economic and social power. This means that the welfare state has not 
realized social justice as effectively as Marshall thought 
(Barbalet, 1988, 64 -8) . Tony Giddens (1982, 171 -8) sees Marshall as 
having underestimated the extent to which the working -class had to 
struggle for citizenship rights since he gives something of a whig 
interpretation of historical progression. Since such rights are 
sites of both freedom and conflict then the welfare state is neither 
an unqualified triumph nor a device for diverting revolutionary 
activity. David Held (1989, 193 -206), finally, believes that 
Marshall's analysis is more subtle than many of his critics have 
allowed for. Yes, he misreads the multi- dimensional roots of 
citizenship rights but falling back onto a simple class analysis, of 
which Giddens is guilty, is no solution. 
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My own response is to agree with Barbalet and Giddens regarding 
Marshall's over -optimistic and rather complacent assessment of the 
welfare state. What if the welfare state has been only a partial 
realization of the social rights of citizenship? As I said in the 
previous section, this could be partially attributed to the emphasis 
which post -war social democrats gave to the state for, whatever the 
historical rationale of erecting a centralized apparatus to 
administer welfare provision, experience suggests that the state is 
not only a necessary condition of social rights but can also be a 
threat to them (Pierson, 1991, 202) . On the one hand, the state can 
achieve what private and voluntary provision can only dream about and 
health services both here and abroad are testimants to this. Yet, on 
the other hand, the state's bureaucratic apparatus and 
institutionalized procedures often reduce citizens to the status of 
claimants, contradicting the citizenship ethic which Marshall et al 
see the welfare state as embodying. 
But why should this be? Why give such an emphasis to state 
administration of welfare provision? As before, I suggest that this 
emphasis goes hand in hand with that given to the state management of 
the economy, the state being seen as equally efficacious in both 
spheres. Experience of the war, and memories of the 1930s, implied 
that this was so. What is more, if the state could run an economy at 
full capacity then there was little reason to think of social 
security as anything more than supplementary provision. Full 
employment was seen as the principal mechanism through which a right 
to a minimum income would be guaranteed, in which case both 
unemployment benefits and social assistance could be regarded as 
secondary mechanisms. This meant that entitlement could be based on 
demonstrable need without too much controversy. But as unemployment 
rose then, obviously, more and more people became subject to the 
conditions laid down for benefit receipt; and as, consequently, 
welfare spending increases so presssure grows for such conditions to 
become more stringent. So, the measures introduced by post -1979 
administrations have not only been politically- motivated but have 
been partially inspired by the logic of a system no longer able to 
cope with circumstances for which it was not designed. Claiming such 
benefits, therefore, is an activity ever more subject to 
surveillance and penalties for non -compliance. A social democratic 
government is unlikely to improve this substantially unless full 
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employment can be resurrected and /or serious social security reform 
can be initiated. 
In a way, then, both social democratic and Marxist 
interpretations of the welfare state are correct. Rights have been 
streamed towards the poorest through capitalism being given a human 
face; yet the flow of rights has also been staunched because only 
revision of capitalistic economics was ever really contemplated. 
The welfare state was the archetypal compromise between a capitalism 
sensing its own demise and a socialism fearing its own emergence. A 
modest role for benefits could be proposed because full employment 
would do the job as provided by Keynesian demand management. With 
social security, the state's function has magnified as those falling 
onto the safety -net have multiplied. 
Marshall, though, lived only through the more positive aspects of 
the welfare state' s emergence and so is unremarkable in the premature 
euphoria he often demonstrates. In 1972, for instance, Marshall 
observes that, 
...no way has been found of equating a man's value in the market 
(capitalist value), his value as a citizen (democratic value) 
and his value for himself (welfare value). (1981, 119) 
This, however, is not seen as being fatal to the welfare project. A 
capitalist backlash is possible, but of minor importance. By 1980 
Marshall had become far less sanguine, far less supportative of 
social insurance and more aware of the persistence of poverty and 
virulent anti- welfare feeling (1981, 132) . Now, the danger for 
social democracy in the future is that it may synthesize, but not go 
beyond, such extremes of optimism and pessimism. For instance, in 
1965 Marshall had written of the reciprocity of rights and duties 
such that since social rights had been fully established, then 
greater emphasis had to be given to social duties - this leads him to 
make incredibly facile pronouncements on health, disability, (1981, 
91 -2) and trade unions and it is not clear whether his views changed 
once he was less confident regarding the establishment of social 
rights. There is a danger that rather than renew the attempt to 
establish social rights, social democrats will partly accept the 
critique of economic liberals and search for individualistic 
solutions which consist in stressing the duties of the citizen to 
overcome dependency without even the cursory glance which post -war 
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social democrats gave to the welfare state's economic environment. 
This would mean that instead of regarding the goods associated with 
social justice and equal status as public goods, they are regarded as 
club goods to be distributed once proof of social membership, through 
the performance of prescribed duties, has been demonstrated. The 
present reluctance of mainstream social democrats to talk of full 
employment and widespread economic reform is evidence of such a 
possibility. In this scheme of things 'benefits' might come to take 
on the kind of pejorative meaning reserved for 'welfare' in the 
U.S.A. , instead of being thought of as integral to social membership 
itself. 
Still, whether social democracy has the moral and intellectual 
resources to re- design the welfare state in such a way that it is able 
to embody social rights more fully than ever before is obviously 
something which no -one can say for certain at present. We can, 
however, identify those issues which have to be addressed if such an 
objective is to ever come about. For instance, can a future welfare 
state be made more consistent with ecological imperatives? Can the 
'growth is good' ethic of industrialization and productivism be made 
consistent with capitalistic reformism? What do social rights have 
to do with our membership of the earth? Similarly, the welfare state 
has often been criticized for its lack of feminist credentials. The 
treatment of women as dependents has contributed to the feminization 
of poverty. Are social rights rights which are capable of 
incorporating the needs of women, or are they inherently gendered 
concepts so that we are required to design entirely new categories? 
The democratic Left as I am characterizing it, i.e. as giving 
equal concern to social movements and to class, could be seen as 
addressing such questions more seriously than social democracy since 
the latter's pragmatism has come to overwhelm its once visionary 
enthusiasm. For reasons of space, though, we will here look only at 
the feminist angle - again stressing that these are not democratic 
Left critiques but feminist critiques to which the democratic Left 
must pay attention. So the question is can social rights 
conceptually accomodate the needs and interests of women or will we 
have to formulate categories 'beyond' citizenship? 
There are examples of feminist critique which challenge the 
discourse of rights. Sarah Benton (1991) has observed that a non - 
citizen can be thought of as someone who has been exiled or as someone 
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who was never admitted in the first place. Women en masse have fallen 
into the latter camp such that citizenship has been a subtle means of 
distinguishing man/citizen (good) from woman /citizen (bad). Men 
have clung to the status and insecurities of public life, held in line 
by a fear of exile. Women have been confined to the private sphere in 
order that men may avoid such a fate themselves. The private sphere 
has always been the space of exile so that to confine women to this 
space has been the way in which men have exerted their 
domination: 
Violence towards women was the accepted background clutter of 
all civil societies. (Benton, 1991, 154 -62) 
However, by characterizing the personal as political, by demanding 
state intervention into the private, e.g. by making rape of wives by 
their husbands illegal, and by claiming rights, women have begun to 
change the rules. Even so, since rights originate in the male - 
dominated public sphere Benton doubts whether the discourse of 
rights can articulate the specificity of women's interests. And if 
rights are inherently gendered, why not 'citizenship' itself? 
Indeed, one of the obstacles in the way of a free construction of 
female identity is this concern to assimilate female -ness to a 
masculine citizenship ethic. 
This gendering of citizenship occurs because citizenship refers 
to equality and rationality which, far from being universals, are in 
truth concepts and qualities which express the masculine way of 
looking at the world. This is to exclude the more emotive and 
affective ways of looking at the world which are consistent with a 
feminine perspective. This is what Anne Phillips (1991a) calls 
' gendered substitution' . What feminist theorists have done is to 
insist that a simple egalitarianism requires that women surrender 
what is specific to them: the objective of equality with men implies 
that women must imitate and duplicate male characteristics. 
Citizenship, therefore, does not capture the 'differences' which 
have been emphasized by feminist thought to ensure that 'woman' 
remains something unique and distinct from 'man' . Nevertheless, 
Phillips, unlike Benton, would not have women abandon the 
citizenship ethic altogether, both equality and difference must be 
stressed and there are similarities as well as differences between 
79 
the male and female perspectives. So we should not aspire to dissolve 
the public /private distinction but to politicize them both 
(Phillips, 1991a, 77 -85). Gender will not be emphsized by junking 
the political, rather, democracy itself must be gendered and this, in 
turn, is only a means to a world where humanity, not gender, is the 
most meaningful point of reference (Phillips, 1991b, 6 -8) . 
Modern feminism, in short, seems to offer no substantial examples 
of critiques which would simply accept the citizenship ethic as 
unproblematic from women's point of view. The real controversy, as 
above, is between those who would abandon citizenship totally as 
essentially patriarchal and those who insist that this abandonment 
would itself be a surrender to patriarchal assumptions. Here, I am 
going to assume that the latter interpretation is correct since even 
the most consistent 'difference theorists' seem to allow for the 
efficacy of universalism, equality etc. (Whitford, 1991, 123 -5) . If 
this is a reasonable assumption then what of rights? 
Jean Bethke Elshtain (1981, 343) is someone who would identify 
women's rights with the maternal, private sphere since to pretend 
otherwise would be to consolidate the public sphere's tendency to be 
parasitical upon the private. But Mary Dietz (1985) opposes this 
because it would be to identify women uniquely with the maternal 
impulse which might not be conducive to a democratic politics. A good 
mother may be a good citizen but the former does not entail the 
latter; citizenship may imply friendship and mutual respect, but not 
intimacy. In short, we must talk of public rights if the political 
is to be feminized (Dietz, 1985, 20 -33). Now, liberal feminists are 
broadly satisfied with the current set of rights since civil, 
political and social rights are thought capable of encompassing 
womens' interests and needs. Socialist and Marxist feminists have 
adopted an ambiguous attitude. Do rights express the emancipatory 
instinct or are they shot through with capitalist, individualistic 
imperatives? (Radical feminists have often adopted an hostility 
towards rights which I am here assuming is misplaced. ) Yet even where 
conventional rights are being accepted, their meanings are re- 
defined to accomodate the feminist perspective, e.g. Andrea Dworkin 
would have us regard pornography as a violation of women's civil 
rights. So perhaps we can suggest that feminists should work both 
according to the agenda implied by established rights, while 
simultaneously working to design a new feminized agenda which 
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requires a new vocabulary. For instance, women's reproductive 
capacity could be regarded as both as a social right and as a 
differential reproductive right without having to be located 
exclusively in the one or the other. So Iris Marion Young (1989, 267- 
9) insists that essential differences between men and women must both 
bé stressed, to avoid absorbing ' female' within 'male' , and denied, 
so that a progressive politics can thrive on the site of the existing 
public sphere. This is to work within and against the established 
order and is why I believe that feminism offers a model which the 
democratic Left must adopt and through which it must come to define 
itself . 
My view, therefore, accords with Pateman's (1989, 184 & 196). 
Since the history of the citizenship guaranteed by the welfare state 
is bound up with a productivist, employment -based society, Marshall 
et al were heralding a new public world at the very time that women 
were being re- confirmed as lesser citizens. In response, women have 
both demanded that citizenship as presently conceived be extended to 
them, but they have also insisted that they possess capacities and 
needs which require a 'differentiated citizenship' . Neither, on its 
own, would be sufficient. In terms of social policy, therefore, this 
requires both a claim for existing social rights and a demand that we 
re- conceptualize the welfare state in such a way that it is no longer 
associated so closely with the employment -based society, this being 
necessary if women's differences are to be permitted space to subsist 
and evolve. We will return to these themes in chapter 10. 
How is this section to be summarized? Economic liberals regard 
civil and political rights as sufficient to guarantee the membership 
of the social order which is required for the equal status of all. 
But this is to ignore social and material conditions and the 
influences which they have on citizenship status. Social democrats 
do give attention to such conditions and so theorize a realm of social 
rights which are to correct for income and wealth differentials. 
However, it is far from clear whether the welfare state has embodied 
such rights. The feminist perspective, in large part, would seem to 
embrace the vocabulary of rights, while setting them in a context 
which twists and weaves that vocabulary into new shapes. This is a 
strategy which the democratic Left should adopt but how this strategy 
can be translated into practical social policy is far from clear. We 
will leave the subject for now, though in the next chapter I will 
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outline a set of economic rights to which both social democrats and 
the democratic Left could and should give support. 
4. Civil Society 
The definition which I have been working on the basis of referred 
to citizenship as the equal status of all members of a civil society. 
Why talk of civil society, though? Because I want to represent civil 
society as the space of particular communities, of the associations 
which we inhabit and of which we are members. But what is meant by a 
'particular community'? Do we mean something unitary or diverse, 
stable or mutable, closed or open, backward -looking or forward - 
looking? We are not going to attempt to answer these questions as 
such since the nature of a community is partly dependent upon the 
space within which that community emerges. We are therefore going to 
discuss civil society as such a communal space, and as a space whose 
meaning and significance alter as we subject it to ideological 
distinctions. 
The classical model of civil society, which conceives of a simple 
distinction between state and civil society, emerged in the 
nineteenth century. In many respects it was a model which was to 
replace the societas civitas of hierarchical feudalism and was given 
systematic analysis by Hegel ( 1957) and Marx ( 1975) . Their treatment 
of civil society is remarkably similar even if they give divergent 
accounts of its political context. Both regard it as having subsumed 
the household and so as having taken over the household's economic 
function, i.e. production. Civil society then expresses both a 
system of needs and the means to their satisfaction and it is in terms 
of this sphere that the rights of man were first formulated. So for 
both Hegel and Marx these are the rights of egoistic man striving to 
satisfy his bourgeois needs through the acquisition and transfer of 
Private property within a system of exchange relations. Both see 
Property as the main determinant of nineteenth century citizenship, 
but both then give differing accounts of the nature and function of 
the state in relation to property. 
In many respects, the political thought of the last century and a 
half can be understood as an attempt to interpret and modify this 
state /civil society distinction. Economic liberals, obviously, 
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wish to 'minimalize' the state sphere and emphasize what they see as 
the spontaneous order of a free society. In Hayek's (1973, 32 -51) 
scheme of things civil society is the open co- ordination of 
organizations and individuals around multiple nuclei. Each of us 
belong to several, overlapping communities with government keeping 
this space plural and non -coercive by enforcing the just rules of 
conduct. The state is conceived as one organization among many. 
Commands and interventions may be appropriate to an organization's 
internal operations but invite disaster if used to co- ordinate 
organizations externally. On this reading, the state is conceived 
not as a distinct sphere but as incorporated into civil society. So 
Hayek's civil society is the co- ordination of private individuals, 
families and organizations through the public rules of just conduct 
with the political relegated to the state's internal operations. 
Having subverted the state /civil society distinction Hayek is 
left with his concept of a spontaneous order. This spontaneity, he 
insists, has been crippled by "false economists" who believed, 
erroneously, that early capitalism brought a decline in the living 
standards of the working -class. Yet, 
...as a result of the growth of free markets, the reward of 
manual labour has during the past 150 years experienced an 
increase unknown in any earlier period of history. (1973, 
68) 
The logic of Hayek's position must lead him to believe that were it 
not for the interferences of the state and of organized labour then 
those living standards would have been even higher! This is a 
convenient proposition, immune to either verification or 
falsification. The extent to which state intervention and labour 
struggles were efficacious can be debated, but to argue that they 
were actually detrimental is to convert the present into a dystopia 
which an 'I- told - you -so philosopher' like Hayek can frown at with 
impunity and without evidence. Perhaps we should take a leaf out of 
Popper' s book and insist that Hayek' s vision of a hypothetical Golden 
Age, i.e. empty of false economists, is no more meaningful than 
Marx's vision of a future one. 
In his spontaneous order Hayek (1973, 88 -90) also allows for 
substantial revision to the law and the rules it prescribes, should 
general principles of justice reveal those rules to be unjust. But 
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exactly how may such rules be identified and revised? Surely this can 
only be done by contrasting the particular rules in question with an 
ideal, non -malfunctioning spontaneous order (1973, 17). Yet how is 
such a contrast to be effected? Hayek cannot allow a legislative 
body, in a political sphere seperate from the spontaneous order, to 
perform this contrast since this would be to resurrect both the 
rationalistic state and the state /civil society distinction which he 
is trying to jettison. So if Hayek cannot allow for a distinct 
political sphere then the contrast of the malfunctioning rules with 
an ideal order can only occur from within the space of the existing 
spontaneous order itself. This raises the suspicion that the 
projected ideal would merely be a duplication of the existing order, 
that the general principles of justice to which Hayek refers are 
nothing more than expressions of the existing way of doing things and 
that, consequently, unjust rules could never be identified 
accurately or revised effectively. This suspicion is raised because 
Hayek appears to be guilty of a performative contradiction. On the 
one hand, he is abandoning any reference to a distinct, political 
sphere from which the spontaneous order can be assessed according to 
the general principles of justice. Yet, on the other, he is 
dismissing the possibility that 'false economists' are themselves 
consistent with the spontaneous order, i.e. he regards them as a 
distortion of spontaneous growth rather than as a logical 
consequence of it. By doing so Hayek is appealing to the very 
distinct political sphere which he denies exists, for upon what other 
basis may certain economists (socialist ones) be denounced as 
'false'? He seems perfectly happy to occupy that sphere himself in 
order to identify and denounce such false economists. Indeed, Hayek 
can only deny the state a privileged position by occupying that 
political space himself . In short, his apparently non -political 
defence of the spontaneous order is shot through with politicized 
assumptions. He seems to be saying that the spontaneous order is as 
close to justice as we will ever get and that false, socialistic 
economists have little to contribute. This is another reason for 
Pegging economic liberalism as shot though with a conservatism whose 
principles of justice would serve, rather than rule, the so- called 
spontaneities of a market economy. So, to summarize. Hayek allows 
for the revision of malfunctioning rules and laws though, in order to 
do so, we cannot refer to a distinct political sphere. He then denies 
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that 'false economists' have anything to contribute to that process 
of revision, as assertion he can only make by appealing to the very 
political sphere - populated by economic liberals like himself - 
which he has already disowned! 
The civil society of economic liberalism consists, therefore, of 
'privatized' entities - individuals, families and organizations. 
These entities are co- ordinated externally according to market 
imperatives which imply an absolute mobility of capital and labour. 
Internally, these entities are structured hierarchically, with 
fixed systems of responsibilities and chains of command - whether 
this be the male- headed nuclear family or the management- headed 
, firm. It is the reconciliation of the free mobility of external 
relations with the restrictive immobility of internal relations 
which constitutes the bulk of economic liberalism which, as we saw in 
the previous chapter, has a conservative disposition also and which 
finds its fullest expression in the 'spontaneous' order of civil 
society. 
While the Right have tended to equate civil society with laissez - 
faire market relations, the Centre -Left have reacted against any 
such equation. As such, social democracy has sought to detach civil 
society from pure market relations and re -align it according to the 
principles of social justice. The social rights of citizenship 
demand that a minimum provision be set in health, education, income 
etc. and be realized through a welfare state. However, as I have been 
arguing, social democracy has accomodated itself ever more closely 
to capitalistic imperatives - partly explained by the fact that 
social democracy has itself effected great changes in the nature of 
capitalism - and, in doing so, often betrays a commitment to economic 
growth and productivism which rivals that of economic liberalism. 
Indeed, in the next chapter I will argue that bothit and economic 
liberalism share in what I will call an 'employment ethic' . So the 
re- alignment of civil society has been modest given social 
democracy's fidelity to the formal labour market. For this reason, 
and because in the nineteenth century its efficacy was being proven 
in various spheres, the state was regarded as the principal agent of 
re- alignment. So the possibility of re- defining civil society as a 
sphere relatively autonomous of both market economics and of the 
political /legal sphere was never really considered - not by the 
Centre -Left establishment at any rate. Civil society therefore 
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became little more than a humanized version of the economic liberal 
alternative, a residue of the economic and of the political. In 
embodying a productivist, growth -oriented and male- oriented ethos 
the welfare state institutionalized this lack of distinctness and 
autonomy. 
In giving an account of this civil society T.H. Green is a good 
place to begin since the New Liberals anticipated so 
much of twentieth century social democracy (Ritchie, 1891; 
Hobhouse, 1922, 74 -7; Freeden, 1978; Vincent & Plant, 1984, 28 -32). 
Green complained that society had yet to embody its abstract 
principles in any kind of institutional form. It prohibited slavery 
, but did not promote self -development: 
Civil society may be, and is, founded on the idea of there being 
a common good but the idea in relation to the less favoured 
members of society is in effect unrealized, and it is unrealized 
because the good is being sought in objects which admit of being 
competed for. They are of such a kind that they cannot be 
equally attained by all. (1884, 263) 
Unless the objects at which we are to aim are the objects of character 
- which each of us can achieve only if all of us do - then social life 
becomes a place of hostility and of destitution for the weakest. For 
Green, the progress of mankind depends upon recognizing virtues as 
ends -in- themselves, the welfare of persons being an element integral 
to the social good. The rights of all requires the realization of an 
equality of conditions (1884, 264 -5). 
It was this equality of conditions that Marshall considered had 
been realized by the post -war welfare state. By being guaranteed 
protection against market fluctuations, each person's integrity 
could be kept in view (1981, 52 -62). Welfare provision was the 
mechanism, 
...by which the individual is absorbed into society (not 
isolated from it) and simultaneously draws upon and contributes 
to its collective welfare. (1981, 91) 
This, as argued above, represents an over -estimation of the efficacy 
of the welfare state and one of the reasons for this is that the 
welfare state was founded in terms of a civil society which was very 
much conceived only as an appendage to the economic and political 
spheres. There are two consequences to this. Firstly, social 
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democrats defined social rights largely as rights within the labour 
market rather than as rights against it. Social rights within the 
labour market refer to unionization, improvements in working 
conditions and working hours and, undoubtedly, much progress was 
made in these and other areas. Yet it is debatable to what extent 
freedom within the labour market can be achieved while freedom to 
exist outside of the labour market is severely curtailed. Apart from 
categorical benefits most benefits are conditional upon labour 
market activity so that those who have to exist outside the market, 
and those who want to, have very few options open to them. 
Furthermore, if organized labour is ultimately dependent upon the 
formal economy then the social rights it does aim to realise may be 
severely hampered. For instance, a strike is less of an effective 
weapon if the resources for striking workers are going to be few and 
far between; also, a strike is going to be less of an effective threat 
if employers know this. In short, social rights within the labour 
market do not, on their own, equalize relations between capital and 
labour. Furthermore, since civil society has been as dependent upon 
the state as upon the economy then it has been shot through with 
political- administrative coercion. The welfare state has very much 
been a centralized, bureaucratic enterprise where, even at its best, 
the benefits system has resembled the doling out of alms by a 
beneficent state. Because of this rather 'minimalist' conception of 
civil society the social rights of citizenship have been more 
conditional for some - poorer workers, unemployed, women - than for 
others - skilled workers, middle -class. If so, to what extent can 
this be referred to as a realization of social justice? 
The second notable consequence, of the social democratic civil 
society lacking any degree of relative autonomy, is that economic 
liberals have continued to occupy the intellectual high -ground, even 
when social democracy was at its strongest. The Right have always 
argued that socialism - whatever they mean by that - puts us on the 
road to serfdom. This argument finally had an impact in the context 
of the economic crises of the 1970s. Given that civil society 
continued to be dependent upon the formal economy, when the labour 
market began to falter the political sphere, more often than not, was 
called upon to take up the slack. For instance, public sector 
expansion was one favoured way of mopping up increasing 
unemployment. But, whatever its effectiveness, this gave grist to 
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the Right's mill: namely, that excessive public spending was sapping 
economic investment and personal initiative. On their world -view, 
civil society and the free market was being inexorably absorbed by 
the state and so threatened by the spectre of totalitarianism. This 
may have been alarmist nonsense but social democracy was unable to 
make an adequate response given that it, too, remained committed to 
the formal labour market, the only conceivable alternative to which 
was the state. As a result, the Right captured the initiative and has 
re- asserted the nineteenth century notion of civil society as being 
equivalent to laissez -faire market relations. It might be wishful 
thinking on my part, but if the welfare state had embodied a civil 
society which was relatively autonomous of the economic and 
political spheres then perhaps it would have been less vulnerable to 
the international, economic shocks of the 1970s and so would have 
offered less of a target to the Right. In certain repects, the 
purpose of chapters 8 -10 is to show that a social dividend might be a 
means of bringing such autonomy about. 
In summary: social democracy failed to offer much of an 
alternative to economic liberalism so far as civil society is 
concerned. It conceived of a greater role for the the public sphere 
and the state but often as little more than a handmaiden of economic 
relations and the 'privatized' agencies contained therein. Civil 
society, on this reading, became a stadium within which market forces 
could be umpired by an all- knowing state, rather than an arena within 
which non -economic and non- market relations can emerge and 
flourish. 
It may be that we are therefore faced with two possible futures. 
On the one hand, the process whereby civil society is increasingly 
equated with market imperatives continues, with all of the social and 
economic consequences that implies. On the other, the relative 
autonomy of civil society becomes a prime political objective. What 
we have here characterized as the social democratic conception of a 
civil society, as the residue of economic and political exchange, 
might be regarded as a means to this relative autonomy but is not, on 
its own, a viable alternative given that we are passing from a 
national, organized phase of capitalism to an international, 
disorganized phase (Lash & Urry, 1987). Indeed, if the negative 
implications of globalization are to be resisted a re- vitalized 
civil society may be a prerequisite. For instance, if we are under 
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increasing danger from ecological threats then we need not only 
international co- operation, over carbon dioxide emissions etc., but 
also localized economies which put less strain on national infra- 
structures. Ways of encouraging greater self -reliance at the level 
of civil society are therefore required. This implies an ethos which 
is pro -public and pro -political without putting undue emphasis on 
the state. Recent social democratic thought has begun to fulfil 
these criteria. But a 'relative autonomy' may require not just an 
ethos which rejects laissez -faire economics but one which challenges 
the broader dominance of capital. So, I here characterize the 
democratic Left as embodying such an ethos. What, though, is meant by 
relative autonomy? 
David Held (1984) sees both liberalism and Marxism as having 
shared a similar commitment to the principle of autonomy. No such 
autonomy, however, is likely to come about unless we are sceptical 
towards the over -centralizations of both economic and political 
power. Yet Marxism has only been sensitive to the dangers of the 
former and liberalism to the dangers of the latter. An autonomous 
civil society requires us to reform and restrict state power while 
re- differentiating civil society by, firstly, equalizing the power 
of all citizens through curtailment of both capitalistic and 
patriarchal state institutions and, secondly, co- ordinating and 
regulating social life (Held, 1984, 231 -6; 1987, 281). 
Following Held (1984, 238) we could define a civil society of 
autonomy, or what I would prefer to call 'relative autonomy', as 
consisting of: 
1) Socio- cultural life: a plural and diverse space of households, 
cultural institutions, community services etc. organized according 
to the principles of direct democracy; 
2) Economic life: self -managed enterprises co- operatively owned by 
workers and a small -scale private sector. 
This requires in addition: 
3) State and government institutions: a central parliament and 
senate elected via proportional representation, with local councils 
and administrative services at both local and national level. 
Now this is all very well, but what it is crucial to understand is 
that this attempt to decentralize economic and political power has 
been the century -old project of social democracy. The trouble is, as 
I have argued, that social democracy's increasing allegiance to 
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capitalist imperatives has done little to dent centralized economic 
power and has re- affirmed centralized political power through such 
means as nationalization and state -administered welfare. It is 
precisely this allegiance which has only produced a minimalist, 
negativist, residual civil society. If, therefore, civil society is 
to be relatively autonomous then we need to learn from the mistakes of 
social democracy. A 'liberal vs. Marxist' dichotomy is much too 
simplistic. 
So, by a relatively autonomous civil society I refer to a communal 
space which is defined not according to the logic and objectives of 
the economic and political spheres but to the projects - individual 
and associative - of its members. In short, the economic and 
political spheres become the means, and not the ends, of civic 
activity. So, an economy of self -managed enterprises may be 
desirable - see chapter 8 - but this requires us to decentralize 
economic power and resources beyond anything contemplated by social 
democracy - and therefore raises the question as to whether this is 
possible without the very widespread state intervention which could 
contradict the whole project of relative autonomy. Also, since self - 
managed co- operatives might easily perpetuate the productivist and 
patriarchal assumptions of both laissez -faire economics and of 
statism then a relatively autonomous civil society would need to be 
both pro -ecological and pro -feminist. This is why in the previous 
section we questioned whether 'social rights' are sufficient to do 
the job expected of them. Perhaps we need to define a set of economic 
rights the purpose of which would be to guarantee freedom both within 
and against the formal economy - see next chapter. So rather than 
interpret civil society as a space which, as it were, buttresses the 
formal economy, we come to see the formal economy as that which 
enables a relatively autonomous civil society to exist. Rather than 
regarding wage- earning activity in the labour market as the ideal 
which we should all emulate, the objective would be to facilitate the 
greatest possible mobility between the formal and informal economies 
such that self- defining communities and self- administering 
associations are given a greater room to breathe than at present. On 
this interpretation, civil society ceases to be a private 'entrance' 
to public economic and political activity; instead, the economic and 
Political spheres become the conditions of civic activity, with all 
spheres having their private and public aspects. The citizen is 
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conceived, then, not as a version of economic man nor simply as a 
political agent - indeed, in the emphasis which both conservatives 
and social democrats have given to the perfectionist elements of 
welfare provision each has come close to idealizing the active 
citizen of republican thought. Instead, citizenship itself comes to 
be regarded as an open space whose purpose is not to discover and live 
according to some pre- defined role but to reflexively define its 
roles as an act of self- creation. The civil society which is 
relatively autonomous of the economic and political spheres is the 
habitat of this 'reflexive citizen'. 
We might, then, characterize the essentials of this civil society 
as, firstly, one where the household ceases to be defined as a 
privatized space of economic agents. Instead, the household becomes 
as much a bulwark against economic interference as against state 
interference - of course state legislation is necessary, e.g. 
against domestic violence, and legislation requires enforcement but 
my point is to distinguish this from the statism which clearly 
threatens individual autonomy especially if, as many believe, we are 
moving into a surveillance society. Secondly, this civil society is 
one where there is greater mobility between the household, formal and 
informal economies - the latter is that which also encompasses self - 
defining communities, or civil and political associations. This 
requires both that the household contains gender -neutral entrances 
and exits so that women have more opportunity to leave the home and 
men have fewer excuses to ignore it and that an increase in free time 
and the material resources is necessary to make this a reality. 
Thirdly, the civic elements of socio- cultural institutions are 
emphasized. For instance, Keane (1991, 150 -62) talks of making the 
media less of an economic enterprise which means experimenting with 
non -market and non -state institutions against those based on 
commodity production and exchange. Though how this translates into 
practical policies is not spelt out. 
To summarize this section: economic liberals tend to equate civil 
society with laissez -faire economics which consists of privatized 
individuals, families and organizations; social democrats resist 
this equation but have either re- emphasized the dominance of capital 
or have promoted the state as its principal countervailing force, 
producing a residual civil society at best; the democratic Left might 
now be thought of as desirous of a relatively autonomous civil 
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society but, as always, a question mark hangs over the feasibility of 
this given the degree of economic and political redistribution and 
decentralization which would be required. 
5. Theories of Citizenship 
I began this chapter by offering a definition of citizenship 
which, I hoped, would enable three theories of citizenship, 
corresponding to our three ideologies, to emerge: the equal status 
of all members of civil society. We should now be in a position to 
s>>mmarize what those theories are. 
For economic liberals citizenship is an attribute of a free 
market. The market recognizes the equal status of all so long as it 
is free from political coercion. Consumer choice and self- respect 
are inseperable. Poverty is an absolute which is now virtually non- 
existent in the West so that socialistic attempts to characterize 
social inequality as coercive are specious so long as market 
mechanisms are allowed to function. As such, a citizenship which 
wraps itself in the language of social justice and the welfare state 
is self- defeating. A more -than- minimal state inhibits the actions 
of the free citizen as a rational, self- interested consumer. By 
allying rights to powers, social rights threaten the integrity and 
irreducibility of rights and erode the social responsibilities of 
citizenship. In response, we must re- invent civil society as an 
unintended set of economic relations where the state is but one agent 
among many. In short, economic liberals think of citizenship as 
referring to the formal equality of wealth- maximizing individuals 
who possess basic rights and duties, in equal measure, within an 
unrestrained market environment. 
The social democrat insists that the free market deprives its 
poorest members of self- respect so that the equal status of all 
requires that markets be set within some kind of political context. 
Social justice therefore refers to those principles which extend the 
advantages of market mechanisms while eliminating the burdens which 
exile many from the full benefits of citizenship. Indeed, state 
action and provision is essential to citizenship since without the 
equalization of conditions those with the greatest resources will, 
de facto or otherwise, prevent the poorest from realising basic goods 
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and opportunities. Some notion of social rights is therefore 
necessary and desirable as is some institutional mechanism through 
which they can be achieved. Civil society, as such, is not reducible 
to economic relations. So, the social democratic theory might be 
stated as: citizenship refers to a substantive conception of 
material conditions where the status of the individual is not 
dependent upon his value in the market and where social rights 
provide some degree of protection, within civil society, against the 
inequities of market -based distributions of jobs and income. 
Now, whereas economic liberals think of citizenship in 
individualistic terms and social democrats think of it in social 
terms, the conception of the democratic Left, being sui generis as it 
were, is somewhat vague and reactive. To a large extent it overlaps 
with that of social democracy, the difference being in the means by 
which substantive citizenship is to be delivered. Social democrats 
are criticized as being too uncritical of the concentrations of 
ownership and economic power which continue to characterize 
capitalism and, therefore, of being over -confident regarding the 
efficacy of the welfare state. Poverty is thought of as being more 
functional to the imperatives of capital than post -war social 
architects imagined. Unless massive economic inequalities are 
addressed seriously then material burdens will continue to be loaded 
on those least able to bear them. Furthermore, moral panics will be 
increasingly aimed against those such as 'scroungers', the 
underclass, single mums and so forth, i.e. those who are judged to be 
welfare dependents, and therefore potentially socially 
irresponsible, by the relatively affluent who will become ever -more 
hysterical in their attempts to shift responsibility for the 
consequences of social divisions. The democratic Left implies some 
reference to feminist and ecological critiques but no systematic 
theory encompassing these has emerged, assuming that one is 
possible. Here, then, citizenship might be thought of as: the 
reflexive, open space of self- definition possible once the 
decentralization of economic and political power has been effected 
and each individual is conceived as an owner of the material 
conditions upon which social relations are dependent. 
How, then, do these theories of citizenship influence respective 
interpretations of entitlement to social security benefits and to 
anY future CI scheme? 
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6. Benefit Entitlement 
Economics liberals are quite clearly predisposed towards 
entitlement based upon market -led criteria. What assists, or at 
least does not hinder, the efficiency of the market is for the good, 
what obstructs the workings of the market is for the bad. This does 
not mean that economic liberals will reject a priori any sort of 
provision which renders the market less efficient, rather it is that 
they give the benefit of the doubt overwhelmingly to market -based 
entitlement . The iron laws of supply and demand may only be dented in 
order to prevent, as Hayek (1976, 87) has it, the severe deprivation 
of "...those who cannot help themselves." Such protection is 
derivative on market forces with, therefore, two consequences: 
firstly, the resources which are made available are likely to be 
minimal since excessive taxation is destructive and likely to be 
self- defeating; secondly, those to whom such resources are 
distributed are likely to be few in number and living at, or close to, 
a subsistence level. So, the relief of deprivation and of severe 
hardship has got little to do with fighting poverty. There may be 
occasional examples of poverty in the advanced West but these are the 
exceptions and do not signify a generalized social condition. There 
is certainly inequality and those who are less well -off but what, if 
anything, makes this a threat to social order is the very welfare 
system itself. By establishing a benefits' floor many are deprived 
of the incentives by which they could help themselves. Indeed, 
remaining poverty is due precisely to this welfare- dependency - as is 
much crime since the enforced dependency of the underclass tends to 
breed illegitimate economic activity which, at its worst, creates 
ghettoes or no -go areas emptied of the rule of law. So a greater 
emphasis on market -based provision will eliminate remaining poverty 
in the long -term by eliminating benefit- dependency in the short. 
This requires a low- taxation regime, a system of highly conditional 
entitlement which stresses the responsibility of the individual 
first and foremost and, eventually, a system of privatized welfare 
provision to which state welfare is little more than a footnote. 
We may, therefore, identify two characteristics of benefit 
entitlement as favoured by economic liberals. Firstly, costs must be 
kept down in two senses: administrative costs must be minimized, 
since excessive bureaucracy is not only inefficient but potentially 
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inimicable to the workings of free government; also, and more 
importantly, spending on actual social security benefits must be 
kept down. Ideally, almost all of the able- bodied will be able to 
survive and provide for periods of incapacity through labour market 
activity. Most social protection will be what the individual can 
provide for himself through private welfare agencies, social 
insurance should be actuarial and divorced from the state to the 
greatest possible extent. In short, public spending on benefits will 
be for the deserving few who cannot provide for themselves. 
Secondly, this, obviously, implies that the burden of proof is 
placed on the individual. To qualify for benefits you must 
demonstrate both that you are in need and that you are incapable, 
through no fault of your own, of alleviating such need. This 
indicates a resurrection of the distinction between deserving and 
undeserving poor. Economic liberals do not shrink away from this 
since measures directed against the 'undeserving' are likely to 
discourage from claiming those who really can provide for 
themselves. The 'deserving', meanwhile, will either have an 
incentive to return to work as quickly as possible, while those who 
absolutely cannot do so, e.g. the severely disabled, will not be 
stigmatized. 
This emphasis upon costs and demonstrable need leads economic 
liberals to be more concerned than any other ideology with the 
selectivism of income -testing and /or means- testing, thus placing 
the onus of claiming benefits squarely on individuals. This is 
necessary if moral hazard, which states that if I am insured against 
x, then x is more likely to occur, is to be taken into account. 
Socialized insurance is condemned for depriving the individual of 
the very responsibility which is needed in order to avoid x. A system 
of private insurance, meanwhile, would not only provide insurance 
but would be more capable of stressing such responsibilities since 
penalties are more easily incurred for reckless behaviour. In the 
absence of out -and -out private insurance, however, a greater 
emphasis upon means- testing and conditionality will have the effect 
of 'encouraging' responsibility within the confines of the existing 
system. So there are basically four aspects to this version of 
entitlement: administrative simplicity, disincentives (against 
scroungers, malingerers etc.), extreme conditionality, low public 
spending. 
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Now, a CI is capable of satisfying the first of these. It is 
easier to provide automatically, through a computerized system of 
provision, than the current system which depends upon reference to 
contribution records and co- habitation rules. However, in its pure 
form, a CI is universal and unconditional which means that it could be 
paid to those who do not earn or work in any form, which is anathema to 
the citizenship ethic of economic liberals. Similarly, it is likely 
to be prohibitively expensive if raised above a subsistence level. 
So though there is enough here for economic liberals to involve 
themselves in the CI debate, they are likely to give only a qualified 
support to the basic CI idea, preferring a system which is 
conditional upon labour market activity, which places disincentives 
in the way of those who would prefer a low degree of such activity, 
and which is inexpensive. In short, a system to which income- and /or 
means- testing is fundamental . If a CI were to be supported they would 
likely prefer that version of it known as NIT. 
If their emphasis upon the market leads economic liberals to 
favour selective benefits then their conviction that citizenship is 
only guaranteed by setting limits to market forces leads social 
democrats to favour more universal and generous forms of provision. 
The market, so it goes, makes an effective servent but a poor master. 
In order to be an effective servent, therefore, a state -organized 
system of welfare is required to institutionalize the social rights 
of citizenship which are intrinsic to the equal self- respect of all. 
This implies, firstly, that resources should be made available 
according to principles which are independent of the market. 
Economic bankruptcy is hardly feasible, obviously, but the market 
can be 'squeezed' to provide sufficient resources in the right 
places. We do not decide which needs we can alleviate based upon what 
the free market can afford, we debate which needs to address - and to 
what degree - and then figure out how to afford them. If that means 
that the market is no longer ' free' then so be it. Secondly, welfare 
resources are likely to be more widely distributed than is the case 
with economic liberalism. Both because more are thought to require 
assistance and because the needs which are to be alleviated are 
harder to assuage than free -marketeers imagine. 
But though citizenship and benefit -entitlement are regarded as 
essential to individual and societal well- being, social democracy is 
still highly committed to industrialized development and economic 
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growth. Indeed, both it and economic liberalism have tended to be 
highly productivist, the difference being over the degree to which 
market regulation is required to combine productivism with justice. 
This means that the social democratic version of benefit entitlement 
is closely allied to the labour market, albeit without the Right's 
faith in some natural, inevitable market equilibrium, e.g. that 
supply creates its own demand. The reason for this is that the 
principal agents of social democratic reform have been the working - 
class who, as I will argue in chapters 4 and 7, tend to be as wedded to 
an 'employment ethic' as the employing- class. This has undeniably 
produced progressive reforms. Yet if the labour market is 
splintering irreversibly into different variants of employment, and 
if we have to acknowledge work which is not based upon formal 
employment, then the labour market may itself have to become more of a 
servent than a master. In any event, the social democratic emphasis 
has had two main consequences for social security. 
Firstly, since the vicissitudes of the labour market are beyond 
the control of the individual a system based primarily upon selective 
benefits is not only stigmatizing it is contradictory. Any modern 
economy depends upon its workforce giving their consent and 
allegiance to their occupation and place of work. This cannot be done 
if workers are treated as little more than units in an equation of 
supply and demand. Since the world of work can be the source of both 
prosperity and of desperation, i.e. unemployment, then the labour 
market should itself provide the protection against the worst 
consequences of demand deficiency. This means some kind of 
insurance -based system. The provision of benefit which is based upon 
self - insurance during times of relative good - fortune is liable to be 
more sensitive to individuals' self- respect than either the hand -out 
of a means -test or the more impersonal funding which comes purely 
from taxation. In short, insurance combines the virtue of 
universality - since all workers pay contributions - and of 
conditionality - since unemployment benefit is payed only during 
specified times of economic inactivity. 
Secondly, since social democracy insists on the existence of 
social rights it is perhaps more sensitive than economic liberalism 
to those factors which prevent labour market participation. The 
latter are certainly responsive to those physical and mental 
endowments which prevent self- reliance, i.e. it is inconceivable 
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that anyone could reject any form of disability benefit, yet theirs 
is still an 'as resources allow' philosophy. This means that 
entitlement to, and renumeration of, disability is likely to be more 
draconian, e.g. as is the case with the Incapacity Benefit introduced 
in April 1995. Furthermore, social democrats are likely to be more 
sensitive to those injuries and medical conditions which are 
incurred in the course of work. Such injuries and conditions are 
regarded as a social responsibility which are deserving of social 
provision. Economic liberals will tend to either minimalize such 
provision or else abolish it altogether, e.g. Minford's (1984) 
proposal to make any benefits for injury compensation non- 
compulsory, reducing it to part of the contract between employee and 
employer. 
So in the social democratic scheme of things the social security 
system primarily implies a combination of insurance -based and 
categorical -based entitlement. It is less concerned than economic 
liberalism with public spending and (dis)incentives, though it still 
maintains some element of conditionality, e.g. reference to 
contribution records imposes a test which most women fail to pass. 
Benefits are earned as of right and /or received as of right according 
to factors beyond individual control. We will look more closely at 
the insurance principle in chapter 7. For now, it is enough to note 
why social democrats are likely to be sceptical regarding CI. 
CI certainly possesses enough attractive characteristics for 
social democrats to want to contribute to the debate. Most now 
recognize that the tax and social security systems must work more 
closely together if a minimum income for all is to be finally 
guaranteed. The integration of the two systems implied by-CI offers 
one model of what this could entail. However, once involved in the 
debate social democrats then display a high degree of scepticism. 
For the most part this is because CI is provided automatically 
without reference to labour market participation, which might be 
seen to offend the employment ethic which social democrats still 
attempt to embody. This means that the sense which individuals have 
with insurance benefits, that they are providing for themselves, is 
eroded. With CI it is as if the entire social security system becomes 
based upon a sefety -net model which social democrats only ever 
envisaged as a supplement to insurance. An adequate income, the 
argument goes, should derive principally from the labour market, 
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i.e. wages, with benefits being a temporary and secondary means of 
provision. Social security should not be conceived as a principal 
instrument of redistribution and social justice, even assuming that 
this is possible. So social democrats seem to give a response to CI 
which is just as sceptical as given by economic liberals. It is in 
chapter 7, though, that we will examine these issues in more 
detail. 
Both economic liberalism and social democracy tend to be pro - 
conditional so far as benefits -entitlement goes, though the former 
are negative towards universality while the latter are more 
positive. The democratic Left, meanwhile, tend to be both pro - 
universality and pro -unconditionality when it comes to social 
security benefits. Since they regard citizenship as an open space, 
as something which should not be filled with perfectionist, pre- 
defined ideas as to what makes a good society and a good citizen, then 
the benefits -in -cash side of the welfare state should not impose 
constraints on its claimants. Or, rather, their ideal is to collapse 
the very 'claimant vs. citizens' struggle which haunts modern 
societies - and which fuels rhetoric whereby the taxpayer becomes the 
exploited victim of the claimant - and replace it with a social 
condition where because we are all citizens we are therefore all 
'claimants'. This the welfare state has so far failed to do. Re- 
constructing welfare provision, in that case, certainly implies 
democratic institutional reform of various sorts, but also implies 
democratic moral and symbolic reform so that welfare ceases to be 
regarded as an instrument of , and a supplement to, a just society and 
comes to be thought of as much more integral to social justice. The 
democratic Left would therefore replace the central role which 
social democrats still give to the formal economy and its labour 
market. They would make the provision of social resources essential 
to individual well -being and would construct a progressive hegemony 
between marginalized social groups by stressing the damage done to 
all by economic centralization. They would seek to replace a 
centralized welfare state with a decentralized welfare society. 
So the democratic Left are immensely sceptical regarding the 
desirability of means- testing. This they interpret as a means of 
discriminating against those who are most in need. Categorical 
benefits are welcome since any universal system of welfare provision 
must take account of the particular needs of certain groups, the one 
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does not exclude the other. They are more ambiguous towards the 
insurance principle, however. On the one hand, it expresses the 
notion that a capitalist economy contains risks which must be dealt 
with. On the other, the principle has often justified an 
individualistic ethos which has strengthened capitalist economics 
rather than presented alternatives to it. The conditionality 
associated with contributions has, as we shall see, excluded from 
provision as many as it has included. The insurance principle at an 
abstract level is fine, but for it to be acceptable to the democratic 
Left it would have to be founded on further collectivist principles 
which could mean eventually dissociating it from contributions 
altogether. 
So, the democratic Left is the ideology which seems to be most 
accepting of CI in its pure form. So long as it fulfills the 
objectives of large -scale redistribution and of paternalist but not 
perfectionist support then it would seem to be acceptable to the 
their decentralizing project. The question is what role might a CI 
play in terms of the larger package of democratic Left policies? 
Might it have only a marginal role contrasted with various forms of 
common ownership and self -organization? There is really no way of 
answering this; however, chapter 8 will suggest reasons why CI could 
be considered as a transitional stage towards the establishment of a 
social dividend and widespread ownership and control of productive 
property. 
7. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have outlined the three theories of citizenship 
specific to the three ideologies with which we are concerned with in 
this research. One way or another these theories are concerned with 
the potential for the free market to realize justice and with the 
state's ability to correct market failures. Such interpretations of 
citizenship exert a considerable influence on the approaches which 
are made to benefits -entitlement, a crucial subject when considering 
social security reform. These approaches differ as to what form 
state transfers should take. Economic liberals favour both 
selectivity and conditionality, social democrats favour the 
combination of universality and conditionality provided by 
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insurance -based and categorical benefits, while the democratic Left 
favour whichever universal, unconditional scheme is the most 
feasible. All three have certain problems with CI, but all three 
recognize in CI something to which they could give support such that 
it is worth proponents of these ideologies contributing to the CI 
debate. 
So far, though, we have looked largely towards the formal economy 
and what the reform of social security, in terms of conceptions of 
citizenship, could mean for it. But with the re- structuring of the 
labour market to the point where it can no longer be automatically 
regarded as the source of income and identity we are justified in 
looking beyong the formal economy. This means looking not only at the 
spaces - economy, market - within which we work, but at what is meant 
by work in itself. Does work simply mean wage -earning or something 
more? This is a question we will now address and we shall see that the 
implications of asking it, both for the social security system and 
for CI, are considerable. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE MEANINGS OF WORK 
1. Introduction 
Our discussion of citizenship in the previous chapter to a large 
extent revolved around disagreements over the proper relation 
between the state and the market. Economic liberalism and social 
democracy are alike in that they play the one off against the other. 
Non -market and non -state forms of association have tended to be 
peripheral to their concerns and, correspondingly, their socio- 
economic philosophies have been centred upon wage- earning activity 
in the formal labour market. The democratic Left are more receptive 
to such forms of association and, through the influence of feminism 
and ecology, have begun to formalize alternative forms of rewarding 
activity and organization. This chapter will attempt to build upon 
previous discussions in order to deepen and extend our understanding 
of ideological disagreements and their importance for social 
security reform. It will proceed by questioning what it is 
ideologies mean by 'work' , for only then will we have a clearer idea 
of exactly what kind of activity it is which benefits should support 
and /or supplement. 
So, the proposition of this chapter is this: any proposals for 
social security reform must be seen within a wider social and 
historical context, i.e. that context which concerns ideological 
disagreements over the meaning and social function of work. For just 
as the differences which political ideologies demonstrate over the 
nature of citizenship, rights, social justice and civil society 
influence their differing conceptions of the role of the social 
security system, so too do their differences over definitions and 
theories of work, employment and free time. As such, the nature of 
someone's preferred reform will derive from their conception of the 
nature and purpose of the labour market and this, in turn, derives 
from how they interpret the relationships between paid work, 
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domestic labour and free time. Furthermore, such interpretations 
relate back to the work ethic and to the emergence of capitalist 
markets. So, the purpose of this chapter is to understand how and why 
differing ideologies have differing conceptions of work and what the 
implications are for social security reform. 
Those implications are dealt with directly in section 6 and stem, 
in large part, from disagreements over the importance of the informal 
economy for well -being and welfare. Such disagreements themselves 
derive from a variety of competing theories regarding the nature of 
leisure and the significance of free time and we will examine the 
relevant debates in sections 4 and 5. I will be arguing that to a 
considerable extent economic liberals and social democrats think of 
leisure and free time as an adjunct to the 'employment ethic', 
whereas the democratic Left think of them as being potential 
subversive of that ethic. The meaning of the employment ethic is 
outlined in section 3, an outline which is itself dependent upon a 
prior explanation of the work ethic's emergence whicb is attempted in 
section 2, below. So, having anticipated this chapter in reverse, as 
it were, we are now in a position to allow the history of work, and 
ideological disagreements over its meaning, to unfold more or less 
chronologically. 
2. Only A Marriage of Convenience? 
Weber never intended his work on the Protestant ethic to be a 
substitute dogma for historical materialism, for that would be an 
equally "...one -sided spiritualistic causal interpretation of 
culture and of history" (Weber, 1930, 183). He desired, but on the 
basis of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of capitalism (1930) did 
not effect, the subversion of the 'idealism vs. materialism' 
dichotomy which early Marxists and anti -Marxists seemed content to 
perpetuate. By doing so, both sides felt the need to hammer and mould 
history into a shape that could conveniently resemble various 
methodological presumptions. But if, instead, we approach history 
in non -essentialist terms then perhaps we can envisage how 
Protestantism and capitalism, the spiritual and the material, 
evolved toward each other on a converging path, without reducing the 
values of the former to the practices of the latter, or vice -versa. 
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This 'converging path' might then be seen to culminate in the 
industrial revolution. What might such an alternative methodology 
imply? 
We might answer this by considering two criticisms of Weber. The 
first is that he underestimates the ambiguity of early Protestants 
toward capitalist practices. He does, of course, point out that what 
the Puritans valued was not wealth for its own sake but "systematic 
work in a wordly calling" (1930, 171 -2), which meant that they 
justified wealth's possession and acquisition but not its 
consumption and enjoyment. Yet his acknowledgement of such 
ambiguity has little dynamism, little sense of evolutionary 
momentum. The battlelines between Protestant values and 
capitalistic practices must have shifted in significant directions 
over time. What I want to suggest is that they started out as 
respectful opponents, became hostile colleagues and ended up as 
loving bedfellows. So if, at an early stage, Protestants considered 
even the possession of wealth to be sinful (George & George, 1961, 
162), this must later have conflicted with the increasing 
recognition of money- making as largely consistent with religious 
duty in a Calling (Tawney, 1938, 113 -4; Walzer, 1965, 13) . Could the 
development of Protestantism, i.e. the demise of Lutherism and the 
ascendancy of Calvinism, be explained as the attempt to resolve this 
conflict until even consumption and enjoyment of wealth were 
tolerated, made virtuous, and Puritanism eventually erased as a 
serious influence? In any case, Weber neglects to emphasize such 
questions. His account freezes any such dynamic evolution and misses 
how Protestantism resolved its ambiguity toward wealth creation by 
discarding religious anachronisms - the Puritan Calling - and 
shaping itself to the capitalistic practices it itself had helped to 
unleash. By opening up a secular space within Christian theology, it 
had encouraged the very material practices which, because they did 
not lend themselves to a Puritan ethic, would threaten its own 
future. Adaption to these practices became the imperative, 
therefore. But Weber 's excessive emphasis upon ideas, culture, and 
the like, means that he gives little sense of how problematic the 
early relationship was between Protestantism and capitalism and how 
traumatic it must have been for the former to accomodate itself to the 
imperatives of the latter. 
Along the same lines, a second accusation may be levelled. Weber, 
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like Marx, seems to have imagined a rapid and revolutionary 
transformation from one world order to another. The death of 
traditional religious conduct and motivation led to its replacement 
by 'business' as a necessary part of life where we exist for it 
(Weber, 1930, 70). But was there really a 'death'? Perhaps we should 
see this transition not as the victory of one ideal, value system or 
moral code over another, but the as endogenous emergence of one world 
order from the old (Hirschman, 1977, 11). So, rather than marginal 
groups assaulting pre- existing ideas and relations, commerce and 
industry in their infancy were nurtured and set on course by the 
established power structure. To focus, like Weber, upon the 
unintended consequences of Calvinism is to imagine a world 
revolution. But this misses the possibility of unintended 
consequences camouflaging unrealised expectations and the extent to 
which there was a continuity in the world order (Hirschman, 1977, 
129 -31). Continuity is explained by established power seeking to 
maintain its essential structure - which is not to imply that it 
always succeeds. To insist upon a revolutionary discontinuity 
implies finding some causal process more abstract and un- worldy than 
the self -preserving instincts of power- holders. So Marx has his 
material forces of history and ambivalence as to what class 
succession involves. Weber, as a non -materialist, has perhaps less 
recourse to essentialist causes; nevertheless, by over -stating 
Protestantism's influence he too simplifies what is complex - how 
humanity interacts with the material world within which it is 
enmeshed - and complicates what is simple - that history is a progress 
of conservative, power- preserving structures. 
So, the alternative methodology I suggest be deployed when 
considering the emergence of the work ethic implies an avoidance of 
reductionism: we should explain the work ethic by recourse neither to 
an overbearing materialism nor to an overbearing idealism. Though an 
elementary point to make it is also an important one since 
reductionism has been all- too -common. For instance, Weber 's 
tendency to underestimate the impact of capitalist practice on 
moral /religious ideas and beliefs, has a counterpart in political 
philosophy whenever theorists are lifted out of the historical 
context in which they wrote. An absolute ahistoricism is, of course, 
rare. But, if we move on somewhat from Protestantism's origins and 
look at John Locke, we should avoid any interpretation of Locke which 
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diverts attention away from his socio- economic context. In so doing, 
we begin to appreciate how the work ethic dovetailed with the 
increasing tendency to make private property central to human 
affairs. 
What we need to do is to see how his theory of property was 
influenced by the property relations of the time. Locke's unspoken 
assumption is that though justice must 'supervise' the process of 
private appropriation and accumulation it cannot question that 
process as such. Locke's theory of justice is blind to the 
possibility of the natural world, prior to property relations, being 
commonly owned. This is why he is attractive to someone like Nozick. 
Now, the charge is not that Locke was simply a crypto- capitalist, a 
spokesman for bourgeois ethics. But the charge is that, 
Locke merely poured into a philosophical mould ideas which had 
been hammered out in the stress of political struggles, and 
which were already the commonplace of landowner and merchant. 
(Tawney, 1938, 256) 
Locke does not need to spell out the fundamental assumptions held by 
the audience he is addressing since he belongs to that audience 
himself: 
When he did mention them... it was only to establish a technical, 
religious or economic argument by reminding his readers of 
something they already knew but had not correctly applied. 
(Macpherson, 1962b, 229; cf. Dunn, 1969, 217 -20) 
Locke's was a justification of existing property rights in the years 
up to 1688, not a root - and -branch analysis of property rights per se. 
Macpherson criticizes those who ignore this and so fail to relate 
mercantillism to capitalism. Locke, 
...consents to state regulation of property as a way of securing 
property. But this in no way controverts a right of 
appropriation unlimited in amount. Unlimited capitalist 
appropriation...requires state jurisdiction over property and 
is consistent with a great deal of state interference with 
individual property. (Macpherson, 1962b, 299 -300) 
In short, Locke 'naturalizes' the Puritan Calling (Taylor, 1989, 
238 -9) . Any proper assessment of his significance, therefore, must 
take account of both Locke the theorist and of Locke the late 
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Seventeenth Century liberal agitator. 
So, when examining the emergence of the work ethic all forms of 
reductionism have to be avoided. Classical Marxism conforms to a 
base /superstructure model. Weber's sociology has room for, but 
hardly elaborates upon, an explanation whereby capitalism and 
Protestantism engage in complex, conflictual and eventually 
reconcilable relations. A thoroughly historical account could show 
Locke as one of those who promoted this reconciliation. Then, as we 
move beyond Locke towards the Industrial Revolution, this non- 
reductionist, dynamic account might be used to explain why it is that 
the Protestant work ethic fades and the capitalistic employment 
ethic emerges. For this to be possible, capitalism and Protestantism 
had to have been burrowing away at each other for some time in a 
manner which neither Weber nor Marx sufficiently allow for. So with 
the onset of the Industrial Revolution the highest form of moral 
activity has ceased to be labouring to God within a Calling and 
gradually becomes wage- earning activity within a labour market. 
3. Work As Employment 
This section deals more closely with how work came to be 
identified as paid employment. 
Capitalism might be defined as a social and economic system of 
private ownership, commodity production and competitive markets. 
Yet, without an ethical culture to bind us to our environment no such 
system would be sustainable. It may be true of any socio- economic 
system, and is certainly true of the capitalist one, that it depends 
not only upon external, formal institutions but also upon internal, 
psychological ones. Without some impulse to identify with, and give 
consent to, our environment then the system cannot operate. Though 
other systems, like Feudalism, might not require consent to any great 
extent, this is not true of capitalism since authoritarianism is not 
compatible with market individualism for any length of time. So, it 
is no coincidence that the most essential capitalist market - the 
labour market - emerged simultaneously with its corresponding ethic, 
what we will call the employment ethic. Earlier markets were less 
essential so that the ethics which corresponded to them could emerge 
over a greater period of time. For instance, capital markets could 
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survive for a while without a full -blown profit -making ethos being 
necessary; and commodity markets could afford to wait for the 
prevalence of a competitive ethos of possessive individualism. This 
is because such markets initially depended upon a relatively small 
elite only, so that no mass motivation was required. However, labour 
markets only function if the millions working within them identify 
with such functioning and this is why an employment ethic is 
required. Coercion and discipline would never have been sufficient 
for industrialization and the rapid upheavals it wrought since 
labour market mobility ultimately depends upon freely -given 
consent, a consent which requires some kind of ethic to give it 
substance. So, why was the increasing dependence of labour on labour 
markets perceived by many workers as freedom? That is the question 
which this section deals with. 
The moral background to industrialization is one where wage - 
earning activity has become the highest moral value because 
Protestantism has become ever more materialistic. So whereas 
Calvinism embraced work as a sign of future salvation but not as a 
means of attaining it, a means of avoiding damnation but not of 
purchasing salvation, over time these distinctions blurred. There 
came an obligation to improve one's Calling and not simply remain 
within it. Unwillingness to work passed from meaning a lack of grace 
to meaning a lack of endeavour. Wasted time was no longer time lost 
for the labouring of God's glory, but time lost for the making of 
money (Robertson, 1985, 57 -69). Raymond Williams, similarly, 
sketches the development of the meanings of work: 
The basic sense of the word to indicate activity and effort and 
achievement, has thus been modified, though unevenly and 
incompletely, by a definition of its imposed conditions, such 
as working for a wage or salary, being hired. (1976, 282) 
We may adapt what A.G. Watts (1983, 133) says of the Reformation: 
industrialzation made work less of a necessity and more of a virtue, 
and then made a "necessity of virtue". In short, as Kumar (1984, 7) 
has it, religion no longer sanctifies work, work sanctifies 
religion. The resulting employment ethic prizes wage- earning 
activity above all and devalues domestic labour, such that a division 
between household and workplace is effected with less social trauma 
than might have been expected. With the household safely out of the 
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way the labour market is then free to thrive. Let us elaborate on 
this. 
A labour market treats labour purely as a commodity. Feudal ties, 
whatever else they involved, did not involve this. The loosening of 
those ties, through the rise in trade and technical innovation, was 
also a transformation in property relations. The worker gained full 
control of his labour power but lost access to the productive means of 
subsistence. The labour market developed as a consequence of, and 
compensation for, the loss of traditional communities and their 
means of subsistence. Whereas households had been the site of both 
production and reproduction (Pahl, 1984, 20), the productive 
function is taken over by the labour market and the home becomes 
solely for the reproduction of labour, to be sustained by income, 
i.e. wages generated elsewhere. The household, then, becomes an 
element within, but not of, civil society. This did not lead 
immediately to the sexual division of labour. But as child labour was 
legislated against and women became confined to the home (even when 
employed as domestic servants) there emerged the 'male breadwinner 
plus female dependant' model which still plagues us today. 
But the employment ethic not only equates work with wage- earning 
activity, as well as devaluing housework, it also obscures this 
equation. The identification of domestic work with 'woman's work' is 
made to seem perfectly natural. This is why many have seen feminism 
as somehow unnatural, a threat to the social order rather than the 
grounds of a new, liberating ethos. For instance, however well - 
meaning, the following passage from E.P. Thompson ignores the 
specifics of gender division in the modern era: 
...despite school times and television times, the rhythms of 
woman's work in the home are not wholly attuned to the 
measurement of the clock. The mother of young children has an 
imperfect sense of time and attends to other human tides. She 
has not yet altogether moved out of the conventions of 'pre- 
industrial' society. (1991, 381 -2) 
Perhaps, but it is precisely such 'alternative' values which have 
been devalued. In short, capitalism requires a labour market and a 
labour market requires a legitimating culture if it is to function. 
The employment ethic, the identification of work with wage- earning 
activity in a labour market, is the essence of that culture. 
These points help us to respond to Thompson's puzzled question: 
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why were the proletariat so accepting of the frugal, acquisitive 
virtues designed to profit their masters at a time when industrial 
capitalism was destroying traditional life? Thompson is certainly 
correct in identifying inner compulsions as being as least as 
important as external disciplines (1965, 356 -7). Yet he also 
suggests that those compulsions themselves had external origins and 
were imposed over a relatively short space of time. Like Weber, he 
sees a unilinear progression from Protestantism to capitalism which 
then forces, via certain institutions and mechanisms, educative and 
disciplining strategies upon a labouring population. The early 
working -class may then be comfortably thought of as the passive 
creation of industrialization and the organized labour movement as 
the working -class beginning to resist the disciplines to which it had 
been subjected. But if, again, we should resist such a unilinear 
interpretation we might view the 'inner compulsion' not as the 
internalization of industrial capitalism's values, but the 
evolution of a work ethic, which the labouring population already 
possessed, into an employment ethic. It may indeed have been 
Methodism which forged the "...last links of the Utilitarian chains 
riveted upon the proletariat..." (Thompson, 1965, 358 -65) but 
Thompson ignores the earlier links in the chain. He is reluctant to 
find any great continuity between the pre -industrial and the 
industrial, between the agricultural labourer and the urban 
labourer, since this would amount to admitting that the early 
working -class were not as passive, and the emergence of organized 
labour not as revolutionary, as Thompson would like. As an 
alternative, I am suggesting that it would not do to over -estimate 
the importance, and deliberateness, of disciplinary strategies on 
the part of Church, state and industrialists. Traditional bonds, 
values and obligations may have been pre -industrial, but this does 
not make them pre- or non- or anti- capitalist. It is not that working 
people were forced to convert to a work ethic intended to undermine 
any desire to resist exploitation. On the contrary, working -class 
identity involved no traumatic rupture with the past. The working - 
class would eventually attempt to resist exploitation at the point 
of production precisely because it shared the same productivist 
norms and objectives as its exploiters. As such, both socialism and 
communism came to be as closely identifiable with industrialism as 
capitalism was. This is precisely why ecological thought often 
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rejects all three and this is what Kumar means when he writes that the 
challenge to the 
...ethic of work was implicit in the very phenomenon, 
industrialism, which provoked the most passionate advocacy of 
that ethic...(1984, 8 -9) 
What is therefore 'implicit' is not a proletariat, but the 
"...elimination of the human factor in production altogether" 
(Kumar, 1984, 8 -9) . It is the automatization of labour and the labour 
process which, ironically, now reverses the process whereby work 
became identified as activity in the formal economy. Marx was right 
to suppose that capitalism reveals crisis tendencies. But it was 
never to be the immizeration of a world -historical class which would 
dissolve modern property relations. Rather, it is the 
marginalization of labour which automatization brings which 
signifies the possibility of change. It is the very fragmentation of 
labour which is significant. 
To summarize: the employment ethic is that ethic which makes work 
and wage- earning activity in a labour market appear synonymous and 
which helps to effect a split between workplace and household. Wage - 
earning activity therefore becomes the highest virtue; 'woman's 
work' becomes invisible and inferior. Subsequent social reform and 
industrial conflict have orbited around this common frame of 
reference. 
4. Leisure and Free Time 
In contemporary Western societies, though, the employment ethic 
is less able to provide the foundations of individual self -worth and 
of social well -being than was once the case. This decline was first 
anticipated in the era of post -war consumerism when many thought that 
rising standards of living signalled the impending emergence of a 
leisure society where the essential problem would be what to do with 
so much free time. In fact, greater leisure time was created but it 
turned out to be the kind of enforced leisure which comes with mass 
unemployment. Our societies are therefore left with two principal 
dilemmas when it comes to labour market reform. Firstly, how do we 
redistribute employment to those who do not possess sufficient 
111 
amounts of it (but wish that they did) and how is the greater free 
time which has been created to be made available to all without the de 
facto coercions which come with mass unemployment? Yet to address 
this dilemma we must also address a more fundamental one. On the one 
hand, society no longer seems able to supply a lifetime of secure, 
full -time employment yet, on the other, it is precisely such security 
of which most of us still have a need. So although the ability of the 
employment ethic to provide the foundations of self -worth and of 
well -being has declined this does not stop us from yearning for a 
time, with all of its attendant solutions, when this was not the case. 
In short, our need for work does not correspond to society' s capacity 
to provide it. But what is to be done? Can wage- earning activity in 
the formal labour market ever again form the basis of self and 
society? Must we search for other ways of providing security or 
certainty? Or is it that, in a postmodern age, we should no longer be 
so dependent upon securities and certainties at all? In the next two 
sections I will present some of the answers which our principal 
ideologies have supplied to such questions. For now, I wish to argue 
that when it has come to considerations of leisure and free time 
ideological theorists have so often been found wanting. Doing so, 
however, requires us to engage with a literature which does not 
reflect the ideological distinctions being made in this thesis. 
Rather than economic liberals, social democrats and the democratic 
Left therefore, in this section we will need to study Marxist, 
conservative and liberal theorists of leisure and free time. My 
conclusion will be that too many of these theorists have treated 
leisure and free time as being of secondary importance compared to 
the employment- centred society and its accompanying ethic. It is 
precisely such complacency which we have to avoid. It may be, of 
course, that CI could fit into and serve an employment society, but it 
might equally be made to serve a post -employment ethos. Unless, 
therefore, we distance ourselves from the kind of theoretical 
approaches I am about to sketch then the full import of CI might go 
missing and we would be failing in our objective of understanding the 
ideological contexts within which CI exists and must be seen. 
Firstly, then, I will criticize those Marxist approaches to 
leisure and full time which adopt a functionalist critique before 
similarly discussing those conservatives and liberals who have 
adopted an equally simplistic formalist critique. 
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The problem with Marxist functionalism was always its treatment 
of leisure as, in Braverman's (1974, 278 -9) words, the "enlargement 
of capital "; that is, as an activity which merely serves to reproduce 
the degradation of the workplace, as inadequate but escapist 
compensation for the inabilities of work to satisfy the expectations 
generated by modern society. Yet this is to treat the sphere of 
reproduction as a mirror -image of the sphere of production, which may 
be justified according to Marxist economism but does not seem born 
out by contemporary social science nor even by everyday experience. 
For even if much of our free time is taken up with consuming the 
products of the leisure industries, such time also allows room for 
activity, both personal and political, which is not so easily 
commodified according to the needs of capital. I may use my time to 
see the latest Hollywood blockbuster or to protest at the government 
favouring the car industry in its transport policy and there are no 
capitalist puppet -masters impelling me to do the former rather than 
the latter. Of course, then the objection comes that the constraints 
on using free time creatively and politically are very much internal 
constraints, a product of environment. Yet is this any more 
cogent? 
This 'environmental' objection is one which was advanced by 
certain members of the Frankfurt School. Yet this critique is 
insufficient precisely because they entangle themselves in the same 
old web within which Braverman was ensnared, i.e. historical 
materialism. They start out to explain why theory has failed to read 
history and end up concluding that it is history which has failed to 
live up to theory. The stream of real history has evaporated leaving 
(false) consciousness oblivious to the economic determinants of 
social relations; and, left floundering and drowning, modern 
identity consists of surrogate freedoms and false needs which 
provide an empty space into which the corrosive influences of the 
culture industry can be poured. 
As examples of this, Erich Fromm (1942, 242 -3) says that "...the 
social character internalizes external necessities and this 
harnesses human energy for the task of a given economic and social 
system." Fromm, though, still held out hope of a better society as 
contrasted with Adorno and Horkheimer (1979, 120) for whom 
.culture now impresses the same stamp on everything..." where 
leisure consists of no more than ", , , after - images of the work process 
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itself" (1979, 134 -7) . Marcuse (1956; 1964) , too, finds the world of 
work to be inevitably repressive, though he does allow that new work 
relations could come about were there to be a liberation from all 
external, subordinating apparatus so expanding the realm of freedom 
and the free play of individual faculties. Now, even in their more 
optimistic moments, what this involves is a Freudian - inspired bias 
against actually- existing civilization, the cynical railing against 
a present which stands condemned when contrasted with a potential 
society never realized, a future never attained. The above 
theorists seek to construct monuments to historical materialism by 
seeking to bury what they consider to be false consciousness and 
inauthenticity. Their utopianism is fatalist, a misanthropic 
vision, unlit by any prescriptive politics. 
Contrast this with those Marxists who avoid functionalism. 
Theorists like Walter Benjamin (1973, 215 -8), Raymond Williams 
(1962, 104 -16) and Hans Enzensberger (1988, 35 -7) are aware that 
leisure has developed partly as a means of functionally plugging the 
gaps of the employment ethic - which, because it values the austerity 
of thrift and hard -work above all, cannot itself establish the virtue 
of consumerism. However, they insist that this is not all that 
leisure can be. Similarly, I believe that if leisure activities and 
free time do have progressive implications, and if we are to open up 
new spaces of freedom and autonomy, then the employment ethic with 
its equation of virtue with paid work must be superceded, both as a 
social reality and as that which guides our norms and identities. 
Obviously, we cannot even begin to do so if we are only alive to the 
regressive features of leisure and free time. 
Just as Marxists have often been betrayed by a functionalist 
interpretation of leisure, so conservatives and liberals have 
adopted an equally simplistic formalism. This, too, is to commit the 
mistake of viewing leisure solely in terms of its importance to the 
formal economy and our employment society. What, then, is meant by 
formalism? For Chris Rojek (1985, 85 -103), formalism characterized 
the early sociology of leisure and implied two things. Firstly, it 
implied a scientific methodology which is reductive and anti - 
normative, examining only the immediate surface rules of leisure 
relations. Secondly, it implies an individualism which uncritically 
views leisure as involving choice, flexibility, spontaneity and 
self -determination. 
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A good example of someone who examines only the immediate surface 
rules of leisure relations is Kenneth Roberts. Roberts (1970, 25) 
finds that the leisure revolution has gone so far as to 
"compartmentalize off" all non -work time and activities so that, if 
anything, it is now the nature of leisure which determines that of 
work. As social life has become more leisure- centred, work has 
become more instrumental and permeated by leisure values. By 'work' 
Roberts means all forms of obligation, including non -employment. So 
he insists that the differences between the leisure time possessed by 
men and by women are inconsiderable because many women have come to 
treat household chores as leisure (1970, 39 -43). The leisure 
industry does not dictate tastes, he insists, it only affects the way 
tastes are satisfied. Tastes could never be standardized, even were 
the attempt made, and sub- cultures will always remain to be catered 
for (1970, 71 -7) . Certainly, leisure is made to perform a "latency 
function" (through which social frustration is sublimated into 
harmless forms), and promotes certain values and styles of life; but 
no great thesis of 'social control' is defensible (1970, 83 -4). 
There is certainly some value in what Roberts says. His 
conclusion that leisure is a 'diversion' rather than a technique of 
manipulation is basically sound. But if a leisure society is 
something that should neither be accepted nor rejected without 
qualification (Roberts, 1970, 97) then we need to engage more closely 
with its ambiguities and contradictions. This means applauding 
those activities which involve the critical faculty of resistance 
and autonomy and deploring those which encourage passivity, for only 
in this way can the impulse to improve society be maintained. Whether 
or not most people feel their leisure lives to be a problem is 
therefore less relevant than Roberts supposes. Perhaps diversion is 
itself a version of manipulation. We are not faced with consumers who 
are either completely sovereign or completely alienated. We each 
need escapism; we each need creative culture. The question is how 
best to proportion these ingredients. Roberts is so intent on 
attacking the critics of mass culture that he fails to mark out a 
coherent position of his own. Indeed, Robert's ideas are an 
appropriate reminder of Marilyn Waring's (1988, 159) acidic comment 
to the effect that of course men have had difficulty in theorizing 
about free time, since only men have free time! 
When writing about leisure many liberals have shared Roberts's 
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approach (cf. Reisman, 1950, 291 -301) since for the liberal the 
wishes and preferences of individuals are paramount and, so long as 
no harm is coming to other people, are not subject to criticism. To 
criticize the wants of the ordinary individual, so liberal logic 
goes, is to set oneself up as an elitist who may impose ones 
(supposedly superior) tastes on ordinary people. This is to risk a 
social and cultural authoritarianism. Yet conservatives, too, are 
often formalists. For example, Daniel Bell (1976) seems to agree 
with Roberts that leisure has a purely reproductive, supplementary 
role, rather than performing the basis of a new politics. Here, too, 
leisure is thought of in anti- normative, individualistic terms. The 
difference is that leisure is being disapproved of precisely for 
these reasons, i.e. the predominance of such individualistic 
hedonism is that which risks drifting society towards anomie, 
demotivation and the lack of a work ethic. If this is allowed to 
continue, says the conservative, social breakdown cannot be far 
behind. 
What are we left with then? With two extremes that we need to 
avoid. On the one hand formalism, which treats leisure, consumption 
and free time in positivist terms as throwing up no questions as to 
what the meaningful content of these social forms should be. On the 
other hand functionalism, which can only deal with leisure and so 
forth in deterministic terms. Liberals and conservatives have 
tended to be formalists; Marxists have tended to be functionalists. 
Yet despite such apparent differences, these various positions 
actually demonstrate a deep resemblance: leisure is treated as a 
supplement to employment and the employment ethic. Liberal 
theorists have heralded the growth in leisure and living standards as 
a vindication of post -war capitalism, a vindication of growth, 
productivism and of societies based upon liberal, individualistic 
principles. Conservatives have deplored what they see as hedonism 
and a potential to undermine the values of thrift and hard -work upon 
which the economy depends, so that leisure is welcome only once the 
day's work is well and truly done. Marxists, certainly those of the 
Frankfurt School, have interpreted consumption as a means of 
diverting the working -class from its historical role by locking it 
inside a capitalist frame of reference, namely employer -employee 
relations, which causes it to accept its exploitation. 
What we might now consider is that neither functionalism nor 
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formalism render us capable of understanding the nature of a post- 
industrial society, and that unless we have such understanding we 
will not be able to identify the current boundaries 'separating' the 
formal and informal economies. Once, therefore, we have appreciated 
the nature of such post -industrial economies we will be in a position 
to comprehend why struggles over the meaning of 'work' are so 
significant to the reform of social security. 
5. Post -Industrialism 
So my argument is that if we were to limit ourselves to 
functionalist and formalist interpretations of leisure and free time 
then our discussions of social security reform would only be able to 
remain within the existing, familiar framework provided by the 
employment ethic. If CI, however, has post -employment implications 
then this would be to do ourselves a grave disservice. Before turning 
our attention specifically to social security, therefore, we need to 
take a look at post -industrialism, since it is within and around this 
thesis that some of the most interesting work on a post -employment 
ethos has been conducted. What I will be arguing is that our 
preferences regarding social security reform alter depending upon 
how we conceive of the relationship between the formal and informal 
economies; conceptions which depend, firstly, upon whether we 
imagine that we do live in a post -employment society and, secondly, 
whether we believe that we should. It is such considerations which 
the post -industrial debate involved. 
The post -industrial thesis had become established and widely 
influential by the late 1970s. Those early theorists, however, often 
avoided any normative critique. Even Daniel Bell's (1973, 12 -33) 
subtle and thoughtful conservatism seems based upon a determinism 
which says that a post -industrial society based upon information - 
exchange and inegalitarianism is on its way, like it or not. Not 
surprisingly, Bell regards that coming, meritocratic society as 
inherently non-socialist: a thesis which coincidentally corresponds 
to his earlier 'end of ideology' thesis. Gershuny (1978, 150 -1) , by 
contrast, talks of encouraging a dual economy, that is, of expanding 
the informal economy and improving the quality of work and leisure 
within it, in order that we may provide "...a viable alternative to 
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employment in the formal sector." The normative importance of this 
suggestion was to grow as unemployment was to rise. Both he and Ray 
Pahl saw this 'duality' as an alternative to two other scenarios: a 
shrinking formal economy leading to a segregated labour market with 
peripheral workers who are subject to unemployment and poverty pay; 
or, that scenario plus state regulation to keep social tension to a 
minimum (Gershuny & Pahl, 1979 & 1980). Pahl (1984, 182) was 
initially complacent and applied insufficient distinctions to these 
three scenarios. At one point he imagined that rising unemployment 
would itself deliver the goods, the poor being in a better position to 
develop "informal support systems ". Later, he was to deplore those, 
e.g. his earlier self as well as Charles Handy, who were too 
uncritical of modern trends: 
...we have to make a conscious effort to unlearn the model of 
work as a male -dominated wage- earning activity. (Pahl, 1988, 
749) 
For Gershuny (1988, 580 -3), the informal economy is a "communal 
production system" where value is exchanged but is not measured 
through money. The 'pool' , into which work is contributed and from 
which services are drawn, is not based on the definite quantities of 
commodities. The informal economy compensates for the 
contradictions of the formal economy, but needs to be thought of 
distinctly and transformed consciously. 
All of this has been doubted. Harding and Jenkins (1989, 48 -9) 
regard the formal /informal distinction as simplistic and inherently 
blind to intermediate types of activity since they regard all sectors 
of the economy as forming a continuum which cannot be classified into 
discrete economies. But Pahl (1984, 129) had already made these 
points without disallowing the possibility of the informal 
sector /economy growing in importance. So, for futurists picking up 
on this debate, the informal economy could be a possible site for the 
attainment of new moral and social ends. As Pahl says: 
A relatively rich society may find that it needs other forms of 
work more urgently than it needs wage labour....The value 
system that encourages competition or greed at the expense of 
collaboration and altruism may not ultimately succeed. (Pahl, 
1988, 748) 
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So such a society, with the emphasis more firmly on non -paid work 
in informal economies, would not be shot through with exchange - 
value, as is the case with the wider civil society at present. It 
could not, therefore, simply be thought of as a black economy, since 
multiple forms of legitimate activity would take place within it. 
The objective would be for communal work - work for friends, 
relatives, neighbours and voluntary organizations - to become not 
only 'production as exchange- value' , e.g. raising funds for a local 
hospital, but a superceding of exchange- value. So, proposals like 
Local Employment and Trading Systems could pool and distribute the 
skills and knowledge which the formal economy does not always 
recognize (Offe & Heinze, 1992, 86 -101) - we will consider this in 
chapter 9. Any such informal economy would only come to have greater 
social value than at present if the artificial distinction between 
work and welfare were to be broken. Not surprisingly, therefore, 
many of those attracted to this aspect of post -industrialism have 
come out in support of CI (Jones, 1982; Handy, 1984 & 1989; Robertson, 
1985) . 
So the post - industrial thesis in some way represents an attempt to 
re- negotiate between the formal and informal economies, and does 
this because of the belief that waged -work is going to be far less 
important in the future, so that our notions of work, and the ways in 
which it is valued, will have to be drastically revised. Free time, 
therefore, could represent a challenge to, rather than an extension 
of, the employment ethic. We are now in a position to outline how our 
three ideologies conceive of work, how they conceive of the formal 
and informal economies and how, therefore, these conceptions affect 
their attitudes to social security reform in general and CI in 
particular. 
á. Ideoloies Work Social Securit and CI 
We have seen, then, that whereas formalist and functionalist 
interpretations tend to regard leisure and free time as appendices of 
the employment society and its accompanying ethic, certain post- 
industrial theorists regard such time as potentially subversive of a 
society where wage- earning activity is prized above all. But where 
do our three ideologies fit into the picture? I submit that economic 
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liberals believe that we do and should live in a post - industrial 
society but that this is by no means a post -employment society. 
Consequently, they retain a strong emphasis upon wage- earning in the 
formal labour market, so that leisure and free time are given a 
formalistic interpretation and are seen as rewards for thrift, hard 
work and enterprise. It is the service industries, rather than heavy 
manufacturing, which have come to predominate and if we are to be 
competitive then the restrictive practices and labour market 
rigidities of the industrial era must be eliminated. Social 
democrats are rather more ambiguous on the subject. Undoubtedly, 
Fordism no longer describes the organization, relations or practices 
of contemporary industry, yet our experience in the 1980s suggests 
that we are premature if we imagine that we have leapt into some kind 
of service -based, post - industrial utopia. So social democrats also 
continue to stress wage- earning in the formal labour market as that 
which motivates individuals and drives a society and its economy, 
their approach to leisure and free time is therefore largely 
formalistic - though if social democracy still implies some 
reference to democratic socialists then the latter have often given a 
functionalist interpretation, i.e. leisure is an opiate which 
distracts workers from the real issues of ownership and control. 
Even so, their continuing commitment to social justice means that 
social democrats are likely to value and reward activity which falls 
outside of the formal labour market, so long as a social utility is 
still in evidence. The democratic Left, finally, feel that we do now 
live in a post -industrial era but that, if the inequities of economic 
liberalism are to be avoided, this era must also be one of post - 
employment, i.e. markets should be made flexible in terms of our 
needs, not vice- versa. This means giving greater emphasis to 
exchange and organization in the informal economy, where free time 
and the spaces of leisure activity are capable of breaking the 
equation between work and employment and of forming the basis of a 
Post- industrialized version of social justice. 
We can see, then, how these conceptions tie in with those of the 
Previous chapter. For economic liberals, the citizen as consumer 
identifies with wage- earning activity; for social democrats, the 
citizen as client is that person who is either temporarily absent 
from the formal labour market or is simulating such activity as a 
carer, student or volunteer; for the democratic Left the citizen as 
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'open space' is the source of value and usefulness, so that there is 
relatively little human activity which is not deserving of 
recognition and renumeration. Now, what are the implications of 
these points for social security and CI? 
In the area of formal activity, economic liberals tend to welcome 
the emergence of a dual labour market for two reasons. Firstly, 
because it implies a core of highly skilled workers capable of 
working with new technology and software. Secondly, because the low - 
paid, low- skilled, peripheral workers of the secondary sector 
provide the economy with a flexibility that allows it to expand and 
contract quickly as circumstances require. This goes hand -in -hand 
with an apparent condemnation of the black economy - especially where 
social security fraud is concerned - while in truth welcoming the 
economic generation which such activity brings. Therefore, so far as 
the formal economy goes, the emphasis here is upon supply -side 
measures. For the social security system this either means the 
scaling down of benefit levels as they currently exist, and /or the 
introduction of greater selectivity in benefit entitlement. In any 
event, the emphasis is very firmly upon cutting the social security 
budget and upon introducing more flexible provision to encourage 
(post -) industrial competitiveness and self -responsibility. 
In the area of domestic labour, the more socially conservative 
aspects of this ideology come to the fore. It is thought proper to 
keep women largely in the home to perform traditional roles - 
especially child- rearing. Yet at the same time the suitability of 
the familiar housewife for the part -time, insecure jobs of the 
secondary labour market is obvious. It may be, indeed, that 
employers structure the hours of such jobs to fit in with the domestic 
responsibilities of such women. Think of the hours of cleaners, for 
example. Are early morning or late evening hours simply for the 
benefit of office workers? So far as segregation along the lines of 
gender is acknowledged, it is believed that any discrimination - 
overt, or otherwise - will be eradicated over time by competitive 
markets. For the most part, though, differing opportunities in the 
job market are thought to reflect natural differences in aptitude, 
skills and desires. By and large economic liberals opt for changes to 
the taxation system to ensure that household income is sufficient, 
without supporting a notion such as a ' family wage' , since this would 
only serve to place extra burdens on employers. So when it comes 
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to the social security system, taking the household as the prime 
assessment unit would seem to be called for. 
In the area of free time economic liberals seem to share some of 
the ideas put forward by a conservative like Daniel Bell. 
Consumption is an increasingly necessary feature of a capitalist 
economy, but cannot be allowed to overwhelm production if that 
economy is to flourish, and even survive. If this is to happen, and 
if the economy and the polity are to be kept rigidly apart, then 
'economic man' must orientate himself in terms of economic 
imperatives, i.e. he must be self- sufficient. This should be 
reflected in his use of free time: a certain amount of conspicuous 
consumption as a reward for hard work certainly, but not too much. 
And for those who fall onto the margins of the labour market, idleness 
should not be allowed to decline into welfare dependency - as is the 
case in the United States, it is thought. So, some form of communal 
service might be appropriate for those, especially the young, who 
are in danger of becoming dependent. In reforming the social 
security system, therefore, the priority must be 'incentives': to 
encourage work, i.e. employment, and discourage idleness. 
So, the Right give a broad welcome to the shape of the current 
labour market. They welcome the flexibility which duality brings, 
while regarding the employment ethic as something to be valued and 
preserved. Economic liberals therefore welcome tax and benefit 
integration to the extent that it rolls back the bureaucratic, 
administrative and tax- eating welfare state and facilitates the kind 
of labour market flexibility which our service -based, post- 
industrial economies require. However, no integrated system should 
pay so much that it reduces work incentives, encourages ibour market 
opt -out and so actually increases welfare dependency. We will see in 
chapter 6 to what extent NIT manages to satisfy these two sets of 
criteria. 
Though they disagree as to whether existing society is, or should 
be, a post- industrial one, social democrats and the democratic Left 
both retain some notion of social justice, which I will simply take to 
imply a freedom from economic necessity. It is this commonly shared 
Objective which, here, allows us to deal with both ideologies 
simultaneously. What is of more importance, since we are discussing 
social security reform, is exactly how this freedom is to be brought 
about. Social democrats would like to retain social insurance as a 
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popular measure which has not yet had its day, while the democratic 
Left's post -industrial emphasis leads them to believe that social 
insurance alone cannot overcome the inequities created by failing to 
stress the virtues of informal activity. In the previous chapter I 
mentioned that both social democrats and the democratic Left are 
capable of supporting a set of economic rights. I will now outline 
what I mean by such rights in order to highlight the similarities and 
differences in their approaches to employment, work and free 
time. 
Economic rights, firstly, imply a right to employment: a right of 
access to wage- earning activity capable of supplying to individuals 
an adequate income - one which meets basic needs and, above this, 
permits them to pursue their freely chosen life -plans. Such a right 
cannot be realized where individuals are faced with two basic 
options: full -time employment or full -time unemployment. The 
current inability of part -time jobs to provide such an income 
prevents individuals from having greater control over their lives. 
Such jobs can be useful supplements to income from other sources, but 
it is very difficult to rely solely upon part -time employment in such 
a way that poverty traps can be avoided. Given the misconceptions 
upon which the social security system was based - that full 
employment could be maintained and that women should be treated as 
dependents - new conceptions are required. This would provide men 
with alternatives to remaining within the labour market, and women 
with alternatives to remaining within the home. The problem is that 
benefits are conceived largely as replacements for loss of earnings. 
Instead, we need to renew our efforts to realize one of social 
policy's central goals: to guarantee a minimum level of income. 
But how is this to be done? Either through a retention of benefits 
as 'earnings- replacements', but with reform to end the 'wage or 
welfare' syndrome, or through a CI. CI could, in turn, either retain 
some notion of conditionality (to preserve the popular acceptance of 
a desert -based ethic), or be completely unconditional in order to 
more fully embody a citizenship ethic. Both social democracy and the 
democratic Left are receptive to the belief that the informal economy 
should become less marginal and more a site of valuable, rewarding 
activity distinct from paid employment. Both, therefore, must 
address this question and consider these two options. 
If this right is granted then another aspect of economic rights 
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follows: a right to work, which here refers to both household and 
communal activity. This right means making such activity far less of 
a burden than it is at the moment because it has to be performed as an 
addition to the effort of full -time employment or the despair of 
full -time unemployment or the insecurity of part -time employment. 
So, by a right to work is meant: a right to have that activity which is 
unpaid, because it falls outside the formal economy, recognized as 
socially and economically valuable and rewarded as such. Again, both 
social democracy and the democratic Left must consider whether this 
is best done through a reformed social insurance or CI. 
Furthermore, this is crucial if each ideology is to make itself 
compatible with the concerns of feminists. As we shall see in chapter 
10, most domestic labour involves caring - for children, spouse, 
elderly or disabled relatives - and most of it continues to be done by 
women. But ' women s work' , however necessary, is undervalued and not 
subject to economic calculation in the national accounts. A right to 
work would not renumerate such activity as if was surrogate 
employment, but it would acknowledge the private value and social 
utility of unpaid work, so enhancing the status of those performing 
it and providing an independent income to many women for the first 
time ever. The objective would be to end the sexual division of 
labour. This would mean erasing any such notion as 'women's work', 
and ensuring that domestic labour is gender -free. So any social 
security reform should enable employment patterns to shift to the 
point where agents are increasingly released from market 
rationality. 
Finally, economic rights imply a right to free time. The 
difficulty is in defining free time and leisure activity. For 
instance, we might want to see leisure as a time -activity free from 
obligation; however, there are semi -leisure obligations which come 
under the heading of domestic labour. Whether the maintenance of a 
garden implies obligation or not depends upon something as mundane as 
whether the householder enjoys the activity or not. It might be best, 
then, to abandon all reference to ' leisure' and talk instead of free 
time, leaving its content to the choice of individuals. This right 
therefore means a right that the time required for the earning of an 
adequate income be minimized to the greatest possible extent, 
leaving the greatest possible time for activity which is autonomous 
and self- defined given sufficient material resources. This excludes 
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the possibility of defining unemployment as free time, therefore, 
and, again, requires a restructuring of the benefits system even if 
the principle of social insurance is retained. 
So both social democracy and the democratic Left, I propose, are 
capable of giving support to these economic rights. However, their 
disagreements as to whether we do live in a post -industrial society 
and should live in a post -employment one means that they will differ 
in their strategies for realizing such rights. I will show in chapter 
7 why and how social democrats wish to retain social insurance, 
albeit with a more generous system, and so remain suspicious of an 
unconditional income like CI; in chapters 8 to 10 I will argue that 
the democratic Left should embrace CI if it is to iron out some of the 
more fundamental inconsistencies between market socialist, 
ecological and feminist perspectives. 
7. Conclusion 
This chapter began by arguing that capitalist modernity takes 
work as its highest moral virtue. For 'work' , as socially -meaningful 
and productive activity, is that most suited to an era where 
religious faith is entering a long -term transformation. We need, 
therefore, to understand how the predominantly religious work ethic 
evolves over time into a secular employment ethic where paid 
employment is that which is prized above all . This evolution was less 
traumatic than we might at first imagine, since Protestantism 
increasingly had to accommodate itself to the capitalist practices 
it itself had helped to create. So wage- earning activity in a formal 
labour market gradually assumes the role of the highest social and 
moral virtue. Work outside the workplace is devalued and rendered 
invisible. As we enter our century paid employment retains this 
role; but after the war, given a peculiar combination of higher 
living standards and mass unemployment, free time (enforced or 
otherwise) assumes a greater significance. However, many of the 
theorists of leisure have tended to work with narrow conceptions of 
what that significance may be. The post - industrial thesis, 
therefore, provides a useful corrective to functionalist and 
formalist theories and enables us to focus upon the distinction 
between formal and informal economies. Economic liberals, for the 
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most part, regard the polarization of the formal and informal as 
either irrelevant or beneficial. Their emphasis, therefore, 
continues to be on the formal economy, they are far less willing to 
dissociate work from paid employment and so they have reason to be 
both supportive and suspicious of tax /benefit integration. Social 
democrats and the democratic Left both believe in giving a greater 
emphasis to the informal economy and allowing 'work' to take on 
plural meanings within a welfare state which accomodates itself to 
the individual, rather than vice -versa. However, there is some 
controversy as to whether social insurance is up to the task. 
I hope, then, that I have shown that an entire economic and social 
history lies behind attitudes towards social security and CI. So 
ideological disagreements take place not only over citizenship but 
also over the future social significance of paid employment. Some 
regard paid employment as essential to a healthy society; others 
regard it as more peripheral. Obviously, which interpretation we 
prefer will determine our attitudes toward economic policies in 
general and employment generation in particular and, equally 
obviously, the desired character of the social security system 
alters accordingly. The next chapter, therefore, will deal with the 
economic philosophies of Keynesianism, Monetarism and allied 
themes, to tease out the importance of social security reform to 
debates over economic policy. As we shall see, all three ideologies 
feed different assumptions into, and draw different conclusions 
from, the debate and so we shall see why all three continue to differ 




WHICH FUTURE FOR FULL EMPLOYMENT? 
1. Introduction 
So far, we have engaged with political philosophy in order to 
understand how notions of citizenship differ as we move across the 
ideological spectrum and with sociology in order to understand the 
environments within which such citizens are thought to live and work. 
In the former case, we saw that disagreements over the nature of 
citizenship largely coincide with disagreements over the proper 
functions of the state and of the market and of the proper 
relationship between the two. In the latter case, we found differing 
conceptions of work, employment, free time and of the economies 
within which these activities take place. In one respect this re- 
emphasizes the widely held view that social and economic policy go 
together so that the purpose and design of a social security system 
alter as the wider economy alters. But this research is trying to 
make the further case that the CI debate, too, takes as its starting- 
point such disputes over the roles of economic and social policy. 
Advocates of CI and those who acknowledge its relevance are both 
alike in thinking that the old distinction between work and welfare 
is redundant. The real debate begins - both within the CI camp and 
between that camp and 'outsiders' - when further consideration is 
given as to how work and welfare should be reconceived. Once this is 
understood, we are in a position to turn our attention to political 
economy and examine alternative economic philosophies; for, 
obviously, our ideas regarding social policy, social security and CI 
alter depending upon which economic philosophy we think should be 
pursued. The purpose of this chapter is to substantiate this 
assertion. 
For both Keynesianism and Monetarism theories of unemployment and 
full employment tend to overlap. Understanding the causes of the 
former allows the formation of appropriate solutions for the latter. 
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If demand deficiency depresses the total level of employment then 
demand expansion will revive it. Or, if inflationary pressures 
and /or supply side inflexibilities force unemployment upwards, then 
relevant monetary and supply -side policies will return it to its 
'natural' level. Sections 2 and 3 will therefore examine 
Keynesianism and Monetarism respectively. However, it is the 
contention of the democratic Left that 'unemployment' and 'full 
employment' may no longer overlap so conveniently. If technological 
factors and international competitiveness have increased in 
importance, it may be questioned to what extent traditional remedies 
will be efficacious in the future. Ecological considerations must 
also be taken into account. These points are stressed in sections 4- 
6. In any event, this chapter will re- iterate the view held by all of 
our ideologies, namely that there are no easy remedies for the labour 
market problems which the West faces. 
2. Keynesianism 
Keynes (1954) considered the classical account of mass 
unemployment and its cure, through the spontaneous restoration of 
the supply /demand equilibrium, to be contradictory. He believed 
that unemployment could not be regarded as the fulcrum of economic 
expansions and contractions via exchange mechanisms, but that only a 
shift to macro -economics would fully demonstrate this. The 
classical economist expected a recession to facilitate, firstly, an 
accumulation of savings leading to a fall in interest rates and a rise 
in subsequent business investment and, secondly, a fall in the wage 
rates and also, therefore, production costs so permitting a rise in 
employment. But Keynes observed that if income depends upon 
employment then no accumulation of savings could be guaranteed. For 
even if wage rates do fall - which he doubted anyway - then from where 
are savings to derive? And if consumption has declined because 
income and employment have declined then what good is business 
investment in the first place? Instead, tax cuts were needed to 
stimulate consumption and, more importantly, public spending to 
stimulate investment. By running a deficit during a recession, 
aggregate demand outruns the initial investment and there is a rise 
in employment and an expansion in the economy. 
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Such ideas heavily influenced post -war policy, but did they work? 
We are not going to plunge into economic history, since many who do 
never re- surface. Nor will we deal at this point with the 
Monetarist's attempt to leapfrog backwards into a pre -Keynesian 
world. What is important here is that, right or wrong, it was 
initially perceived to have worked and that by the mid- 1970s, right 
or wrong, perceptions were changing. By the 1980s full employment 
and low inflation had swopped places on the shopping -lists of both 
economists and governments. At the beginning, Monetarists may have 
sought to deny the validity of the Phillips's Curve, but the new 
economic reality and political culture they helped to initiate 
simply restored the notion, popularized by Phillips, that there is a 
trade -off to be made between low inflation and high employment. The 
difference was that now low inflation was to be the overwhelming 
priority. Consequently, Keynesians became sensitive to accusations 
of inflationary recklessness and have sought a long -term goal: 
"deferred full employment" (White, 1991, 7 -11). 
In certain respects, this describes the approach of the New 
Keynesianism. In 1964 James Meade (1993, 38 -40) was studying the 
negative impact on employment of a combination of automation and 
minimum wage levels. He imagined the future conforming to one of 
three possible scenarios. Firstly, and assuming the operation of a 
minimum real wage, a dualism between privileged and underprivileged 
workers, with the latter having to compete for whatever low paid jobs 
they could get. Secondly, the squeezing of labour demand to the point 
where full employment is abandoned as a realistic objective. 
Finally, the attempt to compensate for the above by limiting the 
supply of labour - a measure he saw as potentially vastly 
inefficient. it would not be too far- fetched to say that elements of 
each of these scenarios have since come to pass. So Meade, following 
Keynes's warning about excessive wage claims, ushered in what he 
himself called a New Keynesianism designed to avoid any of these 
scenarios by combining anti -inflationary policies with a pro -growth 
bias. Since, realistically, space does not permit us to outline New 
Keynesians on an individualistic basis - Meade's ideas extend way 
beyond simple economics, so that even he would take us off on too much 
Of a diversion - we will here simply sketch the principal themes and 
proposals of New Keynesianism. 
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Firstly, demand expansion is still favoured by many New 
Keynesians so long as supply -side measures are in place to dampen 
inflationary pressures. In one respect this is no different from the 
'reflation without inflation' ideal which the old stop -go cycles 
never realised. But many insist that this ideal can be realized via 
the greater opportunities that now exist for international co- 
operation. For instance, European-wide co- ordination via a the 
European Monetary System to protect currencies - and interest rates 
- against international markets (Cripps & Ward, 1983, 93) and to 
ensure that any growth in demand is paid for out of higher 
productivity and not out of the promise of currency devaluation at a 
later date. However, even a Europe committed to affordable growth 
might only shift the problem of job creation. Even assuming that such 
demand expansion could be co- ordinated across all member states, 
would this not put Europe as a whole at a disadvantage should the 
U.S.A., Japan and Asia remain economically conservative? 
Secondly, many proposals have been made to reform the process of 
pay bargaining. For instance, the annual bargaining round could be 
squeezed into a shorter time -period in order to discourage 
occupational groups from leap- frogging over one another, in an 
attempt to maintain diferentials, so promoting wage inflation. 
Another proposal is Layard's (1986, 4 -5) tax -based incomes policy. 
This would be statutory but would avoid price freezes and strong -arm 
corporatist tactics. If employers award wage increases above the 
stipulated percentage they would have to pay a tax on the difference 
so that both they and employees would need to adjust their behaviour. 
It might be, however, that this would penalize those who have to pay 
above the norm to attract labour, could be avoided anyway and would 
require complex administrative machinery (Standing, 1986, 110). 
Thirdly, some have supported import controls. John Eatwell 
(1982, 154) insists that unemployment is itself a form of 
protectionism designed to cut imports, so that it is fair to replace 
this form with another. This, he thinks, would not lead to 
retaliations since it is other countries which would have the most to 
lose. Indeed, planned trade on an international level would be 
ideal. Others believe that a protectionist war would ensue and that 
even if one were avoided industry would become more cautious and 
inward -looking (Hawkins, 1979, 98 -100). 
Fourthly, a consensus exists on the necessity of improving skills 
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training to prevent labour market 'blockages' and bottlenecks 
(Hughes & Perlman, 1984, 227). There is, however, controversy on the 
possibility of compulsory elements in any new system. That by, 
...depicting training as the means of solving unemployment and 
creating a more competitive economy, the less laudable and less 
emphasized objectives will prevail. (Standing, 1988, 100) 
In other words, such measures are not geared to the long -term 
capacities and potentials of individuals. it would be socially 
degenerating if a great number of people spend their lives in a 
whirlwind of short -term jobs and short -term training 
Fifthly, changes to the social security system have also been 
advanced. To depress wage demands it has been suggested that 
unemployment benefit be reduced; for instance, the young, 
especially, should have their search -time shortened. However, it is 
recommended that at the same time there should be: higher redundancy 
pay for older workers; higher benefit for the longer term unemployed; 
an increase in the earnings -limit - to reduce the poverty trap; the 
continued payment of benefit during certain periods of employment 
(Sinclair, 1987, 273). Also, benefits could be paid to employers as 
an encouragement to take on the long -term unemployed. We will be 
examining the principles of New Beveridge proposals in chapter 7. 
Finally, Layard (1986, 92) has estimated that to reduce 
unemployment by i million or more would require an output growth rate 
of at least 4% for some years, as happened between 1933 -7. Indeed, 
all of the above proposals seem to depend upon, or accompany, 
substantial increases in economic growth. Another typical estimate 
is for growth rates of 3 -4% sustained over a number of years to 
reduce unemployment by 1% per annum (Kreisky, 1989) . Yet the sad fact 
is that few countries have achieved such rates recently. 
These represent the most general ideas of the New Keynesianism. 
Let us now examine two proposals more closely: job or training 
schemes and labour supply reductions. Many job or training schemes 
have been designed but all tend to follow a basic pattern. After a 
certain amount of time spent unemployed - often twelve months - 
claimants are offered a job or training placement to last for a 
specified time with also, perhaps, an uprating in their benefit 
level. This would then make the long -term unemployed more attractive 
to employers by updating their skills and re- introducing 
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them to the world of work (Philpott, 1991, 58 -74). Supporters are 
often certain that it would substantially reduce unemployment and 
Sweden's programme is cited as proof. 
What supporters are concerned to do is to distinguish such schemes 
from workfare. If we define workfare as being required to work in 
state -provided employment on pain of benefit withdrawal then what 
features must a genuine job -guarantee scheme demonstrate? Firstly, 
the unemployed should be free to take up the offer or not, without 
fear of benefit withdrawal. Secondly, the job or placement should 
offer an attractive package at, or close to, the average weekly wage. 
Citing Sweden, therefore, is not entirely justified. Its programme 
has never been voluntary since anyone unemployed for 13 months has 
been required to join or lose eligibility for benefit. According to 
the brief definition above any element of coercion is illegitimate. 
If a proposed scheme is genuinely helpful and attractive then no 
coercion will be needed and if it is not then any coercion violates 
individuals' status as citizens. Of course, the issue is blurred by 
those workfare schemes which are supportative rather than 
disciplinary and seek to provide a helping -hand rather than a 
stigmatizing label. Even so, my definition stands. A helping -hand 
is no such thing if refusal is, ultimately, not an option. Compulsion 
with a smiling face and a name -tag is still compulsion. The 
unemployed are entitled to ask why they are required to work or train 
when they are not free to do so. Layard cites Beveridge as supporting 
the conditionality of benefit receipt: 
The main attractions of denying income support to the long -term 
unemployed who refuse work placements is that it 
would...eliminate long -term unemployment. As Beveridge 
pointed out, it is not clear that it is in the interests of the 
unemployed to be allowed to degenerate at home rather than face 
some kind of challenge. (Layard, 1986, 109) 
But Beveridge was living in, and imagining, a world where paid work 
was the norm and full employment could be maintained. Time and again 
he wrote that the benefit system was unworkable under conditions of 
mass unemployment - by which he meant hundreds of thousands. What is 
just is social and economic conditions where coercion is not only 
immoral but unnecessary. A proper placement scheme would help those 
whom it targets and reduce long -term unemployment but could do 
nothing in itself to create those conditions. Anything less 
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individualizes unemployment, blames the victim and diverts 
attention from the real problem. 
Another popular proposal to be found in and around New Keynesian 
circles is systematic reductions in the supply of labour. There are 
two means of doing this. The reformist way involves raising the 
school -leaving age, lowering the retirement age, reducing overtime, 
extending holidays (and introducing work sabbaticals), encouraging 
more skills training and splitting full -time into part -time jobs. 
These proposals tend to be viewed as only marginally efficacious, 
helpful but not a panacea. So, Hawkins (1979, 123) believes that 
overtime would be resisted by employers whose first priority is 
increased output and employees who would be reluctant to see a drop in 
their earnings. Increased holiday time would be absorbed by either 
greater overtime or productivity. However, earlier retirement could 
be economically feasible. For Layard (1986, 156 -8), such proposals 
are only workable if output and employment are increased by expanding 
output demand. If unemployment falls, for whatever reason, 
inflationary pressures are created threatening output and so 
lowering employment in the long -run. Hours of work should, and have, 
come down but not as a panic reaction to unemployment. Keane and Owen 
(1986, 175), however, believe that a strategic combination of the 
above measures could be useful. 
Such doubts apply all the more to the 'revolutionary' alternative 
- taking us some way beyond New Keynesianism, admittedly - which is to 
co- ordinate from the highest level downwards a long -term systematic 
reduction in working time. Gorz (1982) has long championed a 20 year 
programme to bring the minimum working -life down to 20,000 hours. 
The problem with this approach is that either this needs to be a 
statist, centralized policy with all of the attendant dangers, e.g. 
that it requires mass labour mobilization and regulation and might in 
any case end up undervaluing unpaid work, or that it would require a 
wide - ranging change in social attitudes which might, even then, 
backfire without centralized control. So you might still be left 
with resistance to, and the additional problem of whether to force, 
change. Nevertheless, supporters point out that increases in free 
time as against wage increases are more popular than often thought. 
Also, that large -scale reductions face difficulties no more 
considerable than any other serious proposal to end mass 
unemployment (Cuvillier, 1984, 21 -3 & 149 -50). 
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So, if there is anything which distinguishes the new from the old 
Keynesianism it is the emphasis which the former have given to 
inflation -control and supply -side measures - which is not to suggest 
that Keynes was unaware of inflationary dangers. The problem is that 
demand expansion is no longer advocated on the scale which it once 
was. Economists are wary of doing so given the inflationary problems 
that had appeared by the 1970s and the fact that certain measures, 
such as growth in public sector spending and employment, cannot 
continue indefinitely. Nor are supply -side measures likely to made 
up the deficit. Paying subsidies to employers, for instance, may 
reduce the number of long -term unemployed but does not in itself 
reduce unemployment per se. The bulk of unemployment is caused not by 
workers lacking the training to fill available jobs, but by the non- 
availability of those jobs in the first place, i.e. a lack of the very 
demand which nation -states seem unable or unwilling to stimulate. 
New Keynesianism's combination of demand - and supply -side 
strategies might reduce unemployment to some extent, but there are 
few who imagine that it would re- create full employment. 
3. Monetarism 
In one respect, there is a self- evident relationship between the 
money supply and the price level. What is highly contentious is the 
directness of the relationship that is posited. Monetarists tend to 
believe not only that an increase in the money supply translates 
directly into the increased demand for goods and services which 
causes inflation, but that an economy can be run on the basis of 
constantly squeezing the money supply to produce the opposite 
effect. Monetarists therefore reduce all economic activity to a 
function of this direct relationship. Furthermore, they interpret 
all political and social organization in these terms. Less 
charitably, Monetarism may be characterized as politics in disguise, 
an ideology dressing itself up as a science. Such accusations are 
levelled especially against the Monetarist theory of 
unemployment. 
Full employment was never really defined, except in a 
tautological sense, i.e. more jobs than men (sic). Friedman proposed 
an alternative: 
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The 'natural level of unemployment '...is the level that would 
be ground out by the Wairasian system of general 
equilibrium...(1968, 8) 
A free market is one where supply and demand balance each other out. 
Where this does not occur the market is still subject to 
inflexibilities and tendencies towards disequilibrium and in a 
labour market this means rigidity of wage bargaining and 
inflationary public spending. Full employment is a fictional pot of 
gold, the delusionary pursuit of which removes it ever further from 
us. Rather, we should conceive of a Natural Level of Unemployment or 
Non -Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU). This is 
the point at which all unemployment really is purely involuntary, the 
point at which all markets clear since wages simply will not fall any 
further. 
For Friedman (1968, 10 -11), Keynesian- inspired politicians 
ignored the fact that wage rises are demanded in anticipation of 
expected price rises. Artificial attempts to reduce unemployment, 
i.e. reduce the supply of excess labour, merely leads to a situation 
where money wages outstrip the growth in output. As the wage demands 
of an over - saturated labour market chase expected price rises so, 
consequently, does inflation rise which leads, inevitably, to still 
higher wage demands being made. A vicious cycle is thereby created 
which risks spiralling out of control. Repeated attempts to reduce 
unemployment will drive the same cycle with increasingly higher and 
unstable rates of inflation. The real solution, then, is to allow 
unemployment to rise so that money wages are depressed, inflation 
falls, people are priced back into jobs and NAIRU becomes consistent 
with sustainable levels of inflation. Monetarists predicted that if 
such strategies were not adopted then we would see simultaneous rises 
in inflation and unemployment, a prediction they felt had come to 
pass with the stagflation of the 1970s - Friedman believing that oil 
price rises could not account for the phenomenon (1977,459 -63). 
Monetarists, therefore, denounced a number of social policies as 
pernicious. Minimum wages, it is said, force production costs up and 
therefore employment levels down, as does union- friendly 
corporatism which allows unions to negotiate the wages of their 
members (the insider) above the market -clearing level so that the 
wages and employment opportunities of 'outsiders' suffer 
accordingly. What is more, generous levels of unemployment benefit 
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encourage the unemployed to search longer for paid work than they 
otherwise would. Employment protection measures also load costs 
onto employers, thus reducing the attractiveness of labour compared 
to labour- saving capital - though it is sometimes admitted that long 
periods of notice can reduce unemployment during growth periods by 
permitting job search (Brittan, 1975, 44 -63). The Welfare state is 
denounced, of course. High public spending, high taxes and reducing 
the costs of being unemployed are all thought to discourage work and 
encourage inactivity. It is government spending and interference 
which makes the price mechanism rigid and creates spiralling 
inflation and unemployment. High taxes destroy jobs and reduce 
incentives to save and invest. An extensive public sector crowds out 
the initiative and creativity of the private sector (Friedman & 
Friedman, 1984, 110 -7) . 
The solutions proposed to bring down unemployment include: 
cutting benefit levels; creating a jobs pool (workfare); tax 
reductions; privatization; NIT; union regulation; abolishing wages' 
councils; liberating the private rental housing market; abolishing 
employment protection and compulsory health and safety regulations - 
since employers will have a market incentive to provide decent pay 
and conditions (Minford, 1985, 2 -7). A labour market, contrary to 
what the Left believe, is by no means a buyers' market since there is 
no monopoly which could not be competitively challenged by other 
buyers (Minford, 1985, 123). 
But the great unacknowledged assumption being made here is that 
the labour market is comparable to other markets. However, labour 
cannot be treated as a commodity for two reasons (Offe, 1985, 150). 
Firstly, it does not have the option of withdrawing from the market 
should exchange conditions prove to be unfavourable. Secondly, it 
does not have the capacity to exist at the market- clearing wage level 
a perfectly operating labour market would pay. Since the Left and the 
Right differ as to what the structural characteristics of any market 
are, these differences become especially acute when considering the 
labour market. The Right sees the measures outlined above - minimum 
wage and so forth - as hindering the emergence of perfect 
competition. The Left, however, insists that the Right's version of 
a 'natural' labour market is really just an oligopsony - many sellers 
and few buyers - so that proposals motivated out of social justice 
give the sellers, i.e. employees, more power and so both humanize and 
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equalize the labour market. And even were it to be granted that a 
greater degree of competition could and should exist, the labour 
market may be inherently non- Walrasian, i.e. does not clear. The 
'insider- outsider' theory suggests that there are costs of firing 
old workers, and hiring and training new ones, which are both 
ineliminable and expensive, making it uneconomical to shed labour 
except in the direst circumstances and so giving workers an automatic 
bargaining power above any market -clearing level. The 'efficìency- 
wage theory, meanwhile, suggests that high productivity can only be 
expected from paying high wages, since this means that workers will 
take fewer of the risks that may cost them their jobs and will have 
incentives to do well (Van Pari j s, 1991, 123; White, 1991, 94) . Wages 
may, therefore, never be subject to the kind of downward flexibility 
which Monetarists imagine (Lal, 1977, 51). 
Of course, the genius of the NAIRU model is that it allows you to 
say virtually anything since NAIRU cannot actually be calculated. It 
does not really matter whether inflation is low and unemployment 
high, or vice -versa: either scenario may be represented as NAIRU so 
that even the favourable one allows Monetarists to insist that a 
downward pressure be kept on inflation via draconian supply -side 
measures. Indeed, any degree of unemployment can be made to seem 
voluntary if you try hard enough (Godfrey, 1986, 77). It may also be 
that market liberation does not lead to greater investment. If 
increased competition produces uncertainties and penalties for 
market failure then a greater reluctance to invest is likely to 
result (Keane & Owens, 1986, 97 -8). And if a recession causes 
people to hoard, rather than spend, their income then demand cannot 
be said to follow supply in all cases - which Say's Law, much beloved 
by Monetarists, denies - and draconian measures against the 
unemployed are therefore as stupid as they are inhumane. So, a large 
amount of empirical evidence has been summoned up to counter 
Minford's (1982, 74 -5) thesis that trade unions cost a million jobs. 
Hawkins (1984, 24) argues that there is no proven correlation between 
increasing benefits and increasing unemployment. If anything, the 
opposite is true since between 1979 and 1984 replacement ratios 
declined as employment fell considerably (Hawkins, 1984, 31). The 
same logic applies to minimum wages (Hughes & Perlman, 1984, 122 -3; 
Standing, 1986, 47 -51 & 60 -74). 
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However, such ideas came to have great sway in the 1970s with those 
who believed that Keynes had had his day. The fact that the NAIRU 
model was both simple and unverifiable enabled Monetarists, once in 
power, to both appeal to the full employment ideal and preside over 
rising unemployment. This sleight -of -hand may well explain their 
dominance of the economics of the 1980s. Indeed, it may be questioned 
whether, on this issue, the difference between Keynesians and 
Monetarists is so great after all. Showier argued there is, 
...no necessary difference between the full employment of the 
one and the natural rate of the other, only difference in 
interpretations of why the actual rate of unemployment exceeds 
these positions, and in the nature of policies required to 
return to the full natural rate of unemployment. (1981, 42- 
5) 
The percentage to be aimed at is academic, he thought, since both 
sides introduce flexibilities into their targets when it suits them. 
If so, it is the continuities between the two sides which should be 
emphasized and we are justified in asking whether their common 
assumption - regarding the desirability of an employment society - is 
tenable any longer. 
So, we saw in the previous section that the New Keynesians have, 
over the last thirty years or so, sought to make Keynes's original 
insight - that market equilibrium is by no means a natural state -of- 
affairs - consistent with an era when fear of inflation prevails and 
confidence in demand management declines. However, it is not yet 
clear whether proposals along these lines are likely to be 
efficacious or, even if they are, whether they will restore previous 
levels of employment. In this section, we have looked briefly at 
Monetarist alternatives and the proposition that market 
interference creates more problems than it solves so that free 
markets represent the only way forward, even for those who value 
something called social justice. However, Monetarism often has 
little moral appeal, intellectually it ignores the fact that the real 
world often does not conform to the laws of economics and, 
empirically, the evidence for its propositions is doubtful. Against 
the recommendations of both Keynesians, i.e. social democrats, and 
Monetarists, i.e economic liberals, the democratic Left suggest that 
we should now be far more sceptical as to whether a diagnosis of the 
economy's ills necessarily entails a prescription as to its 
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remedies. This is so, firstly, because economies have moved away 
from the fordist methods which have defined so much of twentieth 
century production. We need, therefore, to examine the impact of the 
new technology on economic philosophies. Secondly, we no longer live 
in a world economy of independent nation -states. The 
interdependence of national economies, which is as old as world trade 
itself in one respect, has intensified. This requires us to take a 
look at international factors. Finally, we now need to be far more 
sensitive to ecological factors. An economic strategy which ignores 
its impact on the environment will not only be ineffective but also 
highly damaging. With their commitments to an employment society - 
which, as we saw in the last chapter, implies emphasizing the 
employment ethic within the formal labour market - it is not clear 
that Keynesian social democrats and Monetarist economic liberals 
have fully grasped this as yet. So, we will continue this chapter by 
looking, in turn, at technology, the international division of 
labour and ecological issues. 
4. Technological Factors 
Technological unemployment is as old as technology. With 
automation labour is made more productive, which either means that 
labour will be shed to bring down production costs or that labour will 
remain a constant so that output may grow, either way yields profits. 
So, over a long stretch of time industries will decline creating 
structural imbalances between labour supply and demand. In short, 
employment- patterns alter as demand - and production -patterns alter. 
The question is, can the decline in the number of full -time jobs since 
the 1960s be attributed to technological innovation or not? 
Obviously, such innovation plays some role, but to what extent? This 
is an important question since those who attribute a considerable 
role to technology are likely to have different recommendations 
regarding economic policy to those who see technology as relatively 
marginal. 
Before adressing this point, what is meant by the 'new 
technology'? Firstly, it implies a shift to information technology 
where companies are smaller than was the case with the old 
manufacturing firms and where production is more flexible, 
140 
programmable and capable of responding quickly to consumer demand. 
Therefore, the production process is less Taylorized than previously 
and based far more on the autonomy and innovation of a core of highly 
skilled workers. Secondly, this means that industrial, or post- 
industrial, sites are more likely to be broken -up and dispersed 
geographically with obvious implications for both urban centres and 
labour organization. Finally, we might also identify a 
globalization of such information and communication networks, a 
technology which is 'virtual' and which spills across national 
borders in a manner undreamt of by our older conceptions of multi- 
national companies since the 'national' no longer presents a border 
to be conquered but, rather, a space to be absorbed. Such 
globalization, therefore, is the unmappable market of the postmodern 
commodity which is produced and consumed everywhere and nowhere 
(Lash & Urry, 1987). These 'soft', decentred and global aspects of 
the new technology were at the centre of the post -fordist thesis of 
the 1980s (Hall & Jacques, 1989) . 
Now, what of our question regarding the significance of such new 
technology to employment? We might identify three broad responses to 
this question about the role of technology. Pessimists - Charles 
Handy (1989) and James Robertson (1985) outline this scenario 
without necssarily being pessimists themselves - are those who see 
technological innovation as essential to the decline of mass full- 
time employment and so as leading inexorably to permanent, mass 
unemployment. Their vision of the future which is on its way is one 
where, in a dualistic economy, 'leisure' is imposed upon those for 
whom the employment society no longer has a use. If this is to be 
avoided we must contemplate and work towards a more egalitarian 
scenario where leisure and paid work are distributed to all. But the 
trouble with this response is that it is too deterministic, too quick 
to see a revolutionary break with old practices and techniques and 
ignores the capacity of societies to adapt to new realities. We are 
not faced with such an either /or future and should not throw 
ourselves off a cliff in the belief that it is about to collapse in 
any event. 
Optimists, meanwhile, are those who stress that technological 
innovation has only ever resulted in short -term unemployment. There 
is no reason why society cannot adapt to new changes, nor do we need 
to conceive of any radical, egalitarian reform. Instead, what is 
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needed is government action to encourage new industries, initiate 
occupational retraining and facilitate geographical relocation. 
The persistence of the new unemployment since the 1960s is simply due 
to the inadequacy of governments' responses to the new technology, 
given the corporatist inertia of the 1970s and the hands -off dogma of 
the 1980s (Eatwell, 1982, 146; Layard, 1986, 10). For technology to 
have been a major factor in creating mass unemployment we would need 
to have seen the kind of increases in productivity which are truely 
labour -displacing, yet such increases have been few and far between. 
It is therefore incredible, to the optimist, that technology is still 
the bete noire for so many. The problem is not technological change 
as such but our inability to cope with it, whether that inability be 
the fault of capitalism itself (Marstrand, 1984, 40 -3) or of 
interventionist governments. 
The optimists, though, presuppose that the new technology 
involves no new qualitative leaps over the old, the assumption being 
that meaningful comparisons can be made with 200 years ago. But if 
product -innovation (what is made) is now being outstripped by 
process -innovation (how it is made), then we cannot simply expect 
history to conveniently repeat itself (Marstrand, 1984, 103 -23) , as 
if technological critics are merely modern -day versions of the 
Luddites. An argument to the effect that new industries will come 
onto the scene to mop up the labour displacement produced by 
technology wrecking old industries may be somewhat premature, since 
it ignores the fact that the late twentieth century's new industries 
are now labour -displacing from their very inception (Keane & Owens, 
1986, 20 -1). The computer may open up new markets for economic 
activities (Beenstock, 1983, 23 -6), but if those activities are 
dominated by the computer then new industries will no longer be the 
sources of mass employment, as was the case in the industrial era. 
Nor can we simply rely upon growth in the service sector, at least not 
so long as it is meaningful work which we desire. For if we are moving 
into a self- service economy then few major opportunities from the 
service sector can be expected (Gershuny & Miles, 1983, 231). 
Pragmatists, finally, are those who try to avoid both the 
technological determinism of the pessimists and the economic 
determinism of the optimists. They do not under- estimate the impact 
of the new technology but still feel that economic and public 
Policies can be devised to neutralize its negative aspects - even if 
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such policies require a radical re -think of traditional orthodoxies 
(Freeman et al, 1982, 189; Freeman & Soete, 1987, 245 -9; Dore, 1987, 
215 -21) . Such pragmatism does somewhat take on board the objections 
mentioned above, but threatens to make a further mistake. If we only 
look at the headline, total level of employment then the true impact 
of technology is easy to misread, i .e. we ignore changes to the nature 
of employment. If the replacement of full -time jobs with part -time 
jobs, short -term and zero -hour contracts, homework and so forth is a 
trend likely to continue then we need to look beyond the headline 
rates of unemployment to the very nature of work itself . We need to 
ask questions not only about the distribution of income but also 
about the distribution of symbolic goods, i.e. how do we ensure that 
employees feel that they are truly contributing to the good or 
service being produced and are participating in a collaborative 
process with fellow workers? It is not too difficult to think up 
schemes to transfer income to those who work in McJobs, but if such 
jobs are dead -end and inherently unsatisfying then exactly how is 
'welfare' being generated? So the pragmatist's response seems fair 
enough. We cannot rely upon either market forces or state 
intervention as suggested by the optimists. Nor should we succumb to 
the pessimist's bifocal vision of either a utopian or a dystopian 
future. However, to the extent that the pessimist at least makes an 
attempt to look beyond our employment society then he may offer the 
pragmatist a decisive way forward; and even if this conclusion is not 
accepted it should be clear that the new, process - innovative 
technology offers a challenge to the old assumption that to 
understand an economy's problem was to be half -way to finding a 
solution. 
5. International Division of Labour 
Earlier we partly defined the new technology as implying a 
globalization of production, what do we find if we focus upon this 
aspect? With the world economy now more of a single, organic, 
reflexive capitalist system than ever, industrial sites are being 
re- located across the world for three main reasons. Firstly, the 
third world can provide an inexhaustible, cheap, manipulable 
reservoir of labour. Secondly, the production process is now such 
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that only low levels of skills are required at the periphery of the 
production process. Thirdly, improved transport and communication 
permit multi -geographic assembly. Simply in order to survive all 
major companies are forced to adapt to these new conditions and take 
account of them when considering future expansion and investment, 
thus helping to create a world industrial reserve army (Frobel et al, 
1980, 8 -15). 
Since, compared with the developed West, newly industrializing 
countries can offer a fraction of the wage costs, a longer working 
day, equivalent productivity and barely -existing employment 
protection they are no longer merely the suppliers of raw materials. 
This does not automatically mean that companies can simply re- locate 
in order to take advantage of such conditions, even if this is what 
they would desire, since there are obstacles to capital migration 
such as the immense costs of transfer, costs which only the large 
trans -nationals can meet. It may also be argued that international 
competitiveness only accounts for a small percentage of Western 
unemployment. Nevertheless, the significance of such international 
competitiveness remains considerable. Firstly, even if it is 
unconvincing to make it a scapegoat for Western unemployment, 
international competitiveness undoubtedly has been a major factor in 
the depression of wages in the West. Western wages are expected to 
compete with lower wages in the third world while beimg completely 
unable to do so, given the higher standards of living and of welfare 
security to which we have become accustomed. Despite this, secondly, 
a global, economic culture has been fostered where it is the needs of 
Western capital which come first and foremost, so that free trade may 
be promoted despite the protests of many in the third world, and anti - 
welfare policies iniated in the West, i.e. in pursuit of the kind of 
regimes (with low public spending and low job and income security) 
which continue to dominate in the East. Finally, it is still rare to 
see the full implications of international trade taken into 
consideration by those who insist that full employment, as 
traditionally conceived, is the principal means of achieving social 
justice. And even if it were, how does this kind of justice square 
with the kind of global justice mentioned in chapter 3? Also, though 
the international division of labour has benefited many in the third 
world, are such growth- oriented economies compatible with the kind 
of ecological concerns we will now go on to consider? 
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6. Ecological Factors 
Though we risk anticipating certain aspects of the debate in 
chapter 9, the ecological implications of the economics of 
unemployment are too important to ignore. 
John Eatwell (1982, 147) observes that economic well -being is 
linked to desirable improvements in living standards. Environmental 
problems may exist but, he observes, they may be taken into 
consideration without growth having to suffer. For instance, 
research and development can be geared more towards energy- saving. 
Beenstock is yet more scathing of ecological economics. He portrays 
the 'limits to growth' theorists as the same doomsayers who have 
always mistakenly imagined that resource -depletion would lead to 
economic crisis. Their error is to ignore the fact that knowledge is 
not a constant: 
...even if resources are finite market forces will provide 
plenty of advance warning since the prices of these resources 
will rise gradually over time...(Beenstock, 1983, 158) 
So, as resources dwindle, the prices of such resources rise, fewer 
people can afford to buy them, demand falls and, therefore, those 
resources are conserved. Similarly, pollution penalties, costs and 
taxes can be introduced which ensure that excessive pollution is 
unprofitable. 
Beenstock is here attempting to represent the environmental 
impact of growth as a cost that can simply be taken into account by 
familiar supply - demand analysis. But can environmental damage 
really be treated in this way? To propose that a free market can be 
environmentally benign is to imagine something like the following. 
Think of the point at which all of the world' s resources are exhausted 
as a horizontal line. For several centuries now we have been 
utilizing and largely destroying those resources and, as such, we 
have been accelerating towards that line. However, Beenstock's 
argument is that as we near the line of absolute resource depletion 
the prices of those resources rise and, according to the familiar law 
of supply and demand, they are conserved. In other words, our path 
towards the line of absolute depletion begins to curve; and as 
resources become fewer and prices higher, so the more we curve away 
from the line we had considered to be our inevitable destination. 
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Logically, then, the conservation which the market unintentionally 
gives rise to resembles a curve which is asymptotic, i.e. we will 
always be approaching the point of absolute resource depletion 
without ever actually reaching it. But could this model apply in 
reality? Does it make sense to say that a lump of coal or a gallon of 
oil can rise to astronomical prices? What would be the social and 
political implications? And would not pollution prevention make 
better sense than a pay -as- you -pollute rationale? Put simply, those 
who believe that the the environment is a market -type mechanism 
should not be given the benefit of the doubt. 
Ecologists make this point all the time and so are equally 
suspicious of economic liberals and social democrats - like Eatwell. 
We are reaching the point where capital accumulation, and Keynesian 
demand management (Henderson, 1988, 37), risk destroying the 
material base of their own existence (Singh, 1976, 3 -7). Nor can 
conventional economists object that an ecological society would be 
one of mass unemployment, and therefore unsustainable. Since market 
failure results from a lack of growth in a growth- dependent economy, 
ecologists cannot be charged with advocating unemployment and 
stagnation as an alternative to growth. It is the current system 
which presents us with the options of environmental destruction or 
mass unemployment (Porrit, 1984, 46) . A steady -state economy is one 
where the quality of life, and not traditional economic criteria, is 
paramount (Mishan, 1977, 107 -8) . This means an equitable sharing of 
work in both the formal and informal economies, with an emphasis on 
the quality of such work and on that of technology (Ekins, 1986, 132) , 
so that employment should only be one of a number of the income 
sources which enable us to flourish (Meadows et aI, 1992, 215). 
In short, ecologists say that we may not be able to afford the mass 
employment which, traditionally, has been thought of as the sine qua 
non of well -being and welfare. Now, whatever the cogency of such 
arguments it is sadly the case that the mainstream of political 
economics has failed to take account of them. Either lip- service is 
paid to ecological concerns or relatively minor action is advocated 
(as with the Rio conference of 1992). Lamentably, those concerns 
have yet to penetrate social policy debates to any great extent. The 
Social Justice Commission (1994, 23) sidesteps them completely, 
conveniently leaving the way for their 'growth is good' ethos. 
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7. Full employment, Social Security and CI 
Social democrats, naturally enough, tend to be Keynesians - in the 
past, this has included democratic socialists (who obviously make 
much more room for state ownership and planning, at the same time), 
though it is not clear whether they will be satisfied with the 
emphasis which Keynesians now give to the supply -side, especially if 
this implies a deflationary Europe; economic liberals tend to be 
monetarists; and the democratic Left, while preferring high levels 
of employment, are sceptical regarding the return of full employment 
for the reasons given in sections 4 to 6. So, we are now in a position 
to ask three questions. Firstly, how do our ideologies differ in the 
meanings they attribute to full employment? Secondly, what are the 
consequential implications for social security? Thirdly, how does 
CI fit into the picture? Let us look at each of these in turn. 
Our three ideologies do not share a common economic goal when it 
comes to full employment, for, if they did, it would be relatively 
easy to isolate this goal and then distinguish between the divergent 
proposals for achieving it. But things are not that simple and we are 
faced with disagreements over ends as well as means. Keynesian 
social democrats are those most committed to full employment as 
traditionally understood. This means that labour supply must not be 
allowed to exceed labour demand to any great extent. There may always 
be unemployment, in the sense that there will always be those who are 
unable to find jobs which suit their tastes, needs and skills, but a 
healthy labour market must be one where no -one is involuntarily 
unemployed for very long. As more women and more part -time jobs have 
entered the labour market, the logic of attempting to define and 
calculate a headline rate of unemployment has become more 
anachronistic. At the moment (September, 1994) , for instance, there 
are 2.2 million officially unemployed. Yet this figure does not 
allow for those who are not caught in the statistical net, but ought 
to be, nor those who, out of short -term necessity, are in inadequate 
(often part -time) jobs which offer little long -term security. In 
other words, Keynesian social democrats are going to have to 
conceptualize and institutionalize more qualititive definitions of 
what it is to be unemployed if the concept of full employment is to be 
salvaged and re- introduced as a coherent political goal. 
Monetarists, as we have seen, will have none of this. Full 
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employment, they insist, is an entirely artificial objective, a 
creation of Keynesianism itself rather than that which justifies 
Keynesianism. As such, full employment has become something of a 
Frankenstein's monster where all attempts to tame and pacify it only 
translate into yet more uncreative destruction. In less colourful 
language, the policies designed to pursue full employment only let 
inflation rip. As an alternative, we need to conceive of a 'natural' 
level of unemployment which is that level achieved when all markets 
clear, for only when such a Walrasian point of equilibrium is 
attained may we define any remaining inactivity as genuine 
involuntary unemployment. Labour markets, therefore, should be left 
alone - without benefit floors and minimum wages - to be as flexible 
as possible, especially given the influx of women and of part -time 
jobs over the last two decades or so. But, as we saw earlier, it is 
not clear that the NAIRU model has any meaningfulness outside of 
economists' textbooks. 
While not necessarily offering a specific alternative to the 
above, the democratic Left do offer some challenging critiques. They 
are satisfied neither with the traditional notion of full employment 
as 'more men than full -time jobs' , nor with the notion of some natural 
level of unemployment. The former is seen as being patriarchal, 
ecologically damaging and out of touch with the realities of 
globalized capital while the latter is simply seen as undesirable, as 
a strategy for allowing third world wages to seep out of the past and 
into the heart of 'advanced' capitalism. Does this mean that the 
democratic Left have no notion of full employment? Not necessarily, 
but if they do possess an alternative it may mean recognizing the 
significance of work and of activities pursued in the informal 
economy, as dealt with in the previous chapter. Full employment 
might, therefore, be thought of as that socio- economic condition 
which is attained when all adults have the freedom to enter and leave 
the labour market on terms beneficial to themselves. However, as 
indicated a short while ago, I believe that this is the direction in 
which Keynesians, too, must move so that either social democracy and 
the democratic Left converge in this particular instance, or the 
latter has no distinct alternative to offer after all. 
In any event, it is easy to see what roles are allotted to the 
social security systems when taking these various conceptions into 
account. Keynesian social democrats insist that a healthy labour 
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market functioning at, or close to, full employment is the best way to 
deliver all individuals a decent income. Their emphasis is very much 
upon employment generation through some kind of state intervention 
into the economy - which, these days, involves stressing the capacity 
of government to facilitate investment, training and co- operation 
between the public and the private. Social security is a way of 
guaranteeing the continuation of at least a minimum income during 
temporary periods of unemployment. But, with the citizen as someone 
who identifies with wage- earning activity in the formal labour 
market, benefits should not be thought of as a means of distributing 
primary income, even assuming that this is possible, though given the 
new conditions to which the labour market is now being subjected a 
measure of structural reform will be required to ease the transition 
from welfare to work. In summary, we may say that Keynesian social 
democrats favour categorical and contributory benefits since these 
are universal but still conditional upon proof of need and /or desert. 
In practice, this will mean the introduction of in -work, top -up 
benefits and of a more generous and inclusive insurance system. 
Monetarists, however, insist that such measures are merely a way 
of preventing a fully mobile and flexible labour market from 
emerging. They, too, emphasize the necessity of employment 
generation, but insist that this requires government to 'get out of 
the way', such that state intervention only costs jobs. The 
establishment of an absolute benefits' floor prevents wages from 
falling to the point where markets clear and fosters the kind of 
replacement ratios which encourage idleness since many recognize 
that they are better off on the dole. So, with their notion of the 
citizen as a self -responsible, self- maximizing consumer who works 
according to market imperatives, economic liberals insist upon a 
system which, while not permitting the re- emergence of absolute 
poverty, frees up the labour market to the point where it can function 
according to the laws of supply and demand. So, their approach is 
even more stringent and they favour widespread selective benefits to 
both provide security and to weed out moral hazard. 
The democratic Left, meanwhile, are the most ambivalent of all. 
They certainly regard employment generation as both important and 
desirable, yet remain sceptical as to the number of jobs that can be 
created. It may, therefore, be necessary to also consider employment 
distribution. This involves the suspicion that there is already 
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enough paid work to go around, the real problem is that this existing 
work is not being evenly distributed. So, think of this simplistic 
example: in a society of 100 people, instead of having 90 individuals 
working 40 hours per week, you might have all 100 working 36 hours per 
week. Obviously, even on this simplistic level, numerous problems 
are created as we saw in our earlier discussion of working -time 
reductions. The important thing to note is that the democratic 
Left's conception is of wages becoming less essential, to whatever 
degree, to individuals' overall incomes. So, on the one hand, they do 
not think of transfers merely as temporary relief and certainly not 
as functional to the self -regulation of market equilibriums. On the 
other, even a generous conception of transfers seems modest when 
compared with the immense amounts of social and economic re- 
structuring which would be required to redistribute existing 
employment and create more of a participatory economy. Social 
security transfers, therefore, have a role to play in any democratic 
Left future but only so long as they are not conditional upon activity 
in the formal labour market and if they are compatible with, and 
perhaps even facilitate, more radical socio- economic reform. 
Now, in the light of such considerations what might the most 
general and abstract justifications of CI be? What many recognize is 
that our employment -based society is undergoing a process of 
irrevocable change and that paid work can no longer be - has not been 
for some time - the only source of income and well- being. As time has 
passed CI has come to be regarded not simply as a reformist proposal 
but as a means of structually altering employment patterns. Firstly, 
it could allow individuals to change their own working -lives without 
reference to state- directed requirements. This, quite simply, is 
because it would be provided automatically. Secondly, it could allow 
a society in which there are more people in employment than at 
present. Currently, unemployed individuals are basically paid to 
remain inactive whereas a CI does not impose such a stringent regime 
of either earnings or benefits - however, this point is to leave the 
overall incentive effects of CI unexamined. 
Now, it is inconceivable that any future government, genuinely 
committed to full employment, could ignore many of the ideas 
mentioned in section 2. As such, CI at least provides some kind of 
ideal for allowing wages and welfare to work more closely together. 
This explains why it might be attractive to social democrats. At the 
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same time, however, its unconditionality and apparent lack of 
generosity present problems for social democrats, committed as they 
are both to formal employment and to benefits thought of as earnings - 
replacements. Keynesian social democrats might, therefore, favour a 
CI which retains reference to contributions, i.e. is not 
unconditional. Equally, they may come to believe that a reformed 
social insurance system is the best way of combining a contributory 
system with closer co- operation between taxes and benefits, so that 
there is no need to go the whole hog and adopt a CI after all. 
Economic liberals, meanwhile, might also be attracted to CI, 
seeing in it a means of allowing wage -rates to fall while still 
guaranteeing a minimum income. They too, though; shy away from 
unconditionality, since for markets to work efficiently not only 
must benefits allow wages to fall to market -clearing levels but they 
must still impose market -type disciplines on their recipients. This 
is something which a CI, paid to all regardless of work status, would 
not necessarily do. If, therefore, CI is appealing in some way it 
could be rendered still more appealing by being designed as a means - 
tested form of provision. Then again, if means- testing is desirable 
then is it necessary to go to the trouble of integrating the tax and 
benefit systems at all? 
Similarly, the democratic Left finds attractive elements in CI. 
If existing employment levels were to be redistributed, then the 
number of hours worked in a lifetime by the average individual would 
fall. If incomes were not to fall also then, since most employers 
could not afford substantial rises in hourly wage rates, wages would 
have to become less central to individuals' overall incomes than they 
are at present. Consequently, we must begin to conceive of an 
individual's income as having several sources. Wages would continue 
to be extremely important, obviously, yet state -provided transfers 
would need to occupy less of a subservient position than is the case 
with conditional benefits. Since CI's unconditionality means that 
it is far from being an 'earnings-replacement , then there seems good 
reason for the democratic Left to give serious attention to it. Yet, 
though this is true, it is also the case, as we shall see, that 
ecological and feminist theorists have good reason to pay CI serious 
attention. The democratic Left only makes a contribution to the CI 
' debate which is on a par with those made by economic liberalism and 
social democracy, if there is a distinctive CI model which 
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corresponds to it. Proposals for working -time reductions do not, in 
themselves, offer such a model. Therefore, it is to the market 
socialist tradition of thought that we shall be looking in order to 
find that variant of CI which corresponds to democratic Left conerns. 
8. Conclusion 
So, building on earlier chapters, we now have some idea of how our 
three ideologies regard political economics in general and full 
employment in particular. We now also have some idea of how their 
critiques of, and recommendations for, the social security system 
alter accordingly. Finally, we have seen that each ideology finds 
elements in CI to attract it but that the basic CI idea also creates 
certain problems for each ideology. This may lead ideological 
proponents to either abandon CI altogether or adopt a version of it 
more consistent with their preferred model of direct transfers. We 
have now, then, made our way through all of the subjects with which 
Part i was intended to deal, allowing us to delve into the specifics 




In Part i we discussed the meanings of citizenship, work and full 
employment in order to understand how economic liberals, social 
democrats and the democratic Left differ in their approaches to the 
social security system. We are now in a position to illustrate those 
differences. There are, however, two caveats which must be inserted. 
Firstly, what follows should only be taken as illuminating a very 
intricate and complex area of social policy from, as it were, a very 
great height. As such, the light which is cast clarifies some of the 
most fundamental aspects of such social policy concerns but does not 
penetrate into their nooks and crannies. This is not an apology, 
merely a re- iteration of the inherent limits of analysis which any 
piece of research must acknowledge. Secondly, as we move into Part 2 
we will be looking more specifically at the ideological variants of 
CI which have emerged out of the debate but this research should not 
be taken as an exhaustative examination of those ideologies 
themselves, not even in the field of social security reform. Some 
economic liberals, for instance, may well support NIT along the lines 
to be sketched in the next chapter because they wish to retain the 
selective provision of transfers - this is the case with Patrick 
Minford. Other economic liberals, however, may feel perfectly 
comfortable with the unconditionality of the pure CI idea and so 
support a PCI, as is the case with Sam Brittan - with the 
qualification that Brittan identifies no great distinction between 
CI and NIT in any event. Others may prefer to avoid tax /benefit 
integration and support workfare and /or birthright grants and some 
may wish to avoid radical welfare re- structuring altogether. Why one 
person believes x and another y may well 1 ie beyond the competence of 
social science to say. Still, with these points in mind consider fig. 
1, which is intended to illustrate the parameters of all social 
security systems. Fig. i should be read from top to bottom. So, if 
withdrawal rates are your main priority, i.e. you favour low rates so 
that as earnings rise people are allowed to keep more of their 
benefits than at present, then this will have two consequences. 
Since low rates of withdrawal will cause benefits to 'spill' over to 
many who may not be in need, strictly speaking, then either the 

























this, costs will rise considerably. Such considerations appear in 
the CI debate with supporters alleging that CI 's low withdrawal rates 
would allow us to combat poverty traps more effectively than with any 
other reform proposal and critics pointing out that this either means 
low levels of CI, e.g. a PCI of £35 per week in 1994, or, 
alternatively, cripplingly high tax rates to afford a decent CI. If 
generous benefits, on the other hand, are your priority then, again, 
two consequences ensue. Either withdrawal rates will be relatively 
high - to prevent benefits spilling over to those who might not need 
them - or, if rates are to be kept at a modest level, then the costs of 
agenerous benefit system rise. Again, these consequences are argued 
over in the CI debate. Some CI critics would retain conditionality 
and point to the higher benefit levels that could be afforded as a 
result; CI supporters observe that the consequence of this is that 
higher rates, and poverty traps, are thus imposed on those in society 
who can least afford to bear them - either this or prohibitive costs 
again become a problem. Finally, if having an inexpensive benefit 
system is your main priority then this either means having high 
withdrawal rates, in order to confine benefits to those who need them 
and /or are entitled to them, or it means having low benefit levels, 
for obvious reasons. 
Now, different ideologies will adopt different principles as 
their priority. In practice, of course, social security systems tend 
to be a complex 'mix and match' because the world of trial, error and 
compromise rarely mirrors the ideologist's textbook. Equally, 
however, all governments are coloured by an ideological hue and so 
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will inevitably attempt to shape that system according to the 
allocative principle which they favour above all others. As such, it 
seems justifiable to take our three ideologies and to assign to each 
of them an allocative principle which will tend to 'trump' those 
alternative principles which are favoured by their ideological 
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So, let us go through fig. 2 systematically. Economic liberals 
take low costs as their priority since high levels of public spending 
are thought by them to damage competitiveness and inhibit risk - 
taking and innovation. They are fully prepared to accept the 
consequences of this since, as we saw in chapters 3 to 5, their ideal 
citizen is one who identifies with wage- earning activity in the 
formal labour market, activity which can only commence if benefits 
are not establishing a 'floor' which discourages effort and so 
creates unemployment. High withdrawal rates and low benefits are 
therefore justified and, consequently, the ideal social security 
system for an economic liberal would be one which was dominated by 
selective, highly conditional benefits reserved largely for those 
who could not afford private insurance. Social democrats, 
meanwhile, principally favour generous benefits. This is because 
their ideal citizen is more than just a market -oriented producer and 
consumer and, in any case, the market cannot provide for the needs of 
each and every individual. They are more willing to accept higher 
costs than the economic liberal, therefore; however, they still 
share the employment ethic and assume that some form of state action 
can maintain high levels of employment, so providing an economic 
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environment within which most able- bodied adults can, and must, 
work. As such, low withdrawal rates are less of a concern so that the 
ideal social democratic system would be one where benefits are 
universal but also categorical and contributory, thus avoiding the 
perceived disadvantages of out -and -out unconditionality. The 
democratic Left, finally, do not insist that individuals - conceived 
of as citizens or not - identify themselves with wage- earning 
activity and so must have the opportunities to 'opt -out' of the 
labour market if they wish, especially since full employment 
increasingly seems to resemble an anachronism. So, benefits are not 
seen as temporary replacements for loss of earnings and, 
consequently, low withdrawal rates are the main priority. As such, 
those on the democratic Left find benefit levels to be less important 
than for social democrats, i.e. since sources of well -being beyond 
the labour market, with its 'wages or benefits' implications, must be 
devised. This is certainly true in the short -term, though in the 
medium- to long -term the democratic Left may wish to increase the 
generosity of the unconditional income, but as a dividend not as a 
benefit. The ideal democratic Left system, therefore, must contain a 
high degree of unconditionality in order to guarantee individuals' 
autonomy. 
So it is important to remember the following points since they 
will be of crucial importance when we come to the final chapter and 
attempt to judge the success or failure of this research in meeting 
its objective. Each ideology gives priority to an allocative 
principle which distinguishes it from rival ideologies and through 
which social security systems and proposed reforms are judged. For 
economic liberals this principle consists in valuing low public 
spending and selectivist benefits; for social democrats it consists 
in valuing generous and universal benefits; for the democratic Left, 
finally, the principle consists in valuing low withdrawal rates and 
unconditional, no- strings -attached benefits. 
We are now in a position to anticipate Part 2. In chapter 6 we will 
see why economic liberals might be attracted to CI and why, according 
to the criteria just explicated, they favour NIT. In chapter 7, 
similarly, we will see why social democrats might find elements of CI 
to attract them but, also, why their enduring commitment to social 
insurance leads them to favour more of a New Beveridge approach with 
CI pushed into the long -term background. In chapter 8 we will look at 
157 
the democratic Left and market socialism and in chapters 9 and 10 we 
will introduce both ecological and feminist critiques, partly to 
examine their distinct justifications for CI and partly to ask 
whether CI could act as a basis for any coalition between market 
socialist, ecological and feminist economics. 
So, by the end of Part 2 we will have a greater understanding of 
why and how ideologies intervene into the CI debate. 
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CHAPTER SIR 
NEGATIVE INCOME TAX 
1. Introduction 
Why is it that throughout this thesis I have mentioned NIT as that 
version of CI most likely to be favoured by economic liberals? 
Because, on the one hand, they are attracted to the flexibility which 
tax and benefit integration would bring. The post -war benefits 
system, they insist, established a 'floor' below which wages are 
unlikely to fall so introducing rigidities into the labour market, 
rigidities which have kept labour supply above demand and so 
depressed employment levels. Integration would mean that wages 
could fluctuate without a loss of income security since benefits, 
i.e. negative taxes, would keep pace with such fluctuation and so 
prevent people from falling into destitution. On the other hand, 
many economic liberals are suspicious of automatic ex ante provision 
since they think that this might dampen work incentives for many. 
Some kind of guaranteed minimum income seems desirable so long as it 
is a minimum guaranteed to those who work for it. At the same time, as 
we shall see, economic liberals insist that if looked at quantitively 
there is no distributional distinction to be made between CI and NIT 
in any case. As such, instead of NIT being a variant of CI - as 
characterized here - it is CI, in its unconditionality, which is an 
unnecessary variant of NIT. Yet this, in a way, still begs the 
question, 'why is it the Right who have given the greatest amount of 
support to NIT proposals'? After all, in the 1960s NIT received 
support from across the political spectrum. The Left viewed it as a 
way of guaranteeing a minimum income and so as being consistent with 
the function of a welfare state. The Right viewed it as a welfare 
provision more consistent with the imperatives of a market economy. 
So what happened subsequently? Why, by the 1980s, had NIT become 
associated so predominantly with the Right - and discredited even in 
many of their eyes? It is the purpose of this chapter to answer this 
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question. 
Before proceeding, however, some mention should be given to 
another form of unconditional income for which economic liberals, 
among others, could give support, i.e. a 'birth -right grant' or an 
'initial endowment'. This implies giving to each and every 
individual, at a particular age or even a series of ages, a lump -sum 
to do with as they like. This grant could be equivalent to the total 
amount of CI /NIT that would otherwise be distributed to an individual 
during an average lifetime; it would be utilized profitably by some 
and so might provide greater economic opportunities than the 
lifetime's trickle of a weekly or monthly CI /NIT. But, though this 
might be the case, such a grant would certainly provide less economic 
security than CI /NIT especially for those who, for whatever reason, 
squandered it. Would such people be therefore deserving of 
conditional help once their grant was spent and they were unable to 
look after themselves any other way? At the risk of sounding naive, 
it is difficult to imagine many, including most economic liberals, 
supporting the idea of leaving the reckless and the incapable to 
starve on the streets. If so, then any such unconditional lump -sum 
would need to be reduced in order to make way for additional lifetime 
provision. To what extent you might combine the two really depends 
upon how you value economic opportunity against economic security. 
Economic liberals, I suspect, would favour the former, i.e. the 
opportunities afforded by a grant, against the latter. But, even so, 
if a lump -sum grant could not be the only form of transfer and if the 
reckless and incapable are not going to be left to starve, then we are 
still left with the seperate problem of justifying some other form 
lifetime benefit provision. This is a problem facing economic 
liberals no less than anyone else. So is a lump -sum grant desirable? 
If so, how high should it be pitched compared to additional benefits? 
These are questions which this research may safely set to one side for 
what we are dealing with are the ideological variants of CI - defined, 
remember, as a weekly or monthly payment - and, as such, NIT requires 
analysis even if economic liberals were to decide that a lump -sum 
grant were to be the main form of income provision. This is so 
because either additional, post -grant benefits would guarantee a 
minimum income - even one at subsistence level - to those who 
qualified for it, in which case we are back with some kind of CI /NIT, 
or it would not, which might imply people starving on the streets, an 
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option I have suggested most economic liberals would not go for. 
So, we will begin by pinning down more precisely than in the 
introduction to Part 2 what the criteria are by which social security 
reform is judged by economic liberals. Then we will trace the history 
of NIT in America and of tax credits in Britain, to illustrate the 
various arguments for and against NIT. We will then conclude by 
drawing out the implications for CI generally, which involves 
examining my assumption that NIT is to be associated overwhelmingly 
with economic liberalism. 
2. Reform Criteria 
Why is it the Right who are principally attracted to NIT? In 
order to begin to answer this question we need to appreciate the full 
range of criteria through which assessments of the welfare state are 
attempted, for only in this way do we appreciate the 'Right' as 
favouring one set of criteria and the 'left' as favouring another. 
So, in no particular order we might identify the following: 
1) Administration should be as efficacious as possible; 
2) Benefits should be as generous as possible;. 
3) Individual liberty is fundamental; 
4) Economic efficiency is a sine qua non of welfare provision; 
5) Redistribution is a means to the end of greater social 
equality; 
6) To be effective, resources must be targeted; 
7) Access to provision should be universal; 
8) Unless work incentives are maintained the system cannot survive 
let alone function. 
Now I do not imagine that these criteria are comprehensive nor that 
they can simply be sorted out into those which are of the Left and 
those which are of the Right. Also, there is a great deal of overlap 
among the above as well as controversy as to what a particular term 
might mean. For instance, the Left could insist that it, in its 
insistence on equality, theorizes the best context for individual 
liberty, while the Right might reply that this would not be liberty 
but utility. Even so, I would like to suggest that the Right are most 
closely attached to liberty, efficiency and selectivity, while the 
Left are most attached to generosity, equality and universality. 
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Administrative efficacy and, possibly, incentives -maintenance are 
less ideological definable. Looking at the Right only, we can see 
that valuing liberty is what leads them to favour low public 
spending, admiring efficiency is what leads them to favour low 
benefit levels and preferring selectivity is what leads them to 
favour high withdrawal levels - to avoid benefit spillage. So we see 
how these critieria tie in with those outlined in the preceeding 
introduction. 
So, are the Right principally attracted to NIT because of this 
commitment to liberty, efficiency and selectivity? Does NIT really 
embody the virtues of low public spending etc.? If so then why, given 
the recent dominance of the Right, has it never been implemented? How 
does NIT compare to CI? Has NIT anything to hold for the Left? We 
will now address these questions in turn. 
3. A History of NIT 
In 1946, G. Stigler outlined a proposal for 'money -grants': 
There is a great attractiveness in the proposal that we extend 
the personal income tax to the lowest income brackets with 
negative rates in those brackets. (1946, 364 -5) 
This, he believed, could improve the incomes of the poor without 
damaging incentives to work and save. So, helping all in need instead 
of introducing complex discretionary criteria of provision. Three 
years earlier the Economist had written: 
It would be a resounding achievement if the British community 
could make provision, out of a simple tax on all its citizens, 
for a national minimum income for all its dependents. (1943, 
837) 
But, wherever else we go chasing through history looking for such 
examples - e.g. to the Speenhamland system - it is Milton Friedman who 
gave flesh to such ideas. 
Friedman (1962, 191 -4) 'individualized' the alleviation of 
poverty. The poor, he insisted, should be helped as individuals and 
not as the members of some occupational class. Nor should help 
..distort the market and impede its functioning." - as with 
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minimum wages. NIT would, therefore, be preferable on "purely 
mechanical grounds" by making social security costs explicit, by 
being 'incentives -friendly' and by reducing the administrative 
burden of government intervention. If there was any danger with NIT 
it was that of a majority "...imposing taxes for its own benefit on an 
unwilling minority ", rather than taxing itself to help those even 
more worse off. 
Now, the NIT proposal was itself quite simple. For whereas social 
security benefits impose a poverty trap on low- income and no- income 
people, replacing the system of benefits and progressive taxation 
with a single system, combining the two, would establish a stipulated 
income level. Those above the level would pay tax on their earnings, 
those below it would receive tax credits or a NIT - calculated 
according to the difference between the earnings in question and the 
stipulated level, but guaranteeing, at the very least, a minimum 
income - see fig. 1. So the poverty trap would be significantly 






state receives net income 
'positive' taxes 
stipulated income level 
guaranteed minimum income 
fig. 1 
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The idea, then, should be seen in the light of the Monetarist 
revolution touched on in the previous chapter. All the more so 
because it is intriguing to note that by the time this revolution was 
in full flow, i.e. the early 1980s, Friedman had become less 
confident about the prospects for NIT. After rehearsing old themes 
regarding the demise of private charity, welfare dependency and the 
desirability of NIT in principle, he complains that the NIT 
programmes considered by Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter were too 
generous: 
If a decent lével of support means that few, if any, current 
recipients are to receive less from the reformed program than 
they do now from the collection of programs available, then it 
is impossible to achieve all three objectives simultaneously. 
(Friedman & Friedman, 1980, 152 -6) 
Namely, the objectives of a minimum income, fewer costs and work 
incentives. So it is important to note that Friedman's complaint 
about a decency level is motivated by a realization that NIT was less 
able to achieve these objectives than he had previously thought. 
What had happened to impair his confidence? As I have mentioned, 
the attention given to NIT originally, in the context of 1960's 
America, was remarkable (Moynihan, 1973) . It attracted a wealth of 
literature, research and support from diverse political 
perspectives. To take one example, for a liberal like Tobin (1965, 
889 -96) the challenge was to provide the economic counter -part of the 
civil rights movement. Freeing Black communities from poverty meant 
neither forcing welfare recipients into the labour market, nor 
giving them the opportunity to withdraw completely. It also meant 
that providing the capacity to earn a decent living had come to 
require supplementing earnings, rather than compelling employers to 
pay wages above the value of the work being paid for. Tobin believed 
that a NIT would encourage a "tight" labour market free from 
discrimination and bureaucratic surveillance, where family break -up 
could be reduced, education and training improved and inequality 
diminished. The most effective criticisms of this came from Alvin 
Schorr (1968, 295 -6) . NIT, he argued, was in the Poor Law tradition 
and would pay only small amounts to those most in need but not as a 
social right. He also wrote that it would pay considerable amounts to 
those who could not be considered deprived (1966,110 -7). Tobin's 
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(1966b, 119) reply to the first criticism was that an income -by -right 
and income- testing had always accompanied one another anyway. To the 
more substantial second criticism he insisted that the obvious 
alternative to distributive reform, i.e. employment creation, would 
take decades and even then be insufficient. To the 'danger' that an 
income guarantee could reduce work incentives, he shot back: 
For centuries this cynicism about human nature has been the 
excuse by which the affluent have relieved their individual and 
collective consciences and pocketbooks of the burden of their 
less fortunate brethren. (1966a, 31 -3) 
Nevertheless, it could not be denied that the work ethic - or, as 
chapter 4 characterized it, employment ethic - looms large in the 
American psyche and that wide -ranging reform would need to reassure 
the public to whom it would be sold. This became clear when Richard 
Nixon attempted to introduce a variant of NIT with his Family 
Assistance Plan (FAP) of 1969, which would have provided income 
support for all families with children - anybody interested in this 
episode, which falls outside our range of interest, should consult 
Daniel Moynihan's (1973) excellent book on the subject. Basically, 
Nixon felt obliged to insert an 'obligation to work' clause into FAP 
in order to smooth off any residual Left -wing edges (Harrington, 
1984, 32 -4). Many deplored the emphasis subsequently given to 
incentives, castigating it along the lines suggested by Tobin. But 
popular belief in rugged individualism and self -help held firm. It 
was, then, the conjunction of two things - the necessity of reform 
along NIT lines and scepticism about effects on incentives - that 
inspired the experiments of the 1970s, the point at which various 
misconceptions were born. 
It is often said that all forms of a guaranteed income are, 
economically speaking, equivalent (Green, 1967, 61). In an obvious 
sense this is true. But all that this means is that it is possible to 
show that the post -tax and transfer levels of a guaranteed income 
like a CI match those of NIT precisely. In other words, the net income 
which NIT provides in fig. 1 is identical to the net income which a CI 
would provide (Van Parijs, 1995, 57). But what this common device 
conceals, sometimes deliberately, are the non -quantifiable 
variables through which such forms are actually distinguished, i.e. 
the ideological dimension. However, so far as NIT was concerned it 
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was the 'common device' which prevailed. For those such as Green the 
trick was to attack poverty and meet the needs of the poor with a 
minimum of income redistribution, so confining help to the very poor 
and filling only part of the "poverty income gap" to maintain 
incentives. Such "...limited coverage reflects recognition that the 
poor are a dwindling minority in the United States" (Green, 1967, 57- 
61 & 159). Now, if making savings is your number one priority then 
fine. My point, in saying that there are ideologically- distinct 
reform criteria, is that this has to be argued for. No appeal to some 
kind of a priori wisdom can be made; especially not one which 
visualizes a "dwindling minority" of the poor. This, quite simply, 
is to sneak in a conception of poverty as an absolute rather than as 
relative. That these moral and political presumptions could 
masquerade as a commonly held wisdom did not augur well for the 
planned NIT experiments. 
And so it proved to be. Would NIT damage work incentives? This 
was the question to which the experiments were overwhelmingly 
addressed. The expectation seems to have been that NIT recipients 
would indeed work less, in which case a less generous scheme could be 
implemented. Cynics might characterize this as an attempt to 
'individualize' the problem of poverty once and for all. Still, such 
an explanation of the experiments' motivation might explain why 
there came an upheaval in political responses to NIT in the mid - 
1970s. Initial results from the New Jersey experiment (1968 -72) 
seemed to show that the effect on the labour supply of white males 
was, after all, negligible. There was a negative effect, yes, but not 
to any great extent - though women did reduce their working hours 
considerably. So Albert Rees and Howard Watts felt confident enough 
to propose: 
The burden of proof would now appear to be on those who assert 
that income maintenance programs for intact families will have 
very large effects on labour supply. (1975, 86) 
Sure enough the backlash followed. Michael Hoskin (1975, 110 -4) 
denied that it was possible to infer any such conclusion from a three 
year local experiment and apply it to a universal and permanent 
state -of- affairs. B.S. & W.M. Mahoney (1975, 183) 'Hawthorned' the 
experiment by claiming that it had been designed in such a way that 
the hopes of those favouring NIT would be confirmed. 
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History does not record whether the Mahoneys used the same 
reasoning once things had swung in their direction. If not, then they 
were in good company. Five accusations against optimistic 
conclusions derived from the New Jersey experiment were levelled. 
Firstly, the Hawthorne effect that the design of the experiment had 
baised the results. Secondly, that the representative sample had 
been purely voluntary and therefore unreliable. Thirdly, that long- 
term responses on the part of recipients would be different from 
their short -term ones. Fourthly, that whereas the working- week's 
length is currently set by institutions, thus constraining 
individuals' preferences, if widespread reform was introduced then 
institutional practices would be more vulnerable to the instinct to 
work less (Stiglitz, 1986, 499 -500). Finally, that the uprating of 
the Aid for Families and Dependent Children program in 1969 had had a 
negative effect on the experiment. The accuracy, or otherwise, of 
these points is not the issue here. What is important is that such 
criticisms were levelled successfully against those experiments 
which dared to rebel against common sense, i.e. give the poor more and 
they work less. But perhaps the fault is really with those who 
favoured a generous NIT. By trying so hard so disprove ' common sense' 
they only confirmed it as something worthy of such close attention. 
They mistook disputes about values for empirical disagreements 
regarding the verifiability of survey data. 
After New Jersey came several smaller experiments. The one at 
Gary, Indiana was widely believed to demonstrate that most 
individuals' desire to earn was not affected by NIT - though a few 
reacted with large reductions. Positive conclusions were drawn from 
this. Namely, that any reduction in working -time was due to an 
increase in time alloted to job -searching and not to instincts for 
laziness /scrounging, and so forth . (Burtless & Hausman, 1978, 1125- 
7) 
But by this time common sense was fighting a rearguard action. 
What was startling about the results of the experiments run in 
Seattle and Denver (SIME/DIME) between 1970 and 1978 was not that 
they showed that the working hours of recipients were adversely 
affected - this merely proved the preconceptions of those who 
articulated the popular wisdom. Rather, it was that SIME/DIME also 
indicated a high level of marriage break -up. The experiment 
began 
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with 4,800 family units and ended with 12,000. This indicated a 
dissolution rate for recipients which was 40% higher than the rest of 
the population (Parker, 1989, 154). Obviously, this could regarded 
as a further nail in NIT's coffin. Counter- arguments were drowned 
out, e.g. that it was the assessment unit which was at fault since if 
people can receive more money by splitting up than by staying 
together than they will do so. Also being overlooked by this time was 
'laboratory' research. Beston, Greenberg and Kasten (1982, 176 -7) 
ran a simulation analysis revealing that the redistributive impact 
of NIT would not harm efficiency - of earnings, hours worked and 
output. They concluded that the choice between tax- transfer systems 
came down to a choice between competing moral values, therefore. 
Irwin Garfinkel (1982, 504) added that even if it were true that the 
poor's incentive to work would decline with NIT, since they were in 
low- productivity occupations anyway it really did not matter. 
So what had happened? The NIT debate had, by the late 1970s, been 
hijacked by those who were more concerned with work incentives than 
anything else. This caused liberals and those further to the Left to 
largely drop out of the debate. The running was increasingly made 
according to the concerns of the Right. But what the Right, 
originally enthusiastic for NIT, increasingly derived from the 
experiments was a syllogism: NIT produces work disincentives and 
family break -up, these effects are undesirable and therefore NIT is 
undesirable. The most outspoken critic of NIT was Martin Anderson, 
social policy adviser to Nixon, Ford and Reagan, who did more than 
anyone else to discredit the proposal on the grounds that it 
destroyed the poor's work incentives (Parker, 1989, 97). No wonder 
that by 1980 Friedman had become less than confident. So, what the 
New Right administrations came to favour was an incremental scaling - 
down of existing provision rather than a lock, stock and barrel 
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replacement. Enter social security reform of the 1980s, and beyond. 
It would certainly explain why tax credits did not re- surface in the 
Thatcherite agenda. Tax credits were proposed as the British 
equivalent to NIT and came close to being implemeted by the Heath 
government. The debate surrounding it, however, did not approach the 
intensity of NIT. Here, the emphasis remained largely focused upon 
normative and theoretical questions. 
NIT surfaced in Britain at a time when the Right was picking up on 
the Left's criticism of the welfare state's efficacy: 
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...the development and application of a system of NIT offers the 
brightest hope of emancipation from the doctrines of 
universality in social welfare that have militated so long 
against an implacable war on poverty. (Lees, 1967, 15) 
Such considerations began to enter the policy arena with the 
Conservative election victory of 1970. It was in that year that the 
Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA) published a significant 
proposal. Relative poverty, they announced, had been eradicated. 
Unequal earning power was perfectly natural . The aim, therefore, was 
to eliminate once and for all the remaining pockets of absolute 
poverty and to reduce tax in order to improve incentives (Christopher 
et al ,1970, 5 -6). This objective formed the backdrop to their 
proposal, Reverse Income Tax (RIT). 
Despite the slight change of name, this was hardly any different 
from NIT. Like NIT it would replace all state cash benefits. Above a 
break -even level - which, in an almost poverty -less society they did 
not specify - earnings would be taxed, though tax remissions could be 
given if private insurance had been taken out. This last point would 
indicate that RIT was not intended to be a wholesale replacement for 
the welfare state. They envisaged that as the earnings of recipients 
rose, NIT could be clawed back at a rate of 100% in order to keep the 
overall tax rate on earnings down to 35 %. This, then, would 
concentrate expenditure on those most in need and minimize the loss 
to national output. They did anticipate certain problems. Firstly, 
that of employers treating positive, 'top -up' taxes as an excuse to 
cut wages, though they thought that this would be unlikely under 
conditions of low unemployment. Secondly, there might be the problem 
of higher -paid workers making inflationary wage demands in order to 
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restore lost differentials, though this might be avoided by such 
workers desiring to help the poor. Finally, RIT might have a negative 
effect on incentives to work and save, though they accepted this as a 
necessary price to be paid for the elimination of poverty 
(Christopher et al, 1970, 68 -72 & 90 -1). 
The IEA continued to hammer away at this theme throughout the 
1970s. Colin Clark uprated RIT in 1977 by, given conditions of 
accelerating unemployment, attaching a work test to it: 
It would be intolerable to have able- bodied people living 
permanently on Reverse Income Tax payments - and devolving 
their principal energies to asking for more. (1977, 30) 
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This is an important point. Where there is full employment it makes 
no sense to ask whether NIT /RIT would, in itself, establish a minimum 
income. Since almost all male family -heads are presumed to be 
earning then NIT /RIT may be regarded as that device which will raise 
insufficient earnings to a minimum level. But once mass unemployment 
descends millions of workers and dependents are left without 
support. Would NIT /RIT then be adequate to establish an income 
minimum? In the absence of a healthy labour market it would need to 
be. But if that minimum were enough to keep recipients out of 
destitution, could they be trusted to improve their positions when 
the opportunity arose? The Right, of course, expressed scepticism; 
the obvious solution, therefore, was to make the receipt of positive 
taxes conditional upon a work test. In other words, a minimum income 
is provided only to those who satisfy such conditional criteria. As 
with responses to SIME/DIME this betrays a logic of the poor being 
poor because they are idle. Strangely, then, NIT /RIT is only a true 
earnings supplement where there is full employment, a concept which, 
as we have seen, the Right claims is both indefinable and 
undesirable. When unemployment rises, therefore, NIT /RIT becomes 
more of a disciplinary device intended to service market 
flexibility. The IEA's war on poverty becomes a war on the poor. 
Clark, consequently, saw no "satisfactory solution" to the problem 
of whether an "idler's" family should be left to suffer (1977, 55) . 
There seems sufficient reason, therefore, to be sceptical of 
NIT /RIT. Under conditions of high unemployment it either fails to 
provide the guaranteed minimum illustrated in fig. l or does so by 
imposing stringent work tests on the poorest. 
RIT found few other supporters, though. What did find favour was a 
more modest proposal to systematize tax allowances. In effect, a tax 
credit would have simplified the various forms of tax allowances, 
providing a surety against taxation. At 1972 prices the Green paper 
on the subject proposed credits of £2 per child, £4 per single person 
and £6 per married couple. National Insurance contributions would 
continue, with those on benefits and /or not paying income tax 
receiving benefits as before (HMSO, 1972) . With these proposals, up 
to i million people would have been floated off means- tested benefit 
(Outer Circle, 1978, 58) . 
Some did note that the redistributive effects would be minor, but 
felt that this would not be important should tax credits be capable of 
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facilitating other redistributive measures. This, for instance, 
could have involved co- ordinating tax credits with income- related 
benefits to more effectively search out that poverty which remained 
largely invisible (Barr & Roper, 1974, 39 -42). G. & P. Polanyi also 
felt that tax credits could be a stepping -stone to more effective 
means of poverty relief. Such an 'effective means' would be RIT, 
which, 
...would concentrate help on the poor by a selective system of 
increased credits for people with low incomes and 
correspondingly higher negative tax rates...which would have 
the effect of confining the benefit to them. ( Polanyi & Polanyi, 
1974, 55 -6) 
But tax credits also attracted a considerable number of 
detractors. For Tony Atkinson (1973, 83 -5) they would not help those 
just above the poverty line nor those below it, not help families nor 
those claiming means- tested benefits, only provide an inflexible 
child credit, leave the sick and unemployed worse off, not abolish 
the poverty trap for many and, finally, redistribute money to above - 
average earners. Atkinson recommended, instead, the co- ordination 
and harmonization of the tax and transfer systems with social 
insurance and progressive taxation to provide greater flexibility 
than that given through tax credits. But despite tax credits being of 
little help to those on less than £8 per week, some felt that this did 
not preclude additional redistributive measures. It might be of 
course that no such commitment to redistribution would come from the 
electorate, but this was a matter of public choice and could hardly be 
blamed on the transfer system itself ( Institute for Fiscal Studies, 
1973, 67 & 73) . 
In any case it was the dissenting voice which prevailed and 
Atkinson himself influenced the Labour Party's rejection of the tax 
credits proposal. The Conservatives would, probably, have 
implemented the reform but were voted out of office. The 1974 -9 
Labour government remained largely wedded to a Beveridgean way of 
doing things, though it did introduce child benefits in realization 
that hundreds of thousands of families were literally being taxed 
into poverty. By the early 1980s the Conservatives were back in 
office but tax credits were not revived since they seem to have been 
equated with NIT, by then discredited. 
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NIT was not dead, however, though it would soon be pretty 
comotose. Patrick Minford (1984), indeed, had been encouraged by the 
findings of SIME /DIME. For here was a reason to dilute the 
'generosity' of NIT . He believed that NIT' s only objective should be 
to eliminate unavoidable need - misfortunes beyond the individual' s 
control. Avoidable need - large families, illegitimate children, 
failure to insure against old age - was for the individual to prevent. 
State prevention would only encourage irresponsible behaviour by 
removing the penalties which required people to alleviate avoidable 
need (Minford, 1987, 81). So, having placed the mask over NIT, 
Minford proceeded to turn on the gas. 
Since public goods should no longer be state provided, he argued, 
the payment of NIT should be contingent upon the production of 
certificates to confirm that recipients were insuring themselves for 
health, education, pensions, sickness and disability to a specified 
minimum scale. So, NIT is seen as a fragile step onto the ladders of 
a private system. The minimum it would provide would be one of 
subsistence only, excluding all items not necessary for survival, 
though what this actually meant was for society to decide. Minford 
saw such proposals as a means of returning the welfare state to the 
people. In fact, to avoid rises in marginal tax rates due to the cost 
of an NIT it would be necessary to maintain a high 70% tax rate on low 
earners. This would benefit those on average incomes 
disproportionately thus improving incentives for those on both 
average and low wages. Such a withdrawal rate should be acceptable to 
the poorest who, after all, are being subsidized by the system: 
The community has a right to expect people to work if they 
can....That is their contribution as a condition of society's 
support. (1984, ix -xv) 
In what detail is it necessary to analyse all of this? Minford 
represents the social policy wing of the New Right revolution. We may 
then, borrowing arguments from political theory, say something like 
the following. Minford' s NIT would be economically self -defeating. 
His vision is almost of a Right utopia whereby self -responsibility 
and self- sufficiency permeate through the population gradually 
enabling the emergence of almost universal private insurance. For 
those who refused to improve their moral character, disciplinary 
strategies would be both necessary and perfectly acceptable to the 
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vast majority. But if these ideas reveal a rather naive view of human 
nature, almost a counter -part of Communist attempts to engineer an 
altruistic character, then no such change would result. So Minford's 
successors would be forced to either fall back onto some kind of 
pseudo -welfare state, or to accept the consequnces of many resisting 
the kind of market -oriented mentality a fully functioning system of 
private insurance would require. But this would be to produce such 
social fallout - ill health, poorly educated workforce - that the 
breakdown of social administration and of social order could result. 
Given this possibility a third scenario could be considered. If a 
retrun to a pseudo -welfare state was undesirable and risking social 
breakdown unimaginable then why not contemplate an increased role 
for the state? This third scenario would be the political dimension 
to Ninfordism. If a return to a semi -paternalistic social order_ 
were not to be considered, then authoritarianism would be the only 
option. Some might say that a version of this has already occurred so 
that the experience with Thatcherism in the 1980s and 1990s provides 
the prototype to any further New Right revolutions in the future. So 
this is the social dimension of Minford's proposals: either the 
current welfare state is not so bad after all and helps create a 
reasonably just and stable society; or, we go part of the way along 
Minford's path and risk economic apartheid with all of its 
consequences for society; or, if this were unacceptable, an 
authoritarian state would be needed with an increasingly passive and 
subservient underclass. Perhaps these scenarios sound too fanciful 
to appear reasonable. Yet Minford's vision of a purely privatized 
society is so far beyond what most of us can imagine that such 
speculation seems unavoidable. 
4. NIT and CI 
How are NIT and CI to be distinguished, then? Why should they be 
distinguished at all? After all, both employ an integrated 
tax /benefit system, both take legal residence as the basis of 
entitlement and both dispense with the contributory principle. 
However, even these similarities may be deceptive. As an earnings - 
supplement NIT is awarded only to those who apply for it and can 
demonstrate that they are in need. So it retains demonstrable need as 
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the central criterion of entitlement. In most cases, as we have 
argued, a work test is required before even a subsistence NIT could be 
granted. Furthermore, since not everyone receives NIT, e.g. 
children, and since it is calculated and credited in arrears, the 
full integration of the tax and benefits systems would not occur in 
any case. There would be a lag between the declaration of your 
earnings and the payment of the positive taxes to pull you at least as 
high as the guaranteed minimum, a lag which would leave most of those 
experiencing rapid changes in earnings in poverty. This is the 
consequence of ex post provision and so NIT is more accurately 
described as a 'unified' system. The main differences between NIT 
and CI, therefore, are: 
1) the method of payment - NIT is paid in arrears, ex post, on proof of 
need whereas CI is credited automatically, ex ante, probably on a 
weekly basis; 
2) income tax rates - in order to keep costs down NIT tends to imply 
higher marginal tax rates on lower earners, while CI involves either 
a total flat -rate or the retention of progressive taxation; 
3) the assessment unit - NIT would almost certainly be paid to 
households, CI to individuals (Parker, 1991, 11; 1994, 7 -8). 
Now, each of these has been disputed by Sam Britten (Brittan & 
Webb, 1990). He sees NIT and CI as lying along a continuum. With 
modern computerized methods, he insists, they are administratively 
equivalent. They therefore provide identical post- transfer rises in 
income not only on the economist's graph -paper but also in reality. 
Perhaps, but this does not change the fact that one is paid ex post 
after allowing for earnings and the other ex ante as a basis for 
earnings. Van Parijs (1995, 35) points out that the basic of Basic 
or Citizen's Income does not refer to some notion of basic needs, 
which it is often taken to do, but to the automatic, no- strings- 
attached crediting of an income in a manner not allowed by NIT. 
Brittan might reply that since both minima are withdrawn such a 
distinction is deceptive. But it is precisely this distinction which 
is theoretically descriptive of two different conceptions of 
citizenship. If an income is to be received in addition to 
inadequate earnings then the separation between taxpayer and 
recipient is being maintained - which, of course, economic liberals 
are happy about given their conception of citizenship. Contrast that 
to a CI where a floor is guaranteed upon which earnings may be built 
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according to each individual's desires. Secondly, Brittan insists 
that that the generosity of a system is not determined by the system 
itself, so that NIT could be just as generous as some versions of CI. 
Again, this is obviously correct and, indeed, Brittan (1995, 242-62) 
is an example of someone who might be willing to see a high guaranteed 
minimum even if this necessitated a rise in income tax, this being a 
necessary, even a sufficient, condition of giving capitalism a human 
face. Such a welcome and generous acknowledgement on Brittan's part 
is a good example of the point made in the preceeding introduction to 
Part 2, i.e that the ideological model provided here has its 
limitations. Nevertheless, Brittan's Rawisianism ( Brittan & Webb, 
1990, 59 -64) stands out precisely because it is an exception. Most 
NIT supporters, like Minford, have been motivated by the desire to 
maintain work incentives and keep costs down. Brittan 's 
intervention into the debate, as such, is likely to find few 
adherents on the Right. Finally, he insists that there is no reason 
why NIT and CI should have different assessment units, each may be 
calculated on the basis either of the household or of the individual. 
However, when Steven Webb (Brittan & Webb, 1990, 54 -8) follows up on 
this point his 'objective' analysis of NIT is heavily slanted in 
favour of the household. After all, if NIT were to paid to 
individuals then what about those who do not earn? Either a work test 
would be required - which a CI would not involve in which case CI and 
NIT are distinct - or a minimum income level would be paid to all - 
which cedes the ground to CI since it would contradict NIT' s ex post 
provision. In short, Brittan may be accused of trying to fit square 
pegs into round holes and I conclude that my distinction between CI, 
as an unconditional income, and NIT holds. 
So NIT is much more likely to find favour with the Right given 
their criteria for judging social security and welfare state reform. 
Theirs is a model whereby a poverty line is defined and the objective 
is to lift the poor above that line at a minimum cost. This is to see 
poverty as an absolute concept, identified objectively, and separate 
from issues of equality. The Left's model of poverty, meanwhile, 
sees poverty as a structural 'extreme' of, though not identical to, 
inequality (Bull, 1971, 65 -6). The fact that these alternative 
conceptions give rise to differing models of guaranteed income is 
something which so much of the NIT debate, by being pitched at an 
economistic level, has ignored. Brittan, despite his advocacy of 
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Rawisian principles, is an example of someone who looks so closely at 
the economics that the ideological specifics get pushed to one side - 
indeed, he concentrates on the economics in order to push those 
specifcs to one side since, for him, they only pose a ' bogus dilemma' . 
The most persuasive case against NIT, therefore, is that it could 
never reconcile three factors: providing a generous minimum, keeping 
costs down, keeping marginal tax rates down (Dilnot et al, 1984). 
And, as we have seen, NIT advocates are often aware of this and most 
allow for it by making NIT less generous. But the danger of pursuing 
such a draconian strategy is obvious and has already been dealt with 
above in relation to Minford. The real questions are, does my close 
identification of NIT with economic liberals really hold firm? Why 
could the Left not give consistent support to it? 
As hopefully made clear in Part 1 our ideologies work with 
radically different conceptions of human nature. The Right broadly 
conceived, as we saw in the case of Hayek, seem to identify isolated 
individuals standing in a potentially hostile environment. To make 
that environment less hostile some given, immutable context is 
required. So, the Right has traditionally looked towards history, 
nation, God, family, market. Only through such structures and 
immutable certainties is the world made a safer, less threatening 
place. The Left, too, see individuals as socialized beings. But 
whereas the Right find that individuals inherit their contexts from 
'outside', the Left find that such contexts are created 
endogenously, i.e. emerge in the act of creation. Now, at their 
worst both sides have indulged in a form of state worship. The Right, 
at their most pessimistic, have seen little hope for human nature 
unless secured by strong, authoritarian external forces. The Left 
have believed that the freest human community will not come about 
unless the grip of property -owners is forcibly removed by a 
revolutionary elite. However the Right resolves its tendencies to 
worship the state, it is clear that if the Left is to utilize the 
state as a partner, rather than serve it as a master, then it must 
evolve the social policies that could allow it to do so. In the field 
of social security this has to imply a reform which, though freeing 
individuals from the commodifying pull of the market, does not throw 
them into the arms of a managerial state. Now this might involve a CI 
or it might involve something which stops short, we will consider 
this in the next chapter, but it is highly unlikely to involve NIT. 
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There are three reasons why this is so. Firstly, because NIT 's ex 
post form of provision makes it a selective benefit which, were it to 
be introduced as a wholesale replacement for other types of benefits, 
offends against the Left's notion of universal, extra- market social 
rights. A more generous NIT may compensate considerably for 
inadequate wages but only by continuing to define us all, even those 
who pay taxes, as primarily producer -consumers in a marketized 
society. Secondly, because, as I pointed out in the discussion of 
RIT, high unemployment either undermines the capacity of NIT to 
provide a guaranteed minimum or it does so by imposing stringent work 
tests on the poorest. Finally, because it is unclear whether NIT 
could ever provide a guaranteed minimum for those who are not looking 
for employment. Theoretically, it is possible to imagine a NIT 
which, rather than supplementing insufficient earnings with ex post 
transfers, supplements non -waged work such as caring, mothering and 
volunteering. But such supplements would still need to be calculated 
- for if the NIT were a gross transfer then it would resemble a CI - 
and if market prices were not available then non -waged activity would 
need to be quantified artificially. But how much is such activity 
worth? Should the non -employed mother of two able- bodied children 
receive more or less NIT than the mother of a disabled child? Such 
questions could be multiplied indefinitely, but would lead to the 
same conclusion: NIT is a supplement to earnings, and earnings alone, 
and therefore does not confer the sort of 'earned rights' which 
social insurance is perceived to confer. I therefore submit that the 
Left is unlikely to find much in NIT to commend it. It is possible 
that NIT could be introduced on a minor scale as a replacement for 
assurance benefits, but Left politicians and theorists err if they 
imagine that it could be a wholesale replacement for existing social 
security benefits. 
5. Conclusion 
If this is reasonable, then my identification of NIT with the 
Right holds. Economic liberals are therefore more likely to support 
NIT because NIT's retention of means- tested provision is more suited 
to their rather pessimistic view of human nature as flawed and 
imperfect and therefore, ultimately, as requiring the 'sticks' of 
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disincentives. NIT was never implemented because even it did not 
seem to satisfy economic liberals' insistence on improving work 
incentives and keeping costs down. For this reason, and whether such 
perceptions were right or wrong, NIT will probably never be 
implemented. The strategy of economic liberals in the future, as 
regards social security, is difficult to gauge. Radical reform looks 
unlikely to re- emerge as a serious proposal, though workfare 
certainly remains on the agenda. In any event, it is certain that 
whatever long -term strategy emerges it will be in competition with 
that devised by social democrats. It is to that alternative approach 
that we now turn. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SOCIAL INSURANCE AND PARTICIPATION INCOME 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter we examined NIT as that form of CI which is 
most likely to be favoured by economic liberals - though many feel, 
contrary to the kind of arguments I presented, that there is no 
substantial difference between the two. In this chapter we will look 
at that form of CI which might find widespead favour among social 
democrats, i.e. a Participation Income. A Participation Income has 
been suggested in a number of places by Tony Atkinson (1993a & 1993b) 
as a CI which would fall short of being unconditional, so that it 
would only be paid to those who were judged to be making a 
contribution to society, whether in the formal or informal sectors. 
This probably means that a majority of citizens would receive it but 
not those who go off and 'do their own thing' or, in other words, 
free -riders who gladly accept the CI but offer nothing back in 
return. So whereas a pure, unconditional CI is open to the charge of 
being exploitative - the free -rider exploiting the hard- working 
citizen (White, 1995) - a Participation Income is more in line with 
the principle of social insurance whereby individuals receive 
transfers from the state in return for the performance of activities 
which have contributed to social welfare. 
Since Participation Income does not have the kind of history 
possessed by NIT our approach to it, therefore, had better be 
different. In sections 2 and 3 we will look at the history of social 
insurance in order to understand why, and how, such a principle has 
become essential to Western social security systems. In section 4 we 
will examine those set of proposals called 'New Beveridge' which, 
supporters allege, retain the social insurance principle while 
correcting for past failures. This approach was adopted by, and in 
many ways is exemplified by, the Social Justice (Borrie) Commission 
which reported in 1994. Finally, in section 5, we will look at 
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Participation Income, its strengths and weaknesses and how it 
relates both to New Beveridge and to CI. 
2. Social Insurance: History 
The difficulty with examining the social insurance principle is 
that there are few sustained arguments in its defence and what texts 
there are tend to be simple accounts of its administrative history. 
The strongest defenders of social insurance have often been social 
administrators and politicians looking for a quiet life and so quick 
to invoke some popular wisdom which, they allege, it would be suicide 
to ignore. So, for instance, the 1969 White Paper stated: 
People do not want to be given rights to pensions and benefits; 
they want to earn them by their contributions. (DHSS; 1969; 
12) 
This apparently simple and innocuous statement effortlessly 
confuses the state transfer system with entitlements to benefits and 
confuses both, in turn, with the social rights which confer 
entitlement. By treating social rights as being so closely up 
with earnings -related contributions this attitude not only biases 
wage- earning above other forms of useful activity but actually 
reinforces the state's dominance in the supposedly contractual 
relationship between state and individual which is being championed. 
This has become obvious to most since many of the entitlements, 
especially to pensions, which the post -war generation thought they 
were 'buying' through their stamps have in fact been undermined by 
successive governments avoiding their long -term commitments in the 
interests of short -term expediency. Yet such statements as that 
quoted above do at least highlight the pragmatic and piecemeal 
character of social insurance and it is this character which probably 
explains why historical exegesis dominates the academic literature. 
So, in this section, we too will delve into the history in order to 
understand two things: firstly, why the social insurance principle 
became acceptable to reformist socialists and social democrats; 
secondly, why even its supporters believe that reform to the 
principle is long overdue given its inability to guarantee a minimum 
income to many, especially to women. 
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Bismarck, it is widely known, initiated and deployed social 
insurance to conserve the internal structure of the newly - founded 
German state and preserve it against the newly -emerging political 
forces on the Left. Welfare legislation of the 1880s was continuous 
with the anti- Socialist bill of 1878 (Zöllner, 1982, 9 -33) . Bismarck 
had three aims: to preserve the traditional, organic relationship 
between the individual and the state; to prevent the enlargement of 
political rights; to reduce economic inequality in order to maintain 
political inequality. Social insurance, therefore, was designed to 
protect the individual - i.e. the male labourer - against the worst 
ravages of the market system in order to bind him heart and soul to 
the conservative state. Bismarck's logic was devastatingly simple. 
If workers vote socialist out of protest at economic insecurity, then 
reducing insecurity will loosen the grip of socialism on workers 
(Rimlinger, 1971, 112 -21). The Social Democratic Party (SPD) 
recognized this strategy for what it was but did not have the 
political power to outmanoeuvre it. By the turn of the century the 
SPD had had to accomodate itself to the new welfare system by 
regarding it as unavoidable if their long -term objectives were to be 
met. Originally an anti- socialist measure, social insurance came to 
be adopted by social democrats as indispensible to a realistic Left - 
of- Centre strategy. 
Something similar was to happen to the British Left in the wake of 
reforms initiated by Lloyd- George. Lloyd- George did have a genuine 
desire to fight poverty as an evil in itself, but the rising cost of 
pensions beyond original estimates convinced him that new benefits 
to cover periods of unemployment would not be affordable out of 
general taxation. The preferred solution was to import the social 
insurance principle from Germany and apply it to unemployment. This 
would more or less dovetail with previous practice and negotiate 
smoothly between the Majority report of the 1909 Poor Law Commission 
- favouring laissez -faire and voluntarism - and the Minority report - 
favouring state intervention. So, here too, some measure of social 
justice could be effected without moving towards the out -and -out 
Fabian socialism of the Webbs - authors of the Minority report: 
...insurance was the Capitalists' answer to the problem of 
want, and by reducing it the insurance covered up what 
Socialists saw as the root cause of poverty. (Fraser, 1984, 
150) 
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And here too what had been opposed by many (like Kier Hardie) as a 
threat came to be viewed as a necessity: 
...insurance became entrenched in the British way of life and 
laid the foundation of the welfare state. (Fraser, 1984, 162) 
This is not to explain social insurance in functionalist terms. 
Indeed, the 1911 National Insurance Act cannot be seen as anything 
other than genuine progress. Also, it meant that in western Europe 
capitalism and socialism could no longer be so easily distinguished, 
i.e. welfare reform may have preserved capitalism but only by 
radicalizing it beyond anything imagined by many Nineteenth Century 
social reformers. However, it is the case that social insurance has 
pro -capitalist roots, roots which have in many ways come to nurture 
social democracy and which no analysis of contemporary social 
insurance reform can afford to ignore. 
The Unemployment Insurance Act of 1920 was an extension of the 
1911 Act but came at the very time that unemployment rose so sharply 
that the insurance fund ran into deficit. So at this point the 
actuarial principle of insurance dropped away and, in effect, 
governments' attempts to preserve the actuarial fiction led to a 
"...system of thinly disguised outdoor relief" (Fraser, 1984, 171) . 
The desire was certainly to return the fund to solvency and adhere 
strictly to the criterion of actual contributions made. But 
structural unemployment prevented this and made unemployment 
benefit into a 'dole' of destitution relief. The first Labour 
government tried, with only partial success, to undermine the 
actuarial principle by abolishing the time limit on receipt of 
benefit. Resisted by the Liberals this led to the Blanesburgh 
Committee which, in 1927, recommended that only a minimum of 
contributions should be required for someone to receive an insurance 
benefit unlimited in duration. So need was becoming the basis of 
entitlement and the unemployed recognized as the responsibility of 
the employed. In 1930, Labour made the much hated transitional 
benefit a charge upon the Treasury rather than the insurance fund and 
removed the 'genuinely seeking work' clause. This helped aggravate 
the budgetary deficit which would bring that Labour government down 
and lead to the formation of the 1931 National Government which 
initiated benefit cuts and means- tests. However, the 1930s at least 
182 
saw the effective end of the Poor Law (Fraser, 1984, 172 -83). 
It was against this background that Beveridge came onto the scene. 
He did little more than rationalize the existing system and he, too, 
sought to avoid an out -and -out socialism whereby benefits would be 
funded out of general taxation: 
Culturally conditioned by Capitalism to respect contract, 
British society resented means- tested relief which penalized 
thrift and impaired dignity, while respecting benefits of 
contractual entitlement. History and social psychology 
dictated that insurance, in Beveridge's phrase, is "what the 
people of Britain desire ". (Fraser, 1984, 201) 
Beveridge believed that it was the government maintenance of full 
employment, and not the transfer system, which would promote social 
solidarity and individual liberty. Benefits should only be 
considered as establishing a national minimum of temporary relief 
and so could be flat -rate. But if benefits were to be flat -rate so, 
equity demanded, should contributions; and if contributions are 
flat -rate their level should be low enough for the lowest paid 
workers to be able to afford them. If, therefore, the system was to 
be actuarially sound, the benefits to be funded out of these 
contributions would have to be correspondingly low. This meant that 
the National Assistance benefit being designed as the final and 
ultimate safety -net was barely much lower than the insurance benefit 
and, very quickly, most of those who received the latter also 
received the former. Beveridge, consequently, vastly 
underestimated the numbers of people who would be forced to rely on 
National Assistance and those who, today, defend the social 
insurance principle seek to reform the system without reproducing 
the inadequacies of Beveridge's design. 
Nowhere where these inadequacies more obviously exposed than in 
the case of women. Beveridge, of course, treated "...man and wife as 
a team" (1942, 49) so that various benefits for which they could be 
entitled would be calculated "...by virtue of their husband's 
contributions" (1942, 10) . The married woman had her home provided 
for her by her husband and so " ... does not need compensating benefits 
on the same scale as the solitary woman..." (1942, 50). And since 
..on marriage every woman begins a new life in relation to social 
insurance" because "...she has other duties" (1942, 51) and will 
..become a new person" (1942, 131) , if a solitary woman should 
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marry, 
She does not carry on rights to unemployment or disability 
benefit in respect of contributions before marriage; she must 
acquire those rights, if at all, by fresh contributions after 
marriage. These could be paid at a reduced rate or could even be 
avoided altogether (with similar knock -on effects on 
benefits). (1942, 131) 
Now Beveridge was not responsible for the fact that at that time, 
allowing for the war, most women were married and did not earn, nor 
for the fact that his attitudes were then quite orthodox, nor for the 
failures of post -war governments to improve the system for women (cf . 
Sainsbury, 1993, 89). But that such assumptions were built into 
social security as an established truth is perhaps down to him. In 
designing a social security system which was gender -blind Beveridge, 
more than anyone else, imposed a myopia on the system from which it 
is still trying to recover. By pushing women to one side Beveridge 
was not only assuming a sexual division of labour, where the wage - 
earning performed by men is more highly valued than the domestic 
labour of women, but was building such divisions into the system. For 
instance, even the thesis of Richard Titmuss regarding the social 
divisions of welfare - a thesis which is still depressingly relevant 
- marginalizes the reproductive welfare predominantly performed by 
women. We will see in chapter 10 how feminist- theorists and 
researchers have identified and condemned a patriarchal bias in the 
social security system which has had immense consequences for 
women's economic resources. 
This is as far as our history need take us. Post -war attempts to 
introduce earnings -related benefits and uprate benefit levels (or at 
least change the name of National Assistance) are footnotes to the 
story sketched above (Micklewright, 1989, 54 -5). By the heyday of 
social democracy, i.e. 1945 -70, poverty had not been abolished and, 
therefore, it has certainly not been abolished after the recessions 
of the 1970s and upheavals (and recessions) of the 1980s and 1990s. 
We are therefore in a position to draw two broad conclusions relevant 
to the themes with which I wanted to deal. Firstly, and whether or 
not they eventually decide to retain the social insurance principle, 
social democrats must be aware of the extent to which the principle 
originated as an anti -left strategy. By adopting this strategy and 
articulating it in terms of working -class politics social democrats 
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helped to popularize the principle and inscribe it into the 
consciousness of post -war societies - to the point where even they 
dare not challenge it. Nevertheless, the principle has roots which 
may continue to feed off a soil of fiscal conservatism which is 
inimicable to the social justice which social democrats claim to 
support. Secondly, and as will be shown more fully in chapter 10, the 
past forms of social insurance have greatly discriminated against 
women. If social democrats want to articulate common ground with 
feminism, therefore, then this is another reason why social 
insurance must come under close scrutiny. Reform proposals often 
termed New Beveridge claim to embody such close scrutiny and we will 
be dealing with them in the section after next. In order to do so, 
however, it is necessary to be more fully aware of the pros and cons 
of social insurance. 
3. Social Insurance: For and Against 
The compromise, which social insurance was meant to represent, 
between market individualism and state collectivism, can be explored 
in more detail. A.I. Ogus (1982, 183 -4) sees the individualist wing 
as implying an exchange contract where what matters are past 
earnings. The collectivist wing is more one -sided with little 
contractual obligation so that the recipient, having no legal right 
to welfare, is dependent upon the transferor. As such, social 
insurance implied the traditional, puritan, capitalist virtues of 
thrift and foresight. It was meant to lead to a new relationship 
between individual and state which looked to the long -term 
consequences of economic activity, where the right to welfare 
would be independent of the government of the day. There would, 
however, also be some (collectivist) redistribution to those most in 
need. However, he sees this compromise as having had four main flaws 
in practice. Firstly, the strength of British common law and the 
insistence upon defending the sovereignty of private property had 
delayed the introduction of social insurance. Secondly, when it was 
introduced it was therefore the individualist wing which was 
emphasized. Thirdly, this emphasis gave rise to the more negative 
aspects of collectivism, i.e. the absence of rights. Finally, 
therefore, social security became an administrative and not a legal 
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concern. In intervening decades this changed somewhat with the 
strengthening of social security's legal character so that rights 
have been emphasized and the possession of assets made less 
important. Ogus (1982, 235 -7) would like to encourage these 
developments and see a new model of social welfare emerge where there 
would be much more of a collectivist relationship with all citizens 
bearing risks on an equal basis, risks which are insured against 
through over -arching state provision with no -one being 
disadvantaged due to a low -level of labour market activity. But he 
views this as unlikely if social insurance remains "at the core" of 
social security, since it allocates resources inefficiently by 
treating the individual as the bearer and the compensator of risk 
(Ogus, 1982, 235 -7). So, Ogus is one of those for whom social 
insurance overwhelmingly privileges horizontal redistribution, i.e. 
across the life -cycle and within a particular occupational and 
income strata, against vertical redistribution, ie. across strata 
from rich to poor. This is a conclusion which research would seem to 
bear out (LeGrand 1982; Goodin & LeGrand, 1987; Goodin, 1988, 
159) . 
Social insurance does this, some neo- marxists have argued, 
because it remains Vic George (1973, 
19) sees the friendly societies and trade unions as having employed 
the insurance principle out of necessity as a humane alternative to 
the Poor Law. Nevertheless, the principle flourished because it was 
a means of promoting individualism and self -help, the values of the 
upper- and middle -classes. The financial burden of social security 
fell mainly on the workers but the principle enabled the state and 
employers to make it look as if they and the workers were all part of 
the same 'team'. It is these contradictions which have bound truly 
reformist governments who, 
...have followed the conflicting policy of attempting on the 
one hand to liberalize the payment of assistance benefits and on 
the other to emphasize the importance of insurance benefits. 
(George, 1973 ,34) 
J.C. Kincaid goes further, believing that insurance creates no 
citizenship rights: 
...nor does payment of taxes, nor the unpaid work of the 
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housewife, nor the helplessness of the permanently 
handicapped. Beveridge was a lifelong liberal and his 
arguments are a classic example of the degrading reduction of 
liberal values to those of the capitalist market system.(1973, 
217; cf. Heidenheimer et al, 1976, 199) 
Despite their functionalism, these arguments bear some weight. For 
if the Left is concerned to fight poverty but does not admit the 
contribution of the insurance principle to poverty's continuance, 
then such arguments would stand largely vindicated. To avoid the 
force of such arguments proper reform would have to confer the same 
status on all benefit claimants (Kincaid, 1973, 219). We will see 
shortly to what extent New Beveridge successfully does this. 
However, there are, naturally enough, many who reject such 
pronouncements on the inefficacy of social insurance. It is very 
rare, though, to find economic liberals lending their support to the 
principle. If any support is forthcoming it is usually for the 
original actuarial principle. So, Michael Beenstock (1987, 266) 
interprets the Elizabethan and Victorian Poor Laws as revealing an 
irreconcilable "...conflict between compassion and concern for 
self -reliance." National Insurance and National Assistance 
overlapped not because the former was too low but because the latter 
was too high. Society could not live with its conscience otherwise 
and so was "...easy prey for the poverty lobby." Political pressure 
eroded the actuarial principle, insurance contributions became a de 
facto tax and the "...concept of social insurance has been allowed to 
wither. Private insurance, however, is immune to political pressure 
in times of high risk and so should be the model of the future as 
affluence grows and poverty decreases: 
Viewed in this broader historical perspective destitution is a 
passing phenomena that is bound to be eclipsed in time by the 
inexorable forces of economic growth. (1987, 266) 
With the disappearance of absolute poverty, the need for a social 
security system will also vanish and actuarial, private insurance 
will re- emerge in the next century. Beenstock believes that the 
reforms of the 1980s will " ...go down in history as the last in a line 
of reforms that stretch back to the Poor Laws of 1601" (1987, 265 -7) . 
In short here, as elsewhere, the market can do no wrong for the 
libertarian Right. There is little consideration in Beenstock's 
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musings of the redistributive potential of social insurance. But if 
economic liberals do exclude themselves from this aspect of the 
debate and if we turn our attention to that potential then what kind 
of redistribution might be implied? Broadly speaking, corporatist 
conservatives will favour a maximum amount of horizontal, and a 
minimum amount of vertical, redistribution with the purpose of 
sustaining social integration - identification with and commitment 
to the prevailing order. Social democracy will favour a higher 
degree of vertical redistribution with the purpose of alleviating 
extreme hardship - here, the provision of industrial rights and 
macro -economics, rather than social security, is the means of doing 
so (Esping- Anderson, 1990, 26 -8). 
Taking such distinct, but closely related, conceptions into 
consideration there are basically five arguments which we might make 
for social insurance. Firstly, that it compensates for ineliminable 
market failures. So, given that there are certain risks which are 
collective and social the compulsory nature of social insurance 
prevents low -risk individuals from contracting out since this 
reduces the revenue available for benefits. Secondly, it 
redistributes to some extent. Paternalist conservatives will argue 
that it is, and should be, more horizontal than vertical while social 
democrats emphasize the vertical aspects. What is important is that 
social insurance makes a clear connection between contributions paid 
and benefits received and so promotes social solidarity and 
reciprocity more effectively than a purely tax- funded system. 
Thirdly, social insurance is paternalist, since individuals will 
make inadequate provision for themselves if left to their own 
devices. Fourthly, it is easier to raise tax revenue when people 
believe themselves, rightly or wrongly, to be contributing directly 
to their own welfare. Finally, social insurance involves far greater 
administrative simplicity than does private insurance (Creedy & 
Disney, 1985, 14 -23). Now, it might be possible to distinguish 
between paternalist conservatives and social democrats in the 
emphasis they give to the various pros. But, in line with the approach 
I am taking in this research, the degree of agreement is more 
important than the degree of disagreement. 
So, we see why social insurance is distruted by some - because it 
fails to redistribute vertically to any great extent and therefore 
embodies an insufficient notion of citizenship - and lauded by others 
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- for the five reasons just mentioned. However, such high -level 
considerations still overlook the main problem with social 
insurance, i.e. that it fails to operate in practice as well as it 
should do in theory. In short, the accusation is that the system has 
failed to adapt to a dual labour market where those in short -term, 
low -paid, usually part -time jobs have only limited access to welfare 
benefits because those on the economic periphery have far fewer 
opportunities to amass substantial contribution records. Most 
commentators now recognize these failings but, once recognized, 
disagreement begins once again regarding the approriate solutions. 
Why is this? Because it is not clear whether such failings are an 
inherent feature of social insurance or whether they derive from 
political laziness on the part of governments. CI supporters will 
tend to back the former interpretation, while New Beveridge 
theorists will tend towards the latter. New Beveridge, therefore, is 
a doctrine which insists that though social insurance has failed in 
the past and is in need of widespread structural reform this is no 
reason to abandon it altogether. On the contrary, to renew social 
insurance we need to re- emphasize it like never before: 
Indeed if it continues to be necessary to support a large 
number of unemployed, then public support for the desirability 
of pooling the risk of unemployment and public acceptance of the 
mechanism by which this is done will be of great importance. 
(Brown, 1990, 217) 
So, New Beveridge is an attempt to re- formulate social insurance on 
the basis that its weaknesses do not cripple its efficacy and that 
contemporary socio- economic conditions can be taken account of to 
bring its strengths once more to the fore. If this approach is to be 
taken seriously then what social democrats - for this is what the bulk 
of New Beveridge theorists are - must do is to ask themselves whether 
the "cash -nexus" of insurance is compatible with providing 
universally for basic needs (Disney, 1982, 33 -58). A 'cash -nexus' 
is that which gives the emphasis to wage- earning as the source both of 
benefit revenue and of benefit entitlement. Attention must be given 
to this area because although earnings -related contributions are 
represented as uniting taxpayer and recipient - we belong to both 
categories at differing points in our lives - under contemporary 
labour market conditions there are increasing numbers of people who 
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belong exclusively to the one or to the other. The danger which 
social democrats must come to terms with is of net recipients being 
defined as an underclass of dependents by groups of net taxpayers. 
Such a social division of welfare is inimicable to social 
justice. For when such divisions prevail, as they do in the United 
States, then basic needs are defined according to the tax revenue 
which earners are willing to make available rather than being 
assessed according to socially- relative criteria (Veit -Wilson, 
1987, 205 -9) . When this happens social justice becomes far less of a 
priority than low taxes and in no way can social democrats be 
satisfied with such an Americanization of society. Do New Beveridge 
proposals reflect such concerns? That is what we will now go on to 
ask. 
4. New Beveridge 
I stated earlier that to avoid the strongest criticisms of their 
opponents, social insurance supporters should aim for a social 
security system which embodies equality of status. What might this 
involve? The International Labour Organization set out the 
alternatives over a decade ago: _ 
Either government contributions should be used to give rights 
to those not necessarily covered on a contributory basis, or 
some form of minimum income guarantee (either associated with 
income tax or not) can be superimposed on the contributory 
programmes. (1982, 88) 
They then set out eight advantages in retaining contributions and 
seven in scrapping them, though spelling out that there is no ideal 
and different nations will go in different directions ( 1982, 88 -91) . 
Such considerations act as the starting -point for New Beveridge 
theorists. 
In Britain, a New Beveridge system was first elaborated by the 
Child Poverty Action Group. Ruth Lister (1975, 39 -40) wrote that a 
Proper anti- poverty strategy would provide an adequate income to 
income -less groups by a "...reform and extension of the existing 
National Insurance system." This meant, firstly, replacing 
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earnings -related benefits with flat -rate benefits and earnings - 
related contributions - otherwise the wage system's inequality is 
merely reproduced. She agrees with George and Kincaid about the 
mythology of the contributory principle, but believes that the 
perception that contributions provide a defensible income guarantee 
is all- important: 
Rather than try and challenge the principle head on, we would 
recommend that the principle be retained but that the 
contribution tests be relaxed significantly. (1975, 46) 
This means replacing paid contributions with credited 
contributions, as well as abolishing relief on private, occupational 
pensions to fund an adequate state pension (1975, 46 -8). So, 
"...anyone registering as unemployed or unfit for work can now be 
credited with contributions..." which have the same status as paid 
contributions in determining eligibility for benefits. 
Supplementary benefits would be scaled down to meet "...the 
exceptional needs of a tiny minority..." and there would be greater 
financing out of general taxation (1975, 63 -8). 
By the end of the 1970s similar proposals had been aired 
elsewhere. The Meade Committee came out in favour of a New Beveridge 
scheme (1978, 294; Barr, 1993, 277 -8) as did the Outer Circle Policy 
Unit (1978) . The former saw the scheme as achieving five objectives: 
reduction in the numbers on supplementary benefits; improved take -up 
(though means -tests could not be eliminated entirely); easing the 
poverty trap; simplification of the tax and welfare system; 
reduction in administrative costs. 
The ultimate aim is to operate the income support system along 
the lines of the N.H.S., which may be used by all sick persons 
without reference to any record of contributions. (Meade, 1978, 
60 -70) 
Now, as it became clarified in the 1980s, New Beveridge implies six 
basic proposals. Firstly, it involves raising the tax thresholds on 
earnings, to avoid taxing low- earners into poverty. This was seen as 
being especially necessary given Thatcherite redistributions from 
poor to rich. Secondly, the gradual abolition of means- tested 
benefits and the introduction of more non -means- tested, non- 
contributory (i.e. categorical) benefits. Thirdly, and perhaps 
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most essentially, raising benefit levels as resources allow. 
Fourthly, taxing certain benefits, e.g. child benefit, so that they 
are not provided to those who are able to do without. This proposal, 
however, is controversial and is far from being supported by all New 
Beveridgeans. Fifthly, phasing out the lower earnings threshold on 
N.I. contributions. This threshold encourages low wages and the 
exploitation which go with them. Abolishing the threshold would 
enable low- earners to amass contributions. However, it would need to 
be introduced gradually since immediate implementation might impel 
many bad employers to cut jobs. Finally, strategic co- ordination of 
the tax and benefit systems to reduce poverty traps. So New Beveridge 
would fall short of the integration implied by CI. It would certainly 
collapse the work /welfare distinction and introduce more in -work 
benefits, but would continue to define benefits as supplements to 
earnings, at least in the short -term. 
It now seems clear that the New Beveridge approach will wield 
considerable influence on social security reform in the future. This 
is because such an approach was adopted by the Social Justice 
Commission chaired by Sir Gordon Borrie, the conclusions of which, 
as I stated in the introduction, are likely to exert some influence 
over any future Labour government. The Borrie Commission came out in 
favour of a re- formulated social insurance system. This would make 
it possible for part -time workers, the self -employed and the 
unemployed to have contributions credited to them. Eventually, 
perhaps, such credited contributions could be extended to those 
judged to be performing socially -valuable activity, e.g. 
volunteers, carers, perhaps even parents and students (1994, 240 -3) . 
The Commission therefore rejected CI, at least in the short -term, for 
its abandonment of the insurance principle (1994, 261 -64) though it 
did have some good things to say about Participation Income (1994, 
264 -5) - we will see why below. Now the Commission was far from 
perfect since its recommendations read like a manifesto and, as 
pointed out in chapter 5, it largely dismisses ecological critiques. 
More specifically, it often betrays a certain inconsistency. For 
instance, it rejects workfare (1994, 183 -4), yet also states: 
Of course, someone who unreasonably turns down a job or training 
offer cannot expect to continue claiming full benefit. (1994, 
239) 
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It is the difficulty in defining what constitutes 'reasonableness' 
which might make the Commission's 'active welfare state' merely a 
statist, top -down one along the lines with which we are familiar. On 
the plus side, however, it calls for tax /benefit integration for 
pensioners, the gradual transition from taxes on earnings to 
environmental taxes, and, significantly, it retreats from one of the 
essential arguments of the earlier issue paper (Clinton et al, 1994, 
38) dealing with tax and benefits, i.e. that CI would adversely 
affect work incentives. This could be taken as an admission, by 
default, that orthodox objections to CI may increasingly be seen as 
spurious. 
Now if New Beveridge and the Borrie Commission were going to exert 
influence on future social security reform what role, if any, would 
be played by a CI? On the face of it there would be no role, for the 
reason already mentioned - social insurance is too popular and too 
entrenched a principle to abandon. However, careful consideration 
might suggest that the future for CI is not too bleak under a New 
Beveridge scenario after all . What seems clear is that the principle 
of social insurance lies along a continuum, at one end of this 
continuum we find the system of contributions and at the other we find 
a ethic. At present social insurance inclines heavily 
towards the contributions pole and has done so for 50 years. This 
inclination adversely affects entitlements to -benefit. For 
instance, men must work for 44 years to qualify for a full pension and 
women for, 39 years; also, to qualify for unemployment benefit (which 
is to be scrapped in 1996) you must, over the previous two years, have 
earned at least fifty times the lower- earnings limit on national 
insurance contributions. Now these qualifying conditions are 
increasingly out of touch with today's labour market, a fact which 
most recognize and many, including the New Beveridgeans, want to do 
something about. Their solution is to make it easier to amass 
contributions and what this would do is to shift the social insurance 
principle away from the contributions pole since the emphasis would 
be taken away from permanent, full -time employment. If, eventually, 
people like volunteers and carers, and so forth, were to covered by 
the new insurance system then that system would be very close to 
embodying a citizenship ethic since the majority of society's 
members, whether inside or outside the labour market, would be 
covered by these more liberal contributions. So, broadly speaking, 
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New Beveridgeans are faced with two options. Either the current 
system stays more or less intact, in which case New Beveridge would 
have failed to realize social justice, or contributions are 
eventually extended to the vast majority of society's members in 
which case we are not far from a citizenship ethic and a full -blown 
CI. So although New Beveridgeans often reject CI it is not uncommon 
for them to allow it a role to be played at some future date (Lister, 
1989, 126) , an admission which must be made since CI would seem to be 
the logical corollary of a re- structured social insurance system. 
So, on the one hand, social democrats seem to be able to give some 
support to CI, albeit in the long -term. On the other, this 'deferred 
support' often manifests itself as an over -reaction against any 
suggestion that CI could be a coherent reform proposal now. Indeed, 
some proponents of New Beveridge jump through hoops to discredit CI, 
either in terms of pure expediency (Meade, 1978, 497) or because it is 
believed that CI would cost too much, would be politically 
unacceptable or would adversely affect work incentives (Hills, 1988, 
32; Hill, 1990, 168 -71). However, a comparative analysis between CI 
and New Beveridge, if it were to be pursued seriously, shows the 
issues are not so clear cut. 
Firstly, _any radical reform strategy is likely to be expensive, 
but New Beveridge has the advantage in that its costs are more ' spread 
out' and therefore concealed. This is so because - whereas CI has 
implications for the social security system, the labour market and 
the taxation system, New Beveridge's implications are mainly 
confined to the former. This means that when it comes to 
consideration of social security alone CI can seem prohibitively 
expensive. Yet this conveniently ignores the fact that New Beveridge 
would need to be accompanied by a considerable amount of employment 
generation - because it sees jobs as still being central to income 
distribution - which is also very expensive. Such generation implies 
state intervention - on the demand as well as the supply -side - and 
sustained economic growth. But achieving the kind of growth rates 
without which a New Beveridge strategy could easily stall may be an 
optimistic objective. David Purdy (1988, 208 -9) estimated that it 
would require an annual growth rate of 3.7% over a ten -year period to 
reduce unemployment to 1 million. The last time this growth rate was 
achieved was in 1963 -7. Furthermore, if the labour market is to 
Perform its role a minimum wage will be required. This would need to 
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be phased in gradually and be accompanied by countervailing measures 
if rises in unemployment were to be avoided (Field, 1984, 65 -81) - and 
even then it might be at too modest a level to do much good. Also, if 
it were decided that the lower -earnings limit on N.I. contributions 
should be abolished - to prevent many part -time workers from pricing 
themselves as cheap labour and out of contributory benefits - then to 
avoid low wages being depressed even more than now, an even higher 
minimum wage than is usually considered might need to be initiated. 
In short, social democrats face no easy options on the question of 
cost. 
Secondly, why would it be politically unacceptable to scrap 
social insurance? As I have pointed out if we are serious about 
reforming social insurance then we need to extend it until it 
eventually covers almost all of the population. This means that the 
electorate has to be educated to accept that wage -earning in the 
formal labour market cannot be the norm for the next century, i.e. New 
Beveridge remains as little more than tinkering around with the 
present system unless the employment ethic is addressed and revised. 
Nor are many CI supporters suggesting that the principle be scrapped 
entirely. Rather, it is suggested, we need to grow up in our 
conception of insurance. This means abandoning the quaint notion of 
insurance as "...putting pennies away for a rainy day" (Beveridge, 
1942, 12). There is every reason to believe that insurance 
contributions could be replaced with a social security tax; the 
important point is to recognize that contributions are taxes. 
But would, finally, the consequences of decoupling be unpopular? 
After all, New Beveridge recognizes that socially -useful activity 
and paid employment are not identical and seeks to end discrimination 
against those who do not earn. But there is still a gulf between this 
and paying an unconditional CI (Atkinson, 1993a). Would taxpayers 
accept incomes going to those who basically do nothing? It is a 
question of how you interpret 'contribution' . If I fancy myself as a 
novelist and am prepared to exist on a subsistence income for several 
months to fulfil my ambition, would society sanction my ambition and 
require me to earn instead? Is road sweeping more valuable than novel 
writing? This is something the Centre -Left still needs to ask 
itself. Do you define some in society, e.g. New -Age travellers, as 
contributing nothing and therefore meriting nothing? Or is it naive 
to imagine that society is at the stage where we have all the economic 
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and social rights we shall ever require? Responsibilities, now 
fashionable within the political vocabulary, should be seen in 
liberal terms. As noted in chapter 3, this means distinguishing 
between duties (non -voluntary), the violation of which incur various 
penalties, and obligations (voluntary), which individuals cannot be 
conscripted into incurring. A liberal society recognizes that 
citizenship in the stronger sense, where we welcome obligations 
toward others, cannot be 'enforced' . All a society can do is to 
create the economic and social conditions where like -minded people 
might begin to accept such obligations. A C.I. could be an important 
means of achieving this. It is capitalist structures - in their rigid 
divisions between production and reproduction, employment and non - 
employment - which insist upon a rigid correlation between rights and 
duties. At its best, the Left has stressed an altruism and co- 
operation which subverts such distinctions and offers greater 
freedoms and equality (Edwards, 1988, 140). 
More and more I believe Goodin's (1992, 206 -8) prognosis to be 
correct. Either we accept a minority of 'free- riders' in order to 
benefit the poor. Or, we try to eliminate free -riders which would 
require the poorest and most vulnerable to demonstrate that they are 
deserving of help. Those favouring the latter (Brown, 1990, 236 -9; 
Cuvillier, 1993, 453) have not said what makes their strategy 
egalitarian rather than statist. Personally I have little regard 
for the 'surfer on the beach', but neither do I feel able to press- 
gang him into society. An insistence upon doing so only reproduces a 
Machiavelli -type republicanism at the heart of liberal democracy. 
Nevertheless, for the foreseeable future social democrats and New 
Beveridgeans would seem to prefer the ' jumping through hoops' option 
so that the above defence of CI in the face of the standard objections 
is likely to hold little water. So if CI's unconditionality makes it 
unacceptable in the short -term and if social insurance reform is 
pursued to the point where it embodies a citizenship ethic then where 
does that leave us? I would suggest that it leaves us with the 
possibility, even the liklihood, of New Beveridgeans giving some 
support to that version of CI known as a Participation Income and it 
is this which we now go on to examine. 
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5. Participation Income 
The Borrie Commission (1994, 264 -5) gave some degree of support 
for a Participation Income since this would retain a condition of 
active citizenship and would not be vulnerable to the criticism, 
levelled at CI, that it implies a 'something for nothing' morality. 
Those eligible for qualification would include not only people in 
employment but also those unable to work, bcause of sickness, injury 
and disability, as well as those in education and training and those 
caring for young, elderly or disabled dependents. As such, 
...the condition of participation would be a wider definition 
of social contribution than just paid work, and would therefore 
be similar to the comprehensive system of credits and benefits 
which we see as the eventual goal of our modern social insurance 
system. (1994, 264) 
The Commission raises some doubts regarding potential costs but 
finds that if such obstacles could be overcome then a Participation 
Income, 
...could go a long towards eliminating means- testing, 
recognising the value of parents' and carers' unpaid work and 
encouraging people to take up employment, education or 
training. (1994, 265) 
So a Participation Income is that version of CI which finds some 
degree of common ground with the social democratic New Beveridge 
approach. 
Participation Income is most closely associated with Tony 
Atkinson. Atkinson (1993b, 9 -11) gives a fair degree of support to CI 
but sees it as having two main obstacles: firstly, the strength of 
public support for social insurance; secondly, CI 's lack of 
conditionality. On the first point, Atkinson insists that it is 
necessary to regard CI as a complement to social insurance because it 
would reduce dependence on means- tested social assistance and would 
help the low paid. On the second point, Atkinson contends that in 
order to secure public support for a CI then CI's unconditionality 
has to be abandoned. So a Participation Income would continue to be 
universal and take the individual as the assessment unit but would be 
conditional on the performance of socially -valuable activity and so 
would complement a modernized social insurance system. As such, an 
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unemployed person taking a part -time job would qualify for a 
Participation Income whereas at the moment he would be disqualified 
from claiming Income Support. 
But what about costings? Atkinson assumes the following: 
Abolition of all income tax allowances 
Abolition of the upper earnings limit on insurance 
contributions 
Abolition of the 20% income tax band but retention of the 25% and 
40% bands 
Taxation of all income and benefits apart from the first £10 of 
earnings 
A CI of £12.50 per week for children 
A Participation Income for all of those over 18 years of age who 
qualify 
With these assumptions Atkinson calculates that a Particiption 
Income of somewhere between £17.75 and £18.25, at 1993 prices and 
wages, could be afforded without any rises in taxation. If these 
costings are correct then half a million families would be floated 
off means- tested benefits; further, a third of all families would be 
worse off, 10% would be unaffected and 57% would gain. If, however, 
the basic rate of income tax were to be raised from 25% to 35% and the 
higher rate to 50% then a Participation Income of between £37 and £39 
could be afforded which would reduce the numbers receiving means - 
tested benefits by 21 million. In any event, Atkinson interprets a 
Participation Income as providing the guaranteed minimum which 
National Assistance et al were never able to provide and as, 
therefore, offering a model of a European safety -net more effective 
than that offered by the Social Charter. 
This is an attractive and compelling proposal but there are, 
inevitably, problems with it. We may group such problems under two 
headings: assessment and monitoring. Firstly, who is to assess that 
activity B is superior to, and therefore more deserving of 
renumeration than, activity y? This is a point that was made earlier 
in chapters 3 and 4 especially, for social democrats often seem to 
hold a conception of the self and of the social order which is as pre- 
determined, rigid and inflexible as that held by economic liberals. 
Both ideologies privilege wage- earning activity in the formal labour 
market - the employment ethic - above all else, though they may have 
distinct ideas as to what makes for justice in a market -led 
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environment. But neither ideology seems able to give an account of 
why this privileging should occur, probably because both are 
themselves the political manifestations of the employment ethic. 
This is especially serious in the case of social democrats who do, 
after all, present themselves as those who recognize the limitations 
of markets and can design social institutions accordingly. And yet 
when push comes to shove it is production and consumption in the 
traditional sense which is celebrated above all else. Or, as Van 
Parijs says in a similar vein, social democrats are, 
...so concerned with the real freedom to consume as abundantly 
as one might wish that they lose sight of the real freedom to 
live as unconventionally as one might fancy. (1995, 33) 
Nowhere does this suspicion of the unconventional manifest itself so 
clearly as in debates over social security reform where the 
insistence is on retaining conditionality and some degree of 
contributory social insurance. Of course, the obvious objection is 
that something like Participation Income looks beyond wage- earning 
to other forms of activity in an enlarged vision of active 
citizenship. Yet as laudable as caring, volunteering and parenting 
are it is not clear to me why they should be recognized as more 
socially -valuable than, say, squatting in a tree in order to prevent 
it from being cut down by a car -obsessed government. We are all free - 
riders in some sense or another: the inactive CI recipient may 
exploit the taxpayer, but, more importantly, it is the taxpayer who 
exploits the recipient by monopolizing employment rents (Van Parijs, 
1995, 89 -130). But, in truth, very few law- abiding people could be 
free -riders all of the time. In insisting on conditionality social 
democrats may be in pursuit of a demon which is found nowhere except 
in their own nightmares. Or, in a Foucault -like reading, theirs is 
just another discourse or regime of power /knowledge, i.e. the f ree- 
riding of the wealthier can be ignored or even applauded, the f ree- 
riding of the poorer must be recognized as a social problem. 
But if, secondly, we nevertheless decide that our social policies 
should privilege some activities above others then how is their 
performance to be monitored? After all, some kind of monitoring 
would need to occur since if receipt of the Participation Income were 
dependent upon no more than the signing of a social contract, well, 
any one of us can do that and, as it were, take the money and run. But 
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if we are to be monitored, to ensure that we are taking our 
citizenship duties seriously, then how is this to be done? It is 
relatively-easy to monitor paid work since there are quite definite 
duties to perform - though even here there are limitations as 
reactions to performance- related pay, especially in the public 
services, have shown. But what about all those other participatory 
activities? Some parents, volunteers, carers and so forth are more 
conscientious than others are therefore more effective in the 
performance of their duties. Are they to be awarded with a higher 
Participation Income, therefore? Would there be penalties for 
failure? Would we have to re -new our contract with the state 
periodically? Would we have to demonstrate that we are meeting at 
least minimum standards when it comes to non -waged activity? How 
would such standards be defined? Who would judge us in relation to 
them? Certainly, such questions seem to lead in far -fetched 
directions but that is a consequence of asking a social security 
system to do what it should not be expected to do, i.e. ensure and 
enforce social integration and solidarity. I, like most people, want 
a society within which everyone has a place and to which they feel 
some obligation to contribute but, as argued in chapter 3 and earlier 
in this chapter, active citizenship is not the same thing as 
compulsory citizenship. The former implies a socio- economic context 
which leaves no -one disadvantaged and to which everyone can freely 
give their consent; the latter implies that, if left alone, 
individuals will go off and do their own thing to the point of social 
collapse, and beyond, so that the benefits of social membership are 
highly conditional upon the performance of prescribed duties. In the 
next century these two competing interpretations are going to be 
vying for dominance and the evidence so far is that the latter is 
winning, but if social democracy is to be truely progressive it may 
have to come to concede the logic of its own reform - that citizenship 
is about inclusion not exclusion - which would allow the former 
conception to fight back. For unless this occurs then social 
democrats may only be about to re- invent the kind of top -down, 
bureaucrtic, administratively complex welfare state which gave the 
New Right such ammunition in the 1970s and which, therefore, may well 
do so again. 
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6. Conclusion 
In any event, social democracy currently seems to be caught in 
something of a dilemma: the more it retains the current social 
security system, the less it is working towards the social justice it 
says it craves; the more it moves away from that system with its 
restrictive contributory principles and the more it embodies a 
citizenship ethic, then the more artificial it is to distinguish 
between virtuous and vicious forms of ( law-abiding) social activity. 
The purpose of this chapter has been to suggest that New Beveridge and 
that version of CI known as Participation Income encapsulate these 
dilemmas perfectly. If such ideas do wield influence on future 
governments then social democrats are going to have to make some hard 
decisions if they wish to retain that influence and resist any 
further backlash from economic liberalism. 
So we have now seen that both economic liberals and social 
democrats find features to attact them in tax /benefit integration. 
The former see the possibility of greater market flexibility but 
insist that any integration embodies the virtues of a means -tested 
system, i.e. NIT. The latter see the possibility of undermining a 
work /welfare distinction which is increasingly irrelevant to 
today's labour market. However, they are sceptical about CI's 
unconditionality and will either prefer to leave it on the back - 
burner or admit that a CI variant, Participation Income, is the 
logical outcome of consistently and seriously pursuing a New 
Beveridge strategy. We will now turn our attention to another CI 
variant, a social dividend, which I will represent as a reform 
proposal corresponding to that ideology which is now only in the 
process of emergence: the democratic Left. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
MARKET SOCIALISM AND SOCIAL DIVIDEND 
1. Introduction 
The democratic Left, as I have characterized it, favours those 
social security benefits which impose the lowest feasible withdrawal 
rates. A guaranteed income, provided regardless of one's earnings 
and work status, would therefore seem to facilitate the democratic 
Left's conception of an autonomous citizen. So when it comes to 
social security reform, CI 's unconditionality seems to be more 
compatible with this ideology than with the previous two we have 
examined. However, if the democratic Left makes, and is to continue 
to make, a contribution to the CI debate on a par with those of 
economic liberalism and social democracy, as this thesis has argued, 
then its support for CI must go somewhat further than this. This is 
because it seems unlikely that a PCI could, by itself, provide the 
degree of autonomy with which I have associated a democratic Left 
society: if individual autonomy is to be maximized then employees 
must be as free to withdraw from the labour market as capital, and the 
modest level of a PCI does not permit this to any great extent. My 
objective in this chapter, therefore, is to argue that the democratic 
Left makes a serious and distinctive contribution to the CI debate by 
including a FCI in its policy agenda, and will only continue to 
contribute if it trys to show that a PCI could open up the door for the 
kind of social and economic reform which offers an alternative to 
both laissez -faire and welfare capitalism. So although a PCI seems 
acceptable to the democratic Left in the short -term, in the long -term 
it might be only be something resembling a FCI which could be 
satisfactory; ultimately, then, the desirability of a PCI stands or 
falls on its capacity to take us forward towards a FCI. The logic 
goes that if a FCI ' s 70% tax rate rules this source of funding out of 
court, then perhaps there are other ways of funding a FCI, e.g. 
through fees, or interest rates, charged for the borrowing of 
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publically -owned capital by co- operatively owned firms. In other 
words, a FCI could be thought of as a social dividend requiring a 
certain amount of social and economic re- structuring: the kind of re- 
structuring, indeed, which has long been associated with market 
socialist proposals. So, I am going to suggest that if the democratic 
Left wishes to develop a specific political and economic agenda then 
it should take a look at market socialist proposals for wider co- 
operative and share ownership, for it is only on this basis that it 
can make a distinctive contribution to the CI debate. When it comes 
to income provision, therefore, there are two principal questions 
which must be asked: exactly how would a market socialist environment 
fund a social dividend ?; how might the transition to that 
environment, with its social dividend, be effected? The former 
question is not one I shall be concerned with for the reason explained 
below. I shall therefore concentrate on the second question and will 
suggest why a PCI may be thought of as one possible means through 
which a market socialist social dividend could be created. 
I appreciate that I have here made some rather bold assertions. 
Why, it might be objected, could a social dividend not be funded by a 
market capitalist society? Certainly, this would require high rates 
of general taxation - as well as corporation, capital -gains and 
inheritance taxes - but there is no structural obstacle preventing 
this and, therefore, no basis for imagining that market socialism is 
the sine qua non of a social dividend. In reply, I fully acknowledge 
that funding a social dividend is a question of political will before 
it is one of institutional reform, since it is this will which 
presently constitutes the greatest obstacle to the introduction of 
something like a FCI. This is because the political will of market 
capitalism is that value -system which is oriented towards the 
private affluence gained through activities, wage- earning 
especially, in the formal economy - even though such values may be 
blind to the realities of inherited wealth. That the prevailing 
political will of market capitalism is probably inadequate to ever 
create and sustain a social dividend can be seen in the fate accorded 
to the ideas which Sam Brittan expressed in the 1980s. Brittan 
proposed that instead of creating privatized monopolies out of the 
nationalized industries, we should all be made share -holders of 
those industries and so be able to draw on a national dividend. Yet 
it was the prevailing 'get rich quick' mentality which ensured that 
203 
such ideas were never likely to gain support. Indeed, this is why I 
am primarily concerned with the second of the questions mentioned 
above, since we must consider whether the will to develop a market 
socialist economy could ever emerge, before we can elaborate on the 
details of its institutional structures. So, what I am going to 
suggest in this chapter is that the democratic Left should think of a 
PCI as a means of altering the prevailing political will of market 
capitalism. 
In section 2 I will outline a feasible market socialism, i.e. one 
which falls short of an economy with 100% co- operative ownership, and 
explain why even problems of transition to this more modest version 
of market socialism still exist. In section 3 I will explain why a 
social dividend is important to a market socialist economy, and in 
section 4 I will outline why I think the democratic Left should 
conceive of a PCI as forming the blueprint of a social dividend within 
a modest market socialist environment. 
2. Market Socialism and the Problem of Transition 
The debate over market socialism first arose in the 1920s and 
1930s, largely as a result of free -marketeers insisting that command 
economics lacked credibility (Hayek, 1935 & 1949). Some socialists 
responded by arguing that the market co- ordination of production, 
allocation and distribution could be combined with widespread public 
ownership of the means of production. In this way, the benefits of 
both markets and planning could be deployed (Lange & Taylor, 1964) . 
The debate faded and remained dormant for some forty years or more. 
Then, once the political climate had altered and it was the free - 
marketeers who ruled, market socialism re- emerged as one of several 
responses made by the Left to Thatcherism, to the increasing 
conservatism of social democracy and to the failures of command 
economics in the Eastern bloc (cf. Mandel, 1986 & 1988; Devine, 1988; 
Cohen, 1991) . Despite the attempts by some on the Right to discredit 
it (De Jasay, 1990; Gray, 1992) , market socialist theory has remained 
remarkably resilient. For the most part, the bulk of attention has 
been directed to either its desirability (Miller, 1989; Pierson, 
1995) or to its eventual feasibility (LeGrand & Estrin, 1989; Roemer, 
1994) . My proposition is that insufficient attention has been given 
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to exactly how the transition to a market socialist economy could be 
effected (cf . Pierson, 1995, 189 -211) . For unless this is addressed, 
then questions of desirability are of theoretical interest only and 
questions of feasibility are incomplete. It is not a matter of 
predicting the future, as Roemer (1994, 126) would have it, but of 
ensuring that such debates have practical as well as theoretical 
implications. 
Now, market Socialism implies the market co- ordination of 
production, allocation and distribution combined with the 
widespread public ownership of the means of production. Two forms of 
market socialism may be identified, corresponding to the historical 
periods distinguished above: 
1) Where there is a market for consumer goods and labour, but none for 
producer goods 
2) A market for all three, plus a degree of worker ownership and 
control. 
Allen Buchanan (1985, 104 -6) sorts out the several components 
implied by these two options: 
1) (a) With no production market a Central Planning Board ( CPB ) 
is to allocate resources and determine an investment plan; 
(b) The CPB must also set and re- adjust prices for producer 
goods - whether the prices are too high or too low depends upon 
the supply of consumer goods produced from producer goods; 
(c) Managers must minimize the cost of production and produce 
at a scale of output such that the marginal cost of the product 
equals the price of production. 
2)(a) Government is to set an overall investment plan and minimize 
unemployment; 
(b) Firms compete within a consumer market and for investment 
funds which government lends at a particular interest rate; 
(c) A firm's workers determine its product, process and division 
of profits; 
(d) All workers vote, though authority may be delegated to 
managers. 
Now, model 1) was developed by Lange and Taylor (1964) in response 
to the charge of Mises that, 
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Where there is no free market, there is no pricing mechanism; 
without a pricing mechanism, there is no economic 
calculation....Exchange relations between production goods can 
only be established on the basis of private ownership of the 
means of production. (1935, 11 -2; cf. Mises, 1969) 
It was Hayek (1935, 207 -14) , of all people, who took issue with this 
to argue that rational allocation under socialism was theoretically 
feasible - the mathematics being readily available - but, in 
practise, it seemed unlikely that millions of simultaneous equations 
could be solved: no such quantity of information could be accumulated 
and co- ordinated. 
Lange and Taylor's response (1964) proposed simulated markets 
whereby a CPB would set prices for industrial goods, so that 
industrial managers would use these prices in calculating their 
outputs. If, subsequently, a certain product was in excess supply 
its 'price' could be lowered; if in excess demand its price could be 
raised. So such trial and error would simulate the expansions and 
contractions of capitalist markets and thus enable the numerous 
equations to be solved. Hayek replied that this was to exclude the 
innovative and risk -taking role of the entrepreneur. Further, the 
CPB would lack understanding of what products to fund and knowledge 
of how industrial firms were truly performing - rectifying this would 
only increase central authority and bureaucracy (1949, 196 -9). 
Managers would have few incentives to minimize costs because they 
would assume that funds would always be forthcoming from the CPB - a 
' problem known as the soft budget constraint (1949, 203 -7) . Finally, 
market simulations would always lag far behind the supply and demand 
fluctuations of the real, dynamic economy since the calculations 
required are still so immense (1949, 188 & 192 -3). 
Over time, Hayek's contribution to this 'calculation debate' has 
proved decisive and Lange increasingly took on board many of his 
adversary's arguments. So, it is to the second of the two models 
outlined above to which market socialists now tend to refer. 
Planning would, therefore, be less essential to a market socialist 
economy than was once thought; what is more, the co- operatives 
stressed in the second model would need to exist side -by -side with 
familiar private firms. Yet many still insist on treating market 
socialism as a once -and- for -all, all -or- nothing affair. 
Paul Hirst recent critique of market socialism is guilty of this. 
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Hirst's intention is to rekindle a tradition of pluralist democracy 
that "...developed in the nineteenth century as an alternative to 
both liberal individualism and socialist collectivism" (1994, 15). 
This advocated an economy that would be decentralised and non - 
capitalistic, based upon 'co- operation and mutuality', and a 
political system that would be based upon 'voluntarism and self - 
government' . In Hirst's (1994, 21 -34) version of this new forms of 
economic and social governance would take us beyond the dichotomy of 
the public and private spheres. An associative democracy would 
revitalize civil society by 'publicizing' it, which means that self - 
governing, voluntary bodies would be treated not as secondary 
associations, but as the primary means both of democratic governance 
and of organizing social life. Equally, the state is 'pluralized', 
i.e. it remains as the source of public finance, is democratized to 
enhance public accountability, but is not allowed to substitute for 
the actions of self -governing associations. As for market 
socialism, Hirst insists that it simplistically reduces the economy 
to enterprises and households which are then assumed to be linked 
merely through markets and competitive activity. So it retains the 
split between the public /political and civil society, and assumes 
that state intervention alone can effect communication between them. 
Assoc iationalism, meanwhile, would supplement markets through 
local, economic governance (1994, 135 -7). - 
But it is not clear why Hirst should consider market socialism 
undesirable. He talks of supplementing markets, but why cannot the 
markets which are supplemented combine private, co- operative and 
state ownership as the more sophisticated market socialists have 
called for? If market socialism is a theory which can do nothing but 
uneasily combine neo- classical economics with statist mechanisms, 
then Hirst's objections would seem justified. But if market 
socialism is more flexible and plural than this, then why not employ 
both it and associative democracy to the most practicable extent? 
Though i will not myself make any great attempt to spell out what an 
associative market socialism would look like, I do, at the very 
least, insist that market socialism be regarded as a pluralist 
proposal, rather than as a once -and- for -all, all -or- nothing affair. 
This is so because while the democratic Left requires a radical and 
feasible economics if it is to have a political future, any political 
economics it develops has to encompass a plural site of diverse 
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interests and objectives. This is why we shall be considering it in 
the light of ecological and feminist critiques in the next two 
chapters. But if Hirst's hostility is somewhat extreme, where does 
it come from? 
Hirst's total rejection of market socialism is quite simply 
entailed by his insistence that the Left -Right spectrum has faded. 
For if the "politicization of property relations" no longer 
dominates politics (1994, 8 -9) then widespread market socialist 
reform would seem atavistic. But it is this insistence which largely 
divorces Hirst's otherwise interesting ideas from the realities of 
social policy analysis. For instance, he calls for a CI as the plank 
of an associationalist welfare system - because its non -state 
universal provision would enable large -scale experiments to be made 
(1994, 179 -84) - but he seems to have little appreciation of the point 
which is central to this research thesis: namely, that the form of a 
CI alters depending upon where we are on the ideological spectrum. 
So, as we have seen, economic liberals favour NIT to maximize work 
incentives and minimize costs. Social Democrats favour maintaining 
the social insurance principle: a Participation Income. The 
democratic Left, assuming that they do make a distinct contribution 
to the debate, are those who favour a social dividend. These are 
substantial differences and, quite simply, CI could not exist in an 
ideological vacuum. But Hirst takes no account of this. So by 
casually invoking CI, with no such ideological reference, Hirst 
damages the efficacy of his ideas. I am arguing therefore, that those 
who deny market socialist ideas any relevance whatsoever, do so 
because they believe that the Left -Right spectrum no longer accounts 
for essential political distinctions and divisions, a belief which I 
maintain is both premature and naive, as we can see if we observe 
Hirst's approach to the CI debate. 
It is the reluctance to take on board this more modest, diluted 
version of market socialism which also spoils Pierson's (1995) 
otherwise interesting discussion of Leftist economics. After all, 
if all firms, without exception, had to be commonly owned - whatever 
that may mean - before we could refer to such an economy as a market 
socialist one, then even an economy where 99% of firms were so owned 
could be referred to as capitalistic. This is nonsensical. What is 
more, no -one supports such a 100% state -of- affairs in any case, and 
few probably ever did. Anything more than a primitive, small -scale 
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economy requires market co- ordination in some form; further, even 
the simplest commodities require such a complex production process 
that the planning and co- ordination of that process in its entirety, 
by the associated producers, seems unrealistic. Collective 
appropriation is referred to by Gorz (1982, 23 -34) as a myth: a mass 
economy cannot be treated as a factory and cannot be split into 
hundreds of thousands of sub -units to be run by their workers. This, 
of course, does not mean that we are condemned to the levels of co- 
operative ownership which currently prevail. Such forms can and 
should be encouraged. What I insist, given the point made above, is 
that if co- operatives were to multiply and account for an ever 
greater percentage of the total economy, then, at some threshold we 
would be justified in defining such an economy as socialistic - 
otherwise we are led back to the nonsense of defining capitalism as 
anything less than an economy consisting of common ownership and 
nothing else. However, having made this point, little consensus 
could ever be expected. What percentage of all firms would have to be 
co- operatives before the respective threshold is reached? 
Commentators disagree, and economic liberals tend to reject the 
question as meaningless. My own feeling - and it is nothing more than 
this I am afraid - is that we would be in a market socialistic economy 
once between a third and a half of all employees worked either in a 
co- operative or at least in some kind of labour- capital partnership, 
involving some kind of share ownership scheme. So when I refer to a 
market socialist economy or environment, therefore, I will be 
referring to this version; a more modest version, and therefore more 
plausible, than the original Lange model. 
Now, since I am largely concerned with the issue of transition I 
will not be engaging with the debates referring to the institutional 
structures of a market socialist economy (Bergson, 1967; Vanek, 
1970; Elson, 1988; LeGrand & Estrin, 1989; Miller, 1989; Gray, 1992) . 
The most important point to note is that whereas in the first model a 
central role is given to a CPB, in the second model state banks would 
be created. These would compete both with each other and with private 
banks to lend out capital; the difference being that such state banks 
could also be given a remit to lend capital at more favourable rates 
of interest to those firms whose motivation is not only to make 
profits but also to engage in the kind of participatory, egalitarisn 
and co- operative activity which offers an alternative to 
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capitalistic enterprise. Even these favourable rates of interest 
would need to be competitive, but at least this would be a way of 
restoring capital markets while, hopefully, encouraging behaviour 
which does not always take profit as its bottom -line. Co- operatives 
would be encouraged, but not entrenched producer -groups. Risks 
could be taken, and success rewarded, but the penalties for failure 
would be nowhere near as extreme as at present since there would be a 
CI /social dividend to cushion the blow of market failure - see below. 
Mal- investments would be disclosed since competitive activity and 
contractual obligations would drive out the soft budget constraint. 
Capital assets would probably not be alienable, because not 
privately owned, but returns to partial capital -holdings would, so 
retaining income differentials - which is to allow for self - 
interest, but not selfishness, in individuals' motivations. Yet, as 
I warned in this chapter's introduction, this is to make an 
imaginative leap and ignore the problems of transition. Why do such 
problems arise? 
Surely, many say, it is the case that relatively few co- operatives 
exist because workers do not desire them and almost certainly never 
will. And if this is the case, does that not make market socialism a 
non- starter to begin with? But that, in reply, is to make the 
Nozickian assumption that the market is a neutral device conducive to 
any form of economic and social experimentation. But what if the 
market discriminates against certain preferences? This is not 
because of a capitalist conspiracy, rather, it is because a certain 
ethos is required to survive in a capitalist economy. Private banks 
are profit -maximizers first and foremost, and though it may be 
desirable to have firms which, while needing to stay in business, 
would have other considerations (such as workplace democracy) such 
private banks will have an overwhelming interest in lending capital 
to the more efficient, profit -maximizing capitalistic enterprises. 
The more egalitarian a co- operative is, the less profit it is likely 
to make and the greater the possibility of bankruptcy. If profit is 
raised in its scale of priorities then the more successful it will be, 
but the less able to refer to itself as a co- operative - since 
reducing labour costs and so re- introducing wage differentials will 
be one of the main ways in which profits are generated. So rather 
than neutrality setting limits to politics, as economic liberals 
tend to insist, politics and pre -institutional factors implement a 
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particular form of neutrality so that any market socialism, 
therefore, requires a political intervention: 
...we must impinge slightly on the prospects of those with 
market -oriented conceptions of the good in order to enhance 
the prospects of those with other priorities: (Miller, 1989, 
96) 
In reply Gray (1992, 50 -2) observes: 
1) That there are inevitable limits to neutrality which market 
socialism, by trapping workers in co- operatives, would violate 
anyway; 
2) Other forms of productive enterprise are driven out by the 
Capitalist market (the small corner shop, the family firm); 
3) Workers simply do not desire a co- operative economy. 
Let us look at these briefly. There is no evidence to substantiate 
1) , since a pluralist egalitarianism could offer greater liberty by 
permitting waged activity as now or participation /ownership within a 
co- operative firm. Against 2) , the fact that the capitalist market 
is admitted to drive out other productive enterprises, if anything, 
strengthens the case for implementing reform to minimize such bias. 
Finally, 3) repeats the familiar Right -wing assumption that desires 
are unformed and a priori. But if workers recognize market bias 
implicitly then it is no surprise that they rarely desire what they 
feel is unlikely to ever exist. Perhaps the widespread existence of 
co- operatives is a necessary condition of the desire to join them 
(Elster, 1989, 110). 
So, the fact that co- operatives are not generally desired does 
not mean that they are undesirable, nor that they could not be widely 
desired in the future. Yet this still leaves us with the problem 
of how the transition to a market socialist society could ever be 
effected. But before examining this issue we need to understand where 
a social dividend fits into the market socialist picture. 
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3. Social Dividend 
In this section I will outline the roles of a social dividend in a 
market socialist economy. 
I have claimed that a social dividend is the ideological form of CI 
favoured by the democratic Left and that this would require some kind 
of market socialism environment. Far from this being a tortuous 
association on my part, the fact is that CI finds many of its 
influences within the market socialist tradition, or in Left ideas 
allied to it. As early as 1920 G.D.H. Cole, though seeing wages 
continuing as the main source of income, predicted that, 
...the commune will itself have the task of determining the 
allocation of income to those sections of the people who are not 
in receipt of an income directly from a functional body. (Cole, 
1920, 146) 
Lange advocated a social dividend, to be received independently of 
one's occupation, as being necessary to a market socialist system - 
because it effects a trade -off between equality and efficiency 
(Lange & Taylor, 1964, 74 -5 & 83 -4 & 100 -3). H.D. Dickinson, too, 
speculated about a social fund - funded out of taxation and interest 
on capital - which if, 
...more than sufficient to supply all the needs of the 
community, for social services and capital formation, then the 
balance may be distributed among the citizens as individual 
income. (Dickinson, 1939, 135 -7) 
For the most part, then, a social dividend was regarded as a desirable 
consequence of a market socialist economy, rather than as integral to 
the workings of such an economy. Those socialists who were most 
hostile to capitalism, without lurching into Stalinism, were 
attracted to it both because it by- passed the social insurance 
principle - regarded as functional to a capitalist economy - and 
because it could be viewed as a return on socially -generated wealth 
in a way that wages never could. As the market socialist debate faded 
so did the attention directed to social dividend. Did that attention 
revive as the market socialist debate re- emerged in the 1980s? 
To a certain extent it did (Breitenbach et al, 1990, 31 -5) , though 
without the attention that might have been expected. In any event, I 
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think we can identify three roles which a social dividend would have 
to perform in a market socialist economy; two have just been 
mentioned. Firstly, it would perform a functional role. A social 
dividend would be one instrument through which market failures could 
be corrected. This would be as necessary in a market socialist 
economy as in a capitalistic one, e.g. remember C.H. Douglas's (1974) 
idea of remedying the deficiencies in purchasing power of twentieth 
century capitalism through a social credit system. For James Meade 
(1993, 152) some form of social dividend would allow wages to fall to 
market -clearing levels, so soaking up unemployment and squeezing 
inflationary pressures out of the economy. Meade, too, is thinking 
largely of a capitalistic economy, but such ideas would probably have 
to be applied to a market socialist one also. Secondly, a social 
dividend would have a re- distributive role. This not only implies a 
transfer of income to the poorest, but a means of doing so which is 
paternalist without being perfectionist - whereas the present, 
conditional, benefit system seems to do the opposite. Roemer (1992) 
and Meade (1993, 148) regard a social dividend as a way of achieving 
an equality compatible with the other desirable objectives of 
liberty and efficiency. 
But these roles are relatively modest: instrumentalist and 
largely concerned with income. They are not specifically market 
socialist and, as just indicated, they overlap with the concerns of 
pro -capitalist theorists. In a market socialist economy a social 
dividend would have a third role. As I have said, in contemporary 
models the CPB gives way to a series of public investment banks to 
lend out capital. The proposal is that the returns to this capital, 
via interest- payments, be distributed equally among all. Roemer 
puts the point succinctly: 
...the profits of firms will not go to a small fraction of 
society, but will be divided, after taxes, more or less equally 
among all households....The social dividend will be a form of 
guaranteed income. ...it is that part of the national income 
which is not distributed as wages or interest, but which belongs 
to the people as owners of the means of production. (Roemer, 
1992, 453 -4) 
This is an important point to remember. A CI might well connect 
individuals to the means of subsistence, but it is still a transfer. 
The function of a social dividend would be to connect us to the means 
of production. I will suggest in the next section that it is the 
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establishment of this connection which may well require a change of 
political will, so that the formal economy begins to serve a variety 
of value -systems and makes room for alternate activities in the 
informal economy, and the kind of institutional reform which market 
capitalism seems unable to accommodate. In any case, a social 
dividend would be a symbolic representation of the collective 
ownership of social wealth and, as such it resembles what Unger 
(1987, 491-3) calls a rotating capital fund where the "collective 
review of the arrangements and results of economic life" are more 
deeply integrated into the institutional order than at present, and 
where our conception of property rights itself changes. But this is 
to move, again, into the realms of speculation. We must begin to 
understand why a PCI could provide the blueprint of a social 
dividend. 
4. PCI as the Transition to Social Dividend and Market Socialism? 
In this section I will present an alternative to traditional 
Leftist conceptions of social transformation and explain why a PCI 
could effect changes to the political will of market capitalism, such 
that the ideal of a social dividend could become widely held and so 
propel the kind of institutional reform which takes us towards a 
market socialist economy as I earlier defined it. 
There are two components essential to any social transformation: 
people must desire it; there must exist mechanisms through which it 
can be realised. The scale of the transformation depends upon how 
many people act to change things and upon their resources - the poorer 
the agents, the greater the numbers required. The nature of the 
transformation is largely determined by the mechanisms available. 
So, many have said that political institutions in a capitalist 
economy inevitably blunt radical reforms. Crudely, then, two 
processes must act in concert: the state must ' push' reforms; agents 
must 'pull' reforms toward civil society. 
Now, the Left has generally been poor at developing transitional 
strategies. Marxists have come closest to emphasizing 'pull', but 
this has tended to be within the limiting context of historical 
materialism, such that class consciousness unfolds according to 
essentialist principles. The history of Marxist theory - certainly 
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for Lenin, Gramsci and Althusser - is then the history of attempts to 
re -think this essentialism. It is non -Marxists, meanwhile, who have 
tended to be statist. Social democrats, for example, have usually 
imagined that a Left party could be elected, initiate radical reform 
and so come to be accepted by the vast majority of people from whose 
eyes the scales would have fallen at last. It is as if the job of the 
working -class was to vote for, and pass power over to, their Labour 
representatives. There have been exceptions on the Left, e.g. 
syndicalists conceived of building economic democracy from the 
bottom up. For the most part, though, the Left have emphasized 
'push' : an avalanche of reform begins at the top -most level and is 
subsequently desired by those whose lives it is intended to improve. 
Similarly, in the market socialist literature we find proposals like 
Saul Estrin's to socialize existing firms and Julian LeGrand's to 
introduce education vouchers (LeGrand & Estrin, 1989, 169 -92 & 198- 
211). Time and again the state is the main starting -point. 
But what if the emphasis is inverted? What if social 
transformation must be widely desired before it can be implemented so 
that desire is an antecedent to, and not a consequent of, state 
reform? By 'antecedent desire' I do not mean simply voting a Left 
party into power to leave them, hopefully, to improve things; I mean a 
revolution in ethics and behaviour such that demands for reform could 
not be resisted, perhaps not even by the Right. Could a PCI initiate 
such a revolution? 
In chapter 4 I defined the employment ethic as that which reduces 
'work' to 'wage-earning activity in a labour market' and then makes 
the performance of such work the highest virtue attainable in a 
modern economy. Most of those who dismiss CI do so, whether they know 
it or not, in the name of this employment ethic. Now, in the 
introduction to this chapter I referred to the political will of 
market capitalism as having something to do with the valuation of the 
private affluence derived from profit -making activity in the formal 
economy, activity which, for most people, involves wage -earning. In 
other words, the political will of parties and electorates in Western 
societies revolves around the centre of gravity established by the 
employment ethic. Those who prefer more of a publically- minded ethos 
are increasingly fighting against the desire, sometimes unadmitted, 
for consumer goods and the ever higher living standards which we in 
the West have come to expect. it is this political will which the 
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democratic Left must aim to transform and it is possible that a PCI 
could be a valuable weapon in doing so. There are two reasons for 
this. 
The first reason offers a direct challenge to the employment 
ethic. Basically, if a PCI brought about the advantages which its 
supporters claim for it, then a substantial pro -CI electorate could 
be created with political pressure building up for ever higher levels 
of income, the unconditionality of which would no longer be a major 
stumbling block. There are two advantages which could bring this new 
constituency into being. 
On the more materialist side of things, I noted in the 
introductory chapter the research which suggests that even CI levels 
below that of a PCI might well have a strong redistributive impact, 
both on the poorest and on many below- average and middle- income 
earners (Parker & Sutherland, 1994) . A PCI, it is thought, would have 
a still higher impact. If this actually occurred, then a sizeable 
proportion of the electorate would have been created who might then 
favour still higher levels of redistributive CI, with a knock -on 
influence on the political process. If a PCI delivered the 
redistributive goods, as it were, then the unconditionality, to 
which the employment ethic stands opposed, might become less of an 
obstacle. Of course, there is no necessary reason why, once this 
electorate was formed (assuming that it would be), it could be 
maintained. The stability and longevity of any such electorate would 
depend upon the skill of the democratic Left in keeping it alive. 
There is always the danger that the wealthier voters would accept the 
redistribution of a PCI but not support any further reform along 
those lines. And, obviously, it may be that a PCI is never introduced 
since the employment ethic is held so strongly by so many in the first 
place! 
But there is also a more substantial, non -materialist advantage 
through which a pro -CI constituency, no longer in thrall to the 
employment ethic, could be formed and maintained. This involves the 
potential for CI, often noted in this thesis, to subvert established 
attitudes to work. This it could do in two ways. Firstly, by 
providing a minimum income without reference to work status it could 
educate people not to equate 'work' with 'employment'. This is 
especially important for those who are not entitled to benefits, 
though they should be, because our social security system regards 
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most benefits as a means of replacing lost earnings. This is 
especially disadvantageous to women. Secondly, it would allow a 
greater plurality of lifestyles than are available at present since, 
by disregarding work status, CI does not require that individuals 
tailor their life -patterns, even their very identities, to fit in 
with the needs of the labour market and with career -oriented norms. 
If it is conformity to such needs and norms which came to appear 
undesirable, then those who experiment with alternative lifestyles 
might no longer be confused with 'free-riders', and nor would we 
continue to imagine that individuals can be press - ganged into being 
citizens. Also, a PCI could entail a change in behaviour. By making 
the formal labour market less essential to livelihoods, e.g. by 
helping the poorest to refuse low -paid jobs, a CI might encourage 
activity that currently goes unrecognized: for instance, the innate 
creativity which, for so many, remains innate because it is not wise - 
let alone practical - to take several months off to follow personal 
ambitions. 
These points regarding attitudes and behaviour are not as far 
fetched as they might at first appear. Given the changes in the 
labour market, attitudes and behavious patterns are already having 
to alter without the benefits which institutional reform would 
undoubtedly bring. As such, it is reasonable to speculate that 
support for the principle of CI would grow as it became recognized 
that it represented such reform. Many people could begin to 
recognize that CI, by taking the emphasis away from the activities in 
the formal economy and so making them less essential to our personal 
identities and social welfare, might provide individuals with more 
opportunities to practise those informal activities - such as 
educational and creative endeavours - which they currently have to 
neglect if they are to earn enough to survive and prosper. Also, a 
PCI could mean that those activities which are already widely 
practised - such as parenting - do not have to involve individuals, 
usually the mothers, devoting almost all of their time to them, i.e. 
if wages no longer have to provide all or most of the household's 
income then there is less pressure on fathers to earn the equivalent 
of a family wage and more opportunities for both parents to share 
duties within the home and take advantage of opportunities outside of 
it. 
So, by directly challenging the employment ethic, especially on 
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these non -materialist grounds, a PCI could go someway to undermining 
the emphasis which the political will of market capitalism gives to 
the formal economy, while offering a coherent post -employment 
alternative behind which an influential pro -CI constituency could be 
built. But if higher CI levels were desired, how would they be 
funded? Answering this requires us to consider another innovation 
which a PCI could involve, one which is less subversive of the 
employment ethic and so one which might appeal to many of us, Left and 
Right. 
So, when it comes to the informal economy a PCI goes some way to 
undermining the employment ethic. But if we now consider the formal 
economy, the second reason why a PCI could weaken market capitalism' s 
political will is not so much that it undermines the employment 
ethic, as provides other channels through which that ethic may be 
expressed. Many consider that a PCI would encourage greater economic 
enterprise, experimentation and risk -taking than at present. There 
are two reasons for this. Firstly, because a PCI provides more of a 
cushion against job losses and business failure than either 
selective or contributory benefits, both of which take several weeks 
to claim and which, because they are meant to constitute almost all of 
an invidual's income during times of dependency, provide little 
basis for building up the kind of savings which can be invested. 
Secondly, because a PCI is guaranteed then its provision can be 
relied upon for however long into the future it may be needed, thus 
providing not only a source of investment but a more stable source 
than either banks - viewed with hostility by many of the self - 
employed - or personal savings and shares can provide. On both 
counts, therefore, a PCI could encourage more people to try their 
hand and set up businesses. If, for instance, half a dozen people 
were to set up in business and agree to invest their PCIs, then a 
guaranteed source of investment, amounting to a couple of hundred 
pounds a week, would be made available, on top of any other capital 
which is obtainable. By the same token, of course, existing 
businesses would have an additional cushion standing between 
themselves and failure. Now, many of these new businesses would be 
the kind of small firms and shops which already predominate. But many 
Will also be the kind of co- operatives and partnerships which are 
currently difficult to establish for the reasons detailed earlier. 
If a PCI, as such, had these desirable effects then there is another 
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reason to believe that higher levels of CI would become widely 
desired. 
So, on the one hand, a PCI seems to open up opportunities within 
the informal economy which challenge and offer an alternative to the 
employment ethic. On the other, it seems to provide opportunities 
within the formal economy which, by allowing greater risk -taking, 
participation and co- operation than at present, permit a modified 
employment ethic to flourish in an environment where people are no 
longer simply defined as employees. Far from being a inconsistent, 
these points testify to the 'plurality of lifestyles' of which I have 
spoken. On both counts, the political will which values the private 
affluence derived specifically from wage- earning is undermined. A 
PCI could motivate a new political will which, geared towards the 
advantages of pluralism in economic and non -economic activity, could 
provide the motivation for citizens to demand further reforms. 
Nevertheless, even if this were so, how would higher CI levels be 
funded? 
It might be done through taxation, of course, though we still run 
up against the objection that since a majority of people would 
continue to be wage- earners, not having taken advantage of the 
opportunities to either opt -out of the labour market or to be more 
participatory within it, then taxes set at too high.a level would 
hamper the sustainability of a high CI. Green taxes could assist - 
see the next chapter - but it is also unlikely that they, on their 
own, would be enough. In short, if a PCI had these beneficial effects 
and if demands for higher CI levels built up, then this could only be 
accommodated by finding an alternative source of funding. The most 
obvious candidate would be to institutionalize a system whereby the 
returns to publically -owned capital are used to fund higher CI 
levels, i.e. a social dividend (Gray, 1988, 130; Aslund, 1992, 26 -7) . 
Basically, the kind of state banks which I referred to earlier 
would be established. They would be in competition with private 
banks and with each other, and might be required to offer favourable 
rates of interest to those firms who are judged to be pursuing moral, 
and not just profit -making, ends. If such state banks were truely 
competitive and so able to remain in business, then the returns on the 
capital loaned out could be used to fund higher CI levels. In other 
words, the economic innovation which a PCI might be responsible for 
in the formal economy could also suggest ways of funding still higher 
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CI levels. Such returns on state - loaned capital could not be 
regarded as mere taxation, since it is the state -loaned capital which 
would have helped to generate the enterprises' profits in the first 
place, and if distributed as a social dividend would improve still 
further the motivation to take risks and start up businesses. A 
virtuous circle is therefore created. The higher the social dividend 
then the greater the entrepreneurship that might be encouraged with, 
consequently, state capital yielding ever greater returns, and so 
funding still higher levels of social dividend. In short, if PCI were 
to be a popular measure then political pressure could build up behind 
it leading to a transformation in the way we regard capital and the 
dividends on profit -making. This would have the effect of connecting 
us to the means of production, as Roemer observed. If more co- 
operatives and partnerships were to be facilitated through such 
state capital then, as I insisted earlier, once such firms 
constituted a certain percentage of the economy, we would be 
justified in referring to that economy as market socialist. It may be 
difficult, and even impossible, to agree on what that percentage 
should be, but we would certainly err if we insisted that market 
socialism must be regarded as a once -and- for -all, all -or- nothing 
reform: a type of property -holding which must blanket the entire 
economy. 
So the potential of PCI for a democratic Left future is this: it 
decentralizes economic power to some small extent and, by altering 
the 'parameters of choice', invites people to demand that it be 
decentralized even more (Millar et al, 1989, 80; Elson, 1988, 28- 
30). Bill Jordan expresses a similar point: 
In a social dividend society, which used the mechanism of a 
guaranteed subsistence income and a right not to work so as to 
confer equal citizenship on all, the notion of a plurality of 
forms of enterprises, but a universal right for workers to be 
represented in decisions about production, would be 
attractive. (1985, 316) 
The point of the above argument has been to suggest that sufficient 
numbers of people might be educated by their experiences of PCI to 
find such a society attractive and so demand that it be brought into 
being. At the very least, it is such an argument which the democratic 
Left can and must take into account. 
Of course, there are numerous objections which can be raised to 
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the above scenario. As already mentioned, perhaps a PCI would fit 
comfortably into our capitalistic environment and not motivate 
people to desire higher taxes and social dividends to fund higher CI 
levels. Also, would the returns on state capital be enough to fund 
anything very substantial, especially since another function of such 
banks might be encourage firms which, while having to make a profit to 
stay in the market, would also possess non -profit -making objectives? 
And even if several billions pounds worth of revenue were raised this 
would only add a few pounds to the PCI and so might be better spent 
elsewhere. These points, though, are relevant to the feasibility 
issues of market socialism and social dividend which are not my 
concern - even assuming that I had the competency to tackle them. But 
there are three objections of more direct relevance to the above 
scenario. 
Firstly, I have already mentioned the objection that PCI, far from 
effecting any such changes in political will, would require such 
changes itself if it were to be introduced in the first place! This 
objection I will set to one side since if we really are serious about 
social justice then any such reforms will require a wide- ranging 
constituency with the requisite changes in attitudes and behaviour. 
The nature of those attitudes may be different with CI, e.g. they 
would need to involve support for an unconditional income rather than 
simple minimum wages, but there would need to be substantial public 
education whichever route we go down. As I have observed several 
times, for the proponents of social justice there is no easy 
option. 
Of more importance is a second objection which points out that a 
social dividend would require exactly the kind of state -heavy 
legislation which I earlier denounced! So it would. A PCI needs to 
be argued for and introduced in terms of existing ethical and 
behavioural principles; for instance, that an unconditional 
transfer makes more sense because it is at present that millions are 
paid money so long as they remain economically inactive. To this 
extent my earlier distinction between 'push' and 'pull' breaks down. 
But what I am arguing for is not simply CI but a PCI as the foundation 
of a social dividend. A PCI would indeed require political reform of 
the existing systems by existing legislators. What I am suggesting 
is that such a PCI would effect changes in attitudes and behaviour 
such that pressure could build up from below for further reform. The 
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state banks, as the source of funding for a social dividend, would 
certainly require structural reform by politicians and policy - 
makers, but they would only be created in the first place if there 
were the political pressure about which I have speculated and which 
would make CI levels as integral to electoral calculations as 
inflation, taxes and public spending. 
Yet there is a third objection, the most important of all. For 
though the above scenario seems neat and not entirely implausible 
within the confines of a nation -state, but what of the international 
dimension? What of capital -flight? Erik Olin Wright (1987, 661 -6) 
raises the spectre of capitalists being scared of CI to the extent 
that they withdraw investment and go in search of more favourable 
social security /tax regimes abroad. So even if a CI were introduced 
the mobility of capital, as always, would ensure that movements for 
radical reform stalled and either conservative forms of CI emerged 
(NIT) or more modest versions (Participation Income). It is 
precisely such considerations which make the emergence of a European 
welfare state unlikely (Liebfried, 1994). However, once again, 
since this objection is relevant to all of those who favour some form 
of social justice, and not just to that version of social justice 
specific to market socialism, then I will postpone discussion of the 
European dimension until the final chapter. 
So, we can summarize the above scenario by saying that, in the 
informal economy, a PCI would go some way to undermining the 
employment ethic while, in the formal economy, it could channel that 
ethic into the sort of enterprising activities which capitalism 
infrequently allows. This would not subvert the institutional base 
of capitalism but it might begin to alter its political will, such 
that higher levels of CI would be demanded in the form of a social 
dividend as funded through returns on state - loaned capital. The 
value of CI to the democratic Left, therefore, is that in the short - 
term a PCI is compatible with capitalist imperatives and, indeed, 
might even promote them by facilitating economic innovation in the 
setting up of small businesses etc. Nevertheless, PCI could be 
something of a 'stalking- horse'. For in the long -term, CI is 
potentially pro -socialist, in that, by shifting the political will 
of capitalism, a reform involving the socialization of property 
begins to appear less frightening, i.e. as heralding statism, and 
more as a means of funding a social dividend through which still 
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greater opportunities within both the formal and informal economies 
can be generated. 
5. Conclusion 
The objections which I raised a short time ago, as well as numerous 
others which lie outside my scope, throw into question the 
feasibility both of a market socialist environment and the 
possibility of that environment funding a substantial social 
dividend. Even so, I conclude that my objective in this chapter has 
been realized. That objective was to provide us with sufficient 
reasons to think of the democratic Left as making a distinct 
contribution to the CI debate. The democratic Left, I have argued, 
must theorize ways in which people can become more autonomous than 
II they are at present. This means having the opportunity to opt -out of 
the labour market on conditions of our choosing and being able to 
participate in the formal economy above and beyond our current status 
as wage- earners. CI therefore offers the democratic Left one way 
forward, and since it resembles the social dividend proposals which 
pepper the tradition of market socialist thought, then we have one 
reason to attribute a distinct contribution to the CI debate by the 
democratic Left. Furthermore, since there is an argument that PCI 
could act as a springboard to higher levels of CI, and perhaps 
eventually to a social dividend, then we have a second reason to 
consider the democratic Left's contribution alongside those of 
economic liberalism and social democracy. The feasibility of a 
social dividend may be argued over ad infinitum, but that there is a 
prima facie case for examining the social dividend peoposal in the 
first place seems clear 
Now, though the democratic Left, if it is to wield political 
influence in the future, must allow for the kind of co- operative 
ownership implied by market socialism, at the same time, it must 
embrace a constituency far wider than that which the Left has courted 
in the past. Market socialism, as such, is only part of the story and 
in the next two chapters I will offer ecological and feminist 
critiques of market socialism to see what role they could have to play 
in the democratic Left's project. So, each of the next two chapters 
has two objectives. Firstly, to convey the distinct justifications 
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which ecological and feminist theorists could give, and have given, 
for CI . Secondly, to round off our account of the democratic Left's 
approach to social security reform. By the end of these final 
chapters, therefore, we will have completed our investigation of the 
ideological dimensions of the CI debate. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
ECOLOGICAL THOUGHT AND CI 
1. Introduction 
There is a delicate balancing act to be effected in this and in the 
next chapter. As I explained in the introduction I do not believe 
that ecological and feminist thought merit equal weight with our 
other three ideologies. The former has lent great support to CI but 
critiques of the welfare state are few and far between (George & 
Wilding, 1994, 161 -88) . The latter has offered extensive critiques 
of welfarism (Pascall, 1986) but few treatments of CI. Nor does 
either seem able to offer a distinctive model, as opposed to 
justifications, of CI. At the same time, though, it would be 
negligent to simply ignore ecology and feminism. Chapters 9 and 10, 
therefore, to do things. Firstly, to present 
and feminist approaches to CI per se; secondly, to offer ecological 
and feminist critiques of market socialism. This latter objective 
refers back to my insistence that a democratic Left economics must 
combine socialist as well as ecological and feminist elements - by 
this I am not claiming that economic liberalism and social democracy 
bear no ecological and feminist credentials, merely that they view 
such critiques as consistent with the social and economic structures 
which this thesis has already adumbrated. Hopefully, then, these 
chapters may be read in two ways. For those interested in a 
democratic Left perspective they provide some explanation of how the 
democratic Left must draw together a diverse range of interests and 
goals. But for those not interested in this perspective it is hoped 
that the accounts of ecological and feminist justifications of CI 
which are to follow stand on their own merits. 
The second section, below, will sketch an outline both of an 
ecological ethics and of an ecological economics. The third section 
will discuss what role a CI might play in any Green society. The 
fourth section will examine other reform proposals, i.e. local 
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currency schemes and Gorzian working -time reductions, and ask 
whether ecologists should favour these proposals or CI. The fifth 
will insist that ecologists should not be dismissive of a market 
socialist strategy and that a CI could effect some kind of bridge 
between Green economics and market socialism, the former helping to 
eliminate the weaknesses of the latter. 
2. The Ethics of an Ecological Economics 
The one principle through which an ecological economics may be 
defined is that of sustainable development, the idea that in order to 
subsist and flourish we should not make demands on the world which 
the world finds it impossible to bear. But does 'sustainable' mean 
low- growth, no- growth, or some other notion of what growth and wealth 
might imply? To answer this we need to understand the ethical 
principles which ecologists would have such sustainability serve. 
This is too big a theme to be pursued in detail here, given that 
whole books may be written on ecological ethics (Bookchin, 1980; 
Naess, 1989) . In any case, all that we need do is to understand those 
aspects of such an ethics which are in some way relevant so social 
security reform. So rather than engage with the voluminous critiques 
of anthropocentrism - which chapter 3 touched on briefly in its 
discussion of Rawls and Parfit - I will focus upon what may be called 
a 'communal ethic' , i.e. the idea that not only is the world an object 
of common ownership but that social practices and institutions 
should be structured in ways which reflect this. 
Though hardly definable as a Green theorist in the sense we have 
come to recognize, some idea of what this ethic involves can be 
gathered by taking a look at Tom Paine. In 'Agrarian Justice' Paine 
(Foot & Kramnick, 1987, 471) defends a variant of Locke's theory of 
property rights. But, Paine was clearer than Locke regarding the 
status of the 'natural' world: namely, that it can be thought of as 
the object of common ownership, rather than the lack of any ownership 
(Foot & Kramnick, 1987, 476). That being the case, it is the 
expropriation of this commonality by the system of private 
ownership, however inevitable and justifiable, for which we have a 
right of compensation: "Every proprietor therefore, of cultivated 
land, owes to the community a ground rent" (Foot & Kramnick, 1987, 
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476) . This ground rent would establish a national fund out of which a 
guaranteed income could be paid. What I want to suggest is that, 
though set in terms of classical liberalism, Paine's critique 
resembles an embryonic ecological and ' communal ethic'. For when 
modern -day ecologists stress a commonality between nations, 
generations, sentient and non -sentient life -forms it is not simply 
out of a fear that the world's resources are extinguishing but of a 
sense that those resources will only be preserved if we remember that 
they belong to all and so to no -one in particular. So this ethic is 
one of stewardship and nurture rather than of manipulation and 
control. Note also how Paine's guaranteed income can be thought of as 
a version of CI, as an income which re- establishes some kind of 
connection between the human world of civilization and the natural 
world of common ownership which we have lost. This is not a ' loading 
of the dice' on my part; on the contrary, Paine's support for such a 
guaranteed income uncannily reflects that which many ecologists have 
given to CI. Before addressing this below, however, we need to 
appeciate exactly what is meant by 'sustainability'. 
As always, there is no easy answer to this. Herman Daly (1977, 
107 -8) defines a steady -state economy as "...constant stocks of 
people and physical wealth maintained at some chosen, desirable 
level ... " This level might not be ' frozen' forever. It could evolve 
as values and technology evolve. But such growth would be temporary, 
deliberate and driven by moral considerations, considerations so 
often marginalized in the 'dash for growth' ethos of modern, 
industrialized regimes. So Daly would require_ us to alter our 
conceptions of growth and wealth, to subject them to moral critiques 
of desirability rather than accepting them unquestionably as goods 
to be pursued at all costs. But is this not just too abstract and 
utopian to take on real meaning? Daly (1977, 115 -6) believes that 
three institutions would be necessary for achieving a steady -state 
economy. Two of these would be designed to keep population and 
physical wealth stabilized and need not concern us since it is the 
third which would be the most important. This would be a 
distributivist institution to limit the degree of inequality 
involved in the distribution of constant stocks among a constant 
Population. This basically means defining maximum and minimum 
limits to personal income as well as a maximum limit to personal 
wealth. This institution would be the most important since it is here 
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that the economy would be provided with its moral basis which, as 
such, would make it a necessary condition of the other two 
institutions. Most interestingly, and at the risk of being accused 
of loading the dice again, Daly talks of NIT as the means for 
achieving the limits on income and wealth. 
So, we see how ecological thought embraces, among other things, a 
communal ethic which stresses the common ownership of the world 
requiring, on the one hand, a sustainable economy - leaving the 
precise meaning of this open - and, on the other, a mechanism for 
distributing income which reflects this commonality. Is it merely a 
coincidence that both Paine and Daly mention some form of guaranteed 
income? 
3. CI in A Green Society? 
For ecologists this communal ethic, combined with the economic 
critique which says that finite resources and a finite eco- system 
cannot accomodate infinite demands, translates into an economics of 
sustainability, steady -state growth and minimum and maximum levels 
of wealth and income accumulation - for reasons of space I am passing 
over the specifics of these objectives. Daly (1973, 168 -70), whose 
influence on such economics is second to none, accords a role to NIT. 
Why is this? 
Of course at this time, in the 1970s, NIT tended to be a blanket - 
term applied to any notion of a guaranteed income- and many people 
like Daly continued to refer to it as such, despite the proposal 
gradually taking on a Right -wing hue - see chapter 6. The important 
thing to note here is the mutual history between steady -state 
economics and a guaranteed income. The earliest reference I can find 
is that by Warren A. Johnson. Johnson (1973, 180 -9) mentions a 
guaranteed income as a process that could make unnecessary forms of 
work in uneconomic locations more attractive to workers - who would 
no longer need to rely on the wages provided by such work. Funnelling 
labour market activity into such forms of work would be necessary if 
economic output and production were to be slowed. He wants to 
distinguish between the objective of poverty relief, which is 
achieved by increasing the economic activity of the poor, and the 
Objective of discouraging economic growth by the non -poor. He 
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defines, in these terms, three principles cum proposals. Firstly, 
expanding the opportunities for service in the public sector, 
especially for the young. Secondly, encouraging new methods of 
livlihood, which basically means a de- urbanization and a search for 
alternatives to the prevailing options of either a lifetime's 
employment, a form of economic tyranny, or complete inactivity. 
Thirdly, the promotion of economic health without the debilitating 
growth from which we now suffer. So, a guaranteed income could be 
raised or lowered, depending upon the productiveness of the economy, 
to maintain stability. It could be financed out of a tax on new 
technology and, to avoid higher birth rates, it could provide lower 
rates of income for a second child and so on. In short, Johnson views 
a guaranteed income as having an "evolutionary potential ", as 
enabling a new form of economic behaviour which is consistent with 
new technology, but without being tied to it. As I have said, Daly 
(1973, 168 -70) refers to a NIT as providing the guaranteed minimum 
income level and as the counterpart to a 100% tax rate which would set 
the maximum limit on income accumulation (cf. Daly & Cobb,1990,315- 
23). 
Green parties, then, are those which are most closely associated 
with a CI and have more or less followed the lead provided by Johnson 
and Daly in the 1970s, i.e. that of associating steady -state 
economics with some notion of a guaranteed income which would both 
fight poverty and encourage more ecologically benign forms of work 
(Irvine & Ponton, 1988, 70 -4; Kemp & Wall, 1990, 77 -8). However, 
ecologists do not universally support a minimum income and the 
relation between Green political thought and CI sometimes seems 
tenuous. Two good examples of this observation can be given. For 
instance, Van Parijs (1992a, 26 -8) writes that a CI would be 
ecologically insensitive, crude and not very well targeted on the 
objectives of resource- preservation and production -maximization. 
More effective measures can be imagined. He accuses Greens of 
'cognitive dissonance', i.e. of desiring an anti- growth economy on 
the basis of their own subjective preferences, of confusing a 
personal hostility to economic development with an objective 
analysis of human/nature relations. Initially at least, Van Parijs 
insists, a CI would be growth friendly and Greens should support it 
not as a means to eliminate output growth, but as a way of integrating 
output growth with considerations of pollution and depletion. This 
230 
argument is paralleled by Richard Norman (1992, 150) who insists that 
any ecological argument only gains significance if it is seen in 
egalitarian terms. We find a similar scepticism within the 
ecological camp. Andrew Dobson accuses CI as being too much of 'this 
world' , as offering no substantial break with present practices and 
as dependent upon the °growth is good' and 'wealth for the sake of it' 
ethos which Greens elsewhere describe as unsustainable and immoral. 
So, it, 
...looks like a social democratic measure grafted 
unsustainably onto the ailing post -industrial body politic, 
rather than a democratically Green measure in the spirit of 
solutions to the problems of sustainability raised by the 
spectre of limits to growth. (1990, 114 -5) 
Similarly, Boris Frankel (1987, 79 -83) makes much the same 
arguments. 
Now, in forming their 'unholy alliance', one to disassociate CI 
from Green economics and the other to disassociate Green economics 
from CI, Van Parijs and Dobson overlook the point which, in many ways, 
this research thesis is concerning itself with. Namely, that if 
considered on its own, without reference to other reform proposals 
however ideologically tinged, then CI is inefficacious and even 
somewhat meaningless. CI must be viewed as a transitional and 
'partial' strategy which, in alliance with other strategies and 
policies, could effect widespread changes in society. What such 
changes would be, and what kind of society they could bring about, 
depends upon the nature of their ideological departure- point. So, 
both theorists are correct to argue that there is no necessary link 
between Green economics and CI, but incorrect if they imagine that 
either must therefore give way to the other. Van Parijs does not say 
anything that someone like Daly would disagree with. Why not 
interpret CI as part of a package of measures designed to target 
growth upon more ecologically benign objectives? Dobson, meanwhile, 
does not consider the long -term potential of CI to promote the 
informal economy. This would occur since CI would represent a non- 
employment source of income which, consequently, could encourage 
activity outside of the formal labour market on a scale greater than 
that now in evidence. In short, CI could assist in taking us beyond 
our employment -based society whose emphasis upon producivity and a 
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'more is better' way of looking at the world is exactly what fuels 
resource -depletion and pollution. Certainly, the initial modest 
levels of CI present a problem. But, as with social democratic 
objections to CI, there are no easy options, not if we are serious 
about reform - this is one of the reasons, as I will argue below, why 
ecologists should not rule market socialism out of hand. In getting 
where he wants us to go, Dobson does not seem to want to start from 
where we are. Or, as Claus Offe puts it: 
...while the right to income as an unconditional citizen right 
would certainly not by itself alleviate the environmental and 
ecological risks and dangers of industrial growth and the full 
employment that is contingent upon such growth, it would 
probably contribute in indirect ways, for it removes some of the 
productivist pressures and anxieties and thus paves the 
political road towards targeted and selective- environmental 
policies, some of which are bound to entail the very termination 
of certain lines of production and production processes. The 
basic income makes an ecological critique of industrialism 
politically more affordable. (1993, 230) 
My own position, in contradistinction to both Van Parijs and Dobson, 
resembles that articulated by German ecologist Thomas Schmidt: 
The demand for a minimum income seeks to achieve very little and 
at the same time a great deal: little, because we want to see 
technologically created unemployment better paid than it has 
been up to now; a great deal because we want those big social 
organizations which up to now have provided work and determined 
the meaning of life to accept that their time is at an end. 
(quoted in Hülsberg, 1985, 12) 
So, my contention is that we have good reason to accord CI a 
substantial role within any ecological reform strategy - to what 
extent remains open to debate. At the same time I doubt that 
ecological thought actually offers a distinctive model of CI. I am 
far from being dogmatic about this; for instance, we might speculate 
about paying a lower CI to parents who have more than one child in 
order to help prevent a population explosion. In any event, even were 
this to be contemplated it does not seem to warrant the kind of 
attention we have given to NIT, Participation Income and social 
dividend since these refer to substantial structural differences in 
the design of a CI. A Green CI may, however, suggest another source 
of funding. Most ecologists seem to want to shift the tax burden from 
human effort ( labour) and human-made capital onto land, energy and 
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resources. This might entail a Site Value Tax, where, "land 
ownership can become more like the right to practice a kind of 
stewardship..." (Kemball -Cook et al, 1991, 15), a stewardship which 
is then reflected in the taxation system (Kemball -Cook et al, 1991, 
24 -5). This idea resembles, as I proposed earlier, the kind of 
communal ethic as suggested by Paine. The purpose of such taxation 
might be to 'excavate out' a third sector between the public and the 
private, between the formal and informal, with the purpose of 
allowing individuals free movement between sectors, which requires 
them to possess a degree of independence currently lacking. 
Here again, CI makes an appearance as extending "...the personal 
resources available to the third sector" (Kemball -Cook et al, 1991, 
91 -3) . This would also tie in quite nicely with Hirst's (1994, 179- 
84) notion of 'associational communities' where individuals also 
have access to a CI . But the wider objective is to shift the emphasis 
away from the simplicities of pollution taxes and view taxation as a 
mechanism for decelerating the depletion of resources. 
Such ideas, then, seem to me to offer an alternative 
justification of CI, but not a distinct model to rank alongside NIT 
etc. This is one of the reasons why ecological thought has not 
merited equal attention with our three principal ideologies. 
Nevertheless, the suggestion being made by ecologists, that Green 
taxes may hold more moral and economic efficacy in the long -term than 
direct taxation, is deserving of attention by all concerned: by 
ecologists, who must then go on to consider whether CI has the 
potential to help realize a communal ethic of sustainábility; and by 
those interested in the CI debate, a debate into which ecologists 
have a unique insight. 
But to where would such attention lead us? Would a CI be central 
to a Green society, or merely peripheral? This is a question which we 
will now go on to consider. 
4. Local Currencies and Working -time Reductions 
One proposal for a Green society which often attracts as much 
attention in the Green literature as CI is that for an inter -active 
network of local currency schemes. Indeed, such schemes may well 
embody Dobson's request that we look beyond the existing body 
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politic. What exactly do these schemes involve? 
The first local currency scheme was established on Vancouver 
Island, Canada in 1979. The idea is simple (Weston, 1992; Offe & 
Heinze, 1992, 86 -101; Baillee, 1994) . A number of people decide they 
want to trade together. Each person makes two lists: one of 'wants' 
and one of 'offers' - with prices attached that simulate normal 
market prices. These lists are then circulated to everyone and 
trading begins. In a way, this is just a systematic barter scheme. 
People's accounts are logged on a central computer and, so far as 
their Green money goes, they can be either in debt or in credit. 
Also, shops and businesses can trade in Green money alone or in some 
combination of Green and 'real' money. The purpose of LETS (local 
employment and trading system) is to stimulate local economic 
activity - so reducing dependency on national and, increasingly, 
international forces - and to recognize the value of those skills and 
activities which the formal economy and its monetary system often 
overlook. Many members of those associations, especially when 
unemployed, record a feeling of self -worth that they had not 
experienced in a long -time (Dauncey, 1988, 52 -4; Ekins, 1986, 196- 
202). 
However, LETS raises some important issues and runs up against 
some important problems - the most serious of which I will not address 
here since they do not relate directly to the subject of income 
distribution (Dauncey, 1988, 54 -60; Ekins, 1992, 150;. Offe & Heinze, 
1992, 92 -8). Firstly, in Canada the authorities taxed those Green 
dollars a person earned in pursuit of their normal profession but not 
otherwise. The problem is, should Green money be taxed? Would this 
not 'institutionalize' LETS and so undermine its entire rationale? 
And on what basis would Green money be taxed? Under the Canadian 
solution, how do we determine what somebody's normal profession is? 
Secondly, what if someone defaults on their debt by leaving the area 
or simply refusing to pay up? This dilemma might be avoided by some 
system whereby people's accounts are publicized so that potential 
debtors are spotted and weeded out of the system. Then again, this 
might lead to mutual monitoring and suspicion, i.e. the worst aspects 
of communal life. Thirdly, a local currency is not inflation proof, 
so giving an advantage to those in debt and penalizing those in 
credit. Therefore, some system of depreciation is required to keep 
the currency circulating - as was the case in Wurgl, Austria in the 
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1930s. Finally, should an unemployed person's Green earnings be 
taken into account when their benefit is calculated? If it should 
then this would raise the spectre of poverty traps and would seem to 
defeat the purpose. But if not then would not the incentive to return 
to employment go, thus putting an intolerable strain on the social 
security system? (A solution here might either be a CI to offset any 
poverty traps or an additional Green CI, i.e. Green credits paid 
unconditionally to those who join a LETS.) 
All of these points require careful thought and research but might 
there be a prima facie case for allying CI with LETS? It would seem 
so, especially since both recognise that the link between employment 
and income is unravelling so that some way must be found of providing 
a non -employment source of income. A CI gives greater opportunities 
to go outside of the formal labour market, while LETS provide a forum 
of interaction and exchange once the journey outside has been made. 
Strangely enough, perhaps, this association was made by the 
Commission on Social Justice (1994, 263) . Their preferred strategy, 
they point out, is to regenerate the employment society by making 
'work pay' . If, however, their assumption of the feasibility of this 
should prove to be wrong then CI "could become increasingly 
attractive_ (1994,263). Now when, later on, LETS is given a brief 
assessment they refer back to their earlier observation to say, 
similarly, that, 
...if the U.K. does not manage to tackle entrenched problems of 
structural unemployment, more detailed consideration will have 
to be given to LETS. (1994, 339) 
Obviously, I regard this as rather too conservative so that a case can 
be made for pursuing large -scale research with a view to radical 
reform in the short -term. 
Now, what this proposed alliance between CI and LETS does is to 
return us to the issue of unconditionality. There is a considerable 
body of thought in ecological circles which says that no income 
provision can afford to be unconditional. This is because if we are 
all members of the only world we have got and if we face colossal 
Problems of pollution and resource -depletion then unconditionality 
is a dangerous principle. Equivalent, in fact, to allowing some 
members of a sinking ship the luxury of doing nothing while the water 
is rising. So, Andre Gorz expresses such arguments forcefully. An 
235 
unconditional income, he insists, would only complement welfare with 
exploitation, 
...while perpetuating the dependence, 
subordination of individuals to centralized 
subordination will be overcome only if 
production of use -values becomes a real 





In its conservative variant a guaranteed income makes poverty and 
unemployment socially acceptable and reinforces "dualistic social 
stratification" (Gorz, 1985, 41). What is important, he thinks, is 
not the size of the 'social wage' but whether it is linked to the 
right to work. Without that right it becomes "institutional 
charity ": 
Each citizen must have the right to a normal standard of living; 
but every man and woman must also be granted the possibility 
(the right and the duty) to perform for society the labour - 
equivalent of what she or he consumes... (Gorz, 1989, 205) 
And again: 
Whatever the size of the guaranteed minimum, it can do nothing 
to alter the fact that society expects nothing of me, thus 
denies me a reality as a social individual in general. It pays 
me an allowance without asking anything of me, thus without 
conferring any social rights upon me. (Gorz, 1989, 207) 
Gorz is seeking to uncouple income from work time, not work 
itself. As such, his is an insistence that a guaranteed income take a 
back seat to the systematic reductions in working -time necessary 
both to strip away the most damaging features of our modern 
societies, i.e. industrialization, and realize a form of non- 
alienated labour. So urgent is this objective that all able- bodied 
adults must be mobilized in its service with penalties for those who 
do not co- operate, i.e. withdrawal of the CI. This kind of systematic 
reduction in working -time was outlined in chapter 5 and is, we should 
remember, a more radical cousin to the kind of piecemeal reductions 
which labour movements have long campaigned for. 
What criticisms might be made of Gorz's ideas? Firstly, Gorz, it 
could be said, is retaining the worst elements of Marxist thought: 
that which regards liberalism as some sort of bourgeois deception. 
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But the experience with communism should have taught us that radical 
politics is only-justifiable if it proceeds from liberal premises, 
which Gorz's automatic equation of 'unconditionality' with the 
'Right' seems to ignore. Consequently, he is suggesting a statist 
reform, involving the widespread and compulsory mobilization of 
labour, with all the confidence of someone who believes that the end 
justifies the means. We have, however, been down that road before. 
Secondly, his identification of rights with duties seems incredibly 
superficial. As argued in chapter 3, upon what basis is the claim 
made that all rights correlate to all duties precisely? If such a 
correlation is made then what happens to the claims of distributional 
justice that the poorest are already the ones with the heaviest 
duties loaded upon them? To believe that we only possess social 
rights if society demands something of us is not only to confuse non- 
voluntary duties with voluntary obligations but is to invoke the 
worst elements of social authoritarianism associated with 
conservatives and communists alike. Thirdly, Gorz seems to retain 
the Marxist concept of labour as a 'process of production' and 
'social utility' . Thus ignoring the critique of labour and work 
provided by feminism - see the next chapter. Finally, Gorz invokes a 
social contract while ignoring the fact that a normal contract is 
that which is entered into freely. Gorz's citizens would, in effect, 
be made an offer that they literally could not refuse. Now obviously 
we all possess certain duties, or negative responsibilities - not to 
harm others, for a start - without which society could not function. 
Gorz's problem is that he would make work, i.e. employment, into such 
a negative responsibility also. Ultimately, as I have said before, 
citizenship is too important a value to be conscripted. 
Gorz's position is certainly compelling. He believes that active 
participation on the part of everyone is required to reduce the 
importance of economic activity in the public sphere. If 'necessary 
activities' are not shared equitably then freedom cannot be 
\ maximized (Gorz, 1994, 96 -7) . But such arguments are only relevant 
if they describe some future period when movement toward a freer 
society has stalled, perhaps because of growing ecological crises. 
I Then and only then might it be justified to link higher levels of CI 
with reciprocal obligations. But until that time the objectives of 
CI and work reduction should not be confused. My position, then, is 
far closer to that of James Robertson (1985, 25) for whom citizenship 
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is, first and foremost, the freedom to choose individual mixtures of 
paid and unpaid work (cf. Meyers et al, 1981, 117 -8) and to David 
Purdy (1988) for whom working -time reductions are better thought of 
as a consequence of people altering their behaviour in order to 
choose, according to what is best for them, periods of employment and 
non -employment. In short, a CI precedes working -time reductions, 
not vice -versa. 
So I find it difficult to imagine that a Green society could 
dispence with CI. At the same time, obviously, it would need to be 
combined with other reform strategies, e.g. LETS and non- statist 
working -time reductions. How these would be proportioned exactly is 
open to question because there seems to be no a priori way of deciding 
whether a CI would be central or peripheral to such a Green 
society. 
5. A Green Market Socialism? 
So far we have given some consideration to an ecological, communal 
ethic, to an economics of sustainability and to the importance of CI 
to any Green society, probably in conjunction with other reform 
proposals like LETS. Within the confines of a discussion as brief as 
this this is as far as I think any consideration of ecological thought 
should go and we are now in a position to address the second of our two 
objectives, namely how to give an ecological critique of market 
socialism. 
Is it the case, then, that a Red society and a Green society would 
overlap? There are three potential answers to this question. 
Firstly, it might be contended that the question is misguided since 
they have nothing whatsoever to do with each other. Such a response 
might be given either by a socialist who considers ecological issues 
to be a neo- conservative diversion from real politics, or by an 
ecologist who may, like Rudolf Bahro (1986), see socialism as an 
inherently industrialized doctrine and therefore unsalvageable. A 
second possible response is to insist that the Red and the Green could 
be considered as different emphases of the same position: a pro - 
communitarian, anti- economistic perspective. So, this might be to 
argue that whatever their historical disagreements there simply is 
no substantive divergence between the two in this our post- communist 
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era. Thirdly, we could see the Red and the Green as forming a broad 
alliance. In other words, we do not imagine that they have nothing to 
say to one another but, equally, we recognise that they do not form a 
seamless whole. 
Now, which of these three responses should we favour? The first of 
the above responses is undesirable and possibly untenable. Only an 
appeal to a fundamentalism of some sort could hope to sustain it and, 
as argued in chapter 2, the democratic Left must eschew any such 
fundamentalism. Ecologists do have to listen to socialists, and 
vice -versa. The second response is also spurious. Socialism may 
well have some non -industrialist credentials, but it also has a long 
history of fighting capitalism in terms of industrialist premises. 
This history constitutes a tradition which cannot help but influence 
current socialist thought, an influence which may point in anti - 
ecological directions. Nor does ecological thought, in its concern 
for sustainability, take an obviously egalitarian approach. We will 
therefore proceed on the assumption that the third of the above 
responses is the most reasonable, since it allows ecology and 
socialism to lean towards each other within the context of the 
democratic Left, while admitting that social democracy, 
conservatism and even economic liberalism all make legitimate claims 
on ecological thought. But if this is to be our approach then where 
does market socialism fit into the picture? 
If this question is to be answered satisfactorily, it is first 
necessary to understand the kind of intuitive scepticism which most 
ecologists demonstrate towards market -type mechanisms. This 
scepticism arises out of the contradiction which they perceive 
between the world (with its limited resources and limited ability to 
absorb pollution) and the apparent ability of markets to fuel desires 
and collective outcomes which are environmentally destructive and 
therefore irrational from an ecological point of view. 
This contradiction is typically illustrated through some analogy 
or other: the tragedy of the commons, for instance. Imagine a field, 
a commons, where each herdsman will wish to graze as many of his 
cattle as possible in order that he may sell them at a profit. So long 
as the numbers of herdsmen and cattle are relatively low, then the 
commons will retain the capacity to supply them with their needs and, 
consequently, there is no problem. But what happens when the numbers 
begin to grow substantially? What happens when all recognize that 
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resources are growing scarce? Each herdsmen still desires to 
maximize the gains he makes from grazing his cattle, and so will 
reason pretty much as follows: ' If I increase the size of my herd then 
each animal which I buy, and subsequently sell, will net me a positive 
utility of +1; though it is true that each animal I purchase will 
contribute to the over -grazing of the commons, since the costs of 
that over -grazing will be borne by all of the herdsmen, then the 
negative utility I incur will only be a fraction of -1. ' The rational 
herdsman, therefore, will conclude that he should go ahead and 
increase his herd. The trouble is, that such reasoning will also be 
shared by every other herdsman. As such, the total number of cattle 
will quickly outstrip the capacity of the commons to accommodate 
them. Far from the negative utility being equivalent to a fraction of 
-1, it will soon exceed the positive utility of +1. Far from market 
mechanisms averting disaster (which, as we saw in chapter 5, is 
argued by Michael Beenstock) , they hasten us towards-the inevitable 
catastrophe of pursuing individualistic self- interest in a world of 
limited resources. This scenario has obvious implications for 
market capitalism, especially given the growing perception that the 
analogy describes real -world conditions, but it also has 
implications for a market socialism. 
This can be seen if we examine Robyn Eckersley's (1992) comments 
on market socialism. Eckersley is pretty much hostile. While 
commenting favourably on a social capitalism which would allow for 
the non -state redistribution of capital assets, she adds: 
The major difference between social capitalism and market 
socialism, as I understand it, is that the latter is concerned 
to ensure that the state should have effective control of 
investment decisions...whereas the former is concerned to 
ensure that the local community should have effective 
control...(1992, 226) 
The trouble is that Eckersley's understanding is incomplete, and 
this is largely due to a reductive conception of market socialism 
similar to that, as we saw in the previous chapter, which is employed 
by Paul Hirst (1994). How does Eckersley (1992, 226) define market 
socialism? Firstly, as involving the state control of the banking 
system; secondly, as implying the abolition of the stock market; 
thirdly, the nationalization of key industries; fourthly, as 
requiring an out -and -out workers' democracy. But, as the last 
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chapter tried to show, market socialism need not imply an all -or- 
nothing, once -and- for -all re- structuring of economic and social 
systems. Instead, it can be thought of as more of a piecemeal, 
gradualist, modest strategy, one not necessarily hostile to social 
democratic reformism. Part of the point of such a reformist market 
socialism would be to subvert the state /market and public /private 
distinctions implied in the first and third elements of Eckersley's 
definition. State control would be less considerable than she seems 
to appreciate and though, undoubtedly, key industries would need to 
be nationalized, surely this affords greater opportunities for pro - 
Green regulation than is the case with private monopolies whose 
botton -line is self - interested profit -making! With a reformist 
market socialism, similarly, capital markets remain so that the 
stock market is re- organized and not abolished. Finally, though an 
all -or- nothing workers' democracy, even assuming that this is 
feasible, has little in itself to contribute to an ecological 
perspective, reformist market socialism proposes no such thing. 
Rather, it proposes improving socio- economic opportunities to allow 
for greater worker participation and control if this is what workers 
desire. Such a participation and control might, then, be entirely 
consistent with the necessity of us all taking a greater interest in 
the state of our environment both as producers and consumers. In 
short, a participative economy is not inherently a Green one, but may 
have more Green credentials than the current state of affairs where 
employment is so often stressful and alienating, domestic labour is 
devalued and consumption is still largely passive. 
In other words, social capitalism and market socialism may not be 
the irreconcilable opponents which Eckersley makes them out to be. 
This may be the case, especially, if the former would also require a 
" 'social dividend' that would provide a guaranteed minimum 
income for all" (Eckersley, 1992, 143). But if a reformist market 
socialism is not something which ecologists should dismiss out of 
hand, is there any reason to believe that there could be a more 
fundamental union between the two? What I now want to do is to 
suggest not only that CI could be regarded as a mechanism of income 
distribution which is common to both a Red and Green society, but that 
through a mutual recognition of this fact both socialists and 
ecologists could find a common cause under the rubric of the 
democratic Left. 
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Why this is so is not too difficult to see. If CI has some role to 
play in any Green society - to whatever extent - and if a PCI is a 
prototype of the social dividend which I have argued is essential to a 
market socialist system, then we have a prima facie reason for 
speculating about the compatibility of an ecological economics with 
market socialism. Ecologists, like Eckersley, are suspicious of the 
latter for two basic reasons: its potential for over -centralization 
and for pro -industrialization. However, as the last chapter showed, 
only the original Lange model gives us reason to be suspicious of 
over -centralization. More recent models have not afforded such a 
great role to the state since they have acknowledged that private 
ownership must be retained, albeit combined with a plurality of other 
forms of ownership. Such models are more compatible with, though 
still more radical than, social democracy, and go some way towards 
meeting Eckersley's objective of decentralizing investment 
decisions. The second cause for ecologists' suspicion is trickier. 
It does seem to be the case that market socialist models have taken a 
pro -growth, pro -industrialized ethos for granted - allowing for 
standard assurances that the ' environment must be protected' . So far 
as I can see, hardly any work has been done in this area and if, 
indeed, such an ethos is indispensible to a market socialist way of 
doing things then the ecological criticism stands justified: market 
socialism would be as destructive of the very environment upon which 
it depends as other, current economic systems. 
Now, though we can only engage here with the briefest of 
speculations, is it unreasonable to conjecture that CI effects some 
kind of reconciliation between the two types of society? After all, 
if CI is common to both societies then why could it not serve both of 
their objectives simultaneously? The objective of market socialism 
is to connect ordinary people to the means of production; the 
objective of ecologism is to facilitate a sustainable economy by 
making production less essential to economic welfare. As I noted in 
the previous chapter, a PCI /social dividend could provide us with 
greater opportunities both for informal activity and for increased 
participation within the formal economy. If so, then a PCI /social 
dividend also bears pro -ecological credentials. On the one hand, it 
challenges the productivism of the employment ethic; on the other, it 
decentralizes productive resources, and so decentralizes economic 
decision -making, as well as establishing the state banks which could 
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be used to promote ecological as well as egalitarian aims. 
So, by having a role to play in terms of each ideological objective, 
perhaps CI makes market socialism and ecological economics less 
tangential than many assume them to be. If the former were to survive 
then it would need to take on board the ecological critique, rather 
than playing the same old game of 'our growth is faster than yours' . 
As I have said, this could be done by lending greater capital, on more 
favourable terms, to those co- operatives which pursue ecological as 
well as egalitarian strategies and objectives, and penalizing those 
firms, of whatever nature, which do not. Equally, few ecologists 
imagine that 'saving the planet' can simply be left to the state, or 
the market. If so, then widespread decentralization must occur, and 
it would seem incoherent not to extend such decentralization to the 
economic realm; as such, the kind of participatory economy implied by 
market socialism offers some kind of model of what this could 
involve. I see no substantial reason, then, why a CI could not 
perform these two functions. By connecting us with productive 
resources, it facilitates greater opportunities both within and 
without the formal economy, opportunities to be taken advantage of as 
individuals see fit. A CI puts the emphasis upon control rather than 
alienation, - fulfilment rather than 'growth for growth's sake' and 
upon time rather than money. 
Of course, it might be pointed out that if the emphasis is no 
longer pro -growth and pro -industrialization, then we are no longer 
talking of a market socialism as such. Firstly, because of the 
'tragedy of the commons' . Secondly, because if ecological economics 
must make room for such decentralization then it is not clear why this 
retains any reference to something distinctively. socialist. This is 
a reasonable point to make and, as I hope I have made clear, any 
democratic Left future would need to combine socialistic, ecological 
and feminist elements. For the purposes of a research thesis 
concerned with CI, however, the prevalence of social dividend 
proposals within the market socialist tradition makes this the most 
reasonable starting- point. 
So, it would seem that CI affords us some scope for reconciling 
market socialist and ecological objectives and strategies under the 
heading of what i have called the democratic Left. As a more specific 
example of this let us return to our discussion of LETS. 
If CI and LETS are in some way compatible, as I suggested earlier, 
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what of LETS and market socialism? I can think of no major reason why 
a social environment equally hospitable to both could not be 
constructed. If, after all, the purpose of a sustainable future, one 
which embodies social justice, is to increase the opportunities for 
individuals to join and contribute to the communities of their 
choice, then we need as many communal spaces as we can get. For those 
who choose to remain within the formal labour market then they would 
be able to work within private or co- operative type firms, as they 
wish, with all of the benefits that implies. For those who wished to 
exist outside of the formal labour market then LETS associations 
could provide an equally rewarding forum for creative and co- 
operative activity. And, of course, there would be those who, for 
whatever reason, remained independent of both - though it is 
difficult to imagine many doing this permanently. So LETS could be to 
the informal economy what co- operatives might be to the formal . If a 
CI is that which provides individuals with more opportunities to move 
between economic sectors because it does not attach conditions to any 
one form of activity then it could be that which facilitates free 
movement bewteen formal co- operatives and informal LETS without 
confining people to either exclusively. So not only is it the fact 
that CI makes an appearance in both a Red and a Green society that 
could act as a focus for a radical politics, it is the 
unconditionality of CI, permiting people to choose where and how they 
want to work, that seems to entourage a multiplicity of participatory 
institutions, without allowing any one to dominate the others. 
Obviously, this subject raises so many questions. For instance, 
would members of co- operatives would possess more economic power 
than LETS members since they would be 'closer' to the centres of 
economic decision -making, i.e. public investment banks? Would this 
not contradict the goal of economic decentralization? If so, the 
answer might be to make such banks and other such institutions more 
accountable to LETS schemes. Then again, would this not be to drag 
LETS into the formal economy where they do not want to be? And would 
it be feasible, given the ephemerality of many LETS? Also, have we 
really dispensed with the objections to paying an unconditional CI 
equally to all? Would this not reward those who opt -out over those 
who earn and /or exchange? Or could we contemplate an unconditional 
CI paid to all which is barely enough to live on, with the possibility 
of adding to this basic income with earnings, social dividend, Green 
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currency or, what is more likely, some combination of the three? 
These are questions I cannot address here but, again, as problematic 
as this subject is I can think of no conclusive reason to regard LETS 
and market socialism as incompatible. 
Undoubtedly, then, both Green economics and market socialism 
exist in a certain tension with regard to each other. But that 
tension is more likely to be creative than destructive so long as we 
do not insist on privileging the one above the other. Given that CI 
has a established history within both, this might be the means 
whereby mutual dialogue is encouraged, especially if other reform 
proposals like LETS are recognized as indispensible. All -or- nothing 
evaluations, such as that given in Martin Ryle's dismissal of CI, are 
of little use to anyone (1988, 54 -8) . If so, then we may be better off 
referring ourselves back to the position adopted by Raymond Williams 
over a decade ago. Williams (1983, 256) defined three desirable 
objectives: going beyond the market economy; shifting production 
toward standards of " ...durability, quality and economy in the use of 
non -renewable resources "; the formation of new monetary 
institutions where capital is a servant not a master. Achieving these 
objectives he saw as essential to any society embodying socialist, 
ecological and feminist values (1983, 266). 
6. Conclusion 
So, we have seen why CI may be thought of as vital to a Green 
society and to the economic strategy through which that society could 
be brought about. At the same time, I have tried to highlight the 
convergence between many aspects of market socialist and ecological 
thought. These themes may be regarded as entirely seperate and I have 
been careful in this chapter not to upset those who would regard 
ecological thought as a post- Left -Right ideology, nor those who 
would wish to establish connections between ecological thought and 
other ideologies. It is this same balancing act which will now have 
to be performed again as we go on to consider feminism. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
FEMINIST THOUGHT AND CI 
1. Introduction 
The point which was made at the beginning of the previous chapter 
is also relevant here and so deserves to be re- emphasized. There are 
two ways in which this chapter can be read. On the one hand, its 
objective is to examine the rationale behind feminist justifications 
for CI. On the other, it takes its place along with the previous two 
chapters in attempting to construct for the democratic Left a 
practical politics which goes beyond the theoretical abstractions 
which dominated the discussion in chapter 2. So, in the last chapter, 
we saw that market socialism must be, and I believe can be, made 
reconcilable with Green objectives. A CI may well be the means 
through which this is brought about. Similarly, in this chapter, we 
will see the challenge which feminist critiques bring to market 
socialism in order to assess what contribution they make to a 
democratic Left perspective and so understand how the CI debate 
shifts accordingly. As before, then, this chapter can hopefully be 
read either purely in terms of its first objective or in terms of 
both. 
In the second section, we speculate as to how feminism should best 
interpret prevailing social and economic structures. In the third 
section, we review the 'feminization of poverty' thesis and one of 
the principal causes of such poverty. In the fourth section, we 
examine the feminist critiques of the state, the family and the 
labour market. In the fifth section we look at possible feminist 
arguments for CI. In the sixth we ask why feminism might be hostile 
to market socialist proposals and speculate as to whether CI could go 
some way to reconciling the two. 
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2. A Capitalist Patriarchy? 
The purpose of feminism is to understand, expose and hopefully 
abolish patriarchy, i.e. the gender bias which tends to prevail in 
most areas of human affairs. Politically, feminism must examine how 
and why social and economic structures serve a male- centred ethos; 
what this implies, among many other things, is an analysis of 
capitalism and the extent to which capitalist institutions and 
practices either help re- inforce or help eliminate pro -masculine 
interests and perspectives. Immediately, however, we run up against 
a fundamental problem given that any analysis of capitalism will 
alter in its implications depending upon which version of feminism we 
favour. A liberal feminism will 'read' capitalism differently from a 
socialist feminism; further, any political feminism will be 
denounced by those who insist that social analysis misunderstands 
the real nature of male /female relations. If we assume, as we must 
for the purposes of this research, that social analysis is of 
relevance then how should we proceed? 
The literature is vast; however, some conceptual clarification 
has been provided in recent years (Beechey, 1979, 77 -80). Sylvia 
Walby (1986,_5) identifies five possible positions: 
1) gender inequality is theoretically insignificant or non- 
existent; 
2) gender inequality is purely due to capitalism; 
3) gender inequality is purely due to patriarchy; 
4) gender inequality is due to a synthesis of capitalism and 
patriarchy; 
5) gender inequality is due to a complex interaction of capitalism 
and patriarchy. 
Walby rejects 1) as simply untenable, as held either by those 
Marxists who cannot look beyond class inequality or by those 
conservatives who cannot look beyond the family as a conceptual unit 
(1986, 7 -16). Also to be rejected is 2) which is held by those who 
would wish to interpret domestic work simply as the reproduction of 
labour power (Secombe, 1974; Dalla Costa & James, 1972) . Walby 
insists that this interpretation ignores the quite separate 
Oppression practised by men, as opposed to capitalists (1986, 16- 
20) Equally reductive is 3) which is held by those who, like 
Shalmuth Firestone, see women's reproductive capacity as providing 
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the base upon which a superstucture of exploitation is built. But 
Walby condemns this analysis as biologically reductionist and blind 
to the centrality of the state and of the labour market ( 1986, 22 -30) . 
Walby sees 4) as being along the right lines (Eisenstein, 1979, 22- 
35). The trouble with it, though, is that it potentially 
underestimates the conflict between capitalism and patriarchy. 
Finally, therefore, 5) describes the position Walby believes to be 
the most reasonable (1986, 31 -3). 
This position is not, however, problem -free. The dilemma is this: 
either we should attribute capitalism and patriarchy to separate 
social spheres - which would fail to deal with that aspect of women's 
oppression which falls outside of the sphere of production - or we 
should interpret both as being rooted in production - which simply 
collapses us back to 4) . As a solution, Walby (1986, 46) insists that 
we abandon the search for an institutional basis upon which 
capitalism and patriarchy might be said to operate. Instead, we 
should view the entire mode of exploitation as important, as 
something which reaches beyond institutional relations. Harriet 
Bradley (1989, 55) subsequently complained that Walby's 'solution' 
might be to make patriarchy an omni- present force which would have 
the effect of reducing analysis to description and of reducing 
critique to mere protest. _ 
Now, it is beyond 
briefly at the broad 
patriarchy be said 
my scope to engage with 
picture alone, 
to inter -relate? 
CAPITALISM 
such arguments. Looking 
how might -capitalism 
PATRIARCÌïY 
and 
EXPLOITER capitalist man 
EXPLOITED labourer woman 
fig 1. 
So, in fig 1, the labourer and the woman are not confused as would be 
the case with 2 ) above. Both are certainly being exploited, however, 
the means of exploitation is different in both cases and there is the 
real possibility of working -class men being as exploitative and 
oppressive as their employers. Fighting exploitation, then, would 
require recognition that labourers' interests and women's interests 
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may overlap but are by no means identical. This is what Walby meant 
by 'complex interaction' and, though there is not the space here to 
pause and elaborate upon it, it is the interpretative framework which 
informs the rest of this chapter. In short, I will assume that a 
feminist politics directs its fire against both patriarchy and 
capitalism, neither seperating them entirely nor reducing the one to 
the other. 
3. The Feminization of Poverty 
As feminist issues entered the academy as serious objects for 
research, the 'gender -blindness' of existing research and debate 
quickly stood condemned. This was as true of work in social policy as 
elsewhere. The 'feminization of poverty' thesis was developed and 
elaborated upon precisely to counter the selective vision of male 
researchers in the area of poverty. 
The thesis wishes to establish not that poverty is a new 
experience for women, but that the long -established poverty of women 
is becoming more visible (Millar, 1989, 311 -3). Why is this? 
Glendinning_and Millar (1991, 25 & 29 -33) link the increased 
visibility of female poverty to a growing dissatisfaction with 
taking the household as the unit through which living standards are 
measured. So increasing still further the visibility of women's 
poverty requires 'individualizing' the unit of measurement. This 
means, above all, researching into the circulation, control and 
management of income within households - we will return to this 
below. Further, it implies taking account of non -material 
resources; namely, the fact that women have less free time than men 
once housework is taken into consideration. In short, women are more 
vulnerable to poverty because they are regarded - and often regard 
themselves - as secondary workers. This means that their domestic 
role comes first where the demands of a job must fit around the 
demands of housework, caring and so on. Also, women's earnings are 
viewed as a supplement to men's, even when the two are largely 
equivalent (Pahl, 1989). So the thesis which proposes that poverty 
is being feminized is inseparable from the debate regarding the 
sexual division of labour. Domestic labour and paid employment 
influence each other and so both must be analysed if women's poverty 
249 
is to be understood. And ultimately, of course, combatting such 
poverty requires that it be assaulted by progressive policies in the 
areas of employment, social security and all of the social services 
(Glendinning & Millar, 1992, 174 -5). This reciprocal influence is 
looked at in the next section. For now, how have issues such as these 
directly influenced social policy research? 
Most obviously, perhaps, has been a rise in attention given to the 
nature of household income. So, Jan Pahl (1989, 67 -74) outlines four 
'systems' through which money is managed in the home: 
1) the whole wage system, where one partner (usually the wife) is 
responsible for all finances and expenditure apart from her spouse's 
spending money; 
2) the allowance system, where there are separate spheres of 
financial responsibility though usually no separate control over 
income - so the wife receives housekeeping money; 
3) the shared management system, where all income is pooled and a 
joint account, from which expenditure is drawn, is kept; 
4) the independent management system, where both partners have an 
income and neither has full access to household funds - so there is 
separate control over income and separate responsibilities for 
expenditure. 
Pahl estimates that 1) prevails in a sixth of all households, 2) in a 
quarter, 3) in half and 4) in a twelth. 
This means that in a substantial number of households women are 
required to manage income, with all of the stress that that can cause 
when resources are tight, but tend not to have control of that income. 
Control remains firmly in the hands of men. Pahl (1989, 151-2) 
discovered that in a significant number of cases women spend a higher 
percentage of the income they manage than men on day -to -day living 
expenses. Further, any additional money earned by wives is more 
likely to be spent on food while husbands tend to spend more on 
leisure. The importance of something like child benefit, therefore, 
cannot be overestimated. Often it represents the only degree of 
control many women have over household income. So, its importance is 
out of proportion to its modest sum: 
If child benefit were to be means- tested, and the household were 
chosen as the unit...these women would be deprived of a small 
but very significant part of their income. (Pahl, 1989, 160) 
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Earlier, Pahl had observed that by shifting the tax burden from 
earnings (direct taxation) to spending (indirect taxation), as has 
been the case since 1979, policy- makers have assumed that household 
income circulates freely and so have, in effect, discriminated 
against women - at the same time, however, some have disputed the 
weight which Pahl attributes to male earnings (Wilson, 1987, 32 -7). 
This obviously has implications for economic and social policies 
which we will deal with later on. 
4. Gender Divisions and Inequalities 
We are left, then, firstly with a feminist critique directed 
against both capitalism and patriarchy and, secondly, the 
application of that critique to the poverty experienced, on an 
increasing scale, by women. We now need to delve more deeply into the 
determinants of such economic relations by looking at, in turn, the 
family, the labour market and the state. 
One point should be borne in mind, however. It should be 
appreciated that each of these institutions or spheres interacts 
quite considerably with the others. The inequality many women are 
subjected to in the labour market is due to the gendered roles they 
are often required to conform to in the home. Reciprocally, 
therefore, such roles reproduce market inequalities. And 'towering 
above' both comes the state which incorporates gendered assumptions, 
and so forth, into its taxation and social security systems. Even so, 
distinctions do have to be made and we begin with the family. 
a) The family 
What of the family, then? There are three basic aspects to 
reproduction: social, labour force and biological. Social 
reproduction refers to the transmission and control of resources 
without which class distinctions could not be maintained. Labour 
force reproduction refers to childcare and domestic labour. Now, 
the only form of reproduction which is specific to women is 
biological reproduction. And yet women are also assigned the task, 
virtually exclusively, of labour power reproduction (Beneria, 1979, 
205_6). Why should this be so? 
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No final answer can be provided to this question since the subject 
is too large and complex but, broadly speaking, we may identify 
external factors and internal ones. The external factors are socio- 
economic. Given that there are pre -existing inequalities in terms of 
opportunities, pay, conditions and career prospects it is perfectly 
understandable that many women fall back on the caring roles that 
have been theirs traditionally. So, psychologically, many women 
come to identify their biological sex with the socially- constructed 
gendered roles which they find surrounding them. This implies that 
various internal factors are also at work. Feminists, as such, argue 
that 'women's liberation' is not only a liberation from the 
expectations and demands of men, but is also a liberation from the 
impulse, which many women demonstrate, to treat men's needs and 
demands as being of primary importance. A 'woman's role' is both a 
functional requirement for the reproduction of society and a 
rational response on the part of women to unfavourable social 
conditions. For even where women's participation in society is at 
its strongest, gendered roles may continue to prevail, e.g. women 
dominate certain professions like nursing. So any explanation of 
women's inferior status requires reference to both external and 
internal factors. 
This is what feminist Marxists so often failed to do. For to treat 
domestic labour simply as a function of capital is to avoid the 
question as to why housework is performed by housewives (Molyneux, 
1979, 20 -1). The 'domestic labour debate' which ensued within 
feminist Marxist theory was completely out of tune with those women 
who knew that their unpaid work benefited both husband and 
capitalist (Scott, 1984, 142 -3); though whether such considerations 
also scuppered the 'wages for housework' campaign is more open to 
question. On the one hand, such wages could legitimate women' s 
confinement within the home. On the other, the campaign could be said 
to have succeeded in getting housework more highly valued than it had 
been previously, even if " ...such a demand could scarcely operate in 
Practice as a mobilizing goal" (Dalla Costa & James, 1972, 36). 
b) The labour market 
Michael Mann (1986, 56) has characterized the labour market as a 
market within which "...stratification is now gendered and gender is 
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stratified" (Crompton & Mann, 1986, 56) . But, if so, what could have 
brought this about? We might identify two principal causes: the 
actions of employers, the actions of organized labour. Firstly, 
however, what do we mean by 'stratification'? 
The point of departure for so many theorists has been the 'dual 
labour market model'. This distinction between a primary sector of 
well -paid, highly -skilled, upwardly -mobile workers and a secondary 
sector of low -paid, low- skilled and easily disposable workers has 
been taken over, and adapted, by those who wish to understand why it 
is usually men who have access to the former whereas women are 
confined to the latter. What all feminist theorists are agreed upon 
is the necessity of not regarding this state -of- affairs as 
'natural'. To interpret differences in earnings, occupations and 
prospects as reflecting 'real differences' is to ignore the 
functional elements of the sexual division of labour. 
Adopting a wider approach might lead us to identify both internal 
and external dual labour market models. The former see 
stratification as having been caused by fluctuations in demand. With 
technological and global changes employers have a motive to offer 
incentives to core workers to ensure stability and product quality, 
as well as developing a periphery of workers who are easy to hire and 
fire. On this reading a dual labour market is the unintended outcome 
of a multitude of firms acting in this way. But this model could be 
condemned as being gender -blind as well as leaving too much else 
unexplained. External models, by contrast, look not to job- specific 
skills nor to high turnover, but to employers' strategies of 'divide 
and conquer' . This means that privileges are targeted deliberately 
on working -class men in order to make them less likely to identify 
their interests with the interests of working -class women. But this 
model, too, harkens back to purely functionalist accounts of gender 
hierarchies. 
How, then, have feminist theorists adapted such ideas? Firstly, 
as should be obvious, by introducing the domestic sphere into the 
analysis. This means identifying those gender- specific ways in 
which the labour force is organized. So part -time jobs, which 
largely belong to the 'periphery' , are seen as ideal for a wife and 
mother who wants two things: a bit of extra money and to get out of the 
house. In short, something compatible with a "maternal /wifey role" 
(Beechey & Perkins, 1987, 112 -8). So women's paid employment is 
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constructed according to the perception that paid work and domestic 
responsibilities are in conflict (Redclift & Sinclair, 1991, 5 -6). 
Women's earnings are regarded as marginal to women's domestic work 
( Redclift & Sinclair, 1991, 148). This tends to mean that women have 
less access to training in new skills than men. So, far from a skill 
being an 'objective possession' (as many economists, especially, 
assume) , it is, rather, an ideological category imposed on different 
types of work. For instance, women's lack of access to skills - 
training has also been due to male workers defending differentials 
and union strength by blocking entry into a predominantly masculine 
sphere. The irony is that as, more recently, the labour market has 
stratified, it has become clear that male workers have only created 
for capital the 'inferior' workers capable of undercutting them in 
terms of pay and conditions (Charles, 1986). 
So as well as looking at the role of employers, feminists have also 
explained the dualisms of the labour market in terms of the actions of 
trade unions. All too often trade unions have appealed to feminist 
rhetoric but not to the policies which would back it up. For by 
ignoring the differing material conditions of men and women a 
familial ideology is reinforced rather than an egalitarian one 
advanced. So, unions for too long regarded 'women's issues' such as 
childcare, maternity leave and menstruation as private affairs, 
unlike the public affairs of pay and conditions (Ungerson, 1985, 18- 
20) . Things may have changed in the 1980s with unions recognizing, in 
the face of the conservative onslaught, that they would be cutting 
their own throats if women' s interests continued to be ignored (Land, 
1980, 75). But whether the return of a Left government, as well as 
the implementation of the European Social Charter, would genuinely 
improve the position of women cannot be determined at present 
(Boston, 1987, 8; Cockburn, 1987). 
c) The state 
The state is thought to both reflect and reinforce gender 
divisions in two principal ways: through the taxation system and 
through the social security system. We will look at each of these in 
turn. 
It was only in 1988 that the taxation system in Britain ceased to 
treat husband and wife as a single unit. This meant that each partner 
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would have their own tax allowance which could not be transferred to 
the other - proposals for introducing transferable allowances had 
been criticized on several grounds, e.g. that there would be a 
disincentive for women to take up work since this would increase the 
tax liability of her husband. So, independent assessment has given 
many women privacy in their financial affairs for the first time. 
Nevertheless, the system still discriminates against women. The 
Married Couples' Allowance (MCA) provides an allowance to be set 
against the husband's earnings, but transferred to the wife if he 
does not have enough earnings to be liable for tax. So this too 
defines the man as the head of the household and the main source of 
income and assumes that income is shared equitably. Pahl (1989, 166- 
7) sees the MCA as benefiting "...richer and employed men as opposed 
to poorer men, unemployed men and all women." For although the system 
increasingly recognizes the costs of the work for which women are 
responsible, it reimburses those costs either to husbands or to 
women as mothers. The objective of independent taxation, she 
insists, should be to increase the living standards of women and 
children. This is not necessarily done by increasing the amount of 
money paid to husbands. Therefore, it, 
...should be linked to a substantial increase in. child benefit 
or to some other compensation to those who are not earning, or 
who cannot earn because of their responsibility to dependents. 
(1989, 166 -7) 
Similarly, the social security system discriminates against 
women. We touched on this earlier in the chapter on social insurance. 
Basically, the arguments against the current system are as follows. 
Firstly, by basing entitlement on contribution records, women are 
not guaranteed income security which is especially the case with 
female pensioners only 15% of whom are entitled to the full category A 
Pension. Secondly, the system continues to treat the household as 
the unit of assessment which invariably means according women a 
secondary, subordinate role. Also, the cohabitation rule falls most 
heavily on single mothers. Thirdly, the current system does not 
recognize the value of unpaid work, though a reformed system along 
the lines suggested by the Borrie Commission could go some way to 
rectifying this. Finally, it provides an incentive to women to take 
IV low -paid jobs only, i.e. those paying below the lower earnings 
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limit of National Insurance Contributions. 
So, both the taxation and social security systems reflect the 
inferior position of women both within the household and within the 
labour market; and since policies are constructed upon this basis 
these positions are largely reinforced. This state -of- affairs is 
obviously unfair. Furthermore, given rapid changes in the nature of 
family life - increasing divorce rates - and of the labour market, 
this reinforcement is dangerous since growing economic 
disadvantages threaten health, well -being and even lives. However, 
working out what should be done to improve the status and well -being 
of women is controversial and complex. Would relatively modest 
reform of welfare provision be enough? Or should something more 
radical be contemplated? Ideally, of course, both strategies should 
be pursued but given that one of the objectives of this chapter is to 
see how feminism might contribute to a democratic Left perspective we 
will now go on to focus on the latter strategy. Yet is a Left 
radicalism benign from a feminist point of view? Does market 
socialism really have anything to offer women? Before being able to 
respond to this question we need to appreciate some of the feminist 
arguments for CI. 
5. Feminist Justifications for CI 
In discussing social insurance in chapter 7 one of my criticisms 
of that principle was that it is not, at present, responsive to the 
distinctive needs and interests of women. In order to acquire 
feminist credentials, therefore, social insurance should be based 
less upon contributions and more upon a citizenship ethic which is 
far less prescriptive when it comes to defining what is and is not to 
be regarded as socially -valuable activity. For Ruth Lister (1990, 
448 -58) , there can be no full citizenship where there is dependency 
and an undervaluing of caring. She argues that this rules out the 
Conservative government as the promoters of a citizenship ethic 
since their concern is with public and not private dependency. Their 
notion assumes that all have surplus time for the performance of 
civic obligations and overlooks both the lack of resources available 
to women and the fact that many of the essential civic 
responsibilities are already performed by women. 
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Yet there remains real disagreement as to how this citizenship 
ethic may be best embodied. Is social insurance, including 
Participation Income, up to the job or do we need a CI? So, when 
Lister (1990, 461) calls for women to be independently entitled to 
benefit regardless of their marital status she sees an insurance 
system which is less dependent upon earnings- contributions as being 
the way of raising the status of caring as opposed to earning. This 
seems fine but, as I argued in chapter 7, the more you reduce in scale 
and number the criteria by which people are entitled to benefit, the 
less reason there seems to be to retain any such criteria. Otherwise, 
your citizenship ethic retains republican, perfectionist elements. 
Still, Lister's approach would seem preferable to those that might 
actually force married women into the labour market as a necessary 
price to pay for female emancipation (McIntosh, 1981, 36 -9; 
Cuvillier, 1979). 
A CI, meanwhile, would either scrap the social insurance 
principle, or retain it in name only (Millar, 1989, 80; Pahl, 1986) . 
From a feminist perspective it seems to have four main benefits. 
Firstly, it would equalize, without anomaly, the treatment of men 
and women in the tax and benefit systems. This is a desirable 
innovation simply in terms of equity and equality. The kind of 
economic discrimination which women continue to face both from a 
male- centred tax system and from a social security system which 
rewards the kind of wage- earning which few women have the opportunity 
to pursue would disappear. It would also end the nonsense whereby 
many wives working part -time have to give up their jobs if their 
husband becomes unemployed. Secondly, CI would give many women their 
own independent income for the first time ever. This would be the 
case with both working and non -working housewives. The wages of the 
former are usually regarded as 'pin- money' to supplement the 
husband's earnings rather than as a means of ensuring autonomy for 
the woman. The latter may be in receipt of child benefit but this, 
again, only recognizes the woman in her domestic role as a housewife 
rather than as a citizen. So this aspect of CI would help improve 
women's management and control of income as well as improving the 
circulation of money within the household - given that the 
'breadwinner' would no longer be the sole source of income. Thirdly, 
CI would recognize and renumerate unpaid work. A re- formulated 
social insurance system would have the same effect but, as I have now 
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argued several times, it is unclear how such a system would assess and 
monitor non -employment forms of work. Would the signing of a social 
contract, as with Participation Income, be a formality? Is so, then 
of what use is it? If not, then surely this new social insurance 
system would merely resemble the old! CI, in its unconditionality, 
would not have the same problems. Finally, CI would improve work 
incentives (Parker, 1993, 61 -8) . The entitlements of a wife to wages 
and benefits would no longer be dependent upon the state of her 
husband's earnings and /or benefits. Also, the lower- earnings limit 
on insurance contributions would go. This encourages women to take 
the kind of jobs which involve low -pay and poor conditions. As noted 
several times, if people have the freedom to remain outside the 
labour market then they have more opportunity to enter the market in 
terms of their needs and interests. Since it is women who tend to 
populate the labour market's periphery they could be expected to gain 
substantially. 
Of course, a CI also has its limitations from a feminist point of 
view. It would require additional, supplementary benefits - which 
might or might not return us to contribution records. It would not do 
anything in itself to improve gender relations between men and women, 
nor those formal relations between female employees and employers. 
Further, some would charge that by taking the emphasis away from the 
generation of full -time jobs it could easily institutionalize 
peripheral employment. And it is possible that by taxing the large 
bulk of earnings CI might actually provide disincentives to married 
women who currently earn - for whereas at the moment; in 1995, women 
can earn £58 per week before paying insurance contributions, with a 
CI they would begin to pay taxes far earlier. Then again, there is an 
counter -argument which says that even if this is true there are only 
so many things social security reform can be expected to achieve. 
Until a wider, more long -term, change of attitudes comes about - and 
perhaps even then - people discriminated against will manage to 
construct inequality out of anything! 
So, as before, I would argue that the case for a CI is compelling 
until we begin to look at the obstacles ranged in its path; namely, 
that reform of the existing system is always the easiest option. An 
incoming Labour government is likely to adopt the kind of social 
insurance reform recommended by the Social Justice Commission. But 
as the Commission itself points out if such measures do not work then 
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an out -and -out citizenship ethic may be the only way forward. If so, 
it is upon the pragmatics of future reform that the greater liberty of 
women might depend. Unfortunately, this is a somewhat sombre note on 
which to close this section. 
6. Market Socialism and Feminism 
Whatever the pros and cons of CI, what of market socialism? At 
first glance the signs do not look encouraging and feminists have 
complained that such a democratic redistribution of ownership has 
less to say to them than it should (Folbre, 1994). One of the main 
problems with market socialism is that it only looks to the formal 
labour market. It proposes the internal re- organization of firms by 
collapsing, or at least reducing, the management /workforce 
hierarchy. Also, it proposes their external re- organization through 
the creation of an economic environment which would be both 
competitive and co- operative. But it does not seem to look beyond 
this sphere and the suspicion of feminists that a market socialist 
economy would leave the sexual division of labour alone might be 
entirely justified. They might, therefore, agree with Paul Hirst 
that market socialism is too narrow in its range and too ready to take 
existing forms of civil and democratic organization as given. In 
order to expand on this let us return to our three critiques of the 
family, labour market and state. 
Market socialism might leave the sexual division of labour intact 
and could even reinforce it for two reasons. Firstly, because if 
worker participation is to be realized then the wage contract would 
almost certainly need to be replaced with a share contract (Weitzman, 
1984, 4 -6) - though, as Peter Abell (1989, 96 -8) has it, this would 
not in itself create a "community of interests". Yet if this were to 
be the only source of household income then this would merely be to 
resurrect, de facto, the 'family wage' long despised by feminists 
since this assumes that a household is to be solely dependent upon a 
breadwinner, usually male (Barrett & McIntosh, 1980, 59 -68) - we will 
return to this below. Resisting the family wage ideal requires 
multiple sources of household income, whether based upon wages, 
shares or transfers. Secondly, therefore, worker participation 
alone would preserve the unequal distribution of income within the 
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household (Pahl, 1989). This objections could only be rendered 
invalid if women had an access to the market socialist labour market 
equal to that possessed by men. In this way wages would be earned, or 
shares possessed, on an individual basis. But this would be to define 
all individuals as workers, which is hardly consistent with feminist 
critiques of the masculinist bias within social thought. And even if 
all were to be assigned the status of participatory workers, would a 
progressive role be thereby assigned to the informal economy? For 
unless men are simultaneously encouraged to enter the household as 
women are being encouraged to leave it, then unpaid work will still 
be the assumed duty of women. In short, under a market socialist 
regime economic man and his employment ethic remain, except now in a 
socialist setting, and the composition of the patriarchal household 
continues intact. And the state, too, remains as a narrow economic 
institution. Would our public investment banks be allowed to lend 
capital to non -profit -making enterprises? If so, then would this be 
feasible? If not, would this be compatible with, for instance, a 
carers' association; or, indeed, with any form of post -economic 
ethos such as those possessed by travellers or social movements? 
So market socialism seems to raise the same problems in the areas 
of the family, labour market and the state as our current economy. On 
the other hand, perhaps these problems really only arise if, again, 
market socialism is proposed as an homogenous, all -or- nothing re- 
structuring of social and economic relations. But what if, as argued 
in the previous two chapters, market socialism is more modest, more 
plural and 'associative' than its critics, and sometimes its 
supporters, assume? Could a CI, therefore, reconcile market 
socialism with feminism, to some extent, in a fashion similar to the 
way it seems to establish connections between market socialist and 
ecological economics? 
As noted in the previous section, a CI would be paid on an 
individual basis and so would provide many women with an substantial 
and independent income for the first time ever, thus helping to place 
the sharing and control of household income on a more equitable base 
(Pahl, 1986) . If, therefore, a PCI were to evolve into a social 
dividend then the effect would be the same: with each individual 
receiving an unconditional income then earnings, whether based upon 
a wage or a share, and whether paid to only one partner or to both, 
would come to be far less determinative of household status 
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than at present. In other words we would have the multiple sources of 
income which are the antithesis of the family wage which favours the 
male breadwinner. 
Secondly, a CI could put an end to the obsession with deregulation 
possessed by the Right. So, instead of a downward spiral of wages 
etc. we would find, as Georg Vobruba (1991, 68) has it, occupations 
and income levels being based far more upon individual choice and so 
leading to the kind of structural change which is conducive to an 
'upward spiral'. Gradually, power could be shifted away from 
employers and back to employees since the former would be less able to 
compel the latter into the labour market on unfavourable terms. This 
is not only a socialist argument for CI but, as mentioned earlier, is 
a feminist one since women tend to occupy the periphery of the labour 
market and so suffer disproportionately from any downward spiral. A 
measure which improved the power of labour, therefore, would also 
improve the negotiating position of women (Gray, 1988). Certain 
part -time, temporary, low -paid jobs would vanish and those that were 
left would be more consistent with individual freedom since 
individuals would be less compelled to take them. And if there were 
to be a change in attitudes and behaviour then a full -blown social 
dividend could transform both the household and workplace from the 
enclosed spaces they currently are into sites where a re- alignment of 
gender roles and status could occur - though, as I have already 
observed, there can never be a guarantee that such re- alignment will 
occur. This would be unlikely to happen with the 'wages for 
housework' strategy which seems to confirm the status of women as 
housewife. 
Finally, a social dividend could either allow people to 'drop- 
out' of the formal economy and pursue the kind of alternative 
lifestyles necessary to a plural and tolerant society, or it could 
facilitate the kind of activity within which public investment banks 
would only have a minor role to play, e.g. LETS. By expanding the 
sphere of civil society and the informal economy civil associations 
could become more of an option for both men and women, who would then 
be able to participate in circumstances where gender imbalances 
could be gradually unravelled. 
In short, a PCI would help shift the balance of power to women not, 
as Parker (1993) points out, because it is pro -female but because the 
current system is pro -male. A social dividend, in an 
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environmentally -benign market socialist context, might come to seem 
an attractive option, therefore. So, CI could be indispensible to a 
feminist economics (cf. McIntosh, 1981, 36) and, indeed, some have 
drawn out the anti- patriarchal implications of CI (McKay &. VanEvery, 
1995). What is more, this economics might begin to display certain 
affinities with market socialism if I am correct in saying that a 
version of CI is common to both. As I have argued, CI /social dividend 
makes market socialism less of an all -or- nothing proposal, helps 
improve its ecological credentials and establishes it as one of 
several plural, interactive spheres. So, market socialism might 
define a formal economy of private, public and co- operative 
ownership which, at some point, dissolves into the democratic but 
informal activity of multiple, fluctuating associations of which 
LETS would constitute an important aspect. Workplace democracy then 
becomes not the blueprint for a new society, a model which we must all 
emulate, but, rather, the most productivist aspect of a post - 
productivist era. 
So just as a CI seems capable of providing market socialism with 
the Green texture without which it struggles for credibility, it 
might likewise dilute and even dispel the masculine bias which comes 
from emphasizing the formal economy of wage- based, or share -based, 
employment. In both cases a CI not only accentuates the importance 
of an autonomous civil society but provides individuals with the 
freedom to move around that civil space to pursue whatever projects 
they see fit. Of course, some projects may be less virtuous than 
those inspired by ecology and /or feminism, but such projects, e.g. 
those motivated by racism, cannot be excluded from a community by 
making a guaranteed income conditional. 
This, then, represents the conclusion of my speculation regarding 
a democratic Left perspective. If some form of CI is common to market 
socialist, ecological and feminist economics, and if we are 
justified in looking beyond a social democratic perspective, then CI 
could be the first step to formulating a politics and a social policy 
which helps take democratic Left debates away from the abstractions 
of philosophical and epistemological issues. What is clear, then, is 
this. Whereas economic liberals and social democrats are capable of 
giving support to CI without regarding it as essential to their 
economic philosophies, the same is not quite true of the democratic 
Left which, if it is to have a future, must establish connections 
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between market socialist, ecological and feminist thought. Part of 
the point of the last three chapters has been to suggest that this 
might well be impossible without some substantial reference to CI. 
As such, CI is far more essential to the democratic Left than it is to 
either economic liberalism or social democracy. 
7. Conclusion 
So, we now have some idea of what the feminist critiques of 
capitalism, poverty, the family, the labour market and the state 
actually involve and we have seen that CI bears considerable feminist 
credentials such that it cannot be ignored by those who view 
patriarchy as the greatest obstacle to a fairer and more just 
society. We have also seen that because the democratic Left is that 
which must draw upon market socialist, ecological and feminist 
economics and because there is a version of CI implicit within all 
three then those interested in a democratic Left cannot afford to 
ignore CI either. 
Having wound our way through this chapter, and all of those which 
have preceeded it in Part 2, we are now in a position to bring this 





In this, the final chapter, we shall attempt to do three things. 
Firstly, give a summary of the research as a whole; secondly, ask 
whether the objective that was laid out at the onset has been 
sufficiently addressed; finally, look towards the future somewhat by 
sketching the arena, i.e. European union, within which the debate 
over social security reform will increasingly take place. This is 
necessary since CI will be a part of that debate, and so the 
theoretical and ideological arguments regarding its desirability 
will shift somewhat onto that terrain. Here, obviously, we will only 
be able to briefly anticipate the form which that debate might 
take. 
2. A Summary of the Research 
Following the general introduction, chapter 2 attempted to give a 
broad outline of the philosophical perspectives and the political 
projects of economic liberalism, social democracy and the democratic 
Left. It also explained why conservatism would not merit 
consideration as a distinct ideology, and why we would only be giving 
intermittent attention to ecological and feminist thought. We then 
began to apply those ideologies to specific subject areas in order to 
tease out those differences which are relevant to any discussion of 
social security reform in general and CI in particular. So, chapter 3 
addressed the concept of citizenship. We saw that economic liberals 
tend to regard citizenship as a form of consumerism, with social 
rights and economic conditions being of little relevance. Social 
democrats think of the citizen more in non -material terms, though, 
because of a residual statism and perfectionism, they have often 
conceived of the poorest especially as the passive clients of welfare 
bureaucracies, and there is the danger that they may continue to do so 
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in the future. The democratic Left tend to be suspicious of the 
concept of citizenship, though it is far from clear that any coherent 
alternative is available. In chapters 4 and 5 it became clear that 
the ideal economic liberal citizen is one whose identity would 
largely-derive from their wage- earning activity in the formal labour 
market, a labour market which remains unregulated to the greatest 
possible extent. The social democratic citizen, too, is one who is to 
seen largely in the context of the labour market, albeit a market 
which embodies social rights and high employment levels via state 
intervention and regulation. The democratic Left is far less 
committed to the formal labour market which, given the perceived 
emergence of a post -employment and post -industrial socio- economic 
order, is no longer viewed as the sole origin of personal and social 
well -being. What do these alternative philosophical, sociological 
and economic theories imply then? For economic liberals, a social 
security system should certainly prevent extreme hardship but they 
take as their priority the minimization of overall costs and, 
consequently, of benefit levels. As I mentioned in the introduction 
to Part 2, their ideal system would be a highly selective safety -net, 
confined to those who could not afford private insurance. They will 
be attracted to CI to the extent that it accords with this priority 
and with this ideal . For social democrats, social security should, 
ideally, 'oil the wheels' of a high -employment labour market and 
provide the most generous benefits possible whenever that market 
'malfunctions', hopefully temporarily. They will be attracted to CI 
if it is able to supply the kind of guaranteed minimum which social 
assistance benefits have failed to provide, thus fulfilling the 
requirements of universality. For the democratic Left, social 
security is more of an instrument of both material and non -material 
equality, and of an individual value -system which is not confined to 
the employment ethic. As such, their priority is the achievement of 
the low withdrawal rates which CI, in its no- strings- attached 
unconditionality, appears to embody. 
This took us into Part 2. In chapter 6 we saw that NIT is that form 
of CI which most corresponds to economic liberal concerns, though 
lany were scared off after the experiments of the 1970s. Chapter 7 
outlined why social democrats are so committed to social insurance, 
leading them to push CI as a possible long -term proposal, though 
Perhaps with some kind of Participation Income in the interim as a 
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logical consequence of a New Beveridge approach. Chapter 8 asserted 
that the democratic Left are strongly attached to CI given that 
social dividend proposals have a long history in market socialist 
theories, though the role which a CI could play in any transitional 
strategy has been under- researched. In chapters 9 and 10 we looked at 
ecological and feminist critiques partly in their own right, to see 
why both are capable of giving support to CI, and partly as critiques 
upon which the democratic Left must draw if it is to have a political 
future. 
3. The Objective Re- visited 
To what extent, then, has this research achieved its objective? I 
began by explaining why an ideological approach was justifiable. 
Firstly, because though many of those who wish to resist tax and 
benefit integration often do so by complaining about the amount of 
time, money, consensus and effort that CI would require (Clinton et 
al, 1994), if we really are serious about fighting poverty and 
economic insecurity then there are no 'short -cuts' and we face an 
uphill task _whatever our adopted strategy. Yet CI's critics often 
ignore this point by avoiding any kind of substantial comparative 
analysis between strategies; with an ideological approach such an 
analysis is difficult to avoid, and we saw in chapter 7, for instance, 
how CI holds its own against the New Beveridge strategy, a fact which 
the latter's more numerous adherents usually fail to acknowledge. 
Secondly, and as I have argued a number of times, there is no such 
thing as an ideologically -neutral CI. To design an actual CI model 
requires us to decide on issues of generosity, conditionality and the 
like, decisions which inevitably refer us back to a host of moral and 
social presumptions. Finally, I observed that taking this approach 
would enable us to make the leap from the theoretical issues to the 
more practical social policy issues, a transition which is under - 
researched in the CI literature, but which seems crucial given the 
overall state of the debate in the mid- 1990s. 
Now, in chapter 1 I stated that our objective was to give some 
response to the following questions, questions which are essential 
to - understanding of the ideological elements of the debate. What 
motivates ideological proponents to contribute to the CI debate? 
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What form do those contributions take? Why do ideological variants 
of CI emerge as a result? Answering the first question- means engaging 
with a complex theoretical background, implying a series of 
overlapping political philosophies and, further, trying to 
understand why those philosophies give their respective critiques of 
the existing social security system. Answering the second question 
requires us to understand that principle according to which an 
ideology would have benefits distributed and allocated. Answering 
the third question, finally, requires us to apply those principles to 
CI, as an abstract field of debate, in order to see how and why the 
ideological variants of CI then emerge. In short, the questions 
which are integral to this research's objective are those which 
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take us from the abstractions of the CI debate to its more practical, 
social policy aspects. 
Let us now consider the findings of this research in more detail. 
So, at the top of fig. 1 we have our direct transfers. Means- testing 
is the least universal provision of all; contributory and 
categorical benefits are universally provided to all of those who 
qualify according to some criteria - having a child, a disability, or 
a good social insurance record; while unconditional grants are paid 
universally to everyone without reference to such conditions - 
unless you want to split hairs and insist that membership of, or 
residence in, a nation is still a way of imposing conditions on 
benefit receipt. CI is, then, the most obvious form of an 
unconditional grant - though it is not the only one, remember the 
brief discussion of birthright grants in chapter 6 - and we saw the 
difference between partial and full CIs. 
We found that most economic liberals criticize the existing 
system for eroding work incentives, for costing too much and for its 
compulsory, bureacratic elements. In Britain, since 1979, we have 
seen how reform motivated by such critiques has increased the 
prevalence of income- and means- tested benefits. Economic liberals 
are therefore attracted to tax /benefit integration since it avoids 
bureaucratic statism and permits greater labour market flexibility. 
In short, their ideal system would be a highly selective one and since 
CI appears to imply some degree of selectivity this is the reason why 
they make a contribution to the debate. For the same reason, however, 
and allowing for the equation which some like Sam Brittan make 
between CI and NIT, few economic liberal supporters will be attracted 
to the ex ante, unconditionality of CI and will only advocate it if, 
additionally, it can be shown to cut the welfare bill. Their 
contribution to the debate, therefore, will involve a combination of 
such support with such scepticism and will leave us with some form of 
CI provision which, while being tax /benefit integrated, is also paid 
ex post according to one's earnings and, probably, one's means. In 
other words, it leaves us with NIT. 
Social democrats, meanwhile, have increasingly come to recognize 
that the social insurance system has not fulfilled its promise, such 
that it has been, and will continue to be, unrealistic to base so many 
benefits upon a lifetime of paid contributions. In effect, the 
existing system is still not universal enough. They will therefore 
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find a greater co- operation between the tax and benefit systems to be 
an attractive option since it is increasingly necessary to allow 
earnings and benefits to work together in the name of a citizenship 
ethic where paid contributions are of less importance. This is why 
social democrats get involved in the CI debate. However, the out - 
and -out integration implied by an unconditional benefit quickly runs 
up against the social democratic version of the work ethic, or what I 
have re- termed the employment ethic. Their contribution to the 
debate, therefore, consists of proposals which, rather than 
integrating the two systems, prefers to co- ordinate them. So, if 
problems come from having the tax and benefit systems overlap, the 
practical solution, for social democrats, is not to fuse them but to 
pull them apart and create more in -work benefits. The Borrie 
Commission, for one, looked favourably on the co- ordination of the 
tax and benefit systems, which might then be combined with a social 
insurance system which is not so dependent upon paid contributions, 
i.e. a Participation Income, which, in turn, might be the logical 
outcome of any rigorously pursued New Beveridge strategy. 
The democratic Left find that the current system is centred far 
too much upon statist and market imperatives, such that it does not 
permit individuals and groups to 'strike out' and pursue goals and 
goods which existing society might find alien and even threatening. 
As such, they are not only the most comfortable with unconditionality 
but, in the long -term, would also favour a FCI. As such, it is 
perhaps the democratic Left which looks most favourably on CI. 
However, in chapter 8 we saw that since tax revenues: probably could 
not support a FCI, alternative sources of funding must be found. 
Could this imply a social dividend, funded not only out of taxes but 
also out of the returns to publ ical ly -owned capital, and would this 
move us towards a market socialist economy? Basically, then, the 
contribution which the democratic Left make to the debate is to 
attempt to locate CI within wider proposals for economic and social 
re- structuring. Within this context a FCI becomes a social dividend. 
Additionally, ecologists and feminists have contributed much to the 
CI debate but do not, for the most part, offer differing models of CI. 
Nevertheless, they do offer differing justifications of CI which, 
While standing in their own right, are also justifications upon which 
the democratic Left must draw. 
I think, therefore, that this research can be summarized as 
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follows. First of all, it is important to remember those principles 
which ideologies take as their priority when assessing social 
security. As established in the introduction to Part 2, economic 
liberals favour low public spending and selectivism above all, 
social democrats favour generous benefits and universalism above 
all, and the democratic Left favour low withdrawal rates and 
unconditionality above all. Now, ideological proponents are 
motivated to get involved in the CI debate as a reaction against the 
current system which, in terms of these principles, is perceived to 
be iniquitous and /or inefficacious and for which CI appears to offer 
some kind of alternative. CI, in the abstract, seems to be all things 
to all observers. Its selectivist implications attract economic 
liberals, its universalist implications attract social democrats, 
and its unconditionality attracts the democratic Left. The form 
which contributions to the debate will then take follows on from the 
critiques which have been given of the existing system. Each 
ideology will stress that principle which the existing system fails 
to embody sufficiently, and which CI could embody, and will attempt 
to screen out the others. For example, since economic liberals 
consider the existing system to be too expensive and too universalist 
they will insist that tax /benefit integration is only a viable 
alternative if, conversely, it is cost -effective and selectivist. 
Social democrats will wish to promote both universal and generous 
benefits, which means that they are currently unlikely to support 
moving all of the way towards an unconditional provision, since this 
can presently guarantee only a modest minimum income. Finally, the 
democratic Left deplore the manipulative tendencies of the post -war 
system, such that they find universal benefits to be justifiable only 
if they are no longer based upon exclusivist contributions, and if 
they enable poverty traps to be eliminated to the greatest possible 
extent. So, obviously, differing ideological models will then 
emerge out of the CI debate depending upon the principles which 
ideologies brought to that debate in the first place. Economic 
liberals will favour an ex post, selectivist CI, or NIT; social 
democrats will either put CI on the back -burner, or favour a social 
insurance version, a Participation Income; and the democratic Left 
will welcome an unconditional income which, over time, could be 
transformed into a social dividend as we search for alternative, but 
complementary, sources of revenue. 
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In short, the questions which I have attempted to address are 
closely inter -related and we see how they flow into one another as we 
move from the CI debate's theoretical aspects to its more practical 
ones. The principles which ideological proponents find are not 
embodied in the existing system are also those which motivate them to 
contribute to the debate, and which subsequently influence the 
nature of those contributions such that varying ideological models 
of CI then emerge. It is this inter -action, this ' flow' , which I have 
tried to reflect in the structure of this research in order that it 
may achieve its objective. 
Despite this conclusion, however, it is still not easy to identify 
exactly where the ideological consensus over CI ends and a dissensus 
begins, since any speculation along such lines is itself shot through 
with ideological assumptions. Is CI a means by which differing 
ideologies reach agreement over the achievement of a common goal, as 
Tony Walter (1989, 143) argues in one of the epigraphs to this thesis? 
Or does CI offer no real basis for agreement, since social policy is 
shot through with ideological disputes which are endlessly 
contestable? In short, is the CI debate one of means or ends? Let us 
look at the two 'extreme' responses to such a question. 
Firstly, there are those who believe that the CI debate is purely 
one of means so that a concentration upon ideological ends is 
entirely misplaced. As such, no substantial ethical and political 
dissensus over CI should exist and those who foster such non- 
technical disagreements are threatening the attractiveness, and 
therefore the viability, of a proposal which could go some way to 
eliminating poverty. This approximates to the position not only of 
Walter, but also of Ralf Dahrendorf (1988) who insists that CI not be 
turned into a political football and so would seem to be expressing 
unease with the kind of approach adopted in this research. Yet the 
trouble with this view is that it depends upon the assumption that an 
open society is characterized by features which are incompatible 
with the 'systems- building' of those who still yearn for a 'third - 
way' between capitalism and communism (1990, 54 -62) . For someone who 
Sympathizes with the Left, in both its social democratic and more 
radical versions, I find this not only to be undesirable and 
untenable but also naive. If anything the demise of state communism 
gives the (democratic ?) Left opportunities which it has not 
Possessed for a century. Dahrendorf 's epitaph is premature and an 
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unthinking application of his four decades old insistence that 
social conflict is sited along the battle -lines of political power 
rather than economic power (Dahrendorf, 1959). As such, I conclude 
that an exclusive insistence upon means is unjustifiable. 
As is, secondly, an exclusive concern with ends, i.e. the 
insistence that disagreements over ideological objectives is all 
that the CI debate boils down to. No real consensus over CI is 
possible and to the extent that one exists this is expainable as 
either short -term, illusory, or possibly itself an ideological 
diversion from the real issues. Alan Duncan (1995, 7 -8) , most recent 
spokesperson for the Gingrich Right, comes close to this 
interpretation: 
The choice is not between Left and Right, but between freedom 
and 'security'. And to choose security is an illusion - the 
state cannot deliver. It is merely a guarantee on long -term 
decline....I think our [Duncan and Dominic Hobson] advocacy of 
Basic Income must be seen to go hand in hand with the dramatic 
reduction in state interference which we also advocate. 
(Duncan, 1995, 8) 
I characterize this as a concern with ends and dissensus since Duncan 
nowhere allows the Left into his scheme of things. If a Leftist 
government introduced CI accompanied by rises in public spending 
would Duncan support it or not? If not, then his support for CI's 
simplicity and individualism is superficial and he is not really 
involved in the debate in the first place. If he did support it, then 
he would have to admit something he has not so far allowed: namely, 
that the Left, with their advocacy of ' security' , do have something 
valuable to say and to contribute. Either Duncan is an anti - 
consensus ideologue or he is a CI supporter, but it is not possible to 
be both. In short, Duncan's attempt - despite his reference to "our 
advocacy" - to weld CI to one particular ideology (his own) is 
simplistic and dangerous. Equally, those on the Left who would not 
allow the Right into the debate are also being reductivist. 
Personally, I often feel uncomfortable with interventions into the 
debate by the likes of Brittan (1995) and Duncan and Hobson (1995) , as 
well as the family- values rhetoric of conservatives like Parker 
(1995) and professed social democrats like Young and Halsey (1995) . 
Yet it is undeniable that their ideas are both valuable in themselves 
and capable of stimulating the kind of debate out of which some basic 
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consensus might arise. 
But if the CI debate is one which somehow consists both of 
consensus, as stressed by Dahrendorf, and of dissensus, as Duncan 
insists, then where does the one end and the other begin? I suspect 
that we there is no definite answer to this because, quite simply, the 
line between the two shifts according to the political circumstances 
of the day. At the moment, the consensus between CI supporters is 
largely born of a determination to push CI into the arena of 
mainstream intellectual and political debate. At present, the 
Conservative government have an interest in not pushing ambitious, 
untried proposals since memories of the Poll Tax are not likely to 
fade for a long time yet. Equally, the Labour Party sees itself as on 
the verge of power and so has an interest in signalling 'busines as 
usual' , allowing for a few relatively modest reforms. So, as I have 
observed, the CI consensus is largely negative, in that it is a 
reaction against the failings of the 'wages or welfare' assumptions 
of the last 50 years, and partly positive, in that supporters wish to 
have CI included more fully in the policy -making arena. If that arena 
were to be entered eventually, then what would happen? Would the 
positive consensus hold, perhaps over the desirability of a PCI, or 
would we be left with only the negative aspects such that the 
ideological disagreements examined here would begin -to come to the 
fore? I suspect that the latter scenario would prevail and, indeed, 
this thesis was conceived in the light of this possibility. In other 
words, what consensus there is may well be only short -term; in the 
long -term it is the ideological ends of CI which may come to define 
the debate. Dahrendorf and Duncan are perhaps both correct but on 
differing timescales. In the long -term, the ideological dimensions 
explored in this thesis become more and more important. 
Now, since various political and economic factors (monetary union 
and globalization, respectively) make it reasonable to infer that 
the European Union will come to occupy a greater proportion of the 
debates over social policy than has been the case in the past, then 
those long -term ideological disagreements will increasingly take 
Place on a European stage. As such, I propose to bring this thesis to 
a close by taking a look at the European dimension in order to help 
set that stage for any future research into the implications for CI of 
ideological disputes, and, conversely, the implications of CI for 
such ideological disputes. 
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4. European Social Policy and the Future of the CI Debate 
For the most part the bulk of this research has concerned itself 
with the nation -state, both in the abstract, conceptual sense and in 
the sense that Britain has been its main point of reference. Up until 
the 1980s this would not have been much of a problem and this research 
could already have come to a close. But that dimension increasingly 
spills over the borders of nation -states such that discussions of 
economics, politics or social policy which ignore it are 
increasingly anachronistic (Ditch, 1993). In short, no future 
social security reform can be implemented without consideration of 
how it will affect other countries and how the social policies of 
other countries will affect it. This applies as much to CI as to any 
other reform strategy. I therefore feel justified, having 
summarized and addressed the objectives of this research, in leaving 
a 'loose -end' which will become more and more important and which 
future research must pick up and run with. So, this section will: 
sketch the background to any discussion of social security reform; 
examine the factor of regional diversity; outline four broad 
scenarios for the future of the European social security system(s) ; 
offer an argument for CI per se; fit CI into those broad 
scenarios. 
Relatively few European social policies have been implemented. 
Though in the 1960s the harmonization of member states' social 
security systems was a principal objective of the European Community 
such an objective has fallen from favour as the number of member 
states has increased (Watson, 1993, 163) . By 1972 it was the common 
provision of minimum standards which the Commission took as its goal 
and in 1974 it recommended the extension of social rights to the whole 
of the working population and the provision of a minimum income to all 
those who were economically inactive. This, however was never taken 
up by the Council of Ministers and the crises of the 1970s ensured 
that the mutual raising of standards across the Community would be 
harder to achieve. The legislation which has been passed has been 
modest, patchy and mostly non -compulsory (Watson, 1993, 163 -9). 
The background to any discussion of social security reform 
concerns the free movement of workers (Watson, 1993, 157). The 
degree of inter -state migration is still relatively modest and 
motivated largely out of economic necessity. However, if Europe were 
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to become more of an open space for European citizens to migrate 
within then the implications for social security are profound. Now, 
the inter -state co- ordination of labour laws is sufficient when it 
comes to encouraging labour migration, e.g. to outlaw discrimination 
against foreign workers. However, when it comes to the right of an 
individual not to lose their benefit entitlements when they go to 
work in another member state then this is a more highly contentious 
aspect of social policy. The transfer of social rights across member 
states is still at a rudimentary stage since many are unwilling to be 
hosts to those who will lay claims to their medical services and 
social assistance. Entitlements to benefits in host countries are 
few with poorer people being discriminated against the most ( Jacobs & 
Zeijen, 1993, 29 -31) . So there is a contradiction here: migration is 
encouraged to oil the wheels of a single market, but the consequent 
flexibility also brings with it an insecurity and a 'welfare 
conservatism' which means that the costs of migration often outweigh 
the benefits. Resolving this contradiction would seem to be the 
single greatest challenge for European social policy, whatever your 
ideology. 
There is, however, little evidence that the challenge is being 
met. For instance, Article 3 of (EEC) No. 1408/71 details the 
opportunities for people to export their benefits from one member 
state to another and aggregate their benefits accordingly. But it 
does not cover non -contributory social assistance schemes - among 
other things - and therefore does not guarantee a minimum income, nor 
has the Commission been able to get the approval of the Council of 
Ministers to extend coverage. Obviously, if such fear of 'social 
tourism' prevails then not only will a common European space fail to 
emerge but the long -established welfare provision of individual 
member states may come under threat. Why should this be so? Firstly, 
because as employers increasingly go in search of those nations and 
regions which offer the lowest labour costs then wage -levels and 
benefit -levels in the wealthier areas will be damaged - though it 
could be argued that low labour costs are far from being the advantage 
Which many imagine them to be since they do not signify the degree of 
skills and experience which investors prefer. Secondly, because 
immigrating workers may depress wages etc. without such re- location 
flYway. Thirdly, a single market encourages take -overs, mergers and 
therefore redundancies. Fourthly, a new culture is born whereby 
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employers complain that they are over -burdened when compared with 
their European competitors, so that not only do all 'strive for the 
lowest common denominator - of benefit levels and entitlements - but 
that lowest denominator itself sinks over time. Now such 'social 
dumping' may be welcomed by some as implying an upward spiral of 
standards in the long -term. Others, though, have found this view to 
be either naive or deliberately misleading and have proposed a Social 
Charter to compensate for the destructive competition of a single 
market. The trouble is that out of the Charter's 19 substantial 
Articles member states only have to sign up to 10 and of 7 key 
Articles only 5 need be accepted. So although it appeals to the 
rhetoric of social rights the Charter does little to embody them in a 
meaningful form. 
Why this weakness of will? What stands in the way of greater co- 
operation between member states on the issue of welfare provision 
(Cutler et al, 1989, 76 -105; Nielson & Szyszczak, 1991, 38; Watson, 
1993, 163 -70)? Quite simply, it is regional diversity which 
obstructs any strong European -wide agreement on social security 
(Williams, 1991, 125 -35). For instance, Collier (1994, 147) 
demonstrates the immense differentials between the nations and 
regions at the top and those at the bottom, e.g. in 1990 the poorest 
German region was still about 20% richer than the _richest Greek 
region. Now, proposals for a European Investment Bank would ease 
those differentials by funding infrastructural improvements in the 
poorest regions, yet no -one should under- estimate the depth of 
regional diversity nor the time it would take to make even modest in- 
roads into them. This is why European -wide social security proposals 
remain at a correspondingly unambitious stage. Should the richer 
nations and regions in the North fund higher benefit levels in the 
poorer South? This is hardly likely to be popular amongst northern 
electorates. No surprise, then, that arguments over the future of 
Europe remain at the level of economic and political debates with 
social policy getting little of a look -in except as supplements to 
Wider proposals. So, those on the Right who argue for a deflationary 
strategy are suspicious of political and legal integration and 
favour a deregulatory labour market with benefit systems to match; 
those, from socially- minded conservatives to post -Keynesian social 
democrats, who are more receptive to reflationary strategies welcome 
some degree of integration and favour employment creation aided by 
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some kind of welfare co- ordination involving the transfer of social 
rights and so forth. 
Furthermore, regional diversity is as non -material and 
ideological as it is to do with income and wealth. Not only that but 
the two interact in surprising ways, as suggested by Esping - 
Anderson. By decommodification Esping -Anderson (1991, 21 -2) refers 
to the extent to which individuals can subsist independently of the 
cash -nexus and, what is more, he insists that is possible to measure 
the degrees of decommodification which advanced welfare regimes have 
achieved. Once this is done, Esping -Anderson (1991, 47 -54) 
identifies 'clusters' of welfare regimes, which correspond to his 
central typologies, with the social democratic Nordic countries - 
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium - being highly 
decommodified, the conservative /catholic countries - Italy, France, 
Germany, Finland, Switzerland - being less so and the liberal nations 
- Ireland, Britain - being the most commodified of all . Whatever the 
empirical respectability of Esping -Anderson's work he articulates a 
common intuition: those who lean towards the Right are attracted to 
the commodifying effects of the market, those towards the Left are 
hostile to them. So, given that such welfare clusters do explain a 
great deal this gives us another reason to doubt that social policy 
will be at the heart of European integration for -some time to 
come. 
If regional diversity in both its material and ideological 
aspects presents social policy with considerable obstacles what are 
the implications for social security? I would like now to outline 
four possible scenarios for the future of the European social 
security system(s) . 
The first scenario is a deregulatory one. In terms of economic 
policy this implies deflationary strategies necessitating cuts in 
public spending and, probably, high unemployment. The deregulator 
insists that substantial social rights, e.g. to a minimum wage, and 
generous benefit regimes simply impose damaging rigidities on labour 
markets at a time when European competition requires flexibility. So 
what this implies is an economic liberalism played out at an 
international level with nation -states adopting the roles which, 
Within the context of a single nation, are occupied by individuals, 
i.e as uncoerced, contractual agents within a free market 
environment. In one respect this seems contradictory. Surely 
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economic liberals should take the individual, of whatever 
nationality, as the unit of free market competitiveness with 
national borders being swept away in the name of laissez -faire 
economics. In practice, nevertheless, economic liberals do tend to 
be nationalistic with their more conservative instincts rising to 
the surface to place limits on the scope of market forces. In any 
event, deregulation just is this combination of free market 
economics and nationalism such that those nations with generous 
welfare regimes will deserve to be punished in a Europe of inter- 
state competitiveness. The deregulator, therefore, finds little 
rationale for economic, political and social integration, 
preferring instead the vision of a Europe of nation- states living 
together according to the outcomes of market equilibrium and not the 
dictats of trans- national super -institutions. So, there is no scope 
for co- operation over social security systems - other than, perhaps, 
legal co- ordination to ensure benefit transfers and the like - since 
this would contradict free market competitiveness. Meade (1991, 22- 
3) is not alone in finding this scenario untenable, as producing 
negative externalities which would require intervention at the 
European level after all. 
The second scenario is one likely to be supported by socially - 
minded conservatives or, in a continental context,- by christian 
democrats. Though oriented towards market -based provision this 
scenario is less concerned with deflation and deregulation, 
insisting that what is important about any European future is not 
only the accumulation of capital but the legitimacy of such 
accumulative strategies in the eyes of those whom they affect. In 
other words, a solidaristic ethic rather than á competitive free - 
for -all. This implies a common European home for European citizens, 
asopposed to the economic liberal consumer. A single currency, a 
central and independent European bank, a strong European parliament, 
minimum welfare standards, all of these institutions and policies 
find favour under this scenario. Social security systems would be 
subject to some form of co- ordination; not only of a legalistic form 
but the kind of co- ordination designed to ensure that benefits' 
systems are not used as pawns in a competitive game of 'our benefits 
and wages are lower than yours'. This scenario, then, aims at a 
'levelling -up' and not at the kind of downward spiral of wages, 
benefits, working conditions and occupational rights with which the 
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deregulatory scenario is accused. 
The third scenario echoes the second but attempts to build upon it 
in that it is still more integrative, co- operative and solidaristic. 
This is the social democratic scenario (Smith, 1994, 274 -5) , in that 
it is concerned not simply to secure legitimacy by smoothing away the 
rougher edges of trans- national capitalism but wishes to construct a 
distinct social space which imposes specific boundaries on market 
relations according to the principles of social justice. 
Conservatives are correct to regard the economic liberal scenario as 
undesirable, yet they still do not go far enough. A single currency 
might be welcome if it permits and even facilitates a reflationary 
economy which actively creates jobs. A central European bank could 
not be fully independent since a social space requires that economic 
institutions be democratically accountable to those whose lives they 
affect. A strong European parliament with legislative powers would 
be welcome and some degree of harmonization between welfare regimes 
to the extent permitted by regional diversity. This implies not only 
the co- ordination of social security systems but a convergence of 
benefit levels, entitlements and structures. This is a scenario to 
which the European Commission often pays lip -service, but little 
else. 
The final scenario is a very speculative one and is nowhere on the 
agenda because of its utopian flavour (Meade, 1991, 3; Venturini, 
1992, 12) . This would be highly integrative and, in essence, a United 
States of Europe. Economically, politically and socially it would be 
centralized in one sense in that national parliaments would 
surrender sovereignty to European institutions; in another sense, it 
would be highly decentralized, according to the much - abused 
principle of subsidiarity, where policy decisions are made at the 
lowest possible level. It is far from clear how decision -making 
Powers would be distributed but the objective, in the case of both 
centralization and decentralization, would be to take us into a world 
beyond the nation -state where other ways of generating welfare and 
justice are required. This Europe of integrative insitutions and 
regions would be given coherence through some kind of continent -wide 
welfare state which would provide 'cradle to grave' provision for 
all. Under this scenario, a single social security system is implied 
so that there are no national or regional diversity of benefit 
levels, and so forth. 
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Each of these scenarios offer to resolve the contradiction 
specified earlier between the need for greater labour mobility and 
the insecurity which such flexibilization entails. The first says 
that insecurity will become less of a factor as free market 
flexibility generates the goods and resources which are the 
inevitable consequence of laissez -faire capitalism. The second and 
third scenarios do not put their faith in free markets and insist that 
more integrative, interventionist policies are required (Cutler et 
al, 1989, 147 -65). In other words, labour markets are not 'left 
alone' and the social rights of European citizens are 
institutionalized. The final scenario goes along with this critique 
but finds that such conservative /social democratic approaches are 
naive in that they underestimate the capacity of international 
capital markets to scupper greater European co- operation so that 
economic insecurity necessitates a higher degree of integration if 
nations are not to be played off against each other. Now, before we 
try to spell out how a CI might fit into each of these scenarios what 
arguments for CI in a European context have been advanced (cf . Michie 
& Wilkinson, 1994, 23 -4)? 
In 1988 Nel van Dijk, who was a representative of the Dutch Green 
Progressive_ Accord Party in the European Parliament, presented a 
working document on Basic Income to the Committee for _Social Affairs 
and Employment which was debating possible social security reforms 
at the time. Though, so far as I have found, the Committee has made 
few radical proposals van Dijk (1988, 15 -19) at least had the chance 
to argue for CI at a European level (cf . Vilrokx, 1993) , even if her 
arguments do not always contain a specific European slant. She 
basically claims that CI would have eight advantages. The first 
advantage she lists is that a CI would take the individual as the 
assessment unit. However, it is not clear to me either that 
conservatives would be happy with this, since the family is seen as 
the bedrock of society, or economic liberals, since their 
individualism extends only so far as the market. Secondly, she 
argues that CI would reduce poverty traps and administrative 
surveillance. But, as already pointed out, poverty in Germany is 
considerably different from poverty in Greece. Too high a CI would 
involve the North bank- rolling the South; too low a CI would be of 
little use to anyone. Nor would differential levels of CI embody the 
solidarity which a European social dimension would need to imply. 
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Also, it is far from clear that conservatives regard administrative 
surveillance as altogether a bad thing. The third advantage is that 
people would have greater opportunities to choose between full - and 
part -time work which, so far as I can tell, would be welcomed by all 
ideologies. Fourthly, a CI could raise the power of labour against 
that of capital, which, of course, those leaning towards the Right 
would not be likely to welcome. Fifthly, people would find it easier 
to take work sabbaticals. This is allied to the previous point though 
might be attractive to the Right if it were consistent with greater 
labour mobility. Van Dijk 's sixth point is that woman would gain more 
financial independence, though it is not clear to what extent this 
would be consistent with the anti- feminist implications of 
mainstream ideologies, Right and Left. The seventh advantage she 
mentions is that CI could encourage more self -employment, since the 
penalties for failure would be less considerable than at present. So 
far as I can surmise this would surely be attractive to all those 
committed to a European single market. Finally, a CI might allow wage 
levels to fall, depending upon the level at which it is pitched. 
This, certainly in the short -term, will be attractive to economic 
liberals but far less so to the Left who would fear an erosion of 
union strength. Also, such a proposal might be resisted by Southern 
countries who feared it would damage the one advantage_they currently 
have in the European union, i.e. cheaper labour. So, having reviewed 
some of the standard arguments for CI and why, especially in a 
European context, there might be dissenters can we specify how a CI 
could fit into each of the scenarios we outlined just before? 
I suggested that the deregulator's Europe was that most likely to 
be supported by economic liberals. As such, it is difficult to 
imagine a European-wide CI emerging from this perspective. Either 
deregulators will favour competition between member states, to see 
who can offer those social security regimes which are most attractive 
to potential investors, or if NIT is to be contemplated then this too 
will be a reform implemented at the level of nation -states designed 
to serve the same competitive rationale. A European NIT would simply 
contradict the hostility which economic liberals show to anything 
more than a single market. In short, I can see no way in which CI, in 
any form, fits into this scenario. 
I then went on to sketch a Europe organized around conservative 
values of solidarity and hierarchy where social rights are 
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contemplated and social security systems might be co- ordinated in 
terms of minimum benefit levels. Whether CI has a role to play within 
this scenario depends upon the continued commitment which member 
states make to the social insurance principle. On the one hand, 
provision based upon this principle is widespread and almost 
certainly here to stay for the forseeable future; on the other, if 
member states really are serious about reform then, as chapter 7 
suggested, the logic of providing some kind of minimum income on a 
more generous and less conditional basis might come to be 
unavoidable. So although it is this scenario which most accurately 
describes the current drift of European social policy (European 
Commission, 1994; Flynn, 1993, 53) , even with such a continent -wide 
social security net the problems of inadequate coverage and take -up 
would not only re- appear but would be magnified greatly. As Atkinson 
(1992, 20) suggests, this might cause policy- makers to look beyond 
income -tested social assistance and think of ways in which a minimum 
income can be genuinely guaranteed. Would such a convergence of 
objectives open the door for a CI, perhaps in the form of a 
Participation Income? Again, it is difficult to see this happening, 
largely because this scenario still approaches social rights rather 
modestly, as measures to secure legitimacy rather than as reflecting 
basic human needs. So any convergence of social security systems 
would be marginal and though the logic of an unconditional income 
might become more persuasive (Benington & Taylor, 1993, 130 -2), the 
legitimacy- securing effects of social insurance are unlikely to be 
overcome. According to Atkinson's characterization of the Social 
Charter: 
...it is not obvious that the Elizabethan Poor Law provides the 
best model for the Europe of the next century. (1992, 20) 
Perhaps not, but it may yet prove to be the most popular model 
(Spicker, 1991; Leibfried, 1994). 
For similar reasons the kind of weak harmonization of social 
security which would characterize the social democratic scenario is 
also unlikely to come about. But even were it to do so then a CI - 
whether a Participation Income or a PCI - would still be at a 
disadvantage given the central committment which social democrats 
still demonstrate towards minimum wages and traditional job 
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creation. Meade (1991, 26) may reject such proposals as inefficient 
and bureaucratic yet, inevitably, they are likely to continue to be 
popular through sheer weight of tried - and -tested familiarity. Also, 
Meade's proposals (1991, 28 -9) to combat the corrosive effects of 
national competition on egalitarian strategies are highly modest in 
themselves, as he acknowledges, so that greater European -wide social 
equality does not look like a realistic prospect (Vobruba, 1991) . If 
this is the case, then even if social democrats do establish some kind 
of hegemony over future developments then the price to be paid could 
be a piecemeal, cautious approach which would eschew any suggestion 
that the links between a minimum income and employment could be 
loosened. So, social insurance would continue to be the motivating 
principle; and though it is possible to speculate about a very small 
CI supplementing social insurance benefits, with the continuation of 
the present system the CI that could be afforded would be at such a 
small level as to be of symbolic value only, rather than of 
redistributive value. 
The fourth, highly integrative scenario would embody a strong 
harmonization, i.e. a single social security regime with highly 
generous benefit levels and entitlements. Though there is no 
necessary reason why a CI, probably a FCI, would correspond to such a 
model it would be the most likely candidate since social insurance 
either fails to provide everyone with a safety -net, thus 
contradicting the ideals of a substantial social dimension, or it 
must jettison the emphasis upon contributions which cause that 
safety -net to unravel and so come to resemble a CI in any case. But, 
of course, such a highly integrated scenario remains a pipe -dream and 
will continue to do so for the long -term, it represents the point at 
which pragmatism becomes more of a virtue than ever. 
So, a CI seems even less of a prospect when it comes to European 
union than it does when we consider the nation -state in isolation. 
The deregulators' scenario makes it look undesirable and 
unnecessary, the conservative /social democratic scenarios remain 
wedded to social insurance, minimum wages and employment creation 
with little room for CI - or even Participation Income - while the 
integrators' scenario lacks feasibility. None of this means that the 
CI debate is irrelevant especially since, as this research has 
hopefully demonstrated, there are numerous persuasive arguments for 
it. However, as Europe becomes more important to considerations of 
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social policy and of social security reform then the obstacles in the 
way of CI's implementation not only become higher, they become more 
numerous. This may be a sombre note on which to close but, as 
suggested earlier, it is far from clear that much of a positive 
consensus has formed around CI. So if CI ever is to emerge onto the 
policy arena then it must ultimately do so in some ideological form or 
another. Were this to occur then considerable interests would line 
up against it. As such, it would be a betrayal to underestimate the 
long haul ahead and though the European context adds an extra 
dimension, an extra reason to doubt that CI has much of a future, the 
dominance of those committed either to income - and means- testing or 
social insurance does not ultimately depend upon that context. One 
way or another the CI debate is still very much in its infancy. 
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APPENDIX 
IDEOLOGY VERSUS DISCOURSE 
As noted in chapter 2, we may also make a distinction within the 
democratic Left between humanists whose critiques are ideological 
and post- structuralists whose critiques are discursive. 
Ideology is perhaps the central concept employed by Althusser. 
Building on Marx, Althusser treats ideology as a material practice 
which, epistemologically, contrasts with science. What does this 
mean?: 
What is represented in ideology is...not the system of the real 
relations which govern the existence of individuals, but the 
imaginary relation of those individuals to the real relations 
in which they live. (1971, 155) 
Ideology is a system of representations of real relations, a system 
within which we come to possess some appreciation of what those 
relations involve and an understanding of how we may act upon them. 
All social fórmations are ideological, communist ones included. But 
the medium of representation is not consciousness: rather, ideology 
is the lived experience of social formations, the means through which 
formations are either preserved or revolutionized (1969, 231 -4) . 
Althusser's theory of the subject rejects the notion of a centred, 
unitary ego. Instead, since "...an ideology always exists in an 
apparatus, and its practice... ", and since ideology is that within 
which we live, then 'individuals' are inserted into ideological 
apparatuses: "...the subject acts insofar as he is acted..." (1971, 
156 -64) . We are made and acted upon by ideological structures. This 
is what is meant by interpellation. Ideology is that which 
constitutes concrete individuals as subjects: we are ideological 
beings through and through. This process, however, never announces 
itself. Indeed, ideology interpellates by erasing the process of 
interpellation (1971, 156 -64). This is necessary to capitalist 
formations, especially, because the apparatuses within which we are 
inserted are not neutral with regard to power. They are what 
Althusser calls Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA). ISAs are 
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functional to capitalist reproduction because, 
...labour power requires not only a reproduction of its skills, 
but also...a reproduction of its submission to the rules of the 
established order. (1971, 127 -8) 
Through churches, schools, the family, the courts, political 
parties, and the media willing subjection to the ruling ideology is 
secured. And when willing subjection is not secured, repressive 
state apparatuses - police, army, prisons - are on hand to procure 
obedience (1971, 169). 
However, Althusser does not visualize us as caught inexorably in 
an ideological web from which we are unable to achieve a critical 
distance. Certainly, as purely ideological beings we are, on our 
own, incapable of escaping from ourselves as sites of subjection. 
But beyond ideology lies science. Ideological practice is only the 
pre- history of scientific practice; between the two exists a 
qualitative theoretical and historical discontinuity: an 
epistemological break. Science is that which must continually free 
itself from the ideology which attempts to 'occupy' it (1969, 167- 
72). Science proceeds from the abstract material of ideological 
practice, makes this material concrete and so transforms it into 
knowledge. Through the Marxist science of society - both historical 
and dialectical materialism - a working -class ideology emerges and 
extricates itself from bourgeois ideology and, by understanding and 
applying the material laws of history, revolutionizes the capitalist 
social formation (1990, 37 -42) . 
To sum up: ideology is a material practice which interpellates us 
as subjects and through which the world is represented to us, so 
without recourse to Marxist science we remain oblivious to the real 
conditions of our existence. 
Now, this theory of ideology is representational because there 
exist real relations which are represented imaginatively. The 
curious paradox is that though this theory is representational it is 
not realist. Althusser is not referring to a world 'out- there' : the 
Objects of theoretical understanding are internal to the theory 
itself. This means that as well as being an anti -humanist he is 
Profoundly ahistorical in his approach. What is to be understood, in 
understanding the material laws of history, is not history per se, 
e.g. the development of class consciousness, but the laws themselves 
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which are as susceptible to scientific, a priori reasoning as are the 
theorems of geometry and mathematics - Gödel notwithstanding. What 
Marxist science 'reveals' is not a class subject but the very 
concepts of historical materialism. It is as if the verification of 
that science's conclusions is given by the methodology of the science 
itself. 
If you think about it, Althusser is being entirely consistent: he 
must be ahistorical because he is an anti- humanist. Because we are 
made as subjects, as the supports of ideological structures, there is 
no need to deal with the irreducibility of consciousness as it 
evolves through history. If we define a structure as the totality of 
a system of internal relations, then Althusser's structuralism is a 
methodology which reveals the totality, to itself, from inside. 
There is no exterior which is not already an interior. 
This allows us to formulate some idea of what 'ideology' might 
imply. Prior to Althusser, ideology implied a wholesale 
essentialism and realism since it was thought that there exists an 
independent material world out -there, beyond what can be said and 
thought about it, which is somehow represented to us in the ideas we 
have of it and to which those ideas refer back. What Althusser does 
is to detach representationalism from realism. Ideology is then 
conceived as the imaginary representation of the real, but what is 
real is not an extra- discursive referent - i.e. material conditions 
in the world - but, rather, scientific theory talking to itself. So 
we could say that ideology implies a referent, a realm of objects in 
a world out -there. By abandoning the referent Althusser, even more 
than Lacan whom he admired, encompasses both structuralism and post- 
structural ism, essential ism and non-essential ism, ideology - 
critique and discourse -analysis. 
Which leads neatly into a discussion of discourse. Many have 
reacted against Althusser's approaches) as methodologically 
incoherent. Either we must go in one direction or another, either 
replace the referent or embrace discourse completely. As an example 
of the latter let us look at Paul Hirst and Barry Hindess. Hirst and 
Hindess attempt to make Althusserian Marxism consistent by 
eliminating, more firmly than their mentor does, any reference to an 
out -there. A concept, they say, is defined by its situation and 
function within a "...determinate field of concepts, a 
Problematic... ", i.e. within knowledge, which is not reducible to, 
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or given from, 'real' conditions (Hindess & Hirst, 1975, 1) . A fact 
is not that which preceeds knowledge, but that which is the product of 
theoretical and ideological practices. To imagine otherwise, to 
imagine that empiricism tells us the truth, is itself an ideological 
construct: 
Concrete conditions are not 'given' to theory in order to 
validate or to refute its general concepts. On the contrary, it 
is the general concepts that make possible the analysis of the 
concrete. (Hindess & Hirst, 1975, 1 -5) 
The current situation within which we find ourselves should not be 
conceived of as an object in the real, because an object does not 
exist independently of the political practice through which it is 
constituted. Objects only exist for Marxist practice in so far as 
they are given definitive form by Marxist practice. Far from this 
being a surrender to pragmatism, it is entirely consistent with 
Marxist praxis, i.e. the convergence of theory with practice 
(Hindess & Hirst, 1975, 322 -3). 
What this leads to is an overwhelming emphasis on discourse. 
Discourse, according to Hirst and Hindess, is not equivalent to 
theory because it is not limited by, nor representative of, the order 
of the real -. Since there is no such thing as a reality -in- itself, 
discourse is interminable and post -epistemological. This must be so 
because epistemology is the attempt to privilege a particular 
discourse, which can only be done by appealing to the criteria 
specific to the very discourse which is held to be privileged. Such 
circularity is ultimately dogmatic: the only way the circularity can 
be stabilized is through a blunt postulation of extra- discursive 
objects and agents without the demonstrable proof upon which the 
epistemological approach itself depends (Hindess & Hirst, 1977, 8- 
19). This is something which even Althusser does and which they 
themselves had done in Pre -Capitalist Modes of Production (1975). 
For even to refer to a mode of production is a contradiction since it 
is to treat the economic as a moment of a combination - with the 
Political, the cultural etc. - and the determining moment, in the 
last instance, of that combination. So discourse -analysis does not 
discover nor disclose truth and falsity; rather, it demands that 
conceptualization, as a practice, observe logical consistency. 
This is what Marxist political analysis must consist in, they 
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insist. 
Now, if discourse -analysis is adopted one of two things occur. 
Firstly, you may come to regard such analysis as untenable and 
therefore abandon Marxism altogether - since Althusserianism is held 
to be the culmination of Marxist theorizing. Secondly, you may 
regard such analysis as perfectly tenable but be therefore forced to 
consider Marxism as merely one discourse within a plurality of 
others: post -Marxism. The former interpretation was the one 
subsequently taken by both Hirst and Hindess - who have since 
identified with social democracy. The second was taken by Laclau - 
see below. 
So discourse can be taken to imply the total abandonment of both 
representation and realism - because the distinction between the 
known and the knower, the object and the subject, is held to be 
incoherent - and therefore of the referent. Ideology- critique, 
meanwhile, implies the relevance of all three. Discourse- analysis 
defines itself as a post -essentialism. There can be neither a 
knower -in- itself (episteme) nor a known -in- itself. Such post - 
essentialism must not only dismiss the possibility of a referent, but 
also the autonomy of the signified. This is to follow the crucial 
post -structuralist move. For if, following Saussure, the relation 
between sign and referent is arbitrary, and if the signified is that 
which means what the referent is, then arbitrariness must extend to 
the relation between signified and signifier. Discourse is, then, 
pure signification. The signified, or meaning, is an act of the 
signifier. When we name, we are creating meaning, rather than 
reflecting an objective meaning already inscribed in the world out - 
there. Politics, therefore, should no longer be considered as the 
identification of objective interests given by material, socio- 
economic conditions; instead, politics is the formation of 
identities which are established only in the process by which they 
are named: my interests are not pre -given, they are discursive 
articulations. So whereas ideology implies a realism - 
representation of a referent - discourse is pure signification, the 
flattening out of the distinct dimensions which both ideology and 
epistemology imply. 
Curiously, though, and despite its apparently radical departure, 
disourse- analysis is a mirror -image of the ideology- critique which 
it is reacting against (Eagleton, 1991, 203 -13). Ideology at its 
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worst, i.e. Marxist economism, implied a reduction of the sign to the 
referent and therefore of the signifier to the signified. It treated 
politics, culture, law et al as superstructures which could all be 
read off from economic class relations. But discourse -analysis, at 
its worst, seems to reproduce such reductionism by collapsing 
everything back into the act of signification. In rejecting, 
correctly, the idea of a direct and simple correspondence between 
concepts and reality, discourse -analysists imagine that any theory 
which implies some such correspondence must be a reification of the 
discursive act. Whereas ideology often implies a causal relation 
flowing from signified to signifier, discourse often retains this 
causal emphasis by reversing the direction of flow from signifier to 
signified. From reducing politics to economics, we have now passed 
to reducing economics to politics, i.e. interests do not exist until 
they are articulated. But what makes one form of articulation better 
than another? How can we argue that the unemployed socialist is more 
aware of his interests than the unemployed conservative? Discourse - 
analysis offers no way of doing so. The discourse which says 
'unemployment is caused by market rigidities produced by high wages 
etc.' is just as explanatory and meaningful as that which says 
'unemployment is caused by the functional requirements of capital'. 
The fact that the capitalistic discourse legitimates and so 
preserves inequalities of power, while the socialistic discourse 
resists them, is of no consideration. Obviously, the strict 
discourse -analysist would regard this ' fact' as itself a discursive 
construction; it was precisely this logic, this unwillingness to 
distinguish between power as production and power as repression - a 
power which may be resisted - against which Foucault began to 
struggle in the last few years of his life. Of course, in opposing 
discourse -analysis in this way we should not ourselves re- duplicate 
the very reductionism with which we are charging both pre - and post - 
Althusserians. To propose distinct dimensions - knower /known, 
concept /real, subject /object - is not to imagine that there exist 
necessary, one -to -one relations between them. But it is to argue 
that eliminating such dimensions only establishes - discursively, no 
doubt - a vulgar anti- Marxism. 
Now, these objections to discourse -analysis are not universally 
applicable. Michel Pêcheux (1982), for example, allows for 
discursive formations which are rooted within ideological 
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formations containing both discursive and non -discursive practices. 
They are, however, applicable to Hirst and Hindess. The work of 
theirs to which I have referred came after a period of unrelenting 
Maoism and before a (longer) period of unrelenting reformism. 
Perhaps, as so often, the most fervent believers in Marxism are those 
destined to become its most fervent, born -again, critics. 
How, then, may we establish a theory of ideology which is much more 
subtle than the one which Althusser reacted against, without 
slipping into the crudities and passivities of discourse -analysis? 
Althusser, himself, offers a model worth adapting to our purposes. 
He was entirely correct to reject any suggestion of a strong, direct 
correspondence between reality and concept, referent and sign. The 
trouble is, he goes too far in abandoning the possibility of 
referring to a world out -there. So what if we return to the familiar, 
realist notion of ideology, except that now we are more sceptical 
about the possibility of representing and knowing the world (cf. 
Woodiwiss, 1990)? We refer to a real world out -there, though we can 
never be certain how accurate our representations of it are. This 
expresses a sceptical realism without falling into the cynicism of 
much discourse -analysis. The trouble with the classical theory of 
ideology was that it treated ideas and propositions as pictures of 
the external world. Like the early Wittgenstein it saw nothing 
problematic in this. But if, like the later Wittgenstein, we should 
now be far more sceptical and modest then perhaps the way in which the 
world is represented to us is more dependent upon the concepts we use 
to describe it than we were once willing to admit. This would not be 
to ditch realism - since I am still assuming a real world out -there 
about which we have some knowledge - but it would be to avoid the 
charge, often thrown against realism, of assuming that the world as 
it is in- itself is immediately accessible to our thought processes. 
So, instead of believing with Althusser that we have uninhibited 
access to concepts which represent the process of scientific 
reasoning, we are left with heuristic, contested concepts which we 
articulate to ourselves through discourse, but which refer 
ideologically to a world out- there, ideology being this attempt to 
represent a real world, an attempt about which we should nevertheless 
be sceptical. On the reading of post- Althusserians freedom, for 
instance, is a signifier whose meaning alters according to which 
discursive formation it happens to be located within at any one time. 
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on my reading, the meaning of freedom is discursive - since the 
concept is used, and used differently, by both Left and Right - but 
arguments over meaning matter in the first place precisely because 
they refer us back to an extra- discursive realm. This realm is not 
only one within which objects exist and interact - this the 
discourse -analysist is happy to acknowledge - it is one within which 
events themselves shape what we can say about them. Several 
interpretations may be articulated but, inevitably, some will be 
more accurate, because more representative, than others. 
For instance, the war in Vietnam was a war of American imperialism 
far more than it was a war against communist imperialism. A homeless 
person signifies a lack of equitable distribution of resources and 
not a lack of responsibility and self -reliance - even though certain 
individuals may be culpable. And conversely, just to prove I am not 
rationalizing a Left perspective, Stalin's Soviet Russia was 
totalitarian and not a socialist paradise in the making. The welfare 
state has institutionalized much poverty in a way that many social 
democrats have only reluctantly, and belatedly, come to 
recognize. 
Now, because we are referring to a world we can never be sure is 
being represented accurately, this extra- discursive realm can only 
be appropriated through a leap from the concept to the real, a leap 
which is an act of faith, a leap into the dark - since we may be wrong, 
ours might be the interpretation which is wrong this time around no 
matter how faithfully we believe in it. But if the leap is not made, 
if we imagine with Althusser that concepts are all, then intellectual 
activity becomes little more than a description of what already is, 
and not a debate over what ought to be, i.e. discourse -analysis comes 
onto the scene and promptly eschews normative debate. Politics, on 
my reading, is not something which is either reducible to economics 
or which reduces economics to itself. On the contrary, politics is 
the assumption of indeterminacy (Abercrombie et al, 1983). It is 
that which maintains the irreducibility of the sign, of the signifier 
and signified, and so permits the sign to reach outwards towards the 
real. It is this 'reaching out' which I refer to as ideological: an 
ideology is politics in action. And ideologies, such as the ones I 
am employing in this research, are the differing forms which, at this 
Point in history, articulate this process of 'reaching out'. An 
ideology is that which is continually making a leap of faith, a story 
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which we tell ourselves about the world in order to understand it, and 
alter it, a little more. 
In summary, there are five elements to this more modest, realist 
theory of ideology: 
1) We should not collapse oppositions as discourse -analysis and 
post -structuralism wishes us to. We should preserve the non - 
identities of subject /object, sign /referent, knower /known; 
2) However, we should not make the old mistake of imagining that there 
are unproblematic, one -to -one, causal relations between these 
terms. The linguistic turn of the twentieth century is to be 
welcomed; 
3) So we approach ideology- critique in an attitude of scepticism and 
reflexivity without expecting that the world out -there is ever 
represented to us transparently; 
4) However, such scepticism should not collapse into cynicism and we 
should never cease to effect reconciliations between the above 
terms. This is how we illuminate the world and mediate between it and 
ourselves to effect change consistent with our differing notions of 
justice. The necessity of reconciliation between ourselves and the 
world, and the inevitability of only partial success, is what I call a 
leap of faith. 
5) An ideology is this leap of faith. A political procedure through 
which we come to have partial understandings of the world. But, 
obviously, there are multiple and conflicting ' leaps' and therefore 
multiple and conflicting ideologies, which all refer to the same 
world and represent it in some way - sometimes accurately, sometimes 
not - though we can never be sure which is the most representative at 
any one time. And not only, therefore, do we seek to understand the 
world through this leap of faith but the ideology to which we attach 
ourselves is also such a leap, only partly forced on us by socio- 
economic circumstances. 
In sum: ideologies are the stories which we must tell ourselves 
about the world. That there is a world independent of, and shaping, 
our representations of it is certain. But which representations are 
accurate at any one time and which means of representing the world are 
the most successful is entirely problematic. On the one hand, I am 
agreeing with John B. Thompson (1990, 5 -11) when he characterizes 
ideology as "meaning in the service of power." The world of referents 
consists of specific power relations and discourse -analysis is in 
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danger of missing the importance of centralized economic power. 
However, on the other, Thompson underestimates the contestability of 
meaning given the complexities and conflicts to which values and 
norms are subject. So ideology refers us to a real world of power 
relations but reminds us that there are numerous ways (narratives and 
stories) by which we can represent these relations to ourselves. 
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